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
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THE FIRST YEAR OF THE OCCUPATION

Special Text 4I-10-63



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The Provost Marshal General's School
Military Government Department

JUNE 1953

THE FIRST YEAR
OF THE OCCUPATION

OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, 1945 - 46

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF HISTORIAN
EUROPEAN COMMAND
FRANKFURT - AM - MAIN, GERMANY
1947

HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN COMMAND
Office of the Commander in Chief

APO 757
August 1947

SUBJECT: Occupation Forces in Europe Series

TO : All concerned

1. The War Department has directed that the history of the military occupation of Germany and Austria in World War II be recorded and interpreted as the events transpire. The agency which is responsible for preparing this history is the Office of the Chief Historian, European Command.

2. The Occupation Forces in Europe Series, publication of which was begun in 1947, consists of a series of studies, monographs, and narratives of the history of the occupation. From time to time, the Occupation Forces in Europe Series will include a summary volume giving a narrative history of the occupation. All the studies or volumes published in the Series for the year 1945-46 or a subsequent year make up the official history of the occupation for that year.

3. Each publication in the Occupation Forces in Europe Series is based upon a thorough study of the correspondence, directives, and other documents relating to the subject. It serves also as a digest and summary of the pertinent passages of the reports of operations which are made periodically to the Office of the Chief Historian by all staff divisions and major units of the European Command. Each publication in the Series, before being issued, is reviewed by the staff divisions or subordinate command whose responsibilities indicate a primary interest in the subject matter.

4. All persons to whose attention these publications come are invited to forward to the Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, APO 757, their comments and criticisms, in order to make available all facts from which a definitive history may be prepared in the War Department.

LUCIUS D. CLAY
General, USA
Commander-in-Chief

HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN COMMAND
Office of the Commander-in-Chief

APO 403
10 March 1950

SUBJECT: Occupation Forces in Europe Series

TO : All Concerned

1. The Department of the Army under current regulations requires the preparation of annual historical narratives of the activities of the U. S. Army of Occupation in Germany. The preparation of the narrative history of this headquarters is the responsibility of the Chief, Historical Division, European Command. Histories of the U. S. Air Forces, Europe, and the U. S. Naval Forces, Europe, are prepared by those organizations.

2. The Occupation Forces in Europe Series, published by the Historical Division, EUCOM, consisting of consecutive narratives, special studies, and monographs constitutes an official history. Each publication in the Series is based upon study of appropriate documentary sources and interviews with responsible officials. Before publication each manuscript is reviewed for accuracy and completeness by the appropriate staff divisions or subordinate command having a primary interest in the subject.

3. The publications in this Series endeavor to furnish a factual and complete account of leading problems and their solutions, major operations, and lessons learned in the course of the occupation. They are, therefore, immediately valuable in orienting key personnel arriving for duty in the Command. They also serve as source material for current instruction in Command and Staff schools of the Army, and eventually will be used in the preparation of a definitive history by the Department of the Army.

4. In order that the Series may be of maximum value to the Command and to the National Defense Establishment, persons to whose attention these publications come are invited to forward comments and criticisms to the Historical Division, European Command, APO 403, U. S. Army.

THOMAS T. HANDY
General, USA
Commander-in-Chief

THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL'S SCHOOL

SPECIAL TEXT NO. 41-10-63

THE FIRST YEAR OF THE OCCUPATION

P R E F A C E

Material in this Military Government Special Text is part of the Occupation Forces in Europe Series, compiled by the Historical Division, European Command. It furnishes a factual and complete account of leading military government problems faced during this particular campaign and the solutions arrived at, oftentimes under the necessity of the moment, as well as an account of the major operations and lessons learned during the first year of an occupation.

While having been reviewed for accuracy and completeness by theater staffs and commands most familiar with the events described, the material presented herein does not pretend to be a final evaluation of lessons learned nor a handbook of current doctrine. It does, however, present historical precedent upon which current doctrine may be tested. In this connection the Military Government Department, The Provost Marshal General's School, desires to express its appreciation to the Chief, Military History, Special Staff, United States Army, for making this document available for publication.

It provides a wealth of source material which will assist the instructor in presenting vivid and realistic instruction. It will also assist in orienting the professionally qualified specialist concerning the field and planning problems arising in the area of his specialty.

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UNITED STATES ARMY

1946 - 1947

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Chapter I
THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY

THE UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

1. Preliminary Negotiations toward the Surrender.

The final step toward the signing of the surrender was taken when Gen. Admiral Hans von Friedeburg, Commander in Chief of the German Navy, met Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower, at Supreme Headquarters in Reims on 5 May 1945. During the meeting Admiral Friedeburg pleaded with General Smith to permit the German armies to surrender to the Allied armies in the west, saying that he feared many German soldiers would be killed if they surrendered to the Soviet forces. General Smith showed no sympathy for this suggestion. He stressed the hopelessness of the German position and said that the Allies were not prepared to talk about anything but unconditional surrender. Von Friedeburg received a copy of the terms of the surrender, but he was not authorized to sign.

2. The Act of Signing.

The provisional German Government (1) authorized Col. Gen. Gustav Jodl, Chief of Staff, to sign the instrument of surrender. He arrived at Reims in a United States C-47 airplane on 6 May and was taken directly to Supreme Headquarters. An Allied delegation including General Smith, Gen. Carl Spaatz, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Air Force, Maj. Gen. Francis Sevez of the French Army, Gen. Ivan Souloparov of the Soviet High Command, and a number of others met the German general in the War Room in the Industrial College of Reims. The instrument was signed at 0241, 7 May. After placing his signature on the paper, General Jodl was granted permission to speak. Addressing the group in German, he said:

With this signature the German people and armed forces are, for better or worse, delivered into the hands of the victors. In this war, which has lasted more than five years, they have both achieved and suffered more than perhaps any other people in the world. In this hour, I can only express the hope that the victor will treat them with generosity.

None of the Allied officers replied to General Jodl's remarks. The surrender was confirmed at Berlin at 0045 hours on 9 May with Admiral von Friedeburg, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, and Col. Gen. Paul Stumpf of the Luftwaffe signing for the German High Command. Air Marshal A. W. Tedder signed for the Supreme Commander and General Zhukov for the Soviet forces, with Gen. Jean Lattre de Tassigny of France and General Spaatz of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces as witnesses.

3. Text of the Act of Surrender.

The document which General Jodl signed read as follows:

1. To the undersigned, acting by authority of the German High Command, hereby surrender unconditionally to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and simultaneously to the Soviet High Command all forces on land, sea, and in the air who are at this date under German control.
2. The German High Command will at once issue orders to all German military, naval, and air authorities and to all forces under German control to cease active operations at 2301 hours Central European Time on 8 May and to remain in the positions occupied at that time. No ship, vessel, or aircraft is to be scuttled, or any damage done to their hull, machinery, or equipment.
3. The German High Command will at once issue to the appropriate commanders, and ensure the carrying out of any further orders issued by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and by the Soviet High Command.
4. This act of military surrender is without prejudice to, and will be superseded by any general instrument of surrender imposed by, or on behalf of the United Nations and applicable to Germany and to the German armed forces as a whole.

5.. In the event of the German High Command or any of the forces under their control, failing to act in accordance with this act of surrender, the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and the Soviet High Command, will take such punitive or other action as they deem appropriate.

4. General Eisenhower's Actions.

After the signing, the Germans were brought into the presence of General Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, who asked them if they understood the terms and if they were prepared to carry them out. They replied in the affirmative. General Eisenhower then went into the War Room and delivered a victory address, in which he credited the triumph to teamwork among the United States, Great Britain, and "elements of almost every oppressed country in Europe." Later, he telephoned to Gen. Omar N. Bradley, commanding the 12th U.S. Army Group, who, on hearing that the enemy had surrendered, instructed his field commanders to standfast and avoid exposing their troops to danger.

5. Announcement of the Surrender.

The German radio station at Flensburg announced on 7 May 1945 the surrender by authority of Grand Admiral Karl Donitz, acting as Hitler's successor. (2) There had as yet been no official statement from the Allied powers, since 1500 hours on 8 May had been set as the time for the announcement. Associated Press correspondent Edward Kennedy sent a news dispatch telling of the surrender before the time for the release, and newspapers carried the story before it was officially announced by President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill. It was originally planned to make simultaneous announcements from Washington, London, and Moscow, but Premier Stalin did not make any announcement until 9 May.

THE COMPLETION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

6. The Collapse of Organized Resistance to United States Troops.

As the Germans announced their unconditional surrender, the Allied armies were storming the last Nazi strongholds in Central Europe. In France, one reinforced division, the 66th Infantry Division, was containing the enemy garrison at St. Nazaire and Lorient on a front of about 112 miles. Some small

areas in northern Yugoslavia, western Latvia, France, the Channel Islands, and along the Elbe River were still in German hands. Only in Czechoslovakia did fighting on any considerable scale by United States troops continue. The little fight left in the Germans was mostly directed at the other Allies. The piecemeal capitulation of the Wehrmacht that took place during the days preceding final surrender seemed part of a deliberate plan of the German High Command and the Donitz Government to surrender as many of their forces as possible to the Western Allies before acknowledging the simultaneous victory of the Red Army.(3)

7. Continued Resistance to the Soviet Forces.

On 8 May, the only announcement from Moscow was a communique summarizing another day of fighting between Soviet and German forces. Stalin's order of that day reported that the "troops of the Fourth Ukrainian Command, continuing their offensive after stiff fighting, today occupied the large town and railway junction of Olomouc, an important bastion in the German defense on the Moravia River line." A communique from the German High Command confirmed the continuance of fighting in Moravia and in the north.(4) Breslau fell to Marshal Koniev's forces after an 84-day siege.(5) Dresden, the last large city remaining in Nazi hands, surrendered on 8 May.(6) In Austria, the Third Ukrainian Army occupied the towns of Waidhofen, Lebing, and St. Michael two days later. A week after the official end of hostilities, fanatical Germans were still resisting in Berlin. SS troops in civilian disguise were setting fires and flooding subway tunnels. The principal building destroyed was the city hall.(7)

8. Capitulation to British Forces.

a. It was more than seven hours after hostilities had officially ended before the Channel Islands surrendered and the only part of the United Kingdom which had been in Nazi hands was liberated. There was no active resistance, but the Germans, who had held the islands since 20 June 1940, remained there until the bitter end. The destroyer Bulldog waited three days within firing distance while negotiations went on. Surrender terms were signed at 0700 hours on 9 May, on the quarter-deck of the Bulldog. Great crowds of excited islanders overwhelmed the landing troops who assured their liberation. The inhabitants were hungry, but so were the Germans, who had been cut off from supplies for many weeks.(8)

b. Also on the morning of 9 May, Dunkerque surrendered to the First Canadian Army, (9) four days after the surrender of

all other enemy forces in the area.(10)

c. The next day, London announced the surrender of two widely separated German forces in the Courland district of Latvia and on the Greek Isles of Crete and Milos. On 11 May, a naval communique reported the surrender of all German garrisons, totalling 20,000 men, in the Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean Sea.(11)

d. In Norway as late as 20 May, armed Germans were still requisitioning fresh vegetables and other food, as well as liquor, clothing, and various types of equipment, from the populace.(12) A raid on 10 June at Lillehammer, German Headquarters in Norway, by 600 British soldiers resulted in seizure of important records and the apprehension of 50 officers, 100 enlisted men, and 127 Wehrmacht women. Defeated Germans had been living in fantastic style in a resort hotel there on stocks they had accumulated in Norway. (13)

e. Copenhagen had been formally handed over to the Allies on 10 May and turned over to the Danes by the British on the same day, but a month after V-E Day the Nazis were not out of Denmark. Col. Gen. S. Lindenau, the highest-ranking uncaptured Wehrmacht commander, was directing the final evacuation and maintaining German authority in the area. No Allied personnel was allowed to enter without permission.(14)

9. The Last German Pocket Contained by United States Troops.

For some time there remained a patch of about one thousand square miles of "free" German territory between the United States and Soviet forces, where German soldiers, under their commanders, roamed at will. This area lay south of Zwickau and east of Rodewisch, near Plauen, and extended to the western limits of the Soviet position near Annaberg and south roughly to the Czech border. Both the United States and Soviet forces whose fronts touched this territory had orders not to "invade" it. Road blocks were established to keep refugees within the area and to prevent the German forces from attempting a counter-invasion. Aside from some 5,000 refugees camping gypsy-style along the roads, there were about 16,000 German troops garrisoning in small towns. All the troops were unarmed, their weapons having been turned over to the 87th Division, but they still had their own officers and regular military organizations and were considered as uncaptured troops. The delay was caused by indecision over the boundary between the United States and Soviet Zones. Instructions to the armies, dated 19 May, established the boundary in this area as a line between Karlsbad and

Chennitz, thus placing about two-thirds of the disputed district under the control of the Ninth U.S. Army and one-third under Soviet control pending final changes to ultimate occupation zones. It was several days before positions could be taken up, and meantime the remnant of German troops was in a state of desporation and terrorizing the towns and countryside while foraging for food.(15)

10. Disposition of United States Forces Immediately after V-E Day.

a. The United States forces reported little enemy opposition. The principal American concern was the detention of German troops and civilians who were fleeing from the advancing Soviet forces in such numbers that roads were blocked. Liaison plans maintained a constant land and sea search to prevent individual or organized escape. (16) The majority of incidents were considered to be sabotage or the activities of a nascent underground movement.(17)

b. The 12th Army Group was deployed on a 550-mile front across Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Germany. For the Ninth U.S. Army, offensive operations ended by 1 May, after which date it maintained a watch on the Elbe River, the decision having been reached that this army should halt along the line of the Mulde and the Elbe River rather than meet the Soviet forces in a headlong advance.(18)

c. Organized resistance against the Fifteenth U.S. Army in the area bordering the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France ended on 18 April.(19) The Lorient garrison did not capitulate until midnight of 7 May. Enemy forces in St. Nazaire held out longer, supposedly for the purpose of destroying installations, but surrendered unconditionally as of midnight 8 May.(20) The French Navy occupied the port on 11 May, and reported no apparent demolition.(21) The XXII Corps was alerted by Fifteenth Army Headquarters on 9 June for movement to Czechoslovakia. A week later all its units had taken up their new positions in that country.(22)

11. The End of Resistance in Austria.

a. To assist the 15th Army Group in Italy and Austria, the 12th Army Group was ordered on 22 May to prepare to move two corps through the Alps into Carinthia to relieve the British. The following day these corps began the movement south, but after reconnaissance and a request from the British this movement was delayed until the congested area could be cleared. Meanwhile, the situation improved and the forces held on alert for movement to Carinthia were reduced to one corps on 14 June and were entirely relieved twelve days later.(23)

12. The Naval Finish: Kiel and the Submarine Surrender.

a. Under the terms of surrender all German warships, auxiliaries, merchant ships, and other craft at sea were ordered to report their positions to the nearest Allied wireless telegraph station. These ships were then to proceed to Allied ports and to remain there pending further orders. Submarines at sea were ordered to surface, to fly a black flag or pennant, and to proceed to such ports as directed. (24) The white ensign or United States colors were hoisted on all ships and craft found in German ports. (25)

b. All forward operating U-boat bases had been located for some time on the Norwegian west coast, notably at Trondhein and Bergen. These bases were well equipped with workshop facilities and stocks of spare parts and torpedoes to permit operation of craft for some time without fresh supplies. It was known that the crews' morale was high. At Kiel, the largest U-boat base in German home waters, about one hundred U-boats were present on 2 May, but by 4 May almost half of them had departed for unknown destinations. (26)

c. By 1800 hours on 9 May, only six U-boats had reported their positions and another five had entered ports. The first U-boat to surrender gave up to a U.S. Navy plane off England and was escorted to Portland harbor by British naval craft. By 10 May, fourteen had answered the surrender order and two had actually reached British ports. The following day, ninety midget submarines complete with crews and equipment were located at Lynaes, Denmark, and at Scheouwen and Overflakkee on the Netherland coast. (27) Seven U-boats were found intact in the harbor at Helgoland. (28) The island of Helgoland was formally taken over on 11 May by a force of Royal Marines, and the garrison and civilians were evacuated. The town of Helgoland had been completely destroyed. (29)

d. The U-boat fleet was slowly being rounded up by Allied vessels and impounded in ports all over the world. On 14 May, a submarine surrendered off Cape May, New Jersey, and the next day another surrendered at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. (30) On 16 May, nineteen surfaced U-boats were sighted off the coast of Norway and were ordered to the west coast of Scotland to surrender. It was estimated that at least fourteen others were at sea and unreported. (31) British Admiral Max Horton, commander of the western approaches at Londonderry, North Ireland, said on 17 May that it was possible some German submarines might not yet have received surrender instructions. By that time more than one hundred submarines had been found at bases, but of the fifty to seventy

enemy underwater raiders on missions at the time of surrender only thirty-four had been accounted for on both sides of the Atlantic.(32) Early in June a large German submarine appeared off the Portuguese coast and sent up a distress signal. Its crew members were informed after they had scuttled the craft.(33) One other arrived at Scapa on the morning of 4 June,(34) but German submarines still prowled the Baltic Sea like pirates, refusing to surrender. Soviet planes searched the sea for the raiders and several battles between aircraft and submarines took place.(35)

13. The Close of the Campaign in Czechoslovakia.

a. The resistance met in Czechoslovakia by United States and Soviet forces was considerably more extensive than elsewhere. It was the only region where air and ground operations continued without a halt after announcement of the surrender on 8 May. The German forces continually opposed or fled from the Soviet forces, while the United States forces were alerted again and again for actions that never materialized.

b. One Soviet force entered the suburbs of Prague from the southeast, another crossed the frontier from Saxony about sixty miles north of the Czech capital, and still another drove south from Moravská-Ostra.(36) On the night of 9 May, Marshal Stalin issued an order of the day proclaiming the liberation of Prague, although the city had been under air attack from German planes that afternoon.(37) Confusion was created by the German-held Prague radio, which forecast continued resistance because, as it said, the German Government had not actually capitulated to the Soviet Union as to the other Allies.(38)

c. The Third U.S. Army was directed to continue its advance to an agreed line of contact with the Soviet forces in both Czechoslovakia and Austria. (39) On 5 May the 4th Armored Division, after attacking in Czechoslovakia to the northeast, was ordered to halt its advance, and after that it marked time until the unconditional surrender. When the 16th Armored Division took Pilsen in Czechoslovakia on 6 May, the eastern line was secured and only routine consolidation of positions was then necessary.(40) Commanding generals of units of the Third U.S. Army were furnished an operational directive on 10 May which provided that units in Czechoslovakian areas would:(41)

Establish defended road blocks at once on all main roads leading into corps areas from the southeast, east, and northeast.

Place signs well in front of these defended road blocks reading; "In compliance with the terms of surrender, German military personnel are forbidden to pass beyond this line."

Stop troop and hospital trains from coming inside our lines by performing such minor demolitions as are necessary.

d. Germans who refused to surrender were subjected to constantly increasing pressure from the Soviet forces. Final collapse of German resistance in Czechoslovakia and the surrender of 420,052 hold-out troops was announced on 14 May by the Soviet High Command.(42) Occasional gunfire continued in Prague streets for some days as Soviet and Czech forces routed German soldiers from cellars and attics. In spite of this danger, President Edouard Benes of Czechoslovakia made a dramatic return to the city on 15 May after six years of exile.

e. The 12th Army Group on 14 May directed that the advance to the south would continue until contact was made with the Soviet forces or with the 15th Army Group.(43) In addition, Third Army was given full authority to put down any resistance. Consequently, the movement proceeded as planned, although mobility was hampered by poor roads and icy conditions.(44) As late as 18 May, instructions from the 12th Army Group to the Third Army emphasized that its positions in Czechoslovakia held at the end of hostilities should be maintained with the use of all necessary force to restrain all movement of German military or civilian elements in the west. As Czechoslovakia was not considered enemy territory, military government was not invoked in the technical sense. Emergency civil affairs detachments were formed and equipped by the Third Army from service and combat troops. These detachments were deployed to exercise control of civil administration pending United States withdrawal.(45) Instructions were issued by Supreme Headquarters on 6 July for gradual reduction of forces in Czechoslovakia in proportion to the reduction of Soviet troops in the country.(46)

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE GERMAN HIGH COMMAND AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

14. Assumption of Command by the Donitz "Government" and Negotiations for Surrender.

The collapse of the German forces was paralleled by the disintegration of the German High Command and Government. Intelligence reports indicated that a jockeying for position had taken place among the various top-ranking German leaders following the reported death of Hitler in late April or early May 1945.(47) In a broadcast to the German nation on 1 May 1945, Admiral Donitz stated that Hitler was dead and that he had been nominated by Hitler to succeed him as Germany's Chancellor and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht.(48) During the early days of May, emissaries of the German High Command and of the Donitz "Government" were already conferring with Allied authorities at Supreme Headquarters (Forward), then located in Reims, France. The German officers who had negotiated the surrender of their northwestern armies on 5 May 1945 remained within the Allied lines to negotiate a complete German surrender.(49) On 6 May Supreme Headquarters directed the Moscow Military Mission to inform the Soviet High Command that the proposed unconditional surrender terms had been presented to Admiral von Friedeburg, the emissary of Admiral Donitz, on the afternoon of 5 May 1945. Admiral von Friedeburg transmitted a message to Admiral Donitz requesting authorization to sign an act of unconditional and simultaneous surrender or that Donitz send the Commander in Chief of the Army, the Commander in Chief of the Navy, and the Commander in Chief of the Air Force to Supreme Headquarters for the signing of the surrender.(50)

15. Establishment at Supreme Headquarters of a Liaison Detachment from the German High Command.

Shortly after the surrender, a liaison detachment from the German High Command was set up at Supreme Headquarters (Forward). Detailed instructions for the composition of this detachment were issued by Supreme Headquarters. It was to consist of fourteen officers and a number of enlisted men and to include a general officer in charge, two officers each from General Staff, "A" Branch, "Q" Branch, and Air Staff, one medical officer, two signals officers, and two naval officers.(51) On 9 May addition of the following German officials was ordered: the Secretary of State for the Reichspostministerium, the ranking radio officer of the Luftwaffe, and, from the German High Command, the ranking signal officer with one senior staff expert on military wireless and cable matters, and the ranking code and cipher officer.(52) Orders were issued by Supreme Headquarters on 13 May 1945 announcing the installation of the German High Command Liaison Party at a point six

miles outside of Reims, France. (53)

16. Establishment at Flensburg of the Allied Control Party.

In the meantime, Supreme Headquarters had arranged to set up its control party at German High Command Headquarters, the seat of the Donitz Government, located at Flensburg, Germany, near the Danish frontier. A control party of twenty-five United States and British officers and fifty-two enlisted men under the command of Maj. Gen. Lowell W. Rock, U.S. Army, was authorized on 11 May 1945. (54) The Soviet authorities were informed and invited to send a similar party. The Soviet General Staff informed Supreme Headquarters that they would send to Flensburg a control group consisting of fifteen officers and additional supporting personnel, to be under the command of General Trusov. (55) The setting up of a control party over German elements in southern Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia was also contemplated. (56)

17. Posthostilities Negotiations between the German High Command and the Allies.

a. Various negotiations and other contacts continued to be made between the Allied Commands on the one hand, and the German High Command Liaison Party at Reims, France, or the German High Command at Flensburg, Germany, on the other. For instance, General Jodl, at Reims, protested that the Soviet forces were continuing bombing operations against the Germans in the East Prussian Army Sector. (57) On the other hand, the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Army, in a message to General Eisenhower, noted that the Central and Southern Groups of the German forces did not cease resistance at 2301 hours on 8 May 1945 and did not remain in their places and lay down their arms as required by the Act of Capitulation. At 1600 hours on 9 May 1945 these forces were not capitulating, but were resisting the Soviet Army and moving westwards. General Eisenhower directed the German High Command at Flensburg to issue orders to the Central and Southern Groups effecting full and immediate compliance. (58)

b. Some confusion arose as to the procedure for correspondence between Supreme Headquarters and the German High Command. This matter was clarified in a letter issued by Supreme Headquarters on 13 May 1945, which stated that Supreme Headquarters would deal with the German High Command only through the Supreme Headquarters Control Party at the German High Command Headquarters. The German High Command Liaison Detachment at Supreme Headquarters existed purely as an advisory body to the Supreme Headquarters staff divisions and was not used as a means of communication

between the German High Command and Supreme Headquarters.(59) Apparently this letter was not complied with immediately and further directions had to be issued to the German High Command through the Supreme Headquarters Control Party at the German High Command Headquarters. These new directions noted that Supreme Headquarters had received many messages from the German High Command Liaison Detachment at Supreme Headquarters and that it was not at all clear whether the Supreme Headquarters Control Party at Flensburg had seen these messages. It was pointed out that it was essential that the Supreme Headquarters Control Party at Flensburg should censor all messages issued by the German High Command, including those to the Liaison Detachment. It referred back to the Supreme Headquarters Control Party at Flensburg, for their primary action, a letter to the German High Command Liaison Detachment from the German High Command Headquarters at Flensburg which proposed the setting up of a radio network by the High Command so that its orders could be heard, not only by German military authorities, but also by German troops.(60)

c. On 14 May 1945, after charges were made from abroad that ill-advised messages had been broadcast over the Flensburg radio, the Supreme Headquarters Control Party at Flensburg was directed to establish control over the Flensburg radio station and to censor any messages coming from it.(61) German radio stations continued to make propaganda broadcasts, however, and on 20 May it was again pointed out that German authorities could use broadcasting facilities only when the Allied military authorities wished and after they had censored the proposed broadcasts.(62)

d. Supreme Headquarters decided to use German Reichspost facilities to the fullest possible extent to supplement their own military signal communications network. An attempt was made to secure the return of Reichspost telecommunications personnel to their proper places of employment. The assistance of the German High Command in this matter was authorized on 23 May 1945.(63)

18. Strengthening of Allied Controls in Southern Germany.

Information from reconnaissance elements indicated that there were southern elements of the German High Command in the vicinity of Berchtesgaden and that there was a wide dispersal and possibly deliberate concealment of documents. On 24 May it was decided to reinforce local control groups in southern Germany with additional United States and British officers. Radio links between the control groups at Flensburg and those in the south were to be arranged.(64)

19. The Arrest of Admiral Donitz and His Followers.

a. In the meantime, the question of arresting Admiral Donitz and the members of the German High Command and Government came more and more to the fore. Admiral Donitz himself and most members of his government were slated for arrest by Supreme Headquarters following a conference between Ambassador Murphy and the British political advisor at Supreme Headquarters. (65) Supreme Headquarters, however, requested that the Soviet Union be contacted before action be taken. In the meantime, steps were taken to reduce and eliminate the "excessive functions" of the Donitz Government. (66) On 18 May 1945 Supreme Headquarters was informed through General Trusov, the senior Soviet representative at Flensburg, that the Soviet Government had "nothing against the arrest of all members of the so-called government of Admiral Donitz." (67)

b. The German High Command Liaison Detachment at Reims was ordered closed down effective 23 May 1945. The members of this detachment were to be disposed of by the provost marshal of Disc Base Section and by G-2 and A-2 Divisions of Supreme Headquarters. (68)

c. The German High Command itself was closed down on 24 May 1945. At 1000 hours on that date, Admiral Donitz and his staff were summoned on board the former German luxury liner Patria, the Headquarters of General Rooks and his Supreme Headquarters Control Party. Upon their arrival they were met by General Rooks and representative officers of the British and Soviet forces and placed under arrest. At the same time, British troops marched into Admiral Donitz school-house compound at Flensburg and took all its occupants prisoners. Thus ended the German High Command and Government at Flensburg. (69)

20. Disbandment of the German High Command, South.

On 17 June 1945 it was decided to disband the German High Command in southern Germany in much the same manner as had been done with the Flensburg Government in the North. The Allied Control Party was to move to the Ministerial Collecting Center area near Kassel. (70) The disbandment of the German High Command South completed the liquidation of all surviving military elements of the German Government.

21. Establishing Control over German Ministeries.

Now that the "government" and all elements of the German High Command were eliminated, the task of gathering together and controlling the scattered elements of the German ministeries remained. The Plan GOLDGUP, drawn up by Supreme Headquarters during hostilities to establish contact with the Soviet forces after the defeat of Germany and to secure control over all German ministeries located in the area subject to General Eisenhower's command, was implemented to some extent in the middle of May 1945. This plan had provided for the setting up of several ministerial control parties to search for the various German ministeries and a Ministerial Control Group in charge of all these parties.(71) Ministerial control parties had already been directed to proceed to Flensburg on 15 May 1945. (72) Effort was to be made to locate all German ministeries in the United States and British areas with the ultimate aim of concentrating all elements of the national government in one center.(73) The Ministerial Control Group, along with the Soviet Mission at Flensburg, assumed a local control over elements of the German High Command in the north. Questioning of members of the former High Command revealed that most of the High Command's documents had been sent south. The setting up of ministerial control parties in the south and of coordinating agencies between them was recommended on 26 May 1945.(74) Control of the German High Command North officially passed from the Allied Control Party to the Ministerial Control Group on 28 May 1945. Brigadier Watkins, in command of the Ministerial Control Group, was also responsible for coordinating activities between the Allied Control Party of the German High Command North and the Allied Control Party of the German High Command South. (75)

22. Establishment of the Ministerial Collecting Center.

The Ministerial Control Group appointed a committee to locate a suitable area where the personnel and archives of the various German ministeries could be assembled. This grouping of German agencies was to be known as the Ministerial Collecting Center. It was finally decided to use the areas of Eschenstruth, Furstenhagen, and Lichtenau, about fifteen miles southeast of Kassel, in the northern part of Land "Hessen".(76) Supreme Headquarters agreed on 5 June 1945 to reserve this area for the Ministerial Collecting Center.(77) The objects of the Ministerial Collecting Center included safeguarding of German archives and records for the Allied Control Council and providing a collecting center for such members of German ministerial staffs as might be required for interrogation or as archivists. After all the required information had been secured, the Allied Control Council would determine the fate of the various ministeries.(78)

23. Movement of the Ministerial Collecting Center from the Kassel Area to Berlin.

a. The establishment of the Ministerial Collecting Center near Kassel was a joint United States-British undertaking and was intended as a temporary measure pending the establishment of a quadripartite ministerial collecting center. Officers in charge of the Ministerial Collecting Center recommended that a committee be chosen to make a survey to find a permanent location in Berlin for the records of the ministries, following the disbandment of the Ministerial Collecting Center near Kassel. It was not considered desirable to attempt establishment of a quadripartite collecting center either in Kassel or in the Soviet Zone. (79)

b. At the Potsdam Conference it was decided that the five chief ministries would be moved to Berlin by 1 November 1945 and that the Ministerial Collecting Center near Kassel would be completely closed out by 1 February 1946. A conference was held on 15 October 1945 to determine the present and future requirements of the Ministerial Collecting Center. (80) It soon appeared that difficulties stood in the way of a quadripartite agreement concerning the Ministerial Collecting Center and that an early removal to Berlin would be extremely difficult. Many American military officials felt, however, that the five ministries mentioned in the Potsdam Agreement should be removed to Berlin, even though they were established in the United States Sector of Berlin under exclusive United States control. They could remain in this sector pending quadripartite agreement. Such ministerial records as were not to be removed to Berlin were to be placed in a central depository. (81) Orders for the removal of the Ministerial Collecting Center from the Kassel Area to Berlin were issued by the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.) on 5 January 1946. (82) This move in which all documents required by the occupation forces or by any future German governments were transferred, was completed by 1 February 1946, when the Ministerial Collecting Center was reconstituted at Berlin-Tempelhof under the command of the 6889th Berlin Documents Center. (83) Only fifty German civil servants were moved from Kassel to Berlin.

THE SEIZURE OF CONTROL

24. Establishment of Control Over Civil Population.

The last stage in the initial assumption of control in Germany came with the putting into force of certain enactments

and proclamations directed toward the civil population, which were later ratified by the quadripartite authority.(84) All entertainment was forbidden. People were allowed to keep their radios, but music was not allowed. Instead, the Allies used this outlet for broadcasting world news, instructions, and public proclamations. Over-all registration of a temporary nature was put into effect. The use of postal and telephone communications was not permitted. A curfew was strictly enforced and travel by any means except on foot or bicycle was prohibited. Motor travel was permitted to doctors, nurses, and clergymen visiting outlying districts. Repair of the badly damaged German railway system was begun immediately, but only for military use. The work previously carried out by slave labor now fell to the Germans themselves.

25. The Setting-up of Military Law.

The laws of warfare protected the property rights of the vanquished Germans and placed other limitations upon the powers of the conqueror. The laws proclaimed by the occupying powers in Germany dissolved the Nazi Party, suspended German laws containing Nazi principles, closed German courts, dissolved the special Nazi courts, prohibited various kinds of private and public communication, made Allied military currency legal tender, blocked German foreign exchange transactions, froze German property abroad, and established control over all German-Government and Nazi property at home and abroad.(85)

a. The law dissolving the Nazi Party listed fifty-two offices, organizations, and institutions, and eight paramilitary organizations which were prohibited. All funds, property, equipment, accounts and records were to be preserved intact and delivered to Military Government. Officers or persons in charge were to be responsible for carrying out those provisions, and any punishment, including death, could be inflicted for failure to comply.

b. The Nazi laws abrogated included the law for the protection of national symbols, the law against the creation of political parties, the law securing the unity of party and state, and another concerning insidious attacks against the state and the party and for the protection of party uniforms. Others were the "Reich" flag law, the Hitlerjugend law, the law for protection of German blood and honor, the "Reich" citizenship law, and decrees of the fuhrer concerning the legal status of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei. Later, other laws were suspended. Limitations were placed on punishment. Only those punishments expressly provided by law, and no cruel or excessive punishments, could be inflicted. Detention without a specific charge and punishment without a lawful trial were prohibited.

c. The Volksgerichtshof, the Sondergericht, and all courts and tribunals of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei and of its associated organizations were abolished. Ordinary and administrative courts were suspended temporarily, pending their denazification. All cases involving any of the United Nations or any of their nationals, cases involving military law or personnel, and claims for money against the German Government were removed from the jurisdiction of German courts. In addition, military government courts could assume jurisdiction of any case, or review any case. All death sentences were to be reviewed.

d. All telephone, teletype, telegraph, and radio services and all internal, external, and transit mail services were suspended. All items in transit were detained by postal authorities. The only post-office functions allowed to remain in operation were savings-bank and other financial services. All employees of the communications systems were to continue to report to their places of duty and were to be responsible for the preservation, maintenance, and repair of facilities. All privately owned communications equipment had to be declared. The law provided for a system of censorship for all correspondence, personal papers, and documents carried either by the post or by civilian travelers and for all communications by telephone, teletype, telegraph, or radio, when such services should be restored. Violations could be punished by death.

e. The printing, production, publication, distribution, sale, and commercial lending of all newspapers, magazines, periodicals, books, pamphlets, posters, printed music, and other printed material, of sound recordings and motion picture films were prohibited, and all theatrical and radio activities. The Ministry of Propaganda and the laws of review were abolished, and the funds, property, equipment, accounts, and records of the ministry were taken over. Violations of this law also might be punished by death.

f. Another law provided that Allied military mark notes of denominations equivalent to other mark currency were to be used for all transactions, and any punishment short of death was authorized for violations. All money transactions between Germans and people outside of Germany were prohibited without specific permission from Military Government. All persons owning or controlling foreign assets, or owing any obligations whatever were required to report it. All foreign currency, checks, drafts, bills of exchange or other instruments of payment were to be delivered to the nearest branch of the Reichsbank.(86)

26. The Apprehension of Nazi Personalities.

The Western Allies entered Germany with well-laid plans for the seizure of control. Much thought had gone into the selection of targets--the strategic points which, if seized, would put the Allies in full control of the situation. Some of the targets were persons; the leading personalities of the Nazi Party, the German Government, and the armed forces. The surrender, suicide, or capture of the top members of the Nazi hierarchy was so rapid that three weeks after V-E Day only a few top Nazis were at large. Hitler's death seemed sure, but was not actually established. His decision to die in Berlin rather than flee to Berchtesgaden to have put an end to the contingency of top Nazis holding out in the mountains and building a "no-surrender" legend for use in reviving nazism among whatever die-hards might survive defeat. Joseph Gobbel, Heinrich Himmler, and Gen. Admiral Hans von Friedeburg committed suicide by swallowing poison. Hermann Göring, Grand Admiral Karl Donitz, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Julius Streicher, Col. Gen. Gustav Jodl, and former labor minister Robert Ley were in custody. Rudolph Hess was still a prisoner in Great Britain. A number of high-ranking officers were captured with their troops.(87)

27. Other Targets of Control.

Other targets destined for seizure were agencies or institutions. These included the Nazi Party and all its auxiliary organizations, the civil administration, and the agencies and means of communication and information.

a. Organized government had for the most part broken down; as a matter of fact, not much government was needed, for the people were too stunned by the sudden collapse to offer much resistance. Military Government detachments in each Kreis, together with weekly meetings and inspections, made it possible to head off any unauthorized activity that threatened. The time was used by Military Government in defining its own organization and in making preliminary studies and evaluations. The necessary changes in German government were obvious. Nazi influence had to be removed, as well as the military character and the central controls. Many appointments to local German offices, made during combat, had to be changed.(88)

b. Other targets were economic or industrial. These included war plants, key industries, and concentrations of economic power and wealth. The disposition of German industry so as to make restitution for the damage suffered by the victims of German aggression and to deprive Germany of the power to make war was one of the most difficult problems. Partial restoration of industry was of course necessary in order to effect any kind of rehabilitation and to prevent starvation. Within a few days

after the surrender, the Ford plant at Cologne was turning out trucks for the use of Military Government in transporting displaced persons. Two boiler plants reopened and a few sawmills were producing lumber for essential bridges and houses; a threadmill was supplying raw materials for clothing; and shops were reopening wherever possible. While no final policy of industry control had as yet been established, the immediate policy was to reopen factories whose products were of help to the Army in its task of maintaining order and in supplying such imperative civilian needs as food, medicine, disinfectants, soap, fertilizer, power, and so forth. Other legitimate industries were permitted but not encouraged. Any luxury enterprise was subject to labor requisition if additional personnel was needed for essential work. The climax to the seizure of control over German industry came on 5 July 1945, when United States officers took over the management of all plants and branches of the I.G. Farbenindustrie, the largest chemical firm in the world and Germany's major producer of war materials. (89)

28. Assumption of Four-Power Authority in Germany.

The ultimate step in the seizure of control came with the Berlin Declaration of 5 June 1945, announcing the assumption of joint control in Germany, by the governments of the United States, Great Britain, the Provisional Government of France, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (90) On 14 July General Eisenhower proclaimed that U.S. Forces, European Theater, had been established under his control and that all military laws and orders issued under his authority as Supreme Commander remained in effect.

Chapter II

THE UNITED STATES FORCES ON V-E DAY

THE STRUCTURE OF COMMAND

29. Machinery for Coordination.

A global conflict necessitating the highest degree of collaboration between the Allied forces led to the establishment of an organization that was capable of both integrated and separated command. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff exercised control over the Army and Navy; the British War Office exercised control over the British military forces; while the Combined Chiefs of Staff was made up of representatives of the two nations and issued instructions in the name of both governments to operational commands. The Allied Expeditionary Force was composed of the U.S. Army, the British Army, and elements of the armies of the liberated countries. Two measures were taken to effect coordination between Supreme Headquarters and these countries: an Allied Contact Section was established in Supreme Headquarters, to which representatives of the Allied governments were assigned; and missions were maintained in the various countries.

30. Machinery of United States Organization.

Even within the United States command, organization was on a complex triple basis, comprised of Supreme Headquarters, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, and the Communications Zone--all working in a closely interrelated pattern of responsibilities.

31. Supreme Headquarters.

a. The Supreme Commander. General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower was Supreme Commander of all United States and British forces in northwestern Europe, as well as of all other national elements forming part of the Allied Expeditionary Force, and in this capacity he received instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He was assisted by a chief of staff, by a general and special staff, and by a number of political advisers who were specialists on the European countries with which Supreme Headquarters was dealing.

b. Distribution of Personnel. Supreme Headquarters included both United States and British officers, distributed, so far as possible, in equal numbers in the staff division and sections. The general practice was for the chief of a division to have a deputy of the other nationality.

c. General and Special Staffs. Of the two sections of the general staff, one dealt with general operations and the other with air operations. The naval and air staffs operated under their respective commanders. The special staff included the Adjutant General, the Engineer, Signals, Medical, Psychological Warfare, Public Relations, Air Defense, and Headquarters Commandant.

d. Major Commands under the Supreme Headquarters. The major commands under the Supreme Headquarters were the 6th, 12th, and 21st Army Groups, the Naval task forces, and the tactical air forces. Field forces, with few exceptions, were assigned to the army groups, which were tactical echelons. On 20 July 1945, the 6th Army Group was disbanded, and its forces transferred to the 12th Army Group.

32. Functions of the United States Elements of Supreme Headquarters.

As well as performing the functions allotted to them under the Allied scheme of organization, the United States elements on the Supreme Headquarters staff were responsible for certain functions in connection with United States troops matters, generally when these involved two or more major commands or were matters of policy. (1) Matters relating to personnel and relations with civil populations were assigned to the United States element of the G-1 Division. United States military censorship and administration of military intelligence units were the responsibility of the United States element of the G-2 Division. The G-3 United States element dealt with inspections of United States troops directed by the Theater Commander, training policies, operation reports, signal communications,

experiments with new items, Theater troop basis, organization of units, and issue of equipment. Administration and planning of major subordinate commands, allocation of service troops, supply, transportation, construction, captured enemy material, employment of indigenous labor, and civil affairs supplies were allotted to the United States element of the G-4 Division.

33. Channels of Command.

In 1944 the division of authority was, briefly, on the following lines: All Theater duties, except those of decision and policy affecting more than one principal United States command, were the responsibility of the Commanding General of the Communications Zone; in United States matters on which the Theater Commander had to take personal action, the appropriate senior officer of the United States element of Supreme Headquarters acted in an advisory capacity to the Theater Commander.(2) In April 1945 the chiefs of the general staff divisions of Supreme Headquarters were designated acting chiefs of the equivalent divisions of the European Theater of Operations.(3) The relation between these two staffs was indicated by Lt. Gen. W.B. Smith, Chief of Staff, as follows:

It seems to me that the guiding principle of operation is that General Eisenhower, as American Theater Commander, is using the staff of the Line of Communications (Communications Zone) to perform the usual functions of a Theater staff. Consequently, every precaution must be taken to insure that this staff is kept well in the general picture. Short-cuts which might confuse or militate against the effective use of the Line of Communications staff in its American administrative functions must be carefully avoided, and full coordination must be assured. Until routine methods of operation are established, this will require the careful attention of all concerned, particularly in routing telegrams and papers for action.

THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF ITS HEADQUARTERS

34. Location and Relation to Other Headquarters.

On V-E Day the European Theater of Operations, which was the second component of United States command, had its headquarters in Paris. The Commanding General, General Eisenhower, and the Chief of Staff were in Reims with Supreme Headquarters, and the chiefs of the general and special staff divisions functioned jointly with the Headquarters of the Communications Zone. Acting chiefs of the general staff divisions had been designated at Supreme Headquarters, (4) but most of the work was performed by the Paris staff.

35. Operational Problems.

The Theater Commander delegated all possible responsibilities to major commands, but reserved the determination of policies, objectives, and priorities, and the issuance of orders affecting more than one command.(5) Major commanders were authorized direct communication with British agencies, the War Department, or with each other on technical and routine matters; all other communications were routed through Theater Headquarters.

36. Duality of Theater Headquarters.

Two organizations could, and did, act as Theater Headquarters: one, the general staff of Supreme Headquarters, and the other, the general staff of the Communications Zone. In an attempt in 1944 to clarify the division of authority between these two bodies, a staff study was submitted by the G-4 Division of Supreme Headquarters containing a proposal to place the Commanding General of the Communications Zone under the operational control of Supreme Headquarters, (6) which would have allotted a greater measure of supervisory responsibility to that Headquarters. No action was taken, however, along these lines until April 1945, when members of the general staff of Supreme Headquarters were designated acting chiefs of the corresponding divisions on the staff of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations.

37. Elements of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, and Their Functions.

a. Functions of the Deputy Theater Commander. On 15 May 1945 the duties of the Deputy Theater Commander were transferred to staff sections, and no further deputy was designated until 15 March 1947.(7)

b. General and Special Staffs. The functions of the general staff of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, were performed jointly by the general staffs of Supreme Headquarters and of Communications Zone. The special staff was made up of the chiefs of the administrative and supply services and was, for the most part, identical with the special staff of the Communications Zone. Exceptions were the Inspector General, the Chief of the Artillery Section, and the Chief of the Military Labor Service, who did not have corresponding duties with the Communications Zone, and the London Munitions Assignment Board, which was considered as a special staff section of Theater Headquarters rather than a Communications Zone agency.

c. Major Commands under the European Theater of Operations. Major commands under Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, were also under Supreme Headquarters, but the control of the first-mentioned headquarters, prior to the dissolution of combined command was administrative rather than tactical. As well as the commands already cited, (8) the following were under the administrative control of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations: Communications Zone, Ground Forces Reinforcement Command, and the First Airborne Army, while the Office of Strategic Services, the Air Transport Command, and the Army Airways Communication System were attached.

THE COMMUNICATIONS ZONE AND ITS ORGANIZATION

38. Functions of the Communications Zone.

The Communications Zone, the third component of United States command, was the organization that dealt with operations and the administration of supply units. It was authorized to deal directly on routine supply matters with the New York Port of Embarkation and the Headquarters of the Army Service Forces, War Department. After the establishment of Theater Headquarters in Frankfurt, Germany, Communications Zone was the major headquarters functioning in the liberated countries. In addition to those functions the Commanding General, Gen. John C. H. Lee, was the Theater Executive for the maintenance of Theater records and for carrying out the administrative functions that were common to the whole Theater. (9) The Theater chiefs of administration and supply were technical advisors to the Theater Commander and served on the staff of the Commanding General of the Communications Zone. Later, with the modifications of Theater organization, more duties

were assumed by Headquarters, European Theater of Operations. Functions originally assigned to the Commanding General of the Communications Zone included: recommendations to the Theater Commander concerning Communications Zone boundaries, and Theater matters of supply, equipment, hospitalization, salvage, captured enemy equipment, transportation, funds, property, accountability, and preparations for the posthostilities period. He was also responsible for the indoctrination of personnel arriving in the Theater, for directives concerning the services, strength reports, casualty reports, prisoners of war, reclassification of officers, censorship, military intelligence, graves registration, quarters, and records and reports.(10)

39. General and Special Staffs.

The general staff of the Communications Zone was composed of the usual five divisions and the Office of the Purchasing Agent, who served also on the special staff of Theater Headquarters. The staff officers of the Communications Zone general staff had functions in connection with Theater Headquarters as well. The special staff comprised the Judge Advocate, Adjutant General, Chief of Chemical Warfare, Chief Quartermaster, Chief Surgeon, Chief Signal Officer, Chief of Transportation, Chief Engineer, Chief of Ordnance, Provost Marshal, Antiaircraft Officer, Chief of Claims, Chief of the Army Exchange Service, Chief of Information and Education, Historian, and Chief Chaplain.

40. Major Commands, Communications Zone.

The major commands under the Communications Zone were Advance Section, Disc Base Section, Seine Base Section, United Kingdom Base, Continental Advanced Section, Delta Base Section, Channel Base Section, and Normandy Base Section, the last two of which were fused on 1 July 1945 and redesignated Chanor Base Section (11)

THE DEPLOYMENT OF FIELD FORCES ON V-E DAY

41. Order of Battle.

The V-E Day battle line, extending from southeast Germany through Austria and Czechoslovakia, north up across Germany to the extreme northwestern tip of that country, contained a total of sixty-one United States combat divisions: forty-two infantry, four airborne, and fifteen armored.

a. The Southern Section of the Line. On the right, or south, of the line was the 6th Army Group, sometimes referred to as the "Southern Group of Armies," commanded by Gen. Jacob L. Devers, with headquarters at Heidelberg. This group comprised the First French Army and the Seventh U.S. Army, which was made up of the following major units: (12) the 12th Armored Division and the 45th, 63d, and 100th Infantry Divisions; the VI Corps, including the 10th Armored and the 44th and 103d Infantry Divisions; the XV Corps, including the 20th Armored and the 3d, 42d, and 36th Infantry Divisions; the XXI Corps, including the 101st Airborne Division and the 36th Infantry Division.

42. The Northern Section of the Line.

The opposite end of the line was held by the XVIII Corps (Airborne), composed of the 5th and 7th Armored Divisions, the 82d Airborne Division, and the 8th Infantry Division. This corps operated with the British Second Army under their 21st Army Group.

43. The Central Section of the Line.

Between these two groups all forces were under Gen. Omar N. Bradley, commanding the 12th Army Group with headquarters at Wiesbaden. The 12th Army Group contained the First, Third, Ninth, and Fifteenth U.S. Armies. The Fifteenth Army area comprised the Rhine provinces; the other armies in this group were disposed tactically over the rest of Germany.

a. The First Army had the following major units under its command: the 78th Infantry Division; the VII Corps, including the 3d Armored and the 9th, 69th, and 104th Infantry Divisions; the VIII Corps, including the 6th Armored and the 76th, 87th, and 89th Infantry Divisions.

b. The Third Army was composed of the following: the 4th and 70th Infantry Divisions; the III Corps, including the 14th Armored and the 99th Infantry Divisions; the V Corps, including the 9th and 16th Armored Divisions and the 1st, 2d, and 97th Infantry Divisions; the XII Corps, including the 4th

and 11th Armored and the 5th, 26th, and 90th Infantry Divisions; the XX Corps, including the 13th Armored and the 65th, 71st, and 80th Infantry Divisions.

c. The Ninth Army comprised the following: the XIII Corps, including the 35th, 84th, and 102d Infantry Divisions; the XVI Corps, including the 29th, 75th, 79th, and 95th Infantry Divisions; the XIX Corps, including the 2d and 8th Armored and the 30th and 83d Infantry Divisions.

d. The Fifteenth Army was made up of the following: the 66th and 106th Infantry Divisions; the XXII Corps, including the 17th Airborne Division and the 94th Infantry Division; the XXIII Corps, composed of the 28th Infantry Division.

44. The Reserve.

The First Allied Airborne Army, containing the 13th Airborne Division, formed the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Reserve.

CONFORMATION TO THE NATIONAL ZONES OF OCCUPATION

45. Situation on V-E Day.

The question of the zonal division of occupied territory had been a matter of discussion among the Big Three since the early planning conferences. Since the second Quebec conference the United States authorities had known that they would have the southwestern zones of Germany and that the zones assigned to the occupying powers would correspond generally to zones of operation during combat. The end of hostilities, however, found the armies of the various powers dispersed over areas not within their respective contemplated zones. The United States battle line on V-E Day extended from southeast Germany and Austria, north through Czechoslovakia, and across Germany to its extreme northwestern tip. One of the first problems, therefore, was the early withdrawal of troops from the occupation zones of the other powers and their realignment in their own zone.

46. Decision on the French Zone.

In the spring of 1945 the major powers agreed that Franco should join in the occupation, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic on 1 May 1945 signed the

Agreement on the Control Machinery for Germany, which had been prepared by the European Advisory Commission. On 13 May Ambassador John M. Winant informed the French of the area proposed for their occupation.(13) The French reaction was favorable. Subsequent agreement between the United States and French Governments established the area as the Kreise of Oberwesterwald, Unterwesterwald, Unterlahn, and St. Goarshausen; the Bezirke of Freiburg and Konstanz; the Kreise of Buhl, Baden-Baden; and Rastatt; and the area of Land Wurttemberg comprising Leonberg, Boblingen, Nurtingen, Goppingen, Ulm, and the north-east portion of Munsingen.(14) The European Advisory Commission expert subcommittee approved the agreement on 5 July, (15) and the necessary amendments were drawn up and later published to the Protocol of 12 September 1944, which had delineated the zones of occupation in Germany.(16)

47. Operations to Conform with Delineation of French Zone.

At the end of June the War Department instructed Supreme Headquarters to withdraw from the area of the French Zones in Germany and Austria, and to make arrangements for the temporary accommodation of a token French force in British or United States Sectors of Berlin. The absence of a final decision on the sectors in Vienna precluded any action there.(17) Operations began on 5 July with the handing over by the Fifteenth Army of the relevant Rhine area.(18) On 10 July Trier, Koblenz, the Landkreise of Unterwesterwald, Unterlahn, and St. Goarshausen, the Saarland, and the section of Land Hessen west of the Rhine River were transferred to French control, (19) and at the same time Tirol-Vorarlberg was placed under French jurisdiction in Austria.(20) Reciprocally, the VI Corps of the Seventh Army had relieved the French on 8 July of the sector of the Lander Wurttemberg and Baden that was designated for the United States Zone.(21)

48. Operations to Conform with Delineation of British Zone.

The first operation connected with the transfer of territory to form the British Zone took the form of an evacuation by the Ninth U.S. Army on 7 June.(22) Three days later General Eisenhower informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the outline plan for complete transfer, which arranged for the transfer to the Second British Army, over a period of three weeks, of territory held by United States forces in Hanover and Westphalia, and the assumption of command by the 21st Army Group of its sector of the Rhine Province by 27 June.(23) The completion of operations, however, took longer than had been planned. Magdeburg was

cleared on 4 July, and the next day the British took over control of their Rhine area from the Fifteenth U.S. Army. (24) Complete control of their Zone in Germany passed to the British by 9 July, (25) while the first adjustment between British and United States troops in Austria took place on the same day, when the 101st Airborne Division handed over their small area of Steiermark. (26) Final British-American adjustment in Austria came with the handing over to the British on 28 July of the sector in Steiermark occupied by the 11th Armored Division. (27)

49. Operations to Conform with the Delineation of the Soviet Zone.

In the drive during April 1945, the Third and Ninth U.S. Armies had moved eastward through central Germany to the Elbe River and had penetrated the contemplated Soviet Zone. (28) According to the plan drawn up for the necessary transfer, the 12th Army Group should hand over, beginning 1 July, the part of the Soviet Zone occupied by United States troops. (29) Following a meeting between Marshal Zhukov and Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay in Berlin, detailed plans were concluded for the occupation by the Soviet forces of the Wismar "cushion" in one day and of the Magdeburg bulge in two. (30) The operations were completed in Germany by 4 July, (31) but final adjustments of the areas in Austria were not accomplished until 19 September. (32)

50. Other Operations in Connection with Occupation of Zonal Areas.

Certain other operations were carried out during the period. On 24 May, the Bremen Enclave, including the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven, was occupied by United States forces. (33) On 6 July the first detachment of United States troops moved into Berlin and began to take over control of the United States Sector there. (34) Plans were drawn up for the gradual reduction, in proportion to the withdrawal of Soviet troops, of the Third U.S. Army forces in Czechoslovakia. (35)

51. Final Extent of the United States Zone.

On 17 July 1945 Theater Headquarters announced that zonal adjustments had been completed, that all areas assigned to the United States for military occupation were held exclusively by United States troops, and that all United States forces had withdrawn from areas to be occupied by other powers. In the final delineation of zones, the United States was allotted the following areas in Germany: Land Bavaria, excluding Landkreis Lindau; Land Hessen east of the Rhine River; Provinz Hessen-Nassau as it existed prior to July 1938,

exclusive of Landkreise Oberwesterwald, Unterwesterwald,
Unterlahn, and St. Goarshausen; the northern parts of Landes
Baden and Wurtemberg south to and including Landkreise
Ulm, Wurtlingen, Boblingen, Leonberg, Pforzheim, and
Karlsruhe; and the Brenner Enclave.(36) In Austria, the
United States Zone comprised Land Salzburg and that part
of Land Oberosterreich lying south of the Danube.(37)

Chapter III

THE UNITED STATES FORCES IN TRANSITION

THE NEW MISSIONS OF THE UNITED STATES FORCES IN EUROPE

52. Change of Mission in Europe.

a. With the end of hostilities, the Allies moved on to the second stage of their task, the aims and objectives of which had been declared by Prime Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt, and Marshal Stalin after the Crimea Conference, as follows:(1)

It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break up for all time the German General Staff that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German militarism; remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production; bring all war criminals to justice and swift punishment and exact reparation in kind for the destruction wrought by Germans; wipe out the Nazi Party, Nazi laws, organizations, and institutions; remove all Nazi and military influence from public offices and from the cultural and economic life of the German people; and take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety of the world.

These missions were primarily the concern of Military Government at all echelons, but they inevitably affected the mission of all the United States forces insofar as the latter participated with Military Government in the accomplishment of the new objectives.(2). The cessation of hostilities, too, and the

occupation of Germany and Austria brought in their train specific new functions for the various services, which led to adjustments in command and command channels. (3)

b. In general, the missions of the United States forces in Europe following the defeat of Germany had been outlined by the War Department in 1944. (4) It was assumed that partial demobilization would be possible and that about 400,000 men would be needed in the Theater a year after the end of hostilities. All ground forces, except some service units in the United Kingdom and North Africa, were to be concentrated on the Continent. First priority had been given to support of the war against Japan, and withdrawal of forces was to be accomplished only by such transportation as remained after this priority had been met.

c. During the period of combined command 12th Army Group, in cooperation with 6th Army Group, was made responsible for the occupation of Germany, and the United States element of the Supreme Headquarters general staff was responsible for planning for the Theater administration. Chiefs of services were responsible for planning within their own services and maintained considerable direct control with the general staff divisions of Supreme Headquarters. Theater chiefs of supply services under Supreme Headquarters and European Theater of Operations continued as chiefs of services following the termination of combined command.

d. The occupation of Germany was the more important of the two main missions confronting the Theater Commander. Since many of the important decisions regarding the occupation were expected to come from the Allied Control Authority and from sources other than military, it was necessary that the military headquarters in Germany be oriented with the United States element of the Allied Control Authority. The second main mission confronting the Theater Commander was the redeployment of United States forces, and at the close of the war in Germany enormous pressure was already being felt in the direction of expediting redeployment, both to assist the war in Japan and to return other forces to the United States. The headquarters which was to handle redeployment needed close contact with the War Department on supply and shipping and had to be closely tied to the personnel administration of the Theater as a whole. It was essential for a single agency to control the line of communications, which would be through France and Belgium until facilities were provided in Bremerhaven.

IMMEDIATE ADJUSTMENTS IN COMMAND AND DEPLOYMENT

53. Supreme Command in Germany.

The agreement reached between the Allied powers in November 1944 on the control machinery in Germany vested the supreme authority in the Central Council, which was composed of the commanders in chief of the four occupying forces.(5) The Allied Control Authority was the Allied central governing machinery for Germany, the United States component of which was the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany).(6)

54. Supreme United States Command in Europe.

The original plan provided for early termination of combined command and establishment of a separate United States headquarters to take over those functions in connection with United States troops that had been performed by Supreme Headquarters. A 4-month period was allowed for carrying out the transfer of command functions. Instead developments after V-E Day caused the 3-way transition to be accomplished in less than one month.(7) On 28 May 1945 General Eisenhower announced his decision on the separation of Theater Headquarters and the Headquarters of Communications Zone in a telegram to General Marshall, which ran:(8)

Despite difficulties created by separation of the Theater Communications Zone Headquarters we have decided to make no basic change in organization for the present. Instead, our G-4 Division will be reinforced with technical experts from each of the special branches in order that the general staff may have here the information on which to base its instructions to the Communications Zone Commander.

The official designation of the new Theater Headquarters as Headquarters, U.S. Forces, European Theater, was made known on 18 June,(9) and on 20 June composition of its staff and its location at Frankfurt am Main were announced in a general order.(10)

55. Special Provisions for Command in Austria.

Entirely different treatment was to be accorded in Austria. It appeared early that there would be serious disadvantages in making Austria a subordinate part of the European Theater.(11) The status of the United States commander in Austria would have been below that of the British, French, and Soviet commanders. A special G-5 Section would have had to be

created to handle Austrian matters if policy direction had been given through the G-5 Division at Frankfurt, and the distance involved would have made it difficult to maintain close touch. The plan was, therefore, to sever all connections between the two countries as soon as possible. The resulting arrangement for Austria was that, while the United States forces there were attached to the European Theater for supply and administration, the United States commander in Austria reported directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on military government and political matters. (12)

56. Adjustment of Communications Zone Functions.

The functions of the supply services naturally fall into two divisions, operations inside Germany and operations outside Germany. The latter category was delegated to the Communications Zone, while the Theater staff was responsible for operations within Germany with the exception of Bremerhaven, where the control of Communications Zone was necessary to unify the shipping program. Communications Zone had an important new mission: responsibility for redeployment, including the withdrawal of units from Germany, their staging, reorganization, and reequipment in France, and their shipment overseas. In addition to matters of supply, Communications Zone was responsible for the administration of its own forces outside of Germany.

57. Adjustments in Deployment.

With the announcement on 16 July (13) of the termination of combined command and the dissolution of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, the U.S. Army in northwestern Europe reverted to a normal command relationship with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War Department. Theoretically, the occupational troop basis of Plan ECLIPSE came into effect. The planning had been directed toward an "Army Type Occupation Force"--that is, a force strong enough to occupy a conquered country and meet any tactical need that might arise, and at the same time to furnish security against subversive actions of a former enemy and give logistical support to the Military Government of the zone. It was assumed that two field armies, with ten divisions organized into three corps would be required. The Third and Seventh U.S. Armies were selected for the task. Planning by the 12th Army Group, (14) later approved by Supreme Headquarters, (15) had provided for the division of the occupation zone into two military districts, each equipped with an army headquarters. The United States Zone was, accordingly, divided into the Eastern Military District, which comprised the portion of Land Bavaria under United States control and which was occupied by the Third Army, and the Western Military District, which comprised the remainder of the United States Zone, and

which was occupied by the Seventh Army. Except for disarmament and disposal of enemy property, district commanders were responsible for the primary missions of the occupation and also, as far as possible, for service functions within their districts.

REORGANIZATION OF THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY

58. Transfer of Communications Zone Functions.

The responsibility for all Communications Zone functions in Germany had been assumed by the armies by 1 July 1945, except in special instances where other arrangements had been made. Depots, hospitals, pipelines, and prisoner-of-war cages in territory destined ultimately to become British or French areas continued to be the responsibility of Communications Zone until turned over to the Allied nation concerned.(16) After the establishment of Theater Headquarters in Frankfurt, the responsibility for the operation of through truck and rail lines passed from the Communications Zone to the armies. Operation of reception centers, movement of displaced persons, and maintenance of redeployment facilities were assigned to the 12th Army Group. The Ninth Army supported the units in Berlin until the Seventh Army (Western Military District) was ready to assume this task. Though Continental Advance Section continued to function until 1 July, its functions were transferred to the Seventh Army, except for supply of the First French Army, the operation of the Saar coal mines, and prisoner-of-war enclosures. (17) The service chiefs of both organizations worked together on the reassignment of personnel. Also Intermediate Section assumed responsibility for the supply of the First French Army, while Fifteenth Army took over the functions in connection with coal production and prisoner-of-war enclosures.

59. Lines of Communication.

The Communications Zone extended and operated lines of communication into Germany to the intermediate boundaries of the armies, and it operated installations necessary to the accomplishment of its mission.(18) Military motor transportation was controlled by army groups, air forces, and Communications Zone agencies in Germany as assigned. District commanders supervised the allocation of civilian transportation. Rehabilitation and operation of ports, railroads, inland water transportation, through transportation, and such depots, shops, and other installations in Germany as were required formed the responsibility of

Communications Zone. Once Intermediate Section assumed the functions in France formerly the responsibility of the two sections which moved into Germany, while Channel, Normandy, and Delta Base Sections and Seine Section were responsible for other areas outside of Germany.

60. Service Responsibilities.

Some apprehension was expressed by the Communications Zone that the new organization would result in a double system of requisitions from the Theater on the New York Port of Embarkation.(19) Maj. Gen. R. B. Lord, Chief of Staff, held that detailed administrative planning for Germany was similar to that for the liberated countries, and he contended that service planning by two general staffs would result in confusion. In place of the proposed plan he recommended:

That the authority and responsibility of the Commanding General of the Communications Zone be extended over the whole Theater except that portion occupied by the armies in an operational role, and further excepting responsibility in Germany for those matters pertaining to military occupation to enforce the will of the conqueror upon the country.

That planning be accomplished by the issuance of over-all planning directives by the Theater Commander (that is, the United States portion of the Supreme Headquarters staff) on the Theater level to the Army groups and to the Commanding General of the Communications Zone.

The position of the Supreme Headquarters planning staff was outlined in a reply to Major General Lord: (20)

It is stated that coordination of service planning by two general staffs would cause confusion. That is, to a certain extent, true. Communications Zone did exactly that twice in the pre-D-Day period---once with Advance Section and Communications Zone proper and once with Forward Echelon and Communications Zone proper. It did cause some confusion, but not insuperable difficulties. This is a real objection but the only one. The only alternative is formation of entirely separate service planning staffs on Theater level.

We recommend separate services in Germany, under supervision of the zone staff direct, and have already ordered the Chief of Transportation, in line with this policy, to create a special planning staff to

deal with Supreme Headquarters. If Communications Zone moved to Germany to perform these functions, a new organization similar to Communications Zone would have to be built up in France.

The chiefs of services, acting under the supervision of the United States element of the Supreme Headquarters general staff, prepared the plans for the functioning of the services within Germany which were incorporated in the final Theater organization plan.

61. Service Commands.

Troop units assigned to the Military Pipelines Service, Military Railway Service, Motor Transport Service, and the Signal Communications Service had been under the control of the chiefs of services and had operated on a Theater-wide basis. After the termination of combined command and the almost entire exclusion of Communications Zone from responsibility in Germany and Austria, the organization of these service commands was modified. (21) The Military Railway and Motor Transport Services were redesignated Theater service commands and placed under the direct command of the Theater Chief of Transportation, while the Signal Communications Service was placed under the Theater Chief Signal Officer. (22) The Military Pipelines Service, pending its liquidation, remained under the Communications Zone. The Inland Water Transport Service became a Theater agency under the Theater Chief of Transportation. The plan for these changes was submitted by the headquarters of the Communications Zone, but action was initiated by Theater Headquarters. (23)

62. Additional Service Functions.

Various other services were faced with new responsibilities after the assumption of the occupation mission by the United States forces. Among these were the following:

a. Transportation Corps arranged for railway operations in Germany, using indigenous railroad personnel. Transportation agencies on the operating level were maintained in Berlin.

b. The Medical Corps was confronted with a serious public health problem in Germany.

c. The Signal Corps had an additional problem in interzonal communications in Germany, for which the German civil and military communications systems were utilized.

d. The Quartermaster Corps dealt with the disposal of enemy quartermaster equipment and supervised the supply systems of the German forces prior to their disbandment.

c. Reequipment of organizations in connection with the redeployment program provided the Ordnance Service with a task of considerable magnitude, while in Germany many problems arose in connection with the disposal of enemy equipment.

f. The disposal of large quantities of enemy war material that had been captured both in the liberated countries and in Germany was the responsibility of the Chemical Warfare Service, while it also had functions in connection with the equipment of units scheduled for redeployment to the Pacific.

g. Redeployment laid a heavy burden also on the Corps of Engineers, which was responsible for the construction of staging areas and for their winterization. In Germany the Corps had a heavy program to accomplish, including the destruction of enemy fortifications, the rehabilitation of German facilities for military headquarters and military communities and the construction and repair of bridges, highways, buildings, and utilities. While much of the actual work was done by German labor, supervision was in all instances the responsibility of the Corps of Engineers.

THE BEGINNINGS OF REDUCTION

63. Inactivation of Army Groups and the Reassignment of Armies.

The reduction of organizations in the Theater began immediately, and by July the army group formations had been eliminated. As early as May, the Seventh Army was absorbed into the 12th Army Group, (24) and the withdrawal of the First French Army to the French Zone (25) permitted the complete inactivation of the 6th Army Group on 20 July. (26) On 26 July 12th Army Group became nonoperational, (27) with the transfer to U.S. Forces, European Theater, of the Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Fifteenth Armies. The personnel of Headquarters, Special Troops, 12th Army Group, was assigned to Headquarters Command, U.S. Forces, European Theater, on 1 August 1945. (28)

64. Redeployment of Armies.

On 15 May the First Army closed its Weimar Headquarters (29) and was transferred from 12th Army Group to Normandy Base Section. (30) It was then readied for redeployment to the Pacific, and embarked on 22 May. (31) The Ninth Army transferred its

responsibilities to the Seventh Army on 15 June,(32) and started its move to the assembly area on 7 July.(33) On 28 July it sailed for the United States.(34)

THE BEGINNINGS OF REDEPLOYMENT

65. Ports and Processing Areas.

The ports used at this time for the redeployment of troops were Le Havre, Marseille, Cherbourg, Antwerp, Glasgow, and Southampton. Most of the units going direct to the Pacific were processed through the port of Marseille by Delta Base Section, (35) while those bound for the Pacific by way of the United States went through the Normandy assembly area, which was operated by the 89th Division.(36)

66. Shipments from May to 17 July 1945.

a. Redeployment operations began on 12 May 1945. Before the end of the month nearly 90,000 men had been shipped. (37) Of these 21,564 were being sent to the Pacific via the United States.(38) The remaining 61,597 men were casuals, including men eligible for discharge, patients, recovered Allied military personnel, and others.(39) No direct shipments to the Pacific were made during the month. (40)

b. In June a total of 313,298 men were redeployed. Of this total, 23,479 men formed direct shipments to the Pacific. Indirect shipments totalled 124,163 men. Casuals, consisting mostly of men eligible for discharge and patients, made up another 165,656 of the June shipments.(41) Major units shipped during June included the III, V, VII, and XIII Corps, the XVIII Airborne Corps, and the 86th, 95th, 97th and the 104th Infantry Divisions.

c. By the end of June, the redeployment program was progressing satisfactorily. The total forecast for the May-June period called for redeployment of 424,025 men.(43) Of this quota 402,459 men were redeployed.(44) The casual quota was not met, 191,760 men being shipped (45) against the quota 193,800,(46) but the quota for indirect redeployment was exceeded 187,220 being shipped, (47) against a forecast of 167,473. (48) Direct shipments to the Pacific fell short of the forecast, the main reason being the change in plans, which called for shipment of a unit's organic equipment thirty-five days ahead of the unit.(49)

If equipment was shipped thirty-five days in advance on slow-moving freighters and if all space on fast-moving troop ships was used, the unit and its equipment could arrive at approximately the same time. The forecast figure for shipments direct to the Pacific for May and June was originally 62,602.(50) This was reduced in June to 21,000.(51) Against this latter quota of 21,000 there were 23,479 men shipped directly to the Pacific.(52)

d. During July the shipping quota for that month was exceeded, but the May-June backlog could not be made up. Against a forecast for out-shipment of 385,910,(53) 391,058 were shipped.(54) Of this number 227,141 men were in units bound for the Pacific via the United States, 72,238 were in units going direct to the Pacific, and 91,679 were in casual units.(55) July shipments included the VIII Corps, the 13th and 20th Armored Divisions, and the 2d, 4th, 5th, 8th, 28th, 44th, and 87th Infantry Divisions.(56)

THE DISBANDMENT OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES

67. The Two Aspects of Disbandment.

The disbandment of German armed forces after 8 May 1945 operated smoothly and according to plan. There were two distinct operations: the liquidation of all command functions of the German armed forces,(57) and the gradual release of the members of the German armed forces held in American custody.

68. Status of the Disarmed Forces after the Surrender.

a. Except for war criminals and security suspects, all members of the German armed forces captured after cessation of hostilities were treated as disarmed German forces. After 4 May 1945 captured Germans in Germany could be reclassified and their status changed from prisoners of war to disarmed Germans. The United States supplied and maintained enemy prisoners of war until they were discharged. All enemy prisoners held by the United States outside of the occupied countries were treated as prisoners of war until they were released. The disbandment of the German disarmed forces and certain paramilitary organizations was the responsibility of army group and zone commanders. The planning, organization, and execution of the program was assigned to army and military district commanders within their respective areas.(58)

b. Non-Germans were statistically segregated from Germans in national groups to await disposal by their respective governments. Soviet nationals were physically segregated and accorded special treatment under the terms of the agreement signed with the Soviet Union on 12 February 1945.(59)

c. The German armed forces were estimated to number about 11,000,000. Of these, 7,200,000 were in the jurisdiction of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. Under the international agreement calling for the handling of prisoners of war according to the zones in which their homes were located, the share of the United States forces in the process of disbandment is represented by the figure 4,800,000. By the end of May 1945, figures of the Post Marshal's Department indicated that there were 1,913,402 prisoners of war held by the United States forces in the European Theater.(60)

69. Successive Steps in the Disbandment of the Enemy Forces.

a. The first group to be released were the members of the Volksturm, that group of German men who, disqualified from service in the Wehrmacht because of age or other reasons, served the army in an auxiliary capacity. After the authorization of the "disarmed-enemy-forces" status on 4 May 1945, members of the Volksturm who had been prisoners of war or who were subsequently captured while in uniform were processed as members of disarmed enemy forces and then discharged. Members captured not in uniform were permitted to return to their homes without processing.(61)

b. On 15 May 1945, Supreme Headquarters authorized the discharge of non-German nationality who were farmers, coal miners, transport workers, or in other key industries, provided that they lived in the area in which they were imprisoned and provided that they were not war criminals, security suspects, or members of the S.S. Likewise, all German women residing in the territory in which they were confined were to be released, with the same excepted categories. (62)

c. Three days later, Supreme Headquarters authorized the release of all prisoners of war over fifty years of age who lived in the locality in which they were imprisoned, providing they were not war criminals, security suspects, or members of the S.S. (63)

d. On 5 June 1945 nationals of France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg who were prisoners of war of the United States forces, or in the status of disarmed German forces not wanted for war crimes by a country other than their own, were released to their respective governments. (64)

e. General discharge was authorized late in June for all Germans except war criminals, security suspects, those in automatic arrest categories, and those whose homes were in the Soviet Zone. Those living in the Soviet Zone were held until an agreement on their transfer was reached with the Soviet authorities. At the same time it was announced that war criminals would be discharged and interned and that automatic arrestees and security suspects could be discharged if held in custody for interrogation.(65)

f. All nationals of the United Nations still held, except Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, dissident Jugoslavs, and Polish not claiming Soviet citizenship, were released to their governments in July 1945. At the same time all neutral nationals other than those with ardent Axis sympathies were released, provided they were not security suspects or wanted as war criminals by a country other than their own.(66)

70. Other Aspects of Disarmament and Disbandment.

In the first months of the occupation, the United States forces also disarmed and disbanded all paramilitary organizations, including the German intelligence service, the Gestapo, the political police, the SS, and the SA. All the property of these organizations was confiscated, their records and headquarters were seized, and the entire membership or their leaders above a certain grade, as prescribed in the directives in effect, were arrested. The German General Staff was broken up by the simple expedient of holding as prisoners of war all of its members who were found. All military academies and officers' training schools were located and closed.

THE REPATRIATION OF LIBERATED PRISONERS OF WAR

71. Basic Policies for Return of United States Prisoners of War.

The War Department prescribed that all persons who had been prisoners should be returned to the United States unless they elected to remain overseas, which very few did.(67) For purposes of shipping, they were assigned priority over other casualties except the sick and wounded. The Prisoner-of-War Executive Branch of the G-1 Division of Supreme Headquarters had formulated the policy that all prisoners, upon cessation of hostilities, should remain in their camps to avoid being classed as displaced persons. The original plan contemplated

that a government might still be operating in Germany at the time of the surrender and that assistance might be received from German authorities in charge of prisoner-of-war camps. When the surrender actually occurred, however, practically all German authority had ceased. Officers were assigned to field forces to assist in liberating prisoners of war, and a special division was established in the office of the Theater Provost Marshal.

72. Numbers of Recovered Allied Prisoners.

There were 91,252 United States and 168,746 British citizens recovered from German camps. Liberated prisoners were moving to the rear in a steady flow by the end of March, and by 30 April 14,174 United States nationals had been recovered from enemy custody and returned to the Communications Zone, some of them having been liberated by the Soviet forces and returned by way of Odessa. The repatriation of United States prisoners of war was completed in June. On 15 March 1945 it was estimated that the total number of Allied nationals held by the Germans was 2,173,764.(68) Many of these, particularly Poles, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians, did not return to the country of their origin, but became displaced persons.

73. Treatment of Other Nationalities.

The regulations issued by Supreme Headquarters provided for the care of all liberated prisoners of war, although the obligation of the United States was not the same for all nationalities. Similar treatment was given to United States and British citizens, but for others, ration scales and other responsibilities differed.(69) Theater Headquarters issued comprehensive instructions regarding the treatment of recovered prisoners, and camps were operated at Stenay, Epinal, Brussels, Liege, Reims, Namur, and Sedan. Camp Lucky Strike was one staging area for returning prisoners and another was Camp Wings, where many were brought by air. Both camps were situated near Le Havre.

74. United States Personnel with the Underground.

Prior to D-Day the underground organization on the Continent, which included more than 35,000 French, Belgian, Netherland, Luxembourg, Danish, and Czech citizens, had assisted approximately 3,000 United States fliers to return to England.(70) After D-Day the advancing armies uncovered a similar number of fliers who had been shot down but avoided capture. Theater directives provided that those who had been out of United States or Allied control for more than five days should be sent to the reception center operated by Scine Section

in Paris, where they would be interrogated by military intelligence authorities.

75. The Standfast Agreement.

During the early part of the German retreat few Allied prisoners were recovered, because the Germans moved their inclosures farther into Germany. On 21 February 1945 the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed through diplomatic channels that the Germans leave prisoners of war in place, with the understanding that persons so recovered would not be returned to military service. The Germans accepted this proposal, and it was made effective on 22 April 1945.(71) On 29 April the Third U.S. Army over ran the prisoner-of-war camp at Moosborg and liberated 100,000 prisoners, including 15,563 of United States nationality. There was a marked increase in the number returned during May, when the use of air transportation increased, and by 9 May the daily rate of processing at Le Havre was 30,000 United States and British prisoners.

THE CARE AND REPATRIATION OF DISPLACED PERSONS

76. Estimate of Numbers of Displaced Persons.

Owing to the meager intelligence available, there was a wide range in early estimates of the number of displaced persons in Europe. In June 1944 it was estimated that there were 11,332,700 displaced persons (including refugees) in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, and Germany, 8,935,400 of whom were displaced persons in foreign countries and 2,397,300 refugees in their own countries. They came from twenty different countries and were the concern of as many governments.(72)

77. Planning, Procedure, and Personnel.

a. Planning for the handling of displaced persons had been begun in late 1943 by Supreme Headquarters, the Allied Governments, and representatives of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The basic plans, amended by later experience, became the directives guiding operations. An agreement reached between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers at the Crimea Conference provided for the exchange of displaced persons and liberated prisoners of war.

b. Displaced persons uncovered by military forces were assembled at collecting points and directed to transit points or areas, where they were given food, temporary shelter, and medical care. They were then taken to assembly centers and cared for while awaiting repatriation. When uncovered in rapid military advance, displaced persons were instructed to stand fast until arrangements were completed for collecting them in assembly centers. As early as conditions permitted, United Nations displaced persons were returned to reception centers in their own countries, where their governments assumed full responsibility.

c. Responsibilities in connection with displaced persons were shared by several agencies and categories of personnel: the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, at first in conjunction with the Supreme Commander and later in sole authority; (73) the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees; (74) the various military missions of Supreme Headquarters; (75) the staff sections of Supreme Headquarters; (76) the Combined Displaced Persons Executive of Supreme Headquarters (after its establishment on 14 July); (77) and the military commanders. (78) After April, when the problem became more acute, the armies and army groups organized special displaced persons military teams to direct operations and supplement the military government detachments. (79)

78. Operations.

A limited number of repatriations had been made prior to the entrance of United States forces into Germany. These involved nationals of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The early stage of the campaign in Germany uncovered only a small number of displaced persons, which was due to the German policy of evacuating their slave workers eastward. United States troops uncovered fewer than 100,000 displaced persons in the whole of the Rhine Province and the Saarland west of the Rhine. By the end of February, however, the Germans appeared to have lost all control over foreign workers, and in the small area of the Remagen bridgehead alone over 3,500 displaced persons were found by the Allied forces on 7 March. With the ensuing major drives across the Rhine in that month, Allied armies found themselves confronted with millions of displaced persons. (80) The flow of Western Europeans being repatriated from Germany increased rapidly until on 15 April Belgians were returning at the rate of 500 daily, and French were passing through transit reception centers en route for their homes at the rate of 2,000 a day. Early in May these numbers increased to a peak of 5,000 Belgians and 20,000 French, as well as 1,000 Dutch every twenty-four hours. During April 140,000 Western European displaced persons

Table I
Status of Displaced Persons as of 31 July 1945

NATIONALITY:	REMAINING ON HAND			REPATRIATED			TOTAL REPATRIATED AND ON HAND	PERCENT REPATRIATED
	IN Camps	OUTSIDE Camps	TOTAL	FROM 1 JULY 45 TO 31 JULY 45	TOTAL TO DATE 31 JULY 45			
BELGIAN	2,056	3,917	5,973	10,444	268,000		273,973	97.8
CZECH	5,686	3,692	9,378	59,994	100,000		109,378	91.5
NETHERLAND	2,296	4,025	6,321	48,000	261,000		267,321	97.6
FRENCH	4,905	11,341	16,246	47,100	1,449,000		1,465,246	98.9
GREEK	8,476	3,725	12,201	—	61		12,262	—
LUXEMBURG	85	8	93	5,000	11,000		11,093	99.1
POLISH	812,067	102,588	914,655	23,681	40,000		954,655	4.2
SOVIET	398,994	136,579	535,573	69,869	1,639,000		2,174,573	75.4
YUGOSLAV	81,828	16,500	98,328	39,559	42,000		140,328	29.9
OTHER ALLIED	86,693	3,693	90,132	1,029	13,000		103,132	12.6
ITALIAN	238,959	28,312	267,271	67,881	237,000		504,271	17.0
BULGARIAN	577	3,592	4,169	—	—		4,169	—
OTHER ENEMY	320,218	9,792	330,010	23,901	49,000		379,010	12.9
TOTAL	1,962,840	327,510	2,290,350	396,458	4,109,061		6,399,411	64.2

were repatriated from 12th Army Group area, and 30,000 from 6th Army Group area, most of them French, with Belgians making up the next largest group.(81) By the end of July, the situation with regard to displaced persons was as shown in Table I.(82)

OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES AND OBLIGATIONS

79. Punishment of War Criminals.

a. Background to the Establishment of Judicial Machinery.

The apprehension, prosecution, and bringing to justice of Axis war criminals was one of the war aims of the United Nations which was constantly reiterated before and after the end of hostilities. In the immediate posthostilities period much was accomplished toward the establishment of the final machinery. The first international agency established to investigate war crimes was the United Nations War Crimes Commission, which convened for the first time in London on 20 October 1943. This commission furnished the Theater Commander with lists of suspected war criminals, accused by different governments.(83)

b. Military Responsibilities.

Supreme Headquarters instructed army group commanders to apprehend and keep in custody all war criminals. Suspects were not segregated from other prisoners of war, but their cards were marked to identify them as such. Their trials had to await the end of hostilities. Group commanders were authorized to appoint commissions for the trial of persons charged with "such violations of the laws of war as threaten or impair the security of United States forces."(84) This power could be delegated down to division level. The restriction limiting trial by military commanders to persons in this category was removed on 19 June 1945 by command of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.(85) After that time, war criminals could be tried before military government commissions or military government courts regardless of the nationality of the victim.(86) The only exceptions were persons wanted by other governments and the high political figures to be tried before the international tribunal. All commanders who had general court-martial jurisdiction were authorized to appoint military commissions for the trial of war criminals. Sentences were to be reviewed and approved by the authority appointing the commission. Death sentences required confirmation by the Theater Commander or his designee.(87) This authority was not revoked until 26 June 1946, one year after the war.(88)

c. Interrogation of Former American Prisoners of War.

After the end of hostilities, the amount of work to be completed by the War Crimes Branch increased considerably. Particularly important during May and June 1945 was the immediate interrogation of some 90,000 American ex-prisoners of war, who were scheduled for immediate return to the United States. Special care was taken to preserve the evidence that had accumulated in concentration camps and other centers of mass murder.(89)

80. Establishment of Judicial Machinery.

The bringing to justice of all war criminals and their swift punishment was specified at the Crimea Conference as one of the prime objectives of the occupation.(90) On 12 May 1945 President Truman appointed Col. Joseph V. Hodgson as U.S. Commissioner on the United Nations War Crimes Commission.(91) This appointment was followed on 22 May by that of Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson as U.S. Counsel for War Crimes.(92) A month later, the Combined Chiefs of Staff authorized Supreme Headquarters to try war criminals, subject to certain limitations.(93) This authority was later delegated to U.S. Forces, European Theater, and formed the basis for the trial of war criminals not brought before the International War Crimes Tribunal at Nurnberg. The plan for this tribunal was drafted at a meeting of delegates of the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union which convened in London on 26 June 1945. The draft prepared at this meeting was ratified at the Potsdam Conference. The first comprehensive directive on the trying of war criminals was issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 July 1945.(94)

81. The General Board.

The General Board was established on 17 June 1945,(95) to prepare a factual analysis intended to present the strategy of the campaign as it had been planned and as it actually had been carried out and to formulate recommendations pertaining to such changes in tactical and administrative doctrines, techniques, organization, and equipment of the U.S. Army ground and air forces as were indicated by the analysis to be desirable. The Board was also to make studies and recommendations on special problems referred to it by Theater Headquarters.(96) The Board was assigned as a special unit within the headquarters of the Fifteenth U.S. Army and shared its commanding officer. Gen. Jacob L. Devers was president of the General Board, in addition to his other duties, and Lt. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, deputy president.(97) On 4 July 1945, General Gerow succeeded General Devers as president.(98) Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., became president of the General Board on 14 October 1945.(99)

82. Disposal of Surplus Property.

In connection with the disposal of surplus property, the office of the Central Field Commissioner for Europe was opened in Paris on 4 July 1945. (100) There were in the Theater approximately 10,450,000 long tons of surplus material valued at \$10,322,000,000. The Army had the task of guarding and maintaining these stocks until early in 1946, when they were first disposed of in large quantities.

OTHER EVENTS OF IMPORTANCE TO 17 JULY 1945

83. General Eisenhower's Visit to the United States.

Ceremonies honoring General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower were held in London on 12 June 1945 and in Paris on 14 June 1945, before his return to the United States by air for homecoming receptions on 16 June. Air Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder became Acting Supreme Commander, and Gen. Jacob L. Dovers, Acting Theater Commander. Gen. Omar N. Bradley took over the temporary command from General Dovers on 17 June and served until General Eisenhower's return to the Theater on 12 July 1945.

84. Partial Relaxation of the Ban on Fraternization.

During June and July, certain relaxations were authorized in the hitherto complete ban on fraternization. On 12 June General Eisenhower announced to a press conference that the nonfraternization policy had been relaxed insofar as it applied to "very young children," (101) while on 14 July 1945 a further relaxation was permitted, allowing United States and British troops to converse with German adults in streets and other public places. (102)

85. Visitors and Inspectors.

Supreme Headquarters and the Joint Chiefs of Staff discouraged visits to the Theater prior to the end of hostilities, but some were made in April and May. Three Mexican general officers, Lt Gen. Eulogio Ortiz, Maj. Gen. Jose Beltran and Brig. Gen. Ramon Rodriguez, arrived in London 30 April 1945 on a trip which resulted in an apology to the British by United States officials when the British complained they had not been notified that the Mexicans were coming. (103) The tour included Supreme Headquarters

at Reims, 12th Army Group Headquarters at Bad Wildungen, Third Army Headquarters at Erlangen, First Army Headquarters at Weimar, Ninth Army Headquarters at Brunswick, and installations at Paris. The three Mexicans departed on 8 May 1945. One of the first congressional committees to arrive was the special subcommittee of the Committee of Agriculture of the House of Representatives. This group came to London in the latter part of May 1945 seeking information on food production in Great Britain and on the Continent. Congressmen and Congressional committees had been confined largely to Great Britain, but when active operations ended an increasing number came to the Continent. Senator W. Dahlquist of Minnesota interviewed General Clay in June to obtain information of interest to the Minnesota Editorial Association. In the same month a committee which included Gen. William Knudsen, C.B. Thomas of the Chrysler Corporation, J.B. Mooney of General Motors, R.J. Roborg of the Ford Motor Company, Gibson Carey of Yale and Towne, and R.R. Deupree of Proctor and Gamble was in the Theater in connection with repair and rebuilding of motor vehicles. The first group of motion picture executives arrived in July. They were followed by other representatives of the motion picture industry and by several tours of editors and publishers.

Chapter IV

THE ASSUMPTION OF THE OCCUPATION MISSION

AGENCIES PREPARING FOR THE TASK OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

86. Planning Groups.

The agencies planning for the military government of Germany included the European Advisory Commission; the military section of the British Control Commission for Germany; the U.S. Group Control Council (German); several commissions, agencies, and divisions in Supreme Headquarters; and staff officers of the European Theater of Operations, the Communications Zone, and the army groups. Some of the plans for territory that later came under Theater staff became an element of some importance in shaping the future of Army and military government policies under General Eisenhower, particularly with regard to the occupation of Austria. High-level decisions were made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while the Department of State was involved in many of the negotiations and became increasingly important after consideration of peace treaties was started.

87. The European Advisory Commission.

The establishment of the European Advisory Commission followed agreements reached at the Moscow conference in October 1943. Members of this commission were John C. Winant of the United States, Sir William Strang of Great Britain, and Ambassador F.T. Gusev of the Soviet Union. Among the accomplishments of the Commission was the preparation of the terms of surrender and the original plans for the governmental machinery for Germany.

88. Training of Personnel and Delegation of Power.

From the first it was recognized that the occupation of conquered territory imposed problems requiring specially trained personnel. Specialists were, therefore, recruited and trained for military government duties. These persons were assigned as members of G-5 staff divisions, military government detachments, and other related organizations. During combat operations and for some time thereafter, military government detachments were supervised by the G-5 divisions in regular command channels. The Supreme Commander delegated his powers as military governor to the commanding generals of the army groups, who in turn delegated their powers to subordinate commanders. Usually a tactical unit, on taking possession of a town or area, did only what was absolutely necessary in the way of restoring law and order and providing relief for the inhabitants. The tactical unit soon moved on and transferred its military government responsibilities to the unit which was assigned area responsibility in the rear.

89. Development of the United States Element of the Allied Control Authority.

a. From the United States point of view, the most important of the agencies planning for military government was the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany), which became the United States element of the Allied Control Authority.(1) The mission of this body as conceived by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was brought to the attention of Supreme Headquarters in August 1944,(2) and a nucleus planning staff was formed immediately.(3) This staff was under the direction of Brig. Gen. Cornelius W. Wickerham, former commandant of the School of Military Government at Charlottesville, Virginia, who later became military adviser to Ambassador Winant.

b. Accomplishments of the planning staff of the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany) in the first few weeks following its organization included conferences with British elements of Supreme Headquarters regarding divisional problems, reconnaissance on the Continent for a location to an advanced section, and the preparation of various plans for the administration of the occupation through an organization built on divisions dealing with subjects such as finance, prisoners of war and displaced persons, politics, transportation, and internal affairs. By 5 February 1945 the group had completed plans for the seizure and control of the German Foreign Office, the Chancellery, the Nazi Party

headquarters, and the transportation system. Meanwhile the Fifteenth Army was planning for the occupation of Berlin, and the request of the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany) for the activation of Headquarters Command was submitted to the Fifteenth Army by Supreme Headquarters on 17 February 1945.(4)

c. On 5 March 1945 the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany) was organized as a command with Brig. Gen. Wickersham as commanding general.(5)

d. On 25 March 1945 the Headquarters of U.S. Group Control Council (Germany) was transferred from Bushy Park, Surrey, England, to Versailles, France, (6) except for a rear echelon, designated the U.S. Group Control Council (Rear), which operated in England until 16 May 1945.(7) Advance Headquarters, which had been opened at Versailles on 9 February 1945, with Col. L.W. Jefferson in charge, was absorbed by the main headquarters.

90. Division of Responsibility between Group and Theater Staff.

While the headquarters was still in England, much consideration had been given to the problem of the relationship between the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany) and the Theater staff, and a meeting was held on 16 March between representatives of both organizations.(8) It was decided that more of the responsibility for the control of Germany should be given to the Theater staff, a decision which involved the revision of approved European Advisory Commission draft directives. Further details were taken up in a joint staff study carried out by both bodies. On 31 March 1945 long-range requirements for army, navy, and air disarmament and demobilization were excluded from the scope of planning, as well as other policies for the United States Zone. From this time it was established that all policies with regard to Germany were to be developed in conjunction with the United States element of Supreme Headquarters, for approval by the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations.(9)

b. A further clarification of the relationship of the Deputy Military Governor and the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany) to the Theater staff was issued on 29 April 1945.(10) So far as Germany was concerned, the Theater staff was specifically charged with the execution, implementation, and supervision within the United States Zone of United States and Allied Control Authority policies. When the responsibility for the government of Germany passed to Allied civilian control, the functions of the control agencies--the Deputy Military Governor, the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany), and military government elements of staff in the United States Zone--were to be withdrawn from United States military command.

THE BERLIN DECLARATION AND THE INAUGURATION OF QUADRIPARTITE CONTROL

91. The Function of the Berlin Declaration.

At the time of the signing of the surrender, General Eisenhower emphasized that the surrender was a purely military one, and that political and economic terms to be imposed upon Germany by the political heads of the Allied nations would follow.(11) The first announcement of what these terms would be came scarcely a month later. A Control Council consisting of the commanders in chief of the armies of the four powers met in Berlin as representatives of their countries to discuss the policies. Members of the Council were General Eisenhower, Marshal Zhukov, Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, and Gen. Jean de Lattre de Tassigny. In these four men the governing powers over Germany were vested. Decisions could be reached only by unanimous vote of the Council members. On 5 June 1945 these decisions were made public in the Berlin Declaration.(12)

92. The Terms of the Declaration.

The Berlin Declaration stated that there would be no central German Government. The administration of the country was to be vested in the victorious powers. The governments of the four Allied nations would determine the boundaries of Germany, or any part thereof, and the status of Germany, or of any area of German territory. A series of articles set forth the following requirements: the surrender to Allied representatives of all persons with Nazi affiliations; the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany; the stationing of Allied forces and civil agencies in any or all parts of Germany, as determined by the Allies; and the imposition of additional political, administrative, economic, financial, military, and any other requirements arising from the defeat of Germany, as seen necessary by Allied representatives. Any failure on the part of the German authorities or people to fulfill their obligations was to be met with suitable action by the Allied representatives.

93. The Entry of United States Troops into Berlin.

Lieutenant General Clay, Lieutenant General Weeks, and Marshal Zhukov at a meeting in Berlin on 29 June 1945, planned for the move into Berlin of United States and British troops to be completed between 1 and 4 July.(13)

Accordingly, the preliminary reconnaissance party of 2,000 men, together with two detachments of Berlin District Headquarters and Headquarters Command troops, moved into Berlin on 1 July.(14) On the following day a reconnaissance party of 3,000, including a number of U.S. Group Control Council (Germany) personnel, moved in.(15) Headquarters buildings were chosen for both the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany) and Berlin District at the Luftgau Building and the Telefunken Radio Engineer Research Laboratory, and by 7 July they had been occupied.(16)

94. Problem of the French Sector in Berlin.

A problem arose with regard to the French Sector in Berlin similar to that which had arisen regarding the French Zone of occupation. When the decision was made at the Crimea Conference to invite the French to participate in the occupation, the area of their Berlin Sector was not defined. In a subsequent meeting of the European Advisory Commission on 1 March, the British representative had suggested that Reinickendorf should be part of the French Sector, while subsequent British proposals named Zehlendorf and Steglitz. The decision was to be left to the commanders in chief, acting jointly.(17) Finally, at the end of July, the French accepted the British offer of the districts of Reinickendorf and Wedding to form their sector of Greater Berlin.(18)

95. The United States Sector of Berlin.

The United States Sector of Berlin comprised the six districts of Zehlendorf, Schonsberg, Tempelhof, Kreuzberg, Steglitz, and Neukolln.

96. Inauguration of Quadripartite Control.

With the entry into Berlin of the Western powers, quadripartite control could be inaugurated. On the municipal level this was, in terms of the European Advisory Commission's decision of 14 November 1944, to take the form of an inter-Allied governing authority, later designated the Allied Kommandatura Berlin, composed of the commandants appointed by the respective commanders in chief and operating under the general direction of the Allied Control Authority.(19) The Kommandatura functioned as a council, and through the oberbürgermeister of Berlin exercised control over all municipal affairs. The commandant of each sector administered law and order in his sector, in accordance with the policies of the Kommandatura. The position of chairman

rotated among the four commandants. In its internal organization, the Kommandatura was divided into all the departments of a municipal government, staffed by representatives of the four occupying powers. The first meeting of the Kommandatura, with Marshal Zhukov presiding, inaugurated formal quadripartite control on 11 July, (20) and was followed on 30 July by the first formal meeting of the Allied Control Council, presided over by General Eisenhower. (21)

THE BEGINNING OF THE OCCUPATION IN AUSTRIA

97. Planning for the Occupation of Austria.

a. The assumption of quadripartite control was a slower process in Austria and was not completed until August 1945. Planning, however, had started in 1944, and from the beginning, a clear distinction had been made between the status of Germany and Austria. (22)

b. It was originally decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the Allied planning organization in England would coordinate plans for the occupation of Austria with those for Germany, but that Austria would be initially under the Mediterranean Theater because forces for the occupation could be provided more quickly from there. (23) The U.S. Group Control Council (Austria) was established in the Mediterranean Theater on 27 January 1945, (24) and the London planning staff started its move to Italy early in February 1945. (25)

c. In December 1944 the proposal that Austria be divided into three zones was made by the Soviet representative to the European Advisory Commission. In March 1945 the four-power occupation of Austria was being considered by that body, but agreement was not reached until early in July.

d. Events early in April 1945 forced changes in the plans for Austria. Soviet forces crossed the Austrian border early in April and captured Vienna on 13 April. Meanwhile, the weakening resistance of the Wehrmacht in Germany indicated that United States forces could invade Austria from the northwest more easily than from the south. Part of General Eisenhower's forces were turned south, therefore, and penetrated into Austria before the Germans could assemble their forces in the mountain "redoubt" of southern Bavaria and western Austria. Control was transferred from the

Mediterranean to the European Theater of Operations, except that the former Theater was directed to furnish military government personnel and the Headquarters staff for the occupation forces.(26)

98. Interim Period of Tactical Military Government.

After V-E Day it was necessary to continue tactical military government in Austria for a few weeks until military government field detachments were in position. When the first members of the military government planning staff arrived at the end of May, they found a confused situation, due to the territorial disposition of units. Troops in Austria comprised all or parts of two army groups, two field armies, four army corps, and twelve divisions, many of which were partly in Germany and partly in Austria. Consequently, their instructions and policies were not exclusively directed towards Austria. During the early period Austria had to be treated on the same lines as Germany.(27)

99. Development of an Austrian Command.

This situation was improved, however, in July. On 5 July 15th Army Group was reorganized and redesignated the U.S. Occupational Forces Austria.(28) The Headquarters Company II Corps, 11th Armored Division, 42d Division, and 65th Division, previously assigned to Third Army and 12th Army Group, were assigned on 6 July to the newly formed U.S. Occupational Forces Austria, (29) the commanding general of which was Gen. Mark Clark.(30)

100. The Place of Austria in the European Theater Organization.

The command directive for Germany and Austria, which was adopted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 June 1945, provided that General Eisenhower as Commanding General of the European Theater should delegate to the Commanding General of the United States forces in Austria such operational control as he considered necessary, and that two divisions should be assigned to Austria.(31) This provision was elaborated in the Allied Forces Headquarters document that established the U.S. Occupational Forces Austria. General Clark was made directly responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on military government and political matters, while remaining under the European Theater on matters of supply and administration.(32) Responsibility for the logistical support of forces in Austria was delegated to the Third Army, and later to Continental Base Section. Thus, the Austrian command assumed its place within the European Theater, retaining, however, a considerable measure of independence as regards policy, military government, and operation.

THE TERMINATION OF COMBINED COMMAND


101. The Dissolution of the Allied Expeditionary Force, and the Realignment of Command.

a. The Supreme Commander relinquished command of all elements of the Allied Expeditionary Force on 14 July 1945. The Commanding General of the U. S. Forces, European Theater assumed command of the 12th and 6th Army Groups, United States naval elements, Ninth Air Force, Communications Zone, and the United States elements of the SHAEF Missions to France, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Norway. (33)

b. The British War Office assumed control over the 21st Army Group and the British elements of the SHAEF Missions to France, the Netherlands, and Norway. British army elements of these missions reverted to the command of 21st Army Group, while the Royal Air Force elements reverted to the British Air Ministry, which also assumed command of the Royal Air Force in Norway. The British War Office assumed command of all land forces in Norway, and the British Chiefs of Staff acted as agents for the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but no change was made in the command of Norwegian naval and air forces until they were transferred to the Norwegian Government. The British Admiralty assumed control of British naval elements, and the French High Command took over the First French Army. The Army Detachment of the Alps did not revert to French command until 10 July 1945.

c. For two weeks the United States element of the Supreme Headquarters staff functioned in the dual capacity of officers of Supreme Headquarters and of U. S. Forces, European Theater. It was a period of adjustment and organization involving the disposal of records and termination of Supreme Headquarters functions. The discontinuance of Headquarters Command, Supreme Headquarters, was ordered effective as of 16 July 1945, a move which marked the end of the joint command of United States and British forces, (34) and the final stage in the assumption of the occupation mission. The constitution, and the interrelation of units, of the United States forces in the European Theater as of 17 July 1945 is shown in the accompanying chart.

EUROPEAN THEATER ORGANIZATION
17 JULY 1945



NOTES:

- A. SIXTH ARMY GROUP NOT INCLUDED BECAUSE IT CONTAINED NO TROOPS AND WAS DISBANDED 20 JULY 1945 TWELFTH ARMY GROUP BECAME NON-OPERATIONAL 26 JULY 1945.
- B. THIRD AND SEVENTH ARMY COMMANDERS ALSO COMMANDED THE EASTERN & WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS RESPECTIVELY.
- C. UNDER TECHNICAL CONTROL OF THEATER QUARTERMASTER.
- D. OCCUPIED AND CONTROLLED BY FIRST AIRBORNE ARMY.
- E. FOR ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY ONLY.
- F. OPERATIONAL CONTROL ONLY.
- G. BOTH IN SAME AREA - BREMEN ENCLAVE.

Chapter V

THE MATURATION OF THE POLICIES AND ORGANIZATION OF THE OCCUPATION

THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE

102. Preparations for the Conference.

a. Toward the end of June 1945, U.S. Headquarters, Berlin District, and Headquarters First Airborne Army were entrusted with the responsibility of organizing and preparing a site for the proposed "Big Three" conference. On 16 June 1945, Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Parks, then commanding Berlin District and First Airborne Army, received instructions to proceed to Berlin to confer with representatives of Marshal Zhukov regarding the use of a neutral meeting area for the proposed three-power conference which was then scheduled to begin about 15 July.(1)

b. General Parks and his party arrived in Berlin on 22 June 1945 and were conducted by their Soviet hosts to Babelsberg, a residential town just east of Potsdam. A preliminary ground reconnaissance party arrived in Babelsberg the next day. The Soviet forces at first permitted the Americans 50 officers, 175 enlisted men, and 50 vehicles in Babelsberg but by the time the principal American conferencees had arrived on 15 July, the military personnel in the compound had increased to 3,238 officers and men.(2)

c. The target date set for the completion of all work at Babelsberg was 13 July, two days before the date scheduled for the arrival of the first conferencees. It was estimated that approximately 4,800 persons, including an official party of 500, accompanying administrative personnel of 300, press representatives numbering 500, and security, air force, and service personnel of 3,500, would make up the American representation at the conference. (3)

103. Sessions.

The Tripartite Conference popularly known as the Potsdam Conference, opened on 17 July 1945, when the President of the United States, Harry S. Truman, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, J.V. Stalin, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Winston S. Churchill, each accompanied by the foreign secretary of his government, met in the Cecilienhof, at Potsdam, near Berlin. Clement R. Attlee, soon to replace Churchill as British prime minister, was also present with the British delegation. After the ninth meeting, the conference was interrupted for two days and resumed on 28 July, when the results of the British general election had been declared. Attlee, as the newly elected Prime Minister, now replaced Churchill in the Conference, which continued until 2 August 1945.

104. Agreements.

Agreement was reached on the political and economic principles of the policy to be followed by the occupying powers with regard to Germany. These principles were, on the whole, those agreed upon in the Crimea Conference in February 1945. In the Tripartite Conference at Potsdam, they were amplified. In addition, certain problems of an international character were discussed, such as the future boundaries of Poland and the expulsion of German civilians from newly liberated areas.

a. Political Principles.

The agreement provided for the general denazification of Germany, for the removal from office of all persons with former Nazi affiliations, and for the punishment of war criminals. Efforts were to be directed towards a decentralization of political structure and a development of local responsibility, to be accomplished by the restoration of local self-government on democratic principles and the encouragement of all political parties. For the time being, no central German Government was to be established.

b. Economic Principles.

In the organization of German economy, primary emphasis was to be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries. All production of war materials was prohibited. During the period of occupation, Germany was to be treated as a single economic unit.(4)

c. Reparations.

Reparation claims of each of the occupying powers were to be met by removal of property from their respective zones of occupation and by appropriation of German external assets.

The Soviet Union, in addition, would receive from the western zones, in exchange for an equivalent value of food and other commodities later to be agreed upon, 15 percent of such usable capital equipment from the metallurgical, chemical, and machine manufacturing industries as was not necessary for the German peace economy; and another 10 percent of such industrial equipment as was unnecessary for the German peace economy, to be transferred from the western zones without payment or exchange of any kind in return.(5)

d. General Occupation Policies.

The Conference adopted as general occupation policy that the commander in chief of each zone would exercise supreme authority in his own zone and that the four commanders would act jointly in matters affecting Germany as a whole.(6) Treatment of the German population was to be uniform throughout Germany as far as possible.(7)

e. International Policy.

Agreement was reached on certain matters of international policy. Although the western frontier of Poland--the future boundary between Germany and Poland--was not yet definitely determined at the Conference, it was decided that, pending settlement of the frontier, all former German territory lying east of the Oder River, including that part of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Soviet Union, should be under the administration of Poland and should not be considered a part of the Soviet Zone of occupation in Germany.(8) It was also agreed that German civilian populations residing within the limits of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary would be expelled and sent into occupied Germany. It was stressed that these transfers must be effected in an orderly and humane manner. The governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, which had been expelling the German civilian population prior to the meeting at Potsdam, were directed to suspend further expulsions pending a study by the Allied Control Council, which was to determine, among other things, the equitable distribution of these expelled Germans among the four occupation zones.(9)

THE REORGANIZATION OF THE EUROPEAN THEATER AND THE SERVICES FORCES

105. The Adjustment of Theater Organization.

The period from 18 July to 31 December 1945 was one of considerable reorganization, at all levels, of the elements constituting the European Theater.

a. The army group formation was eliminated by the disbandment of 6th(10) and 12th Army Groups(11) and the redesignation of 21st Army Group Headquarters as Headquarters, British Army of the Rhine.(12) The area occupied by the United States, exclusive of the Berlin Sector and the Bonn Enclave, was divided into the Eastern Military District and the Western Military District.(13)

b. On the major command level, September saw the discontinuance of the Assembly Area Command and the transfer of its functions and personnel to Oise Intermediate Section.(14) In December, United Kingdom Base was discontinued and its functions and personnel were transferred to London Area Office;(15) the Bonn Enclave ceased to exist with the transfer to the British of that territory, except for the ports of Bonn and Bonn-haven;(16) and on 29 December, a new command, Continental Base Section, was formed from Headquarters, Advanced Section.(17)

c. A change also occurred in Theater command: on 11 November, General Eisenhower left the Theater and Gen. George S. Patton served as temporary Theater Commander until 26 November, when Gen. Joseph T. McNarney arrived and became Theater Commander.(18)

d. There was a major organizational change in the Air Forces on 16 August, when the U.S. Strategic and Tactical Air Forces was redesignated U.S. Air Forces in Europe and reorganized into an occupation air force.(19) The 9th Air Force became the basic unit, with units of the 8th, 12th and 15th Air Forces. The Air Transport Command and the Army Air Forces Communications Service were attached to and received logistical support from Theater Service Forces, as directed by Theater Headquarters.

106. The Reorganization of Service Forces.

The major organizational change, however, concerned the Service Forces, which at the beginning of the period functioned under the control of Headquarters, Communications Zone.

a. Preliminaries to the Change.

The functions of the chiefs of services had been defined in the Theater organization plan of 12 June 1945. They were to remain under a subordinate headquarters, with their activities somewhat reduced in scope from what they had been during combat.(20) Several of the elements of the Communications Zone staff had been transferred to the new Theater Headquarters when it was established in Frankfurt am Main on 1 July 1945, and the plan for that headquarters called for a separation

from the Communications Zone, with which it had been closely interwoven up to that time. Planning for the new service headquarters started in July, and on 21 July the announcement was made that Theater administrative and supply services would be combined and that a new headquarters, to be known as Headquarters, Theater Service Forces, European Theater, would be activated on 1 August 1945.(21)

b. Establishment of Theater Service Forces, European Theater.

The order which called for the reorganization was published on 21 July 1945.(22) and the new Headquarters became operative on 1 August, with Lt. Gen. John C. H. Lee continuing in command until 29 December, when his place was taken by Maj. Gen. Carter B. Magruder.(23) The newly activated headquarters took over all installations and functions which had previously been assigned to the Communications Zone. It was divided into a main echelon at Frankfurt and a rear echelon at Paris. The Paris headquarters was the normal channel of communication with Army Service Forces and the Zone of the Interior ports until 3 December 1945.(24) Each staff division, however, was directed to establish its main headquarters at Frankfurt as soon as practicable, and after 3 December the principal functions, except redeployment, were performed there. On 1 August the total personnel employed by the service forces amounted to slightly more than 2,000,000.(25) The headquarters included a general and a special staff, the Theater chiefs of services being special staff officers for the commanding generals of both the Theater and the Theater Service Forces. The relationship between the two staffs remained the same as under the Communications Zone.(26)

c. Reorganization of Subordinate Commands of Theater Service Forces.

With the inauguration of Headquarters, Theater Service Forces, European Theater, certain technical commands were established under the commanding general:(27) the Theater Motor Transport Service, the Military Railway Service, and the Theater Inland Waterways Transport Service, all three being under the technical command of the Chief of Transportation, United States Forces, European Theater, the Military Pipelines Service, until its inactivation on 1 October;(28) and the American Graves Registration Service, which was redesignated American Graves Registration Command on 1 October 1945 and assigned to the supervision of the Theater Chief Quartermaster.(29)

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT

107. Over-All Trend.

The trend of organization in Germany took the form of a gradual evolution from military to civil government. During combat operations, military government was secondary to military operations, and although the responsibility for military government was assigned to the Supreme Commander, this responsibility was subordinate to that of defeating the enemy. Full responsibility remained with the military commander until the military government machinery could be set up. In the period immediately following the end of hostilities, therefore, the military government detachments that took up their positions with tactical units had only local jurisdiction.(30) Their integration into a military government for larger areas came later.

108. Territorial Basis for Established Military Government.

That one of the prime requisites for a system of military government was a settled territorial subdivision of the area to be governed had been recognized in the early directives, which called for the establishment of military government on the pattern of existing German political and administrative areas. The exigencies of combat, however, had led to a changing distribution of area responsibility among tactical units in which the following of local administrative boundaries was more or less a matter of chance. The friction which developed from the ensuing conflict of jurisdiction led to the policy of following German internal boundaries for all purposes connected with military government, which became standard practice under static conditions. The first major step in the direction of stabilization came in September 1945, with the division of the United States Zone into the three states of Grosshessen, Wurttemberg-Baden, and Bavaria, each with a state government empowered to enact state legislation and exercise other state governmental powers, subject to the supervision of Military Government, regional offices of which functioned in each state.(31)

109. Early Chain of Military Government Command.

With the stabilization of the occupation came the definition of a chain of command for military government, passing from Theater Headquarters to the commanders of Third and Seventh Armies, also designated as the commanders of the Military Districts, and from them through a "Territorial military government detachment chain of command," which ran parallel to the German civil administrative chain of command.(32) This was the first complete chain of command for military government and it was notable in that it was independent of the tactical chain.

110. Development and Stabilization on the Headquarters Level.

A corresponding evolution and final stabilization occurred in the headquarters organization of military government. The original bodies from which the final organizations of the Office of Military Government developed were the G-5 Divisions of Supreme Headquarters and Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, and the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany).

a. G-5 Division.

In the early period, G-5 Divisions functioned at Supreme Headquarters, European Theater of Operations and Communications Zone, the last two of which were interrelated. At the dissolution of Supreme Headquarters, its G-5 Division was consolidated with the G-5 Division of the European Theater of Operations and became the G-5 Division of U.S. Forces, European Theater. The responsibilities of this division were the control and supervision of the normal functions of German civil government at all echelons below the national level. It was composed of nine branches: executive, internal affairs, legal, financial, economics, trade and commerce, displaced persons, public health, and industry. On 1 October, the G-5 Division was redesignated Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone). (33)

b. U.S. Group Control Council (Germany). (34)

On the same date the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany) was redesignated Office of Military Government (U.S.). (35)

III. Division of Functions.

These two units composed the military government staff of the Theater Commander. The functions of the Office of Military Government (U.S.) were: to furnish the United States element of the Allied Control Authority for Germany; to develop major military government policies for, and to supervise military government activities in, the United States Zone, covering local government and civil services, education and religious affairs, public welfare, postal service, finance, courts and prisons, displaced persons, economics, industry, newspaper, radio, and theaters. The functions of Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone) were: to supervise within the Zone United States military government policies; to supervise United States civil affairs in liberated countries; to supervise restitutions, supply, control, coal, currency depositories, rail transportation, safety, health, denazification, displaced persons and refugees,

and election returns; to direct military government in the
Bronen Enclave through the commanding general of Bronen Port
Command.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THEATER HEADQUARTERS AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT

112. Measures toward a Separation.

Experience brought a more efficient division of functions and responsibilities between the military command and the military government authorities. In general, the tendency was to classify any matter relating to the control of the civil population and the political, economic, and cultural life of Germany as a military government responsibility, and any matter concerning the security of the zone or requiring a large personnel for guard duty or administration as the responsibility of the purely military elements of the occupation forces. Immediately after the redesignation of the G-5 Division as the Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone), military government activity began to be further separated from other Theater functions. In October 1945 a memorandum was issued to all branch chiefs of the Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone) instructing them to make a detailed study of the problems within their area of responsibility in the light of the following principles: The field forces of the Army and Theater Headquarters would have no direct military government functions, but would be available to maintain the security of our forces and the authority of military government when required. The administrative and technical services of the Army would provide the following: administrative support; rations, clothing; and petroleum stocks; and pay of United States military and civilian personnel in the military government organization. In all other matters, the military government organization would depend upon German civilian agencies and personnel for supplies and services. Direct communication was authorized between the regional offices and the Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone); control of the German civil authorities was to be carried out at the regional level.(36)

113. Transfer of Information Control Functions.

The Information Control Division, which was a staff division of Theater Headquarters, was discontinued on 10 December 1945(37) and its functions were reallocated to military government offices.

114. Responsibility for Displaced Persons.

At the time of the inauguration of the Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone), responsibility for formulation of policy on displaced persons passed to the new organization. Control and supply of displaced persons, however, was left with the tactical forces, and a number of detachments which had been detailed to this duty continued to operate under corps and Army control.(38)

POLICIES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

115. Final Establishment of Occupation in Austria.

a. One of the earliest major accomplishments of this period was the final establishment of the occupation in Austria.(39) On 19 August the advance headquarters of U.S. Forces Austria moved into Vienna; after a series of conferences with Soviet officials, the commanders in chief of the other three occupying powers Gen. Mark Clark, Lt. Gen. Sir Richard McCreery, and Gen. Mario-Emile Bethouart, moved into the city on 23 August. The Soviet forces were under the command of Marshal Ivan S. Koniev.(40)

b. By September 1945 the United States Sector of Vienna was established, comprising the districts of Neubau, Josefstadt, Alsergrund, Währing, Döbling, and the northern part of Hernals adjoining Währing.(41) On 11 September the Allied Control Council met for the first time.

c. Two of the major achievements of quadripartite control during this period were the extension through the whole of Austria of the power of the Provisional Government under Dr. Karl Renner on 20 October, and the preparations for, and supervision of, the first free elections for the national and provincial legislatures of the postwar period. This was held on 25 November 1945, with approximately 93 percent of the registered voters participating. Eighty-five Volkspartei members, 76 Social Democrats, and 4 Communists were elected to the Nationalrat, or lower House of Parliament; Volkspartei majorities were elected to the provincial legislatures in all the Lander except Vienna and Karnten (a Land of the British Zone), where socialists formed the majority. Leopold Figl, chairman of the Volkspartei, was elected chancellor of the new government, which was formally approved on 14 December by the Executive Committee of the Allied Control Council.(42)

116. Denazification.

a. One of the major purposes of the occupation of Germany was to eradicate from German life all evidences of nazism; one of the first steps was to attack the Nazi Party itself. It was dissolved, its funds and property were confiscated, its records and headquarters were seized, and its leaders were arrested and interned. All Nazi schools and newspapers were abolished, and Nazi propaganda was prohibited. All auxiliary organizations of the Nazi Party, including the youth groups, were swept away. All laws and practices based upon the Nazi philosophy, or involving discriminations on grounds of race, color, religion, or political opinions, were suspended by the military commanders and later repealed by the Allied Control Council. By the end of 1945, approximately 110,000 Germans had been arrested, of whom almost 50,000 were in automatic arrest categories. About 80,000 enemy civilian internees were in the custody of the army.

b. Denazification of the German government and institutions was begun in the earliest stages of military government. In the reconstitution of the civil administration, appointment of Nazis was avoided with the greatest care. Naturally, some crept in by falsifying their records, but they were thrown out later. In the early months of the occupation, the efforts of the military government authorities were concentrated upon the denazification of the government, and especially of its essential services. Denazification of the police was announced officially as complete in December 1945. Military Government Law No. 8, which became effective on 26 September 1945, began the process of denazifying German industry, business, and institutions other than the government. It excluded members of the Nazi Party from all employment in which they would have responsibility or authority, restricting them to the lowest clerical positions and common labor. All Germans were required to register with the authorities, stating the facts as to their membership in the Nazi Party, and the trial of all members of the Nazi Party above nominal participants was contemplated.

117. Civil Government.

a. The first obligation of an occupying power is to restore and maintain law and order. The victorious Allied armies found in Germany no national government worthy of the name and hardly any county and local governments capable of functioning with any degree of efficiency. The whole governmental structure was so completely tied to nazism that it crumbled, along with the party and military machines. In the circumstances, the

conquerors had to man the essential services in order to get public utilities to functioning, to furnish a police force in order to forestall an outbreak of crime and sabotage, and to set up its own courts in order to try offenders expeditiously. After these first urgent steps were taken, the occupying force could begin setting up local and high administrations and turning back to the inhabitants a degree of responsibility for their own government.

b. No branch of the German government was more thoroughly nazified than the police and the courts. In the United States Zone, it was necessary to tear them down almost completely and build anew. The Nazi national police, the Gestapo, was broken up completely; so also was the political police. Some elements of the criminal and municipal police and of the local fire departments were found to be untainted and suitable for incorporation in the new organizations. With these as nuclei, new personnel was screened, employed, trained, and put into services in the new Military Government police and fire departments. By November the new police had been so successful in winning the confidence of all concerned that the military commander had begun to issue arms and ammunition to them.

c. All German courts were closed and justice was administered exclusively in military government courts. The notorious Nazi People's Court was abolished. Personnel was sought to man new German courts and in August 1945 German courts gradually began to function under Military Government supervision.

d. After provisional governments had been established generally at the municipal and county levels, three Lander, or states, were constituted on 19 September 1945, each headed by a minister president. All the members of the Land governments had to be confirmed by the appropriate Office of Military Government. On 17 October 1945 was inaugurated a consultative council known as the Landerrat, composed of the ministers president of the three Lander and the German chief administrator of the Brennen Enclave.

118. Political Progress in Germany.

a. Revival of Political Parties.

Stimulus was given to political organization and activity by the announcement on 2 August 1945 of the decision of the Tripartite Conference in Berlin to permit and encourage throughout Germany, as a step toward the reconstruction of German life on a democratic and peaceful

basis, all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion. Up to this time all political activity had been banned in the United States Zone. Although the ban continued in effect during all of August, informal and preparatory organizational work began, with communists and social democrats most active. On 27 August a revised directive was promulgated for the United States Zone, under which military government officers might accept and approve applications to form "democratic political parties to engage in political activities at Kreis level."(43)

b. Party Newspaper.

In Berlin four organized parties were already functioning when United States forces occupied the United States Sector of the city, the Soviet military authorities having granted them permission to organize. Each party published a newspaper, whose editorial office and printing establishment were in the Soviet occupied area, and all papers were subjected to Soviet censorship.(44) The first party papers in the United States Zone appeared on the streets of Munich on 26 January 1946, the day before the first elections were held in Bavaria.(45)

c. Increase of Political Activity.

Political activity was comparatively great in the larger cities during September. In the smaller cities, however, it was slight, and in most rural districts it was nonexistent. There was no mass demand for political organization. That which occurred was inspired by a few leaders, most of whom had been active before 1933.(46) Organized political activity increased during October, although the public, absorbed in the business of merely keeping alive and preparing for the coming winter, showed little interest. In October, the communists applied for authorization to organize on a Land level in Bavaria and there was some indication of organization on a national level. Communist programs appeared to be in close agreement in all zones.(47) On 23 November political parties were authorized on a Land level,(48) and organization got well under way in the United States Zone in December for the local elections scheduled for the last two Sundays in January.

119. Labor Unions.

a. One of the points agreed upon in the Tripartite Conference of Berlin was the right of the German people to form free trade unions. General Eisenhower said in his message of 8 August to the German people: "You will be permitted to form local unions and to engage in local political activities. An initial aim of trade unions and political

parties should be to help in the measures necessary now to prepare for the coming winter."

b. By July 1945 interest in the organization of unions was growing, and a material increase in labor organization was expected as a result of the decision of the Tripartite Conference.(49) Unions were already being formed in nine of the fifteen Kreise of northern Wurtemberg. In Stuttgart, there had been active labor organization since the first days of the occupation and the leadership was of an unusually high type. In Nurnberg, fifty work councils had been permitted to organize on a provisional basis. Meetings of labor groups were held in Mannheim, where a well-organized general trade union was operating. Initiation fees were usually one Reichsmark and the low dues were computed on a sliding scale based on earnings. Almost without exception, the labor organizations were initiated by pro-1933 leaders. Workers were admitted regardless of craft or industry. Political, confessional, and previous trade-union commitments were deliberately avoided, and a strong desire to break with the past was evident. Denazification was the first objective.(50)

c. During August activity leading to the formation of trade unions increased throughout the United States Zone, and one organization operating on an interzonal basis was reported to be active in the British and Soviet Zones.

120. Reparations and Restitution.

The principle that Germany would be required to restore the property removed by her from occupied countries was announced in the Allied Declaration of 5 January 1943 at London. The principle that Germany would be required to deliver reparations in kind was agreed to by the Allied Governments in the Yalta Conference. The Potsdam Agreement elaborated upon both of those principles. Until near the end of 1945, little progress was made in either reparations or restitution, as detailed international agreements were needed in both fields. Reparations in kind were made extensively in one form even during the first months of the occupation, large numbers of German prisoners of war being held as elements of the labor force of Allied countries. A beginning was made in the dismantling of German industry for reparations deliveries when 156 plants in the United States Zone were marked for this purpose by the Economic Directorate, and twenty-four of these were allocated as "advance reparations" on 1 October 1945. By the end of November, the dismantling of ten of these had been finished or was in progress. Only small quantities of artistic and industrial material were

restored to their rightful owners from the United States Zone in 1945, as the Allied Powers had at that time not agreed upon a definition of restitution.

121. Economic Problems.

a. The economic life of Germany was paralyzed after the surrender. The war took a tremendous toll in damaged factories, broken lines of transportation, disruption of the systems of distribution, and depletion and dispersion of the labor force. German economy probably reached its lowest ebb in June 1945, when industrial production was not over 2 percent of existing capacity and the normal food ration was only about 900 calories per day. The prospects of recovery were poor, since Germany was divided into four zones whose borders were practically insurmountable economic barriers across which almost no trade was carried on during the first year of the occupation.

b. The Potsdam Agreement was a milestone in the development of economic policy for Germany in its assertion of the principle that the whole country should be treated as an economic unit. No progress was made, however, in bringing about the economic unity of Germany. The agencies of the United States forces of occupation charged with the economic control of Germany were therefore forced to proceed with a policy looking to a limited rehabilitation of the United States Zone.

c. Certain kinds of economic endeavor were stimulated as much as possible: agriculture, brown coal production, railways, inland water transport, electric power. Postal communications were brought back into operation by October. Where possible, plants providing essential peacetime items like soap, leather, shoes, and textiles were allowed to resume production. By the end of 1945, industrial production had risen to about 10 percent of existing capacity, and the normal daily ration had been increased to 1550 calories. To maintain the latter, however, it was necessary to begin, in January 1946, the direct importation of foodstuffs from the United States.

d. Steps were taken during these early months of the occupation to prevent Germany's war industry from coming to life. A comprehensive survey of industry for the purpose of identifying war plants was begun in May 1945, and no plants capable of being diverted to war production were allowed to reopen. The demilitarization of German industry was begun in November with the destruction of the first war plant.

122. The Restoration of Freedom.

The accomplishments of military government during the first few months of the occupation may best be summed up in terms of the rights and liberties of the individual German citizen. As a consequence of the Allied victory, Germany was freed from the domination of one of the most ruthless dictatorships of modern times. The instruments of oppression--the Nazi hierarchy, the military caste, the intelligence service, the Gestapo, the political police, and the concentration camps--had all been swept away. All political prisoners had been set free, unless there was a good reason related to security for holding them. The bombardment of Nazi propaganda in the press and by radio was silenced; in its place, the Germans had the beginnings of a free press and radio. Religious freedom had been reestablished, and the surviving Jews had been freed from Nazi persecution. A good beginning had been made in reopening the schools and in providing free education without political and militaristic propaganda. Limited public rights had been granted in the freedom to associate in political parties and trade-unions, and to hold some kinds of public assemblies. The Nazi domination of the theater, motion pictures, music, and art had been broken. To be sure, the German population had been plunged by war into want for the necessities of life--food, clothing, and shelter. It cannot be said that the German citizen enjoyed the full rights of a citizen of a democratic state--but the groundwork had been laid for the freedom of the individual and the regeneration of the German nation.

POLICIES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES FORCES

123. Destruction of German Fortifications.

a. During the early months of the occupation, German military installations such as airfields, ordnance plants, and weapons emplacements were identified, surveyed, and inventoried. All large ammunition dumps and storage depots of the German armed forces were found. All installations that were a hazard to the occupying forces or the civil population were promptly destroyed, placed under guard, or marked with warning signs. The destruction of mine fields, underground factories, and permanent fortifications was a task that was to continue for a long time. By the end of 1945, the network of fortifications and defensive works was

almost completely surveyed, but only about one-quarter demolished.

b. German defensive works and fortifications were divided, for the purpose of destruction, into two groups. First priority was given to those installations which constituted an immediate hazard to occupation forces or which could immediately be utilized for war purposes without additional construction or production. Second priority was given to those installations which could not be utilized without additional construction for resumption of German war industries. The Allied Control Authority set the target date of 6 June 1951 for complete destruction.

124. Surplus Property.

No reliable estimates of the amount of surplus property were made before about 1 October 1945. It was then estimated that there was in the Theater 10,480,000 long tons of surplus material valued at \$10,322,000,000. Although the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner was established in September 1945 and negotiations were begun for the sale of surplus property in Europe, relatively slow progress was made until 1946 due to the lack of complete disposal instructions and the limited dollar credit of prospective buyers.

125. On V-E Day the United States forces had 36,260 pieces of requisitioned property in the United Kingdom and the liberated countries. By November 1945 these real estate holdings had been reduced to 28,000. Real estate holdings in the occupied areas of Germany and Austria by this time totaled 27,000 pieces. The highest priorities for new construction were given in 1945 to the redeployment program and the repair of Bremen and Bremerhaven as the principal ports of supply for the occupation forces.

126. Black Market Curbs.

On 15 September 1945, General Eisenhower prepared a statement which was read to all troops, explaining regulations designed to curb black marketing. Troops were ordered not to sell or exchange articles issued or sold to them by the Army, while Germans were forbidden to deal in those goods. (51)

127. Further Relaxation of Nonfraternization Order.

In Austria, all restrictions on fraternization were removed on 24 August 1945, except when this involved known Nazis or was directed toward marriage. Later, in November,

marriage with Austrians was allowed. In Germany a similar, though slower, development was taking place. On 1 October 1945, the Allied Control Council lifted all restrictions on fraternization, except for marriage and billeting. Control over these two aspects was reserved to commanders of the United States, British, and French Zones. The Council's action did not affect the Soviet forces, since they had not adopted any regulations governing fraternization. In a message to United States troops, General Eisenhower stressed the strict prohibition against marriage with Germans and billeting of troops with German families.(52)

128. Administration and Repatriation of Displaced Persons.

Every possible effort was made to repatriate United Nations displaced persons before winter, in view of the anticipated shortages of food and fuel in Germany. Some categories of displaced persons presented especially difficult problems: these were stateless persons, nonrepatriable persons, and the Jews. By August 1945, it was the policy of the United States that stateless and nonrepatriable persons, such as Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, and ex-enemy nationals persecuted because of race, religion or activities in favor of the United Nations, should be granted the same assistance as United Nations displaced persons. Special centers were established for those people, with United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration teams in charge. Numerous special Jewish assembly centers, such as those at Zeilsheim, Landsberg, and Wolfratshausen, were established. In order to prevent a breakdown of morale, the Central Tracing Bureau made every effort to trace members of families who had long been separated. In October 1945, special rations were authorized for persons persecuted under the Nazi regime. Efforts were also made to employ nonrepatriable displaced persons, and by the end of 1945 steps had been taken to effect a complete registration, showing their skills. Work projects were being developed, in cooperation with the military authorities, and displaced persons were given first priority on these projects. In November and December 1945, transportation difficulties revolving around the lack of fuel resulted in a static period of repatriation movements. Only 40,785 displaced persons were repatriated in November, and 578 in December, leaving 313,444 in camps and 167,644 outside the camps. The total number of displaced persons repatriated by the end of December 1945 was 2,709,127.(53)

129. The Repatriation of Liberated Prisoners of War.

a. By the end of June 1945, repatriation of 91,252 liberated American prisoners of war was regarded as complete, although 114 remained in hospitals.(54)

b. The vast majority of liberated prisoners of war of all nationalities except Polish and Yugoslav were repatriated by the month of August 1945. In the early fall of 1945, the policy as respects Poles was that they would be repatriated only if their homes were west of the line fixed in 1939 as the line of demarcation between the Soviet and German spheres of control, and if the individual was willing to be repatriated.(55) Yugoslavs were not to be repatriated pending a decision by the State Department.(56) A law enacted in Yugoslavia on 23 August 1945 deprived of citizenship all members of the Yugoslav Army, liberated from German custody and resident abroad, who did not declare their readiness to be repatriated before 15 December 1945.

c. The practice of forming Civilian Guard Companies and Labor Service Companies from ex-prisoners and displaced persons not desiring repatriation, mostly Polish in nationality, was instituted in the summer of 1945.

d. The official end of operations in the repatriation of recovered allied military personnel was marked by the rescission of the Theater standing operating procedure on 1 October 1945.

130. The Punishment of War Criminals.

a. Establishment of the International Military Tribunal.

Plans for an inter-Allied war crimes tribunal were drafted by representatives of the occupying powers at London in a conference which began on 26 June. The conference drafted a charter and established the International Military Tribunal, before which Nazi organizations and major criminals whose crimes had no particular geographic location were brought to justice. Under the terms of the charters, war crimes were defined in three categories: crime against peace, crimes against humanity, and crimes against international laws and usages of war.(57)

b. Number of War Criminals.

The task ahead was a big one. The Central Registry of War Criminals and Security Suspects, originally located in Paris, already had the names of approximately 18,000 alleged war criminals in its files. By the end of 1945, 5,000 more names were under preparation. To try these, together with all the members of the organizations found guilty by the International Military Tribunal, presented a problem of tremendous proportions. It was estimated that

to try 100,000 individuals so that each would appear before a tribunal composed of three judges, would take the time of 375 judges for a period of four months, if one hour were allotted to each accused. (58)

c. Responsibilities.

By Theater directive of 20 September 1945, (59) staff responsibility was placed on the Theater Judge Advocate, whose office thus became the principal agency for the investigation and prosecution of war crimes. In addition, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, was given the responsibility for the apprehension of the persons designated by the Theater Judge Advocate as suspects or witnesses.

d. Delegation of Responsibility to German Courts.

In order to lighten the gigantic task of trying all war criminals, a plan was submitted to the War Department on 5 December 1945 wherein it was proposed that special courts be constituted by Military Government, with the Office of Chief of Counsel controlling the flow of cases as a part of its authority to direct the trial of Axis war criminals. (60) Provided the victim was not a United Nations national, the accused was to be tried before a German court unless he was a major war criminal wanted by the International Military Tribunal. This plan was approved on 18 January 1946. (61) The burden of the Theater Commander with respect to punishment of war criminals was reduced further by a law of 20 December 1945, issued by the Allied Control Council, according to which the main group of persons to be tried before German criminal courts were those who had committed crimes on racial, religious, or political grounds. By this measure the German people were made to share some of the responsibility for the punishment of the guilty among them. (62)

e. Major War Criminals.

The Committee of Chief Prosecutors for the Investigation and Prosecution of War Criminals prepared a list of major war criminals which was announced on 29 August 1945. The names on the lists were: (63) Hermann Wilhelm Göring, Rudolf Höss, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Robert Ley, Alfred Rosenberg, Hans Frank, Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Dr. Wilhelm Frick, Julius Streicher, Wilhelm Keitel, Dr. Walther Funk, Baron Constantin von Neurath, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen and Halbach, Karl Dönitz, Baldur von Schirach, Fritz Sauckel, Albert Speer, Martin Bormann, Franz von Papen, Alfred Jodl, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Erich Raeder, Hans Fritzsche. These defendants were tried in the war crimes trials at Nuremberg which opened on 21 November 1945.

f. Other Trials.

By the end of 1945, considerable progress had been made. In September the Luneberg trials had begun, with an indictment against forty-nine war criminals; (64) on 8 October, in Wiesbaden, seven Germans were placed on trial for the mass murder of 500 Polish and Soviet slave laborers in a mental hospital; (65) the Dachau concentration camp cases were being tried before a military commission; (66) and the groundwork for other cases, such as the Malmedy Massacre and Mauthausen concentration camp atrocities, was rapidly being laid.

THE POLICE-TYPE OCCUPATION

131. Changing Concepts of the Occupation.

a. By the fall of 1945, it had become clear that the occupation forces would not have to cope with a strong resistance movement in Germany, as had been feared before the end of hostilities. German plans for underground activities had been in a formative stage at the time of the unconditional surrender, and the early apprehension of key figures of the SS, SD, and Gestapo had deprived a potential resistance of its leadership. In the early months of the occupation, the most serious threats to security were offered by disorderly displaced persons and German youths, some of whom were disposed to form secret organizations of a subversive character. There was no further need for the overwhelming show of force which had been made in achieving the victory and during the first months of the occupation.

b. Many of the short-term objectives of the occupation were quickly accomplished. These included measures such as the disbandment of the German armed forces, the destruction of the Nazi Party and its affiliated organizations, the imprisonment of the political police, and the breaking-up of the German general staff. To accomplish the long-range objectives of the occupation such as the punishment of war criminals, the destruction of Germany's war potential, and the reeducation of the German people in the ways of democracy, a long period of occupation had to be contemplated.

c. The original plans for the occupation called for the stationing in Germany of relatively large field forces, organized at first into two armies. This may be characterized as an army-type occupation, and it depended upon the conversion of ordinary combat units into occupation forces. The European Theater was, however, soon notified by

Washington that large field forces of the army-type would not be available for the control of the German people. From this fact arose the concept of the police-type occupation. Its central idea--that an occupied nation may best be controlled by a relatively small but highly mobile and especially trained security force--cannot be attributed to any individual or any single agency. Part of the concept came from the War Department, while many aspects of the organization and functions of the security force, or constabulary, were developed from practical experience in the occupation of Germany.

132. The Constabulary and the Tactical Reserve.

The knowledge that only a relatively small force would be available for the long-term occupation of Germany forced the command of the European Theater to consider the most efficient use of the manpower that would be available. In the fall of 1945 thought along this line began to crystallize, and certain ideas gained general acceptance. Granted that a large portion of the strength available would have to be used as headquarters and service troops, it was believed that most efficient use could be made of the troops available for security and the control of the German population by setting up a relatively small, but highly trained and mobile super-police force, or constabulary, to be supported by the remainder of the troops, which would be held in a tactical reserve. It was calculated that the constabulary should have a strength of about 30,000 and that the tactical reserve should consist of three mobile combat divisions. The former, operating by a system of roving patrols, would provide for the general security of the area of Germany occupied by the U.S. Army and would enforce upon the civil population the edicts of the Military Government. The latter, held in strategic locations, would be available to back up the constabulary in any emergency. The only apparent disadvantage in this plan was that the number of mobile ground combat forces would be so limited as to prevent any action outside the United States-occupied areas, in case forces were needed for strategic support of other Allied forces or for the implementation of national policy in other parts of Europe. The major underlying assumption in the adoption of the police-type occupation was that the other United Nations in Europe would cooperate in the maintenance of peace by upholding law and order in their areas of responsibility.(67)

133. The Proposal for a Superpolice Force.

General Eisenhower outlined the theory of the police-type occupation to General Marshall on 8 October 1945 and proposed a pyramided superpolice system with mobile tactical units in

reserve, as follows:(68) a "city" and "country" police composed of Germans or Austrians, supervised by Military Government, for the enforcement of military government ordinances in addition to usual police duties; a "state" police composed of specially trained, highly mobile United States units of the mechanized-cavalry-squadron type, which would be given a security patrol mission; an organization of centrally controlled United States counterintelligence agents; and United States combat formations of regimental strength or larger, located in principal communications and administrative centers and capable of rapid movement to threatened places.

134. Communication of the Plan to Commanders.

Late in October, General Eisenhower communicated the plan to all headquarters in the European Theater. He described the pyramided police system as a U.S. constabulary working over the local city and country German police. It would be responsible to the civil governor of the United States Zone, while the supporting troops would be organized under the United States military command. No strategic reserve was to be retained, but each district was to maintain certain troops on an alert basis as a local reserve prepared to furnish forces for emergency use. The various headquarters were requested to submit by 1 November proposals for the tactical disposition of troops based on these principles.(69)

135. The Problems of Activating a Constabulary.

During November the plan was put into operation on an experimental basis. A small-scale trial group began operations in the Eastern Military District about the middle of the month as a supplement to the normal combat units having occupation duties. The lessons learned were to be utilized in putting the plan into full operation by 1 July 1946. By that time the winter would be over, the new harvest would be reaching the people, and the basic assumption underlying the plan--that the German people were relatively quiescent--would be well tested. Furthermore, the shift at that time would coincide with what was then accepted as the target date for "civilianizing" the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.), as it was then anticipated that the German and Austrian people would be governing themselves with only minimum control. It was assumed that the major functions of Theater troops pertaining to displaced persons, prisoners of war, and surplus property would be substantially finished, as well as tasks in liberated countries. (70) The plan contemplated a constabulary unit that would patrol a fixed area and, through high mobility, be capable of supporting adjacent constabulary units. Activities were to be coordinated with German local and frontier police through military government officers at local levels and through normal

staff coordination at Thoator level. The proposed strength of the constabulary was based on the size of the area covered and its population. The estimate for the mobile combat force was three divisions, made up of two armored and one motorized infantry divisions concentrated in regimontal or larger strengths near the centers of population and disposod so as to be ablo to reach all areas of their operational range.(71)

136. Opposition to the Plan.

Despite the opposition of the Provost Marshal to the proposed division in the security command,(72) recommendations were submitted to the War Department on 22 December for a separate constabulary unit.(73)

137. Planning for the Constabulary Program.

a. The Third Army was made responsible for the organization of the force and was provided with preliminary planning data. The Public Safety Branch, Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone), assisted in working out the program and in coordinating constabulary functions with the Counter Intelligence Corps, the military police, the German civil police, and other agencies.

b. The constabulary was to be developed as an elite force of the highest caliber United States personnel available, and no over-age or limited-duty men were to be used. If practicable, the troops were all to be reenlisted veterans. Their period of training was set at ninety days. The use of foreign nationals was considered for some time, but it was finally decided that it would weaken such a centrally controlled system by creating language and training difficulties.(74)

c. A contral Zone Constabulary Headquarters was to be established with three brigade headquarters at the German Land level. Each was to include an air reconnaissance squadron and a varying number of mechanized cavalry regimonts, which were to be modified by elimination of the bulk of the tanks and artillery and substitution of carbines, tommy guns, jeeps, and motorcycles for the heavier weapons and transportation. Twelve group headquarters were to be coordinated with German civil authorities at points agreed on with Land Offices of Military Government. Finally, forty-eight squadrons were to be allotted to the groups, distributed according to the population of the area and its security needs, and the reserve was to be assigned at group and higher echelons.(75)

Chapter VI
THE MANPOWER PROBLEM
PROGRESS OF REDEPLOYMENT (1)

138. Before V-J Day.

For the last half of July and the first ten days of August 1945 the story of redeployment was the uneventful one of an operation at last fully organized, with the responsible agencies trying to cope with the backlog left from the first two chaotic months. This was reduced by 10 August to under 27,000 through shipment of an excess of nearly 70,000 men bound for the Pacific via the United States(2). Direct shipments to the Pacific were 96,000 short.

139. The Changes at V-J Day.

On 10 August 1945 the redeployment machinery was for the first time functioning fairly smoothly. Plans were laid for the redeployment to the Pacific, directly or indirectly, of 186,000 men in August. As many as 382,000 men with low priority for discharge were in course of preparation for redeployment. Procedures were thought out and published, or about to be published, which would cover the whole scheme of redeployment from the European Theater down to the achievement of the occupational troop basis by 1 July 1946. On V-J Day this whole prospect was swept away. Two cables were received from the War Department which announced the imminent defeat of Japan and the procedures to be adopted as soon as this was accomplished.(3) These directions required the Allied commanders in China and the Pacific to report immediately upon their requirements for men and material for the next sixty days in the light of the surrender of Japan. Direct redeployment to the Pacific was to cease almost immediately. All enlisted men with adjusted service rating scores of 85 or above were to be returned immediately to the United States, under a priority second only to the urgent requirements of the Pacific Theater.(4) On 14 August, the news of the surrender of Japan was received and the War Department cabled orders to put the above instructions into immediate effect.(5)

140. Progress in Redeployment During August.

Some units were so close to their sailing date that it was not feasible to cancel their departure. Over 100,000 men in units of low priority for discharge were therefore shipped to the United States during August.(6) The air lift known as "Green Project"(7) was reduced slightly during the month. Where possible,

units intended for the Pacific were sidetracked from the pipeline while units containing mainly candidates for discharge passed through first. Some units intended for the Pacific were assigned temporarily to duties in the Theater that had been performed by units then being shipped home for discharge.(8) Subordinate commands were entrusted with the task of selecting units for redeployment, with a view to nominating units as far as possible in their correct priority for discharge. Major commands were informed that candidates for discharge should be assigned priority as follows: first, those with adjusted service rating scores of 85 or more; secondly, those with scores of 75 to 84; and, thirdly, those with scores of 60 to 74.(9)

141. Estimates and Policies during August.

In the middle of August, it was hoped that 250,000 men could be moved each month--200,000 for discharge and 50,000 for duty in the United States. It was expected that by the end of the year Theater strength would be reduced to just over a million men.(10) The War Department was emphatic in urging the Theater to get the candidates for discharge out of Europe first. The Theater responded by raising the estimate for the shipment of men for discharge to 227,000 per month for August and September.(11) In order to fill the quota of 200,000 high score men for September, seven divisions and 81,000 men in smaller units were alerted for shipment. The divisions were authorized to proceed at an over-strength of 12 percent.(12) On 16 August the age limit for discharge was reduced to 38. Any enlisted man regardless of special skills or assignment, who was above that age was entitled to return to the United States within ninety days.(13) The "critical military occupational specialty numbers," possession of which might result in the retention of a man otherwise eligible for discharge, were reduced in August to three.(14) The ultimate critical score was tentatively fixed at 45. Men with scores below this were assigned to the occupation forces, and men with higher scores to units that might be shipped to the Pacific.(15) Later it was decided that units for the strategic reserve, which were regarded as of the same category as units for the Pacific, should contain only men with scores below 45.(16)

142. Shipping Plans.

On 20 August 1945, the Theater announced to the War Department its proposals for revised shipping plans for the remainder of the month and for September. It was then estimated that eleven complete divisions would be shipped to make up in large part the quota of 200,000 high score men eligible for discharge. Theater Headquarters also reported that 70,000 low-score men would be included in the shipments of the near future.(17) After a few days the War Department announced a great increase in the rate at which the Theater must ship its strength back to the United States. It directed the Theater to ship over 400,000 in

September and an average of 322,000 in each of the following four months.(18) The Theater requested that, in order to meet this requirement, it should be allowed to include more than the 20 percent of low-score men then authorized, and that a liquidation force of 300,000 be authorized in addition to the occupation force.(19) This second request was refused. (20) The War Department then announced that no more troops for the Pacific would be required of the European Theater. The emphasis was exclusively on men for discharge.(21) The Theater was especially requested not to return men with medium priority for discharge to the United States, as it was not practicable to reassign these men and there would be no alternative but to discharge them. This would slow the discharge of men with higher priority and have a bad effect on morale.(22)

143. Achievement in August.

By the end of August the change from redeployment for the Pacific campaign to return of large numbers to the United States for discharge was complete. Arrangements had been made to reduce Theater strength to its occupational troop basis by the end of January 1946. Men with medium priority (between 45 and 70 points) were being held up until November. Fifteen divisions had been alerted for shipment. The total number of men redeployed during August was 278,270.(23)

144. Progress in Redeployment during September.

a. European Theater Headquarters did not abandon its recommendation for the authorization of a close-out force, and finally the War Department was persuaded to approve it.(24) The basis for this force was intended to be the medium priority men when the War Department could not reassign. Meanwhile an adjustment was made in computing adjusted service rating scores to include points accumulated between V-E and V-J Days. This had the effect of adding at least eight points to the score of every man in the Theater.(25) Theater Headquarters was alarmed early in September by the discovery that the scheduled shipments to February would bring its strength below the occupational troops basis. This was partly due to a miscalculation by the Theater of over 200,000 in its strength, but shipping forecasts were altered to clear up what was real in the throat. (26) "Green Project" was greatly reduced in September, and finally ended on the last day of the month.(27)

b. The plan for the occupational troop basis, worked out in the Theater before 6 September, was approved

by the end of the month by the War Department. It called for a Theater strength of 707,000 at the end of 1945, including 363,000 occupation troops. The rest were the close-out force and some service units for the Mediterranean Theater. The 1st, 3d, 9th, 42d, and 78th Infantry Divisions and the 1st and 4th Armored Divisions were thereupon designated as the occupation forces. Six divisions were designated as the close-out force and two as the strategic reserve. The rest were declared eligible for discharge.(28)

c. On 6 September the War Department announced plans for the redeployment of officers. Except for field grade officers, for whom the critical score was 100, there was not much difference between the officer critical score and that for enlisted men.(29)

d. The shipping situation was responsible for a certain amount of delay in the September sailings. Dockyard strikes, the return of ships of other flags, miscalculation of loading and unloading time, and bad weather were various causes of this delay.(30) Nine divisions were shipped out of the Theater and three, with two corps headquarters, were inactivated in the Theater during September.(31) Assembly Area Command was also inactivated, its functions being taken over by Office Intermediate Section on 22 September.(32) By the end of September a total of 1,451,558 men had been shipped out of the Theater, and the Theater strength was reduced to 1,672,569.(33)

145. October to December.

a. At the beginning of October, efforts were made to clear up the backlog from the previous month and to arrange that all those eligible for redeployment in that month be shipped in their proper priority. It was hoped that all men with scores of 80 and above could be shipped home in October, and all those with 70 and above in November. As the month advanced, however, it was seen that the same causes which brought September shippings below their quota would prevent the lag being made up in October. When the Queen Elizabeth, the Aquitania, and the equivalent in troop space of the Queen Mary had to be returned to Great Britain early in the month, all hope of clearing the men with 80 points and over in that month was lost. The target had now to be moved up to the middle of November. Moreover, major commands continued to report discoveries of high point men or units previously not accounted for. Some relief was gained by the use of warships for returning men for discharge.(34) The methods of redeploying the air forces had long been causing dispute. In this month Theater Headquarters at last approved the plan submitted by Headquarters, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, under which units which adjusted service rating scores in

five-point brackets were prepared by the Air Forces and then called forward by Theater Headquarters in due course. (35) Seven divisions were redeployed complete in October. (36) Altogether 366,903 persons were shipped home, of whom 313,404 had scores of 75 or above or were officers of above the then critical score. (37) Theater strength was then 1,317,328, of whom 163,282 were enlisted men with 80 or more points and officers with 75 or more. The scores of nearly 100,000 were still unknown. (38)

b. The main event of the month of November was the opening of the port of Bremen for replacements and the arrival of the first replacements there. (39) November was also the month in which the largest numbers were sent home, 420,795 being shipped, of whom 400,058 were for redeployment. (40) In December the War Department announced that for that month less shipping would be available to the European Theater. All the warships and twenty-one other vessels were taken from the Theater allotment. (41) During the month seven divisions left the Theater. (42) The rate was slower than in the previous month, partly because another month like November would have reduced Theater strength below what was required at the time, and partly because even the lowered quota was not met owing to stormy weather. The number shipped during December was 327,272, of whom 303,689 were for redeployment. (43) The critical score at this time was 60. Nearly 30,000 enlisted men of the total had scores of 73 or above. (44) By the end of 1945 over two and a half million men--81 percent of the Theater strength--had been redeployed to one or another destination. (45)

146. Redeployment Plans for 1946.

In November the War Department asked for the views of the European Theater on two plans for redeployment for the first half of 1946. One was to use all the shipping that could be allotted to bring the Theater's strength down to the occupational troop basis as soon as possible. The other was to be more gradual, but still to phase-out troops as quickly as was consistent with the other functions of the Theater. (46) Obviously, if there was to be any difference between these, the first one would result in functions other than redeployment being neglected. The Theater therefore supported the second, mentioning in particular that use of a large part of the occupation force in support of the close-out force while it was being redeployed would draw too heavily on the strength of the former. Furthermore, this would happen in February and March, when a large part of the occupation force would be withdrawn from operational duties to be trained as constabulary units. It was suggested, therefore, that as far as possible the close-out

force should redeploy itself, one twelfth of it being moved in each of the first three months of 1946 and one fourth in each of the next three.(47) In December the strengths of the close-out force and the occupation force, which had before been fixed at 344,000 and 363,000, respectively, were reduced to 316,000 and 300,000. This reduced the authorized Theater strength at the end of 1945 from 707,000 to 616,000. The actual strength on 1 January 1946 was 622,789.(48) The final shipping schedule published early in 1946 showed that the close-out force was to be shipped out in six approximately equal monthly loads. It also showed 15,000 miscellaneous shipments, and shipments of high point men for whom replacements had arrived from the United States to the number of 34,500 in January and approximately 20,000 a month thereafter.(49)

SUCCESSIVE CHANGES IN THE OCCUPATIONAL TROOP BASIS

147. The United States Occupied Areas.

The final withdrawal of United States forces from the other occupied zones and of all other Allied forces from the United States Zone was reported to be complete on 17 July 1945.(50) Plans had been made for the reduction by three-quarters of the United States troop strength in Czechoslovakia.(51) The main United States area of Germany was divided into two Military Districts, the Western consisting of Wurtenberg-Baden and Grosshessen, occupied by the Seventh U.S. Army, and the Eastern, Bavaria, by the Third U.S. Army.(52) The United States Zone of Austria was already established, and during this six-month period no alteration took place in its organization, except for the move of Zonal Headquarters to Vienna in October.(53)

148. Successive Reductions.

The alterations in the projected occupational troop basis that took place in the summer and fall of 1945 were completely unrelated to the organization in the Theater at the time. Some reductions in commitments and inactivations of major headquarters, however, were of significance in determining the future pattern. The first of these was the inactivation of 12th Army Group on 1 August.(54) In September the withdrawal from Czechoslovakia began. This was not completed until 10 December.(55) Early in October, United States troops began to withdraw from Norway.(56) On 1 November the first systematic action toward insuring that the forces remaining after the close of redeployment would be in the most advantageous employment possible was taken

when the Theater G-1 Division set a ceiling strength on all staff divisions and major commands. One month later this ceiling was declared effective, and all commands were ordered to reduce their strength to the established ceiling or to furnish full justification for the excess.(57) On 9 December 1945 most of the territory in the Bremen Enclave was restored to the British Zone.(58) On 18 December the Theater Commander announced the basis of the occupation force for the second half of 1946, when for the first time the occupation would be the sole task of the forces in the Theater. The target of 300,000 was to be reached by 1 July 1946. One army, three divisions, and a constabulary force of 38,000 was to be the security force for the whole United States occupied areas, including Austria. Theater Service Forces and the base sections under it were to be inactivated by 15 March 1946. Unnecessary activities were to be cut out, and necessary ones closely reviewed to insure that no personnel savings were neglected.(59)

149. Overstrength, Replacements, and Reinforcements.

a. Several reasons combined to cause the Theater to rely on overstrength, on units surplus to the table of organization, and on grades and ratings surplus to the table of organization of their units during the last half of 1945: No reinforcements on any scale could be expected at this time; (60) the point system of redeployment made the whole situation so fluid that it was not feasible at the time to build up new permanent units; and tasks had to be performed in the Theater for which there was no organization, and in many cases no precedent. Considerable latitude was allowed in the Theater in the use of overstrength and of grades surplus to tables of organization, but the policy that permitted this emphasized that the use of these must be neither permanent nor unlimited.(61) Even so, by July 1945 surplus grades had reached the number of 54,000. It was suggested by the War Department that a total of 38,000 of these might eventually be allowed in the occupation forces. In order to pare down requirements as far as possible, commands were instructed to make the minimum use of civilian help of all kinds.(62) It was a long time, however, before any reduction in overstrength could be made. On 8 October the Theater G-1 Division requested a total of over 70,000 grades.(63) The plan now submitted called for a steady monthly reduction in surplus grades in the Theater, and the target of 38,000 seemed not to be too difficult. After screening, the surplus grades were reduced to a total of 52,760, and this total was approved.(64) On 30 November 27,178 permanent surplus grades were approved.(65)

b. The most urgent demand for replacements in this period was that which occurred in August for Quartermaster Corps officers. Reassignments had been numerous, and tasks were heavy. The War Department was approached, but replied that any such replacements must be found within the Theater. (66) The first postwar replacements promised the Theater were 240,000 who were to arrive between 1 October 1945 and 1 July 1946. (67) As early as 3 October the Theater requisitioned 135,000 of these, asking for specialist, and making the special request that they should arrive before the end of January 1946. (68) The War Department promised the replacements, but could not guarantee their arrival by the date specified. (69) At the end of the year, though some replacements had arrived, the schedule had not nearly been met. (70)

150. Suitability of Arrivals.

a. Under these circumstances the correct placing of reinforcements, not only in the command where they were most wanted, but also in the job where they would do the most good, was an essential contribution to the efficiency of the Theater. But the size of the drafts and the inadequacy of their classification into military skills before leaving the United States caused more and more withdrawal from this ideal, until finally, on 24 December, it was decided that allocations to major commands would be made by arm and service and not by military occupational specialty. (71)

b. The Theater was naturally anxious to know what standard of training could be expected of its replacements. In reply to a request for this information, (72) the War Department stated that the first replacements might be expected to have seventeen weeks' training, but that later ones were not likely to have more than basic training. (73) Theater Headquarters in reply recommended that the reinforcements should be trained in the United States at least until 1 July 1946, when some of the current Theater problems would have been solved. (74) No action, however, was taken on this recommendation. Some specialist schools were started in the Theater. These were for office staff and teletype operator categories, which were in shortest supply, (75) and they continued in operation until the end of the year, when they were closed down for lack of suitable students. (76) The permanent Adjutant General's School, however, with a much smaller monthly enrollment, assumed the task of training office personnel for the whole Theater early in the new year. (77)

c. The whole system was complicated by the fact that, with a rapid turn-over of personnel, a rather large proportion of Theater strength at any given time consisted of men who were ineffective, either because they were not yet assigned or because they had been removed from assignment for shipment home. Commands were forced to withdraw a man from his assignment a fortnight before his replacement arrived in the Theater; when the replacement arrived, it was another fortnight before he could take up his duties; but all the time they were in the Theater both men were carried on the Theater strength. (78) At year's end it was reckoned that out of an official Theater strength of 616,000 no less than 163,000 were ineffectives. Of these, 90,000 were normal ineffectives, such as men on leave, pass, and furlough, in confinement, or in the hospital. Of the rest, 25,000 were on reenlistment furlough or on rehabilitation, recuperation, and recovery detachment in the United States; 23,000 were shortages in replacements for high-point men who had already left; and 25,000 were in the redeployment pipeline. (79)

151. The Police-Type Occupation Force.

The original occupation troop basis of 363,000 was intended to be assigned as follows:

Headquarters and other military overhead	38,000
Ground Forces (seven divisions)	144,000
Service Forces	103,000
Air Forces	<u>78,000</u>
	363,000.

In the light of experience in the occupation, it was decided by November 1945 that these forces were not all necessary. There seemed to be no likelihood of a general armed uprising. What resistance there was consisted of individual acts of indiscipline, sabotage, and crime. Under these circumstances, the plan was changed so that troops were assigned as follows: (80)

Headquarters and other military overhead	20,000
Mobile combat forces (three divisions)	65,000
Service Forces	80,000
Air Forces	78,000
State Constabulary	<u>38,000</u>
	281,000.

A single army headquarters was to be responsible for the combat forces in the main zones of Germany and Austria. In Frankfurt and in the separate areas of Berlin, Bonn, and Vienna, there were separate independent commands. (81)

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL(82)

152. Types of Civilians Employed in Europe in Late 1945.

a. Two methods of recruiting United States citizens for employment in the Theater were adopted. Men in the forces were allowed to obtain their discharge from military service in the Theater and retain their jobs or be assigned to similar jobs; others were recruited in the United States. (83) Women were not recruited at the beginning of this period except for specialists, but this policy was changed before the end of the year. (84)

b. Allied and neutral civilians were recruited in all cases through agreements with the governments concerned. Some of these governments allowed only small quotas of their civilians to go abroad. (85)

c. Displaced persons or Allied nationals recruited in Germany were expected to be a fruitful source of civilian labor. In the first months of the occupation the movement of displaced persons was too rapid for them to be of much use as labor. Later, many of those left in the Theater because they would not accept repatriation were employed. (86) As workers, however, they were often far from satisfactory.

d. When once German civilians were authorized as employees, they soon became the main source of labor. (87)

153. Procurement Policy.

In July 1945 a survey of all available civilian labor was made by Theater Headquarters as an aid in determining procurement policy. On the basis of this, it was decided that, although some units had violated current policy and even international agreements in hiring and moving their civilians, contracts should not be terminated for this reason, so that the first priority for employment was for civilians already employed on a contract basis. (88) Next in priority came soldiers discharged in the Theater, then specialists from the United States, displaced persons, and indigenous civilians. The term "specialists" was fairly rigidly interpreted, and comparatively few United States citizens were recruited in America at this time. (89) The hope that headquarters could be manned entirely by United States and indi-

genous civilians had to be abandoned because of serious shortages in clerical staff. In September, therefore, some British women clerks were moved to Frankfurt.(90) Citizens of other nations were also employed there soon after. At that time the priorities for employment were as follows: discharged United States military personnel; United States civilians recruited in the Theater; displaced persons; enemy and ex-enemy civilians; Allied and neutral civilians; and United States civilians recruited in the United States. (91) Little alteration in the character of the civilian labor force occurred after this time.

154. Administration of Civilian Personnel.

The administration of civilians in the Theater was the responsibility of the G-1, G-3, G-4, and G-5 Divisions and of the Adjutant General of Theater Headquarters; the general staff divisions, the Adjutant General, the Engineer Labor Procurement Office, the General Purchasing Agent, and the Military Labor Service of Theater Service Forces, and major commands. Functions were divided as follows in Theater Headquarters: the G-1 Division had general policy supervision over all civilians; G-3 had supervision over labor service units; G-4 was responsible for supplying the services of these units; and G-5 had special supervision over working conditions for ex-enemy civilians. In Theater Service Forces, G-1 and G-4 duplicated the functions of the same divisions in Theater Headquarters; the Adjutant General had the operative supervision over all the civilians in the command concerned; and the other staff divisions mentioned above had charge of certain special aspects of civilian labor. Major commands had operative control over civilians employed locally; thus, Headquarters Command controlled civilians employed in Theater Headquarters.(92)

PRISONERS OF WAR

155. Conditions of Employment of Prisoners of War.

The conditions under which prisoners of war might be used as labor were clarified in July by a message from the Secretary of State. He wrote that with the unconditional surrender Germany had lost the rights of a belligerent power, and that consequently the provisions of the Geneva Convention no longer applied to German prisoners of war in Allied hands. (93) Most of the German prisoners of war who were working for the United States forces were organized in Labor Service Companies. These were bodies of not less than 250 men working under a Labor Supervision Company, each of which consisted of

a fairly small nucleus of U.S. Army supervisory personnel.(94) In August 1945 there were a total of 2,430 Labor Service Companies in the Theater.(95) Another type of prisoner-of-war unit that was working for the United States forces was the disarmed enemy unit. This was a unit that had surrendered complete and was working under its old organization. Conditions for the disarmed enemy units were as follows: they were broken down into company-size units, except in special cases; German field grade officers might not retain operational command except in special cases, though they might retain supply and administrative duties; unit designations and all insignia, except insignia of rank, were abolished; United States personnel were responsible for all supervision of the work; and, in spite of the policy described above, the members of the unit possessed the privileges of prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention.(96) One of these units, a Luftwaffe Signal Battalion, worked for the U.S. Air Forces, Europe, from June to November 1945, without armed guards, and showed outstanding discipline and cooperation.(97)

156. Statistics.

Most of the labor units working for the United States forces in the early postwar period were under the control of the Communications Zone, and later under Theater Service Forces. The Communications Zone and its successor kept complete statistics of numbers of prisoners held and numbers working. At V-E Day, in a total of 1,545,644 prisoners, 280,937 were at work.(98) The peak of prisoner-of-war labor was reached at the end of August, when 491,442 prisoners were working out of a total in the Communications Zone of 716,568. On 29 December 1945, of a total of 535,023, workers numbered 331,521.(99)

Chapter VII

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONING OF THE OCCUPATION

DEVELOPMENTS IN THEATER ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIP

157. General Developments during the First Half of 1946.

The first half of 1946 saw a steady continuation of the process of reduction in installations and personnel in the European Theater. In both the field forces and military government, efforts to attain the same objectives of simplification and economy resulted in increasing efficiency until, by 30 June 1946, a streamlined organization had been evolved from the more complicated and unwieldy one that had been in operation on V-E Day.(1)

158. Termination of the Military Districts.

On 2 January 1946 the Eastern and Western Military Districts ceased to function, and their territories were redesignated as Third and Seventh U.S. Army Areas.(2) As their respective headquarters continued to function, the elimination of the Districts brought few changes in operations, except as regards military government supervision.

159. Reorganization on the Command Level.

Considerable change occurred, however, on the major command level.

a. The Theater Motor Transport Service, Military Railway Service, and Theater Inland Waterways Transport Service were discontinued 1 January.(3)

b. Continental Base Section, which had been formed at Reims, France, on 10 December 1945, moved on 3 January to Bad Nauheim, Germany, where it was combined with Advanced Section,(4) and became operational on 15 January 1945.(5)

c. On 15 January 1946, Western Base Section was formed in Paris to take over the functions previously performed by Headquarters, Theater Service Forces, European Theater (Rear), Seine and Oise Sections, and the USFET Mission to France.(6)

d. Delta Base Section, the main function of which had been the redeployment of personnel, first to the Pacific and later to the United States, was inactivated on 22 January 1946,(7) since the peak of redeployment had been passed.

e. The Ground Forces Reinforcement Command was discontinued on 31 January 1946, and the Ground Forces Reinforcement Coordinating Group was established at Marburg, Germany. (8)

f. On 1 February 1946, Hungary and Roumania were incorporated in the European Theater,(9) and on 1 June West African District passed to European Theater control.

g. On 15 February Western Base Section was enlarged by the addition of two new subordinate commands, Chanor Base Section and London Area Office, both of which were relieved of assignment to Headquarters, Theater Service Forces. (10) A few days later, on 20 February 1946, Chanor Base Section was discontinued and its functions were transferred to Western Base Section.(11)

h. One of the two remaining armies, the Seventh, was inactivated on 31 March 1946, leaving the Third Army to serve as the occupation army.(12) Personnel of the Seventh Army were reassigned either to the Third Army or to the United States Constabulary.

i. Bremen Port Command, which had been assigned to Continental Base Section on 1 March 1946,(13) was discontinued on 15 April,(14) after which date the 17th Major Port was the main administrative headquarters for the Bremen-Bremerhaven area.

160. Inactivation of Theater Service Forces.

These and other measures were directed toward the final elimination of Theater Service Forces, European Theater. On 1 February 1946 the Theater Chiefs of Claims, Special Services, and Information and Education, and the Theater Chief Chaplain, Fiscal Director, and Provost Marshal were designated special staff officers on the special staff of the Theater Commander.(15) On 28 February 1946 the Theater Signal Communications Service was assigned to Theater Headquarters,(16) and the following special staff officers were assigned to the Theater Commander's special staff: the chiefs of Army Exchange Service and Chemical Warfare Service, the Chief Surgeon, Chief Engineer, Chief Quartermaster, Chief Ordnance Officer, and Chief Signal Officer.(17) The final step came with the

Inactivation of Headquarter, Theater Service Forces, European Theater, on 28 February 1946. (18)

161. Naval Command in the European Theater.

a. On 1 May 1946, the headquarters of U.S. Naval Forces, Germany, was shifted to Bremerhaven, a small liaison group being maintained at Theater Headquarters in Frankfurt. The naval command had also been going through a process of consolidation. On V-E Day the U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, comprised U.S. Naval Forces, France; U.S. Group Control Council; Naval Division; and the U.S. Naval Forces, Germany, which in turn included U.S. Navy, Southwest Germany; U.S. Naval Ports and Bases, Germany; and U.S. Naval Advanced Bases, Bremerhaven and Bremen. On 31 May 1945 an agreement was signed between the Army and the Navy for the orderly operation of ports in Europe. (19) On 10 November the U.S. Ports and Bases, Germany and the U.S. Naval Advanced Bases, Bremerhaven and Bremen, were decommissioned and their activities consolidated in the U.S. Advanced Base, Weser River. In December, U.S. Naval Forces, France, was decommissioned and its responsibilities transferred to the Commander of Naval Forces, Germany, with a liaison group remaining in Paris. The Advanced Base at Le Havre continued to function as a subordinate activity of U.S. Naval Forces, Germany, until 10 July, 1946, when it was decommissioned. The U.S. Navy, Southwest Germany, was never commissioned. The naval elements of the U.S. Group Control Council, consisting of the Disarmament and the demobilization Units, were subsequently redesignated the Naval Advisor, Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.), and the U.S. Member, Tripartite Commission. This included the Naval Division of the Allied Commission for Austria; the U.S. Naval Member, Military Mission, Potsdam; and the Naval Technical Unit, Europe. (20)

DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS BETWEEN MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND THE UNITED STATES FORCES

162. Headquarters Level.

In the development of military government policies for the United States Zone, the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.) had to coordinate with the staff of the Theater Commander and, for supervision of the United States element of the Berlin Kommandatura, with that of the Deputy Military Governor. It had also to maintain liaison with the U.S. Group Control Council for Austria. Prior to 1 April Military Government maintained personnel and agencies in both Berlin and Frankfurt. Early in 1946, however, it

was decided to consolidate all military government functions in Berlin, leaving only a small G-5 Division in Theater Headquarters. On 1 April the G-5 Division of Headquarter, U.S. Forces, European Theater was reestablished, (21) with the following functions: to inform and advise the Theater Commander on military government matters as they affected the occupation forces; to coordinate responsibilities and activities of the field forces with military government agencies and activities; to maintain liaison with the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.) and with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration; to supervise the control and care of displaced persons; and to conduct Civil Affairs matters outside the occupied countries. The organization of the new G-5 Division comprised a Plans and Coordination Branch, Economic Affairs Branch, Government Affairs Branch, Supply Branch, and Displaced Persons Branch, with Information and Administration Branches functioning as part of the Executive's Office. A rear echelon of military government offices was also maintained at Frankfurt, attached to Theater Headquarters for administration and supply. (22)

163. Land Level.

a. Development of the Land Offices of Military Government.

With the official confirmation of the Eastern Military District on 12 August 1945, the official designation of the G-5 Section of Third Army became the Office of Military Government for Bavaria, and it was consolidated by the end of September with the Regional Detachment E-201. (23) The 3d Military Government Regiment was assigned to Headquarters, Eastern Military District, in September. (24) Personnel procedures were simplified as all military government personnel in Bavaria was now under the direct control of the District Headquarters. In Western Military District, the reorganization of the G-5 Section of Seventh Army had continued from August to October 1945, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, was placed on Deputy Chief of Staff level and became responsible to the army Commander for all military government within the Military District. The entire staff of the headquarters was to assist in the military government of the District. (25)

b. Increase of Responsibility.

From 1 January 1946, the three Offices of Military Government for Bavaria, Wurttemburg-Baden, and Grosshessen each became an independent command under its

respective director, who was to report directly to the commanding General, U.S. Forces, European Theater. All command and supervisory powers passed from the commanding generals of Eastern and Western Military Districts. They retained general court-martial jurisdiction and responsibility for supply and administrative support,(26) and also their previous functions and responsibilities in connection with security, prisoners of war, disarmament, and displaced persons. On the redesignation of the Military Districts in January as the Third and Seventh U.S. Army Areas, the relationship previously maintained between military government and the Military Districts continued between military government and the army areas.(27)

c. Revision of Relationship.

In February 1946 the relationship was revised, and certain functions connected with redeployment and travel outside the occupied Zone, previously assigned to the Land directors, were reallocated to the area commanders or to the Theater.(28) In June 1946, by which time Third Army had been assigned responsibility for the whole United States-occupied area of Germany except the Bremen, Berlin, and Frankfurt areas, the G-5 Section was reestablished, to exercise supervision and control over matters pertaining to displaced persons and Civil Affairs and to maintain liaison with military government officials.(29) The Section was organized in three branches: administration, military government, and displaced persons.

d. Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone).

On 1 April 1946 the Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone) was inactivated and its functions were redistributed between the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.) and the new G-5 Division of Theater Headquarters.(30)

164. Relations between the Field Forces and the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.).

a. Recommendations regarding details of staff coordination between the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.) and the G-5 Division of Theater Headquarters were made by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, to the Chief of Staff in April 1946 and were approved in June.(31)

b. In the field, a similar tendency was seen toward

definition of the relation between tactical troops and military government. In May 1946 provisions were made for the commanding officers of all tactical and service troops to report the location and extent of their units to the military government detachments in the Landkreis. Particularly close coordination was to be maintained in the administration of displaced persons. Conferences were to be held between the various military government offices and other occupational units. (32)

THE REDUCTION TO THE OCCUPATIONAL TROOP BASIS (33)

165. The Outlook for 1946.

On 1 January 1946 the allotted strength of the Theater was 616,000 and the actual strength 622,739. (34) Shipping capacity sufficient to transport an extra 20,000 men to the United States had been allotted for January to take care of the backlog and expected losses. Exclusive of these 20,000 men, the average monthly lift for the first six months of 1946 was estimated at 90,150. (35) This meant that 238,000 men must enter the Theater by 1 July 1946 if the occupational troop basis of 300,000 was to be filled. Of these, 90,000 would be men returning from re-enlistment furlough; rest, recuperation, and recovery; and other temporary absence in the United States. (36) A margin of about 14,000 men was allowed against unexpected shipping shortages or delays; so 135,000 replacements were expected. (37)

166. The January Disturbances.

This program, and especially the part of it which cut the monthly shipments from a peak of 400,000 to 90,000, did not appeal to the troops in the Theater. They felt that they were forgotten, an attitude which was not helped by the news on 6 January 1946 that there would be no more redeployment on a point basis and that men with 50 points would still have three months to serve in the Theater. (38) The explanation for this order was that there were no replacements. (39) Two other press releases served to intensify the feeling and to cause it to find voice. One told that war brides were being shipped to the United States, the other that open demonstrations in the Pacific Theater had been effective in

getting men with 50 points sent home from that Theater.(40) The effect of these releases was that demonstrations began in the European Theater, too. In Paris, London, Frankfurt, and in other parts of Germany crowds of soldiers gathered and marched, or shouted slogans. On the direction of General McNarney, who felt that the meetings were the result of the failure of the Theater and the major commands to explain the true facts of the case, no action was taken to break up the meetings. At this moment the War Department announced that the demobilization program was to be revised.(41) For the time being this had no effect, but on January 13, when the meetings had been going on sporadically for five days, General McNarney in a press interview asked that the meetings be discontinued in view of the fact that they had served their purpose.(42) The same day an intensive publicity program was launched to bring home to the minds of the occupation forces the fact that there was at least some reason for keeping them in Europe.(43)

167. The New Plan and Its Effects.

The new War Department demobilization plan kept the old point system, but speeded up the pace of releases under its provisions. It also introduced a scheme whereby men could be released on length of service alone.(44) On this basis it was estimated that men with 55 points would be on their way home by mid-February; with 53 points or three and a half year's service by the end of the month; and so on down to 40 points or two years' service by the end of June.(45) As a result of this, all unit shipping dates were advanced. A new shipping plan was devised which would concentrate about four-fifths of the six-month lift over the first four months.(46)

168. Out-Shippments in the First Six Months of 1946.

Shipping was not a scarce facility in this period. The War Department sent what it thought fit, and would not cut allocations even when requested to do so. The Theater authorities reported that overloading of vessels resulted in an excess left. To "alleviate" this situation, the War Department directed that ships might be underloaded.(47) In January shipments exceeded even the increased estimate, 161,310 troops being shipped out.(48) This included the accumulation from the previous year, over 10,000 men who were not being redeployed, and about 40,000 who had been intended for later shipment.(49) In February it was hoped to better the target by 13,000, but owing to various causes about 10,000 of these were still in the Theater at the end of the month.(50) In March the estimate was again exceeded, and over 130,000 were shipped out. In these three months

total shipping was almost 400,000, including 370,000 redeployment personnel, instead of an expected 327,000.(51) In the next three months shipments out of the Theater again dropped off, and only 169,345 men for redeployment sailed in the whole period. This did not prevent, however, targets for repatriating men due home on account of point score and length of service from being met.(52)

169. Close of Unnecessary Port Installations.

With the lessening of the homeward flow, it became possible in the early part of 1946 to close some of the staging and port installations that were serving troops on their way home. In January and February all the local commands in France were combined as Western Base Section, and at about the same time the importance of the intermediate staging areas was considerably reduced by the transfer of the processing of all but major units to the port staging areas. (53) In January the port of Marseille was closed.(54) Antwerp was closed at the end of March, and Le Havre at the end of June. Henceforth all shipments from the Continent were to be from Bremerhaven.(55)

170. General Survey of the Redeployment Scheme.

From the point of view of the mechanics of the redeployment scheme, the requirements of the Theater and the War Department, and the measures that were taken to meet them, the program was a complete success. The men were shipped out, slowly at first, then with more and more speed, until shortage of men checked the operation.

CONTINUING MANPOWER PROBLEMS

171. Theater Strength Targets.

On 18 January 1946 the Theater Commander suggested that by 1 July 1947 the Theater strength should be 200,000, including a permanent Air Forces component of 43,000. In reply the War Department set up the following series of targets, all of which included 43,000 in the Air Forces; 230,000 by 1 September 1946; 200,000 by 1 January 1947; and 160,000 by 1 July 1947.(56)

172. Strength Control.

a. On 8 January 1946, General McNarney directed that vigorous action should be taken to reduce overstrength and to bring Theater strength as soon as possible within unit tables of organization.(57) The authorized personnel had been 37,607 for 1 July 1946. Careful pruning reduced the requirements of major commands to 17,811. The staffs of the newly authorized military communities required 14,389. The new figure, therefore, stood at 32,200. This cut did not satisfy Theater Headquarters, and a further drastic screening brought the figure down to 24,005. An overstrength of 25,000 was allotted, to give a certain margin for unanticipated requirements.(58) On 25 May 1946 the War Department granted an indefinite extension of the time limit for meeting the occupational troop basis.(59) On 30 June actual Theater strength was 342,264.(60)

b. Replacements continued to be one of the problems of the Theater. It has already been mentioned that the shortage of reinforcements held up the homeward shipment of troops.(61) Despite cooperation of the War Department, shipments still fell. In February, however, the War Department announced that 64,000 replacements would be in the Theater by the end of the month, which would meet scheduled requirements. Replacements to the number of 26,000 were promised for March.(62) The War Department's commitment to supply 240,000 replacements by 30 June 1946 was practically met, and further arrivals were forecast at the rate of 10,000 a month.(63)

c. The shortage of officers in the first half of 1946 was particularly serious as respects its chaplains and those with legal experience.(64) In general, the Theater was suffering from a shortage of about 26 percent in officer strength. Steps were taken to spread this shortage as evenly as possible;(65) but it was not expected that the situation would be relieved for some time after the end of June.

d. In contrast to the many shortage problems, one problem was caused by a surplus. The total number of Negro enlisted men in the Theater grew far beyond the authorized proportion, 10 percent, of the occupational troop basis, and eventually beyond the capacity of the Theater to assign them.(66) The War Department appeared to ignore requests not to ship to the Theater men who had enlisted for three years for arms and services not authorized Negro troops in the Theater. A few such men were transferred to the United States, but later the policy of the War Department was to

assign them, regardless of their choice, if they refused to make a second choice. (67) The War Department raised the authorized percentage of Negro troops in the Theater from 10 to 15, (68) and the Theater authorized first 10, then 20, and finally 50 percent overstrength in Negro units and directed all these units to carry at least 40 percent overstrength. (69) In addition, a Negro Provisional Infantry Regiment was activated, (70) although there was no permanent authorization for Negro infantry in the Theater. On 12 June 1946 it was estimated that at the end of the month there would be an overstrength of Negro troops of 75 percent. When this was represented to the War Department, the latter agreed to ship no more Negro troops to the Theater, while Theater Headquarters undertook to place those who were already there. (71) Soon after the end of June, methods were authorized for returning unnecessary Negro units and personnel to the United States, and at about the same time the War Department suspended Negro enlistment in the Regular Army and the problem was well on the way to solution. (72)

173. The Liquidation and Manpower Board. (73)

The Theater Liquidation and Manpower Board was established on 14 January 1946, (74) to consist of six or seven senior officers. Its mission was to report directly to the Chief of Staff on progress being made in strength reductions, to make recommendations as to how these could be speeded up, and to make special surveys as required by the Theater Commander and the Chief of Staff. (75) Successive chairmen were Maj. Gen. Leven A. Allen and Brig. Gen. Aubry L. Moore. Activities of the Board during the first six months of 1946 included the following: A survey of the United States troop requirements in the United Kingdom, which resulted in the phasing-out of the London Area Office; a survey of the use made of manpower in Headquarters Command; a review of the value of the continuation of the G-5 Division of Theater Headquarters as a separate entity; recommendations for the assumption by the Adjutant General's Department of much of the routine work then done by each of the staff divisions; recommendations for closing the ports of Le Havre and Marseille, and the replacement depot at Namur; and a survey of the manpower requirements for the communities in the Zone.

174. Civilian Personnel.

Little change in priorities and procurement policies in the employment of civilians took place during the first six months of 1946. In March, the adoption of a standard em-

ployment contract and the Continental Wage Scale for Allied civilians put all European civilians except displaced persons and ex-enemies on the same footing.(76) A slight difficulty in recruiting civilians for service in the Theater was removed in May, when the wearing of the civilian uniform which had been hard to get on the Continent, was made optional. Various attempts to build up a rather large cadre of United States civilians in the Zone had met with comparative failure. Up to April 1946 only 351 women of the Women's Army Corps, including five officers, had accepted civilian jobs. In the first six months of 1946, only 170 men were discharged to accept jobs in the Theater.(78) At the end of June 3,300 civilians were on requisition from the United States. Only 743 had arrived since 1 January.(79) An attempt was therefore made in June to induce dependents living in the Zone to accept clerical and administrative jobs.(80) In the same month, recruitment in the United States was widened to include types of jobs less responsible than those for which United States civilians had previously been considered.(81) By June, too, the correct civil service grades had been assigned to nearly all positions.(82) The numbers of Germans and displaced persons employed increased vastly during these six months. That of Germans rose from 169,000 to 262,730, and that of displaced persons from 28,000 to 60,460.(83)

175. Prisoner-of-War Labor.

a. Early in 1946 further steps were taken to reduce the numbers of prisoners of war at work, by discharging them and allowing them to accept work as civilians. In January commanders were authorized to reduce the number and strength of labor service units to the minimum that might be sufficient for the job to which they were assigned, to replace by local civilians all units doing common labor, and to discharge all prisoners resident outside the United States Zone who were in a category for which discharge was authorized, provided that they were immediately reemployed as civilians. Commanders were further directed to hand over to the Provost Marshal all prisoners who became surplus owing to this action, and to report progress in discharging prisoners of war each month thereafter.(84) Later, however, it was made clear that, though this policy was to be met as far as possible, it was not to be followed to the point of depriving the Theater of necessary unskilled labor. Prisoners-of-War labor was used especially in liberated countries. Out of 143,000 prisoners expected to be necessary for labor after 30 June 1946, 106,000 were for work in the Western Base Section and its installations. It was still the policy to discharge all prisoners as soon as they were no longer required.(85) To facilitate the discharge of

prisoners of war direct to the work they would take up as civilians, major commands were authorized to set up mobile discharge teams to visit installations from which it would be difficult to send prisoners to discharge centers and discharge them on the spot, so that they could pass directly into civilian employment. (86)

b. At the beginning of the year, the number of prisoners of war working as labor units was 331,521. (87) This figure declined steadily throughout the first six months of 1946. On 31 May it was just over 200,000. (88) and on 30 June it had been reduced to 136,327. (89)

Chapter VIII

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE OCCUPATION

POLICIES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

176. Denazification.

High on the list of military government accomplishments came denazification. In the first half of 1946, the process of denazifying the German government and civil administration in the area occupied by the United States was brought to completion. An official announcement to this effect was made on 20 June 1946. Toward the end of 1945, emphasis had already shifted to the denazification of economic life and institutions other than the government and civil administration. In 1946 a large share of the responsibility for denazification was shifted to the Germans. An important step in the assumption of this responsibility by the Germans was the enactment on 5 March 1946, by agreement among the three Länder in the United States Zone, of the German law on denazification--- significantly entitled: "The Law of National Liberation." Under this law, special German denazification courts known as Spruchkammern were set up for the trial of all members of the Nazi Party other than nominal participants. On 14 June 1946 the responsibility for administering denazification was turned over to these German Courts, while Military Government retained the functions of observation, liaison, and reporting.

177. Reforms in German Judicial and Penal Administration.

One of the principal tasks of military government was the reorganization of the German Judicial system. After an initial period when all German courts were closed and justice was administered exclusively in military government courts, the first civil courts were reopened in August 1945. By 1 April 1946, 372 courts on all levels were functioning in the United States Zone. All these courts had been purged of their Nazi personnel and influences. As confidence in their efficiency and political reliability increased, more and more types of cases previously tried in military government courts were turned over to them. During the same period, progressive reforms were introduced in German prison

administration and the penal systems. A program of segregation of prisoners by age, sex, type of offense, and length of sentence was carried out. Prison hospitals for the insane and diseased were set aside from the regular system.

178. Elections.

One of the most important military government achievements in this period was the reinstitution of free elections in Germany. The first was held on 20 January 1946 in Grosshossen, when 83 percent of the eligible electors voted for members of the Gemeinderate. The Social Democrats polled 38 percent of the votes, Christian Democrats 27 percent, Independents 24 percent, Communists 4 percent, and Liberals 2 percent.(1) This was followed a week later by a zone-wide election on the Gemeinde level,(2) while in April and May elections for Kreis councils and for Gemeinde councils for the larger Gemeinden were held throughout the zone,(3) with the Christian Democratic Union outstripping the other parties.(4) The culmination came on 30 June, with the zone-wide election for delegates to the constitutional assembly to draft charters for the three Lander states. Of the eligible electors 71 percent voted, and Christian Democrats again emerged as the strongest party.(5)

179. Labor Unions.

On 14 April 1946 authorization for the organization of German labor unions on a state-wide basis in the United States zone was announced at a conference of Military Government officials and German labor representatives in Frankfurt. (6)

180. Reparations.

a. At an international conference held in Paris from 9 November to 21 December 1945, the representatives of eighteen nations considered plans for the equitable distribution of German surplus assets. An agreement was reached on the share in the reparations to be paid by Germany to the respective participating nations. At this conference an administrative agency, the Inter-Allied Reparations Conference, was established to make allocations of reparations to the member nations. This agency prepared "The Plan for Reparations and the Level of Postwar German Economy in Accordance with the Berlin Protocol," which was adopted by the Allied Control Council for Germany on 26 March 1946. The main object of this plan was to bring about the industrial disarmament of Germany and at the same time to guarantee to Germany the retention of sufficient industrial capacity for

self-support.

b. In accordance with the international agreement on reparations, the United States Military Government began to survey German industry and to mark factories and establishments for destruction or for dismantling and delivery to other nations as reparations in kind. By 1 July 1946, sixty-nine war plants in the United States Zone were listed for destruction or demolition. Dismantling operations were started on the plants allocated as advance reparations, and some machinery was delivered to the Soviet Union. On 26 May General Clay, Deputy Military Governor, announced that the United States had stopped reparations deliveries from its zone in Germany, except for factories which had already been allocated, until all occupying powers had agreed to put into effect the Potsdam decision on administering Germany as an economic whole.

181. Restitutions.

The program for the restitution of art objects and other valuable property looted by the Nazis in the countries that they conquered was still delayed in the first half of 1946 by the failure of the different nations concerned to agree upon an interpretation of the broad definition of restitution contained in the London Declaration of 5 January 1943. In the early months of 1946, efforts to reach an agreement were continued. In the meantime, a program of returning stolen property found in the United States Zone was instituted. The Offenbach Archival Depot, which opened in March 1946, received more than two million pieces of library material written in 35 languages. At the end of June no decision had yet been reached on the disposal of some 400,000 pieces of this literature. By June 1946 Hungarian, Greek, and Soviet Restitution Missions were in the United States Zone. The property involved in 39 percent of the 1,823 claims filed by ten countries had been partially or entirely located, while Germans had filed 20,000 declarations of knowledge of the location of property, 17 percent of which had been processed. France received an oil-cracking plant, and the Netherlands received 297 streetcars out of a total of 301 taken from that country.

182. Importation of Foodstuffs for the German Population.

In January 1946 the importation of foodstuffs from the United States for the relief of the German population was begun. For the supplies to be imported into Germany to prevent disease and unrest, accounting was made under the War Department Military Government appropriation for "Govern-

ment and Relief in Occupied Areas." Transfers were accomplished by quantitative receipts, the value being represented as a charge against the export-import fund of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.).

POLICIES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES FORCES

183. Military Training.

Of the varied accomplishments of the United States forces during the first half of 1946, the redirection of training policy was among the most important and most urgent, in view of the influx of replacements into the Theater.

a. A series of inspections in May and June 1946 revealed serious deficiencies. In most cases the only training conducted was of a basic nature, generally consisting of guard duty, familiarization firing, and such other training as was needed for the performance of the occupation mission. Some units had rotated duty and training periods, but the program had not been effective. A major hindrance to the achievement of an efficient training program was the high proportion of ineffectives. The reduction of their number was stressed in the training program outlined in May 1946, and measures taken to accomplish it included a reduction in the number of transient billets and leave centers, and a cut in the number of personnel on leave, furlough, or pass from 12 to 8 percent of actual strength. Tactical units were directed to devote a minimum of forty hours weekly to training, and nondivisional service units were to give each individual a minimum of three hours of basic and two hours of technical training weekly.(7) At the same time, a pamphlet supplementing earlier information and instructions, (8) designed to improve the standards of leadership and command, was distributed.

b. A more specific training problem centered on the constabulary, which required a special training program to fit the men for their duties. In January 1946 responsibility for the organization of the force was delegated to the commanding general of the Third Army, and on 18 January Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon was announced as Commanding General of the U.S. Constabulary.(9) On 15 January 1946 Theater Headquarters published a thirteen weeks' training program for the Constabulary, and in February a troopers'

Manual was issued. The

handbook was issued. The Third Army drew up a training scheme comprising three stages: the training and indoctrination of personnel from 15 February to 31 May; on-the-job training from 1 to 30 June; and postoperational training after 1 July.(10) During the month of June, emphasis was laid on carrying out simulated and real operations. Each troop participated in at least one practice search-and-seizure operations, and, in addition, each brigade held a command post exercise.(11)

184. Movement toward a Civilian Occupation.

It had long been assumed by the military authorities that the line of development would be from a military occupation to a civilian supervisory occupation. At the time of the surrender, the number of United States citizens employed in the European Theater was small, and consisted largely of highly trained technical specialists. The Theater policy prohibiting recruitment of civilian personnel from the Zone of the Interior, except for persons possessing unusual qualifications, continued throughout the summer of 1945. The use of discharged military personnel as civilian employees was initiated in July 1945, and from September the recruitment of civilian employees in the United States was authorized. In addition, civilian employees were recruited from the Allied and neutral countries, and among displaced persons and enemy nationals. In the first half of 1946, the number of civilian employees of the United States forces for the first time surpassed the military strength of the Theater, as shown in the following table.(12)

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL FROM APRIL TO JULY 1946

Month	Civilian	Military
April	333,674	401,684
May	345,531	383,109
June	360,572	332,292
July	374,466	342,264

185. Agreement with United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

To take the place of the previous agreement between the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and Supreme Headquarters, an agreement was signed in Frankfurt on 19 February 1946 by Maj. Gen. H. R. Bull, Chief of Staff, on behalf of the United States forces, and Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan, Chief of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in Germany.(13) The Army continued to provide basic supplies for displaced persons in the Zone, but joint Army-Administration panels were established to coordinate supply operations. The Army gave supplemental medical and dental care, and agreed to consult camp directors first in instances of search, arrest, or detention of displaced persons. The Administration operated displaced persons' centers, arranged for the participation of voluntary agencies in the displaced persons programs, operated a central tracing bureau, maintained records, and assisted in planning for repatriation.

186. Aerial Mapping Project.

The project known as CASEY JONES for the Aerial mapping of Europe and the northwest coast of Africa was nearing completion on 1 July 1946. This project was planned by the United States and Great Britain, and flights were started in June 1945. The Air Force was charged with the aerial photographic missions and the Theater Chief Engineer with inspection and acceptance of the finished film. Countries not covered, pending a more favorable international situation, were the Soviet Union, Soviet-occupied Germany, Jugoslavia, Albania, Spain, and Portugal. (14)

187. Shipment of Alien Dependents.

a. In 1946 the Army started fulfilling a new responsibility that it had assumed; the shipment to the United States of the war brides and children of United States personnel. The policy in effect provided that free government transportation would be given to the dependents of military personnel of all grades, of honorably discharged veterans, and of civilian employees of the War Department and the American Red Cross. The commanding generals of Theater Service Forces and the United Kingdom Base were designated by the Theater Commander as his authorized representatives to conduct the program,(15) and extensive planning was carried out. Western Base Section arranged for shipment of dependents from the liberated countries, and Continental

Base Section handled the project in other European countries, including occupied territory.

b. The first shipment of war brides, 626 in number, sailed from Southampton on the Argentina on 26 January 1946, while the first to leave the Continent sailed from Le Havre on the General Goethals on 8 March 1946. By the end of June 1946, 45,285 had sailed and applications had been received from an additional 15,672.(16) Figures for shipments from the three base sections through 30 June 1946 are shown in the following table.(17)

SHIPMENT OF ALIEN DEPENDENTS JANUARY TO JUNE 1946

Base Section	Adults	Children	Total
United Kingdom	28,299	10,424	38,723
Western Base	5,300	673	5,973
Continental Base	526	63	589
Totals	34,125	11,160	45,285

188. Occupational Planning and Accomplishments.

The most extensive achievements of the United States forces in the first half of 1946 were the successful transition to an established occupation forces, designed for a long occupation, and the building up of a system of military communities in the occupation areas.

a. Planning Responsibility. The responsibility for planning was in the hands of the Special Occupational Planning Board, which was organized on 19 September 1945 with General Bull as chairman.(18) The Board was to draw up plans for living quarters, recreational facilities, and services for occupation forces and their dependents in accordance with certain basic standards.

b. Progress of Planning. By 8 October certain basic assumptions had been arrived at: that the occupation would extend for at least five years; that most of the cost of construction and rehabilitation was to be borne by the Germans as reparations; that the troops were to be stationed in compact military installations of not less than regimental size, similar to Army posts; that facilities were to be at least the equivalent of the best of the former German Army; and that maximum use was to be made of existing former German Army installations. It was estimated that some 90,000 dependents of officers and enlisted men would be brought to

Europe during the following year, and transportation, housing, schools, and merchandising facilities were to be provided. Surplus vehicles were to be sold to military personnel for their personal use, and gasoline and oil made available. By December, tentative locations had been put forward for the communities, and the commanding general of Theater Service Forces had been made responsible for the preparation of further plans. Generals commanding geographical areas were to plan for the use of the facilities existing in communities of their areas, and to submit their reports and estimates by 20 January 1946. On submission of the Theater plan, however, the War Department stated that no construction, either temporary or permanent, was to be authorized.(19)

c. High priority was given, in this planning, to the shipment of dependents to the Theater. Originally, plans had excluded the dependents of enlisted men except those of the first three grades. By the time applications were accepted, however, in the middle of February, dependents of all enlisted grades had been declared eligible by the War Department.(20) The matter of relatives by marriage was later clarified in "in-laws in fact dependent and who are additionally bona fide members of the household" were declared eligible for transportation on a spaceavailable basis.(21) As of 25 February, 138 applications for transportation of dependents to the Theater had been received, and it was requested that all personnel desiring transportation should submit applications by 29 March 1946. At that date, 415 officers, 26 enlisted men, and 8 civilians had filed applications. All dependents were processed through the port of Bremen. The first to arrive in Europe reached Frankfurt am Main on 29 April 1946, and by 28 June 2,467 dependents had arrived in the Theater from the United States, including 2,328 dependents of officers, 80 of enlisted men, and 59 of civilians.(22)

d. Educational Facilities for Dependent Children. With the presence of families in the Theater, a need arose for educational facilities for the children. Planning for this had started early, and in May 1946 publicity was given to the qualifications desired in teachers,(23) By the end of June, plans were well advanced for the opening of the schools in October.

e. Army Exchange Service Facilities. Certain general facilities and services were also expanded for the use of all members of United States communities. One of these was the Army Exchange Service. At the cessation of hostilities, little was available in post exchanges except

tobacco, candy, and a few toilet articles. By September 1945, post exchange officers were being urged to extend their activities to provide more and better services.(24) Plans submitted on 28 December envisaged a greatly expanded service, to include tailoring, and watch- and radio-repair. In the last quarter of 1945, the first merchandise began to arrive from other countries with which contracts had been made, namely, Spain, Sweden, France, Belgium, Switzerland.(25) In the first half of 1946, contracts amounting to nearly four million dollars were placed in Germany and Austria, while contracts amounting to nearly twenty million dollars were placed in other European countries.(26) The Army Exchange Service itself supervised the production of beer, soft drinks, and ice cream, using German facilities as far as possible.(27) Auto maintenance and repair, tailoring, laundry, dry cleaning, hairdressing, and watch- and radio-repair were also provided by the Army Exchange Service. The sale of jeeps began in June 1946, and it was planned to sell cars by lottery from July 1946.

f. Leave and Recreation. Leave and recreation facilities remained abundant, although the current policy was one of cutting down inefficiencies and eliminating expense by instituting a pay-as-you-go policy. By June 1946, leave centers and tours were operated in Great Britain by the American Red Cross; in Paris, Rome, Brussels, and the Riviera by the Army; and in Switzerland, Denmark, and the French Alps by negotiation with the foreign government at a flat-rate cost to the individual. Rest areas within the occupied areas were also authorized from November 1945,(28) and were maintained at Königsee, Berchtesgaden, Garmisch, and Chiemsee in Germany, and at Bad Ischl, Cmunden, and Mondsee in Austria.(29)

189. War Crimes.

a. By the beginning of January 1946, Case No. 1, against the twenty-two principal defendants and seven German political and military organizations, was being prosecuted before the International Military Tribunal at Nürnberg, and by the end of June the case was nearing completion. Proceedings for violations of the laws of war to the prejudice of United States nationals, notably prisoners of war, and for atrocities committed in the concentration camps, were being conducted before military commissions or military government courts. These cases included the Borkum Island Case, opened on 6 February at Ludwigsburg; the Mauthausen Concentration Camp trial, opened on 11 May 1946 at Dachau; the Malmedy Massacre trial, opened on 16 May; and the Flossenbürg Concentration Camp trial, opened on 11 June.


b. The U.S. Army had in its custody a large number of civilian internees, amounting to 150,000 persons, who had been arrested during the first year of the occupation in implementation of the automatic-arrest policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.(30) These presented a problem of feeding and guarding, and the danger that new Nazi cliques might be formed in the camps. It had become clear that many people had been interned on purely technical grounds. The automatic arrest category policy was amended, therefore, from time to time during the first year of the occupation. Mandatory arrests were limited to active members of organizations under indictment and to war crimes suspects and dangerous security suspects.(31)

THE UNITED STATES FORCES ON 30 JUNE 1946

190. The United States Forces on 30 June 1946.

The constitution and the interrelation of units of the United States forces in the European Theater as of 30 June 1946 is shown in the chart on the following page.

EUROPEAN THEATER ORGANIZATION
30 JUNE 1946



NOTES:

- A. RESPONSIBLE TO OFFICE MILITARY GOVERNMENT (US), FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT MATTERS ONLY
- B. FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT MATTERS, THE COMMANDING GENERAL US FORCES AUSTRIA REPORTS DIRECT TO JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
- C. OPERATIONAL CONTROL ONLY
- D. UNDER TECHNICAL CONTROL OF THEATER QUARTERMASTER

Chapter IX
THREE EXAMPLES OF UNITED STATES OCCUPATION

OCCUPATION OF THE RHINELAND

191. Beginning of the Occupation.

The occupation of Germany began in September 1944, when the first troops operating under the Supreme Commander entered German territory and captured a few towns. The first German city to fall was Aachen, which surrendered on 21 October after a five-day bombardment by the First U. S. Army. Enemy defenses west of the Rhine River crumbled rapidly, and by 12 March the 12th and 21st Army Groups stood on the German Rhine throughout its entire length north of the Mosel. Practically all enemy forces had been cleared from the area. Much of the civil population had fled before the advancing Allied armies, but enough people were left to warrant their control for reasons of military security. During the fall and early winter of 1944-45, a few military government detachments operated in the region already conquered along the western frontier, and a few tactical units got their first experience as security troops for the control of the German population. Military government detachments had been trained for duty in specific German localities and attached to the armies, which had been directed by the 12th Army Group to leave detachments behind all departmental and regional capitals as the army rear boundary moved forward. By 24 September 1945 there were twenty-six such detachments. With a total strength of 133 officers, 7 warrant officers, and 235 enlisted men, serving with the Third U. S. Army. Approximately nine detachments were made available to each corps.(1)

192. Collection of Intelligence for Military Government Operations.

Studies of specific cities ahead of the armies were made and issued to the detachments concerned, detailing as nearly as possible current conditions in the town, including the extent of bomb damage, the number of industries still operating, the possibilities for billets, the condition of railheads, laundries, storage warehouses, refrigeration facilities, and dump parks. Detachments in forward zones

relayed much information of value through daily and special reports and through interviews with intelligence couriers who visited them daily. Civil affairs, military government, and G-5 staffs of divisions and corps supplemented this and the information obtained through the constant cooperation of G-2 and the Counter Intelligence Corps. The information was widely disseminated along with other literature of all types and, in addition, meetings were arranged with specialists in various fields. As a result, the plan for the occupation of Germany was not a bare framework when these first detachments went to work there.(2)

193. Change from Civil Affairs to Military Government.

a. During operations in France, Belgium and Luxemburg, the mission of G-5 had been confined strictly to civil affairs, particularly the interpreting and adjusting of conflicts between civilian and military needs so that the vital requirements of each could be satisfied. It was difficult for tradesmen, producers, and local officials to understand why combat-zone restrictions should be continued so far behind the lines, where the guns could no longer be heard. In Germany it became necessary for the first time to establish a government over a defeated people.(3)

b. Civil Affairs was organized as the military agency charged with keeping the civilian population "off the back" of the fighting forces; so far as the Army was concerned, its chief purpose was to further military objectives. Every assistance was given state authorities in France, Belgium, and Luxemburg in surveying their devastated countries and in establishing control. Officials of these countries resumed their posts quickly and took measures in support of military operations. In Germany it was not a matter of reinstating a former government, but of setting up a complete military authority. Such authority was to be exercised indirectly through local self-government, but only when such a government, purged of all Nazi personnel and doctrines, could be established.(4)

194. Conditions Encountered in Germany.

Upon entering Germany the armies found it necessary to restore order in a desolated country that was still, in many regions, under enemy fire. Retreating enemy forces and civilians alike, ordered to evacuate, attempted to take with them everything of value except unthreshed grain and crops still in the ground, and they added to the extensive combat damage by destroying public utilities still usable. Military government officers found the

people who stayed behind badly frightened, docile, and tired of war. At the end of his first week of military government, the commanding officer of Detachment 1502, Third Army, reported to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, that the German villagers had begun to show an "attitude of friendliness and cooperation" to American troops. He added: "Some of the inhabitants have openly expressed their anti-Nazi feelings. Consensus of opinion is that Germany is doomed and that the quicker the Allies overthrow the Nazis the quicker Germany will be able to begin reconstruction."(5)

195. First Actions of Military Government.

a. Laws, ordinances, and notices were published immediately in all towns and were almost everywhere readily obeyed. Exceptions were noted at Koblenz and Cochem, where the people were described as "sullen and uncooperative," and detachments moving east of the Rhine observed a similar attitude. Defiance of Allied rule was most frequently shown by the Nazi indoctrinated youth. Immediate and wide circulation of laws and ordinances which the people were expected to obey was obtained by distribution of a special issue of Die Mitteilung, a newspaper published by agents of Publicity and Psychological warfare. Subsequent copies with straight news reports were accorded respect by the Germans because of the official character of the first copy. As time went on the publication proved to be popular and print orders were increased from week to week. In the Third Army area alone, a circulation of 100,000 copies was attained by 31 March.(6)

b. After issuing directives, military government turned next to those things which would be of help to the Army. The people were instructed to clean up the streets and bury the dead. Highways and water, light, telephone, and gas systems were repaired with German labor as rapidly as possible. To carry out War Department instructions, units which uncovered evidence of atrocities required the populace living nearby to see and examine the evidence of the control exercised by the Nazi government. In some cases, Germans were forced to bury the bodies of the victims. On the whole the military security situation was better than had been anticipated and military government was able to effect reasonable organization and tight control over the people after only a brief period of anarchy. Every German over twelve years of age was registered by military government detachments and names were checked against lists provided by the Counter Intelligence Corps. As soon as possible civil government and law enforcing bodies were set up.(7)

196. The establishment of Civil Government.

The military government detachments moving into the Rhineland found no government in operation when they arrived. Civil authorities had for the most part been evacuated by the German Army and it was hard to find residents who knew anything about government. A number of Bürgermeisters who remained behind had to be removed from office because screening showed them to have been ardent Nazis. The most cooperative officials were found by making use of old civil lists dating back to 1927-33. In many of the Kreise, non-Nazis who had been removed from office by the Nazi government in 1933 were reinstated. In some of the smaller Gemeinde non-Nazi officials were found who had not been removed because of their long service to the community and some of them were retained. At the level of government next higher than the Kreis, the Regierungsbezirk, and at the still higher level of Provinz it was more difficult to secure satisfactory civil servants. At all levels where chief administrative officers were appointed, they were able to organize police and other essential services on a limited scale. All appointments were on a temporary basis, and some appointees were subsequently dismissed after investigation by the Counter Intelligence Corps.(8)

197. The Machinery for Law Enforcement.

a. As the area occupied during the winter of 1944-45 was small, it was difficult to assay the quality and permanence of government organizations established locally. The chief interest at the time was the promulgation of military government law and the establishment of courts for its enforcement. Legal action began with the posting of proclamations and laws which established military government, abolished Nazi laws and organizations, suspended courts, imposed security restrictions upon the German population, and ordered penalties for violations. The machinery for enforcement was provided by the appointment of courts composed of military government personnel.(9)

b. The courts set up gave a quick and decisive answer to any questions that might have been entertained on the severity to be exercised by the United States forces. The first sentences handed down were sufficiently severe to convince the Germans that they were not dealing with the 1918 American. In Koblenz, for instance, where Germans had known the Americans in 1918, the citizens were certain that there would be no change since the last occupation. They read the proclamations skeptically, but soon discovered that the proclamations meant what they said. The courts tried and

convicted civilians charged with such offenses as violations of curfew and circulation restrictions, crossing the Franco-German border, private slaughtering of cattle, larceny of property of the United States forces, failure to report the presence of German soldiers, and transportation of mail over the frontier. Sentences were from seven days' to six months' imprisonment at hard labor.(10)

c. Since a study of case records revealed a lack of uniformity in sentences, an abstract of all cases tried in the 12th Army Group area was sent to corps, divisions, and detachments for information and guidance. In some cases, letters were written to courts pointing out the inadequacy of sentences in certain cases involving serious offenses. A board of review was appointed and charged with the review of all cases in which the punishment exceeded imprisonment for one year or a fine of one thousand dollars, and all other cases tried by courts appointed by the armies in which a petition for review was filed.(11)

198. The Advance into Germany.

General Patton launched the first modern assault-crossing of the Rhine River on 22 March, at Oppenheim. This crossing progressed smoothly and three others were made north of the Ruhr by the 21st Army Group during the night of 23-24 March. Two days later the Third Army made two more crossings in the Oberwesel-Boppard area. The advance beyond the Rhine was ordered on 25 March, and at the same time the Fifteenth Army was ordered to assume responsibility for the occupation of the Rhineland, where the rapid advance had left a tremendous amount of territory without occupation forces and governing bodies.(12)

199. The Assignment of the Fifteenth Army.

a. As the armies proceeded eastward from the Rhine, the Fifteenth Army was to be prepared to occupy, organize, and govern the Rhineland, including the Rheinprovinz, the Saarland, the Pfalz, and the portion of Hessen west of the Rhine River. By 1 April it was to take over the defense of the west bank of the Rhine River from Bonn to Neuss. Operational control of all units then defending the sector was to pass temporarily to the Fifteenth Army until such time as those units might be relieved by units of the Fifteenth Army. The Fifteenth Army was to extend its defensive sector on the west bank to include Homberg by 5 April, and, at a time to be decided later, Munchen Gladbach.(13)

b. Because it was most immediately available, the XXII Corps was designated by Fifteenth Army to assume responsibility for the defense, security, and military government of the Rhine sector. As conditions warranted, the Corps was to be prepared to occupy, organize, and govern additional areas in the rear of the First and Ninth Armies, namely, all of the Rheinprovinz west of the Rhine River in Regierungsbezirke Düsseldorf, Aachen, and Cologne, and eventually the parts of Düsseldorf and Cologne east of the River.(14)

c. The XXIII Corps had most of its forces in the United Kingdom but, as soon as possible, it was to take over Regierungsbezirke Trier and Koblenz in the Rheinprovinz, and the Saarland, the Pfalz, and the portion of Hessen west of the Rhine River. Later, as the First, Third, and Seventh Armies advanced into Germany, the XXIII Corps was to be ready to take over additional areas across the Rhine.(15)

d. On 10 April responsibility for an area west of the Rhine and south of the German-Netherlands frontier was assumed, the Ninth Army retaining responsibility for screening and patrolling the west bank of the river and for the maintenance and protection of the bridges. The following day, the Third Army area around Koblenz was added to the Fifteenth Army's responsibility. The city of Koblenz itself was taken over three days later. Except for certain supply installations within the city and traffic control at the east approaches of bridges, Bonn and the surrounding area passed to the control of the Fifteenth Army from the First Army on 15 April. During the next two days, the relief of Third Army Units was completed and preparations were made for movement of the Fifteenth Army to the Seventh Army area west of the Rhine. On 20 April boundaries were extended to the Rhine River from Boppard to Oppenheim. The remaining portions of the Saarland were taken over on 24 April and the area within the Rheinprovinz lying east of the river and the last portions of Hessen were taken over the following day.(16)

200. The Last Resistance in the Rhineland.

a. When the Fifteenth Army assumed responsibility for the Rhineland, fighting continued in approximately one fifth of it. The combat area included about one half of each of the Regierungsbezirke of Düsseldorf and Cologne and a tip of the Regierungsbezirk of Koblenz, all lying east of the River. The tactical operations along the Rhine River had become negligible, consisting of only occasional patrolling and light artillery fire. The mission specifically for-

bade any attack in force across the river and no single patrol larger than a company was authorized at any time. Combat and reconnaissance patrols were sent east of the river, and contacts with German forces were reported until 11 April. On 6 April, for example, a raiding party repulsed a counterattack by three enemy tanks near Hittorf. Sixty prisoners were taken. On the same day a patrol in the vicinity of Eilendorf returned with forty displaced persons. The following day one of the patrol groups encountered an antipersonnel mine on the east bank and suffered twelve casualties, while the other eleven patrols sent out that day reported no trouble. Of the six patrols sent out on 8 April only one met resistance. It was ambushed, and one man was killed and another wounded. On 10 April the 101st Airborne Division reported that three or four patrols were unable to cross the Rhine because of heavy enemy fire in the area of Düsseldorf. (17)

b. The principal combat mission of the Fifteenth Army was to hold the Rhine River line intact while First and Ninth Army forces were reducing the German forces trapped in the Ruhr pocket. Resistance here had been split into two pockets by the two Armies, and enemy tanks and troops were milling aimlessly in the center of the two shrinking circles. By 18 April only one rapidly disappearing pocket remained on the east bank of the Rhine, just north of Cologne, and resistance in the Fifteenth Army area had ended. The mission of the Army was immediately shifted in keeping with this development. (18)

201. Organizing for the Occupation.

a. There was a noticeable difference in the way in which tactical units and military government units tackled the problem of control of German territory. Tactical commanders deployed their troops for possible defensive or offensive use, with combat operations as their chief concern. Military government units, on the other hand, had been trained for occupation on the basis of existing political divisions and organizations of the German Reich. This was founded on a system of organization which had as its basic unit the Stadtbezirk, or Stadtkreis, (roughly a city and its surrounding area of influence) and the Landkreis (similar to a small county). (19)

b. The tactical disposition of troops seldom coincide with the administrative subdivisions of military government authority. The boundaries overlapped to such a great degree that confusion developed in both the military government and the tactical organization, and a great deal of con-

fusion was created in the minds of the German people. Both the purely military and governmental commanders became uncertain of the bounds of their proper authority and frequently were obliged to make decisions by instinct rather than by regulation. The multiplicity of commands and the issuance of orders by almost all of these commands caused repeated duplications of effort. Many orders were issued by different units covering the same area or populations, with varying specifications: The effect upon the Germans was plainly undesirable.(20)

c. Early in April the tactical set-up with a forward combat zone and a rear security sector was found to be unsatisfactory for the mission of military government. The disposition of troops was changed to coincide more with the political subdivisions and all authority was centered in the corps commander with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, directly in charge. The corps were to organize their areas into districts and subdistricts, each district conforming to the boundaries of the Regierungsbezirk and subdistricts to those of one or more Kreise, insofar as practicable. Consideration was to be given to the establishment of the two districts in the Regierungsbezirke lying on both sides of the river, for instance Düsseldorf and Cologne. All existing tactical headquarters were to be subdistrict and sector headquarters. The corps commanders were to be responsible to the army commander for the maintenance of control, including security, traffic, and policing, and the administration of military government.(21)

202. Counterintelligence Activities.

The First, Third and Ninth Armies in their advance past the Rhine had been unable to give complete counter-intelligence coverage, but they had been successful in exploiting a large number of personality targets, including Gestapo and military intelligence personalities, and in first uncovering the Werewolf organization. In spite of this, when the Fifteenth Army took over the Rhineland, the counterintelligence coverage was, at best, superficial.(22)

a. All static Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments in the area remained in place and came under the control of the Fifteenth Army. Target information was obtained from the armies and the "T" Forces. The activities of "T" Forces west of the river had been completed before the Fifteenth Army assumed responsibility and all priority targets had been exploited. These forces continued to operate east of the river in the Ruhr after reduction of enemy forces until 1 May, when responsibility for their activities passed

to the Fifteenth Army. The Counter Intelligence Corps was responsible for the screening of all appointees to local government positions and also assisted temporarily in the screening of thousands of refugees and displaced persons.(23)

b. Reconnaissance of the area for security and other purposes was an unending process. Numerous denunciations were received and valuable contacts and sources of information were established. There were no outward indications of organized hostility, but instances of subversive activity indicated that certain elements of the civil population were recovering from the first shock of the occupation and if they were organized, might constitute a real threat. Incidents included cases of wire stringing, isolated sniping, and violations of travel and curfew restrictions. (24) An investigation of incidents in coal mines and a glass factory produced evidence that certain industrialists were left behind at the time of retreat to protect their industries, at the same time denying the products of the industries to the Allies. This discovery was one of the first indications of the problems to be encountered in the de-nazification of German industry.(25)

203. Mission of the Occupation Forces.

Civil government was established at all levels as quickly as possible, but there were five tasks for which only United States troops were to be used, namely:(26)

a. Troops were to administer and guard displaced persons camps until replaced by United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration teams, supplemented by selected displaced persons.

b. Troops were to serve as military government security guards. Foreign liaison officers and interpreters were to be used at all division and higher headquarters. German civilians could be used by military government detachments as interpreters and clerks.

c. Troops were to be used to police the larger German cities until the German civil police could be re-organized.

d. Troops were to supervise and control the prohibited five-kilometer frontier zone.

e. Finally, troops were to assist the Counter Intelligence Corps detachments and guard intelligence targets.

204. Security Guards.

During the advance across the Rhineland the armies considered assigning troops to military government, but no action was taken. Meanwhile a disordered Germany needed guarding. The German populace watched its chance to break into Wehrmacht food stores when guards were withdrawn, and displaced persons frequently celebrated their liberation by looting. In April the corps began to assign field artillery, infantry, cavalry, and antiaircraft troops to G-5 to serve as security guards. They were called "converted battalions," but retained their unit designations and equipment. These troops posted proclamations and ordinances, interrogated suspicious individuals, and kept main supply routes clear of displaced persons and refugees. In many instances arms were taken from civilians by guards patrolling assigned areas. Battalions from liberated countries were also used; normally as guards on bridges, roads, railroads, depots, and utilities, and as convoy and train guards. This same security guard plan was followed by the Fifteenth Army when it took over west of the Rhine. In addition, the 16th Cavalry Reconnaissance Group and the 16th and 19th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons were employed as mobile combat reserves to handle situations beyond the capabilities of local security forces. They were reinforced by approximately one motorized infantry company. (27)

205. Policing the Cities.

The work of returning mayors and auxiliary police to town was begun immediately; but it was not easy to find qualified men for the jobs, as the German police had collapsed completely under the pressure of combat conditions and had, for the most part, retreated with the German Army. It was necessary in the meantime to use tactical units in all the larger centers of population and sometimes in every little community. Military police battalions, as available, were used for policing and traffic control and other troops were trained to supplement them. As civil police forces were organized, they helped to enforce military government regulations, thus relieving tactical units of the burden. In order to avoid confusion, permanent changes in the structure of the German police system were delayed until after the withdrawal of Allied troops into the established boundaries of their respective zones. (28)

206. Border Control.

a. As a constantly expanding area required more troops than were available, a secure border zone was a necessity. A system of border control was outlined on 15 April, establishing a frontier command to lay and patrol a prohibited zone along the German frontier for 138 miles, from Losheim in the south to Venlo in the north, and extending from one to five kilometers. This zone was to be evacuated, and authorized crossing points were to be established for German, Netherland, and Belgian nationals. Guards were placed at these places and mines were laid in the open areas. Liaison planes supplemented by motor and foot detachments patrolled the area. Battalions from liberated countries could be used as guards if augmented and controlled by United States troops. The Netherland troops assigned to the frontier command were composed mostly of men from the underground army, who had been taken into the regular army. They were not always entirely satisfactory in carrying out the duties assigned to them and occasionally conducted private looting expeditions. There were no instances of friction, however, between United States troops and the Belgian and Netherland troops. (29)

b. For the first few days guards were ordered to shoot any trespasser on sight. This order was soon modified to authorize power of arrest only. Originally, it had been planned to evacuate all of the 30,000 nationals living in the zone, but actually only those considered a threat to security were evacuated. Any person who aided war criminals, disturbed the peace, or performed any hostile act was subject to evacuation. (30)

c. Military government authorities issued passes which were valid at the fifteen crossing points. Civilians of the western nations escorted by military government personnel and holding the proper papers could go through, but all Soviet citizens, Poles, Czechs, and other eastern nationals were turned back at the border and returned to the jurisdiction of the proper displaced persons authorities. Trains carrying displaced persons were stopped by Counter Intelligence Corps men, but no complete check was possible because of lack of personnel. No provision was made for people living along the border. Formerly these people had been issued frontier passes by each country concerned, permitting them to pass back and forth to carry on their business. Many people living in the Netherlands, for instance, had farms in Germany. The system worked a hardship on such people, but no solution was ever reached. (31)

207. Assistance Given to Counter Intelligence Corps.

The tactical forces assisted the Counter Intelligence Corps in situations requiring force beyond the latter's capabilities. In making arrests, for example, the agents of the Counter Intelligence Corps were often backed up by military police or details of regular troops. The Counter Intelligence Corps called upon the troops for assistance in making systematic searches of houses or outdoor areas, in posting special guards in unusual circumstances, and in guarding prisoners. In turn, the Counter Intelligence Corps served the troops in an advisory capacity respecting their security problems and went into action when summoned by the troops to undertake interrogations or to screen personnel.(32)

208. Progress of Military Government at the End of Resistance.

As of 1200 hours on 18 April, the remaining front along the west bank of the Rhine was officially deemed uncovered, and the tactical mission completed. The reshuffling of tactical troops to conform with political demarcations had simplified the G-5 problem, and the improvement was reflected in the reaction of the German population. A policy of military government had developed that seemed to be working, and an over-all administrative system had been set up.(33)

a. Qualified Germans were being appointed to civil offices as rapidly as possible. A high percentage of the adult population admitted Nazi membership, but most of the people questioned gave stories of yielding to outside pressure in order to retain jobs. The problem of incomplete Nazi registration records confronted all military government teams in the area. A new directive was issued by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, permitting people who had joined the Nazi Party through necessity to hold office at least temporarily, without which the military government authorities would have been hard pressed to find governmental personnel of any caliber, because the prohibition on all Nazis had the effect of preventing practically all qualified persons from holding office. The military government detachments were not as successful in establishing the German courts as they were in establishing administrative agencies. There were only a few qualified judges who had not been tainted with the Nazi ideology.(34)

b. Politically the people were apathetic, as they were more concerned with personal problems. With the exception of the Communist Party, which was trying to regroup its membership, there were not noticeable attempts of any of the political parties to reestablish themselves. (35)

c. A War Crimes Division was set up on 14 April consisting of personnel suddenly converted from tactical to occupation duties. Numerous cases were filed, the majority of which were solved by the aid of volunteer German informers. Many persons wanted on charges of war crimes were known to be in the Ruhr area, including some of high rank such as Field Marshal Model, the commander of the German Army Group "B", which had been trapped in the Ruhr pocket. The outstanding case during the period concerned the murder of seventy-one political prisoners of the Nazis, just prior to the arrival of the United States troops at Landswehr, near Solingen, and their hurried burial in a mass grave in a sand pit near the village. (36)

209. The Cordon Sanitaire.

Wartime living conditions, particularly in prisoners-of-war and displaced-persons camps, had created a high incidence of typhus and it was necessary to take steps to control it. On 23 April the Fifteenth Army, as directed by Theater Headquarters, established a cordon sanitaire along the Rhine River to protect the areas to the west from the louse-borne disease. Ports of entry or guard stations were established and all civilians and liberated prisoners of war traveling from east to west were deloused before crossing. Delousing stations were set up to carry out disinfection on an around-the-clock schedule. Reception centers provided temporary shelter and food, as well as medical inspection. Individuals suspected of having any communicable disease were isolated for observation. (37)

210. The Situation on and after V-E Day.

Before the end of hostilities, the XXII and XXIII Corps of the Fifteenth Army were engaged in the occupation, organization, and administration of an area of 14,000 square miles, about eight times the area of the United States occupation zone after World War I, but including the same area and its capital city, Koblenz. In spite of the difficulties resulting from continuous shifting and readjustment of troops within the area due to redeployment, a great deal of progress had been made. (38)

a. The occupation mission of the XXII and XXIII Corps was not announced by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, until 19 May. On that day the Rheinprovinz Military District Provincial Government was initiated. According to the plan, the area of responsibility of the Fifteenth Army was treated as one Military District. The three Regierungsbezirke of Düsseldorf, Aachen, and Cologne, constituting the area of responsibility of the XXII Corps, were placed under one Oberregierungs-Präsident, while each of the three had a Regierungsbezirk-Präsident and a completely constituted administrative staff. This unit was supervised by the military government personnel attached to the XXII Corps. The Regierungsbezirke of Trier and Koblenz and the Saarland, the Pfalz, and Hessen were similarly organized as a unit under the supervision of the XXIII Corps. By 20 July 1945, effective civil administration within the entire area of the Rheinprovinz Military District had been established at all levels of administration from the provinz level down to and including the Kreis level. The area was under control and had become serene enough to permit the beginning of political reorganization by the German population. The Social Democratic, Communist, and the Anti-Fako (Anti-Fascist) Parties were the first to organize, with their activities centering in Düsseldorf. The Anti-Fako Party seemed to have some Catholic clerical support. (39)

b. Within the first few days of June, the process of turning over the Regierungsbezirke of Düsseldorf, Aachen, and Cologne to British control was begun. This division of the Rheinprovinz Military District brought to an end the progress in the reconstitution of the civil government. The provincial government as it existed on 20 June, together with the Oberpräsident and his staff, passed to the control of the I British Corps. The south part of the Rhinprovinz was then attached to the administrative system which had been established at Neustadt. (40)

c. Under an agreement reached with the French, the XXIII Corps was directed on 5 July to turn over its territory of the Saarland, the Pfalz, Hessen west of the Rhine, and the Regierungsbezirke of Trier and Koblenz to the First French Army. The relief of United States units by the French was completed by 10 July. (41)

211. The Value of the Rhineland Occupation.

The Rhineland occupation served as a trial run in military government. For the first time, the tactical objective of an army was secondary and military government the

primary concern. The statement from General Eisenhower's headquarters that the Germans were "going to get military government and are going to know it is military government," was borne out in the Rhineland. The XXII and XXIII Corps, with some of the veteran European Theater fighting units, were commanded by two of the Army's most experienced combat generals-- Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon, commander of the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions in nearly every major campaign from the North African landing on, and Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Gaffey, commander of the 4th Armored (Spearhead) Division, which the German SS troops called "Roosevelt Butchers." Actual experience seemed to prove that cooperation was as important as force. In many ways the original plans for the occupation had to be changed when they were tested in practice. Much was accomplished and much was learned that was to prove helpful in the later more permanent job of occupation. (42)

OCCUPATION OF NORWAY

212. The First Stages.

a. The total German surrender included, of course, a surrender of their forces in Norway, although these had not been defeated in the field. In fact, during the period of hostilities there had been no invasion of Norway after 1940 by United Nations forces, except for a Soviet expedition into Finnmark, in the far North. Shortly after V-E Day, however, a small joint British-American force landed in Norway to control the 347,000 German troops located there and to help rehabilitate the Norwegian nation. (43)

b. In many ways, conditions in Norway were found to be better than expected. The Norwegians were hard working and well disciplined, and quickly restored their government to good working order. The country was not devastated except Finnmark, where the Germans had laid waste the country in their retreat before the Soviet forces.

213. Attempts to Remove German Installations.

It was not possible to remove German installations immediately. It was not even possible to disarm the Germans immediately. Few untoward incidents occurred, however, and the German forces proved cooperative. Their units were

gradually moved into restricted areas and thence slowly transported back to Germany. All types of ships were pressed into service to bring these surrendered troops back to their homeland, but German ships predominated. By 1 August 1945, 25,000 German prisoners had been moved from Norway to the United States Zone and 15,000 to the British Zone of Germany. An attempt was made immediately to bring all members of the German Navy, including German civilian employees, into these restricted areas or reservations. There were insufficient British and Norwegian naval personnel, however, to control completely the naval stations and shore batteries, so that a skeleton German naval organization was retained. By 10 July 1945, there were 70,052 German naval Personnel on the reservations and 19,699 outside the reservations. (44)

214. Recovered Allied Military Personnel.

a. A total of 86,458 former Allied prisoners of war were discovered in Norway, distributed in 400 camps and work detachments. On 14 May 1945 all German guards on camps containing ex-prisoners of war were ordered removed, and the Germans were directed to leave a thirty-day supply of food at each of the camps. Prisoner-of-war exchange teams were sent into all camp areas, each including a British officer, a representative of the Soviet Repatriation Commission, and, where necessary, Polish or Jugoslav prisoner-of-war exchange officers. (45)

b. On 18 May 1945 a Soviet delegation arrived in Oslo from Stockholm to supervise the repatriation of the recovered military personnel and displaced persons of Soviet nationality who were located in Norway. On 10 June an agreement was reached between the Soviet and the Norwegian Governments providing for the evacuation of Soviet nationals from southern Norway by rail and sea through Sweden and Finland, and for their evacuation from northern Norway by sea direct to Murmansk. The evacuation through Sweden and Finland commenced on 13 June 1945 and was completed by 13 July 1945; the evacuation by sea direct to Murmansk commenced on 23 June 1945 and was completed by 26 July 1945. Altogether, 18,852 people were evacuated. (46)

215. Continued Evacuation of German Personnel.

a. By 15 August 1945, 124,000 Germans had been evacuated from Norway. By that date the staff of the German Headquarters near Oslo had been greatly reduced, although many of its members were held in Norway for interrogation. (47)

b. On 20 September 1945 it was estimated that all disarmed Germans in the following categories who were slated for the United States Zone of Germany would be evacuated by 15 October 1945: All whose residence was in the United States Zone of Germany, except 4,500 who were in arrest or essential labor categories; all whose residence was in Austria, except the Soviet Zone; and 50 percent of those whose residence was in the Soviet Zone of Germany. Responsibility for the disposition of the remaining 50 percent, or about 57,000 persons, was accepted by the British. It was estimated that about 70,700 disarmed Germans would remain in Norway after 15 October 1945, of whom 4,500 resided in the British Zone of Germany, 57,000 in the Soviet Zone of Germany, and 4,500 in the United States Zone of Germany and who were in arrest or in an essential labor categories. In addition, about 11,000 German civilians would be left in Norway. (48)

c. By 20 September 1945, all German forces in Norway had been disarmed except a small number used as guards. By 17 October 1945, 251,818 had been evacuated to Germany and Austria and a total of approximately 70,700 remained to be evacuated to those two countries. (49)

d. By 5 September 1945, the disarmament of the German Navy and of German naval fortifications had been completed. By 15 October, over 50,000 German naval personnel had been evacuated to Germany. By that date, 10,113 German naval personnel remained "frozen" and were employed in such capacities as dumping ammunition and minesweeping, and as crews of merchant ships or on dockyard duty. (50)

216. Return of King Haakon.

King Haakon returned to Norway on 7 June 1945. On that date, the SHAEF Mission to Norway handed most governmental powers back to the Norwegian civil government. This was only a month after the original landing on Norway. (51)

217. Destruction of German War Material.

It had been Allied policy throughout Europe to destroy captured German war material. The carrying out of this policy created resentment among Norwegians, who felt that this material should have been turned over to the Norwegian Government, and much criticism was expressed in Norwegian newspapers. Eventually, the Allied Land Forces issued a news release to the Norwegian press explaining the necessity for such destruction, to prevent any future war potential. It mentioned that certain exceptions had been made in the

cases of Norway and the Netherlands, as enough German war material had been left to supply the coast defenses.(52)

218. Inactivation of Supreme Headquarters.

The SHAEF Mission to Norway ceased to exist, as such, on 14 July 1945, when Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, was dissolved. On that date, the American elements of the SHAEF Mission to Norway became the USFET Mission to Norway. Effective 24 August 1945, the Headquarters Allied Land Forces, Norway, took over all troops in Norway. Two commands were formed under this headquarters. One, the Oslo Zone, comprising the Allied Zones of Oslo and Stavanger, was under American command; the other, comprising the Allied Zones of Bergen, Trondheim, and Tromso, was designated British Land Forces Norway.(53)

219. Establishment of Norwegian Auxiliary Forces.

Much enthusiasm for the Allies was felt among the Norwegian populace. In fact, many Norwegians wished to join the U. S. Army for service against Japan. The Norwegian Government asked Allied Headquarters whether Norwegians could enlist in the U.S. or the British Armies, and were informed that they could not. It was finally agreed, however, that the Norwegian Government would raise an army composed of "liberated manpower units" which would aid the Allies within Norway. This was to be under the tactical command of the Allied Land Forces Norway, but the Norwegian Government was to retain full disciplinary powers over these units. The agreement with the Norwegian Government establishing this new army of "liberated manpower units" was signed on 28 June 1945.(54)

220. Evacuation of United States Troops.

a. It had originally been planned that United States troops would leave Norway by 1 August 1945. This proved impossible because of the comparatively low speed at which German disarmed personnel was moved out of Norway. United States forces in Germany were unwilling to accept a large-scale movement of Germans over a short period of time. Hence the repatriation of disarmed Germans was gradual and American occupation forces in Norway were unable to leave during the summer of 1945.(55)

b. The USFET Mission to Norway finally became inoperative 20 October 1945. American Task Force "A," which comprised all American forces in Norway except specialist and headquarters groups, became inoperative on

5 October and was completely phased out of Norway by 17 October 1945. A detachment of Theater Service Forces personnel, known as Theater Service Forces European Theater Liquidation Detachment, Norway, remained a short while to close out the remaining supply and administrative details. Likewise, a small group of officers and enlisted men remained to work with the American Embassy to clear up such matters as had to be handled at the ambassadorial level. With the exception of this latter group, the USFET Mission to Norway was phased out on 31 October 1945, likewise, Headquarters Land Forces, Norway, became inoperative on 31 October 1945. This terminated the combined command in Norway and, after that date, the command of land forces in Norway became purely a British responsibility.(56)

OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

221. Beginnings of the Occupation

a. On 4 May 1945 the Third U.S. Army was directed to advance into Czechoslovakia to an agreed point of contact with the Soviet forces. By 8 May this agreed point of contact had been reached by the United States forces, which occupied a line beyond the cities of Budejovice, Pilson, and Karlsbad.(57) Until 17 June 1945, the part of Czechoslovakia occupied by United States forces was under the tactical control of the V Corps of the Third Army, commanded by Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner. On 17 June 1945 the command of all V Corps troops and units still occupying Czechoslovakia passed to the XXII Corps under Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon.(58)

b. The mission assigned to Third Army was to put into immediate effect the terms of the surrender and such provisions of Operation ECLIPSE as were applicable to the situation. This involved holding all areas which Third Army troops occupied to prevent any movement of German troops into Germany until they could be disarmed and properly discharged; maintaining the boundary between United States and Soviet forces; and occupation of the part of Czechoslovakia allocated to the United States.

c. After V-E Day, there was little resistance to the enforcement of the surrender. A few incidents were re-

ported of small bands of armed enemy troops operating in the rear lines of the Corps, but these were speedily brought under control. There were no major outbreaks of Werewolf activity, although a number of cases of cutting of telephone lines, occurred. German soldiers and Czech partisans exchanged a few shots, but no large skirmishes were reported. To avoid captivity or internment by the Soviet forces, many German soldiers continued to attempt to pass the United States lines, but these were returned to Soviet control in accordance with agreements. (59)

d. Contact with the Soviet Army in Czechoslovakia was established at three points on 10 May 1945. The 6th Armored Division met elements of the Soviet forces in the vicinity of Karlsbad; the 2d Division contacted an officer from the V Russian Tank Corps at Rokycany; and the 16th Armored Division met elements of the CII Russian Corps at Veserbury. Further contact was made all along the control line within the next few days. (60)

e. Civil affairs activities were initiated in Czechoslovakia almost immediately upon cessation of hostilities. The liberated Czechs were both anxious and willing to take up the reins of government at the point where they had been snatched away by the Nazis. Military government proper was not established, since the country was liberated and therefore received the same treatment as the liberated territories of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Assistance rendered to the Czech Government, therefore, took the form of assistance in the rehabilitation of the country by its own government.

f. The occupation brought numerous problems, chief of which were: elimination of Nazis from the Sudetenland; disbandment of German forces; problems of refugees and displaced persons; evacuation of Sudeten Germans; location of war criminals and high-ranking Nazis; and maintaining the Pilsen Line with the Soviet forces.

222. Recovered Allied Prisoners of War.

On 9 May 1945 Third Army evacuated many Allied ex-prisoners of war, and by the evening of the following day all United States, British, and French ex-prisoners of war had been moved from the Third Army area. Most United States, British, French, and Netherland prisoners of war had been located in Karlsbad, Brux, and Schuncau. V Corps used a hundred trucks and seventy-five ambulances to evacuate them to Pilsen. From there, United States and British personnel were evacuated by air, train, or truck. (61)

223. Recovered Soviet Nationals.

An exchange point was established at Pilsen, where Allied ex-prisoners of war and displaced persons who were western nationals were exchanged for Soviet citizens.(62) An agreement was reached with the Soviet forces whereby 5,000 of their ex-prisoners of war or displaced persons would be turned over to them daily. The Chief of Staff, with several staff members, attended a conference with the Chief of Staff of the Fourth Soviet Guards Army and arranged details of the mutual transfer of personnel, both military and civilian.(63) Soviet patients were returned to Soviet-controlled territory by United States ambulances, and during the period 2 to 28 June 1945 a total of 1,117 Soviet military personnel were evacuated in this manner. All relations with the Soviet forces on these arrangements were cordial.(64)

224. Displaced Persons.

The Third Army in Czechoslovakia was entrusted with the responsibility for displaced persons located within their sector and those passing through it. Ordinarily, most trains carrying Polish displaced persons being repatriated to Poland were routed through Czechoslovakia. In August 1945 an investigation by the XXII Corps of the Third Army revealed that some displaced persons and prisoners of war were not receiving a sufficient amount of calories to meet the standards set by higher headquarters. Immediate action corrected this situation and large stores of captured enemy food stocks were built up, from which these individuals were fed. During the period 1 to 6 October 1945, the Czech Government assumed control of all displaced-persons camps except one, which the XXII Corps continued to maintain as a transient camp. XXII Corps continued to inspect all camps, however, to insure their proper maintenance. During October and November 1945, 201 Poles, 133 Jugoslavs, 158 Hungarians, 193 Rumanians, 5,892 Germans, 1,590 Austrians, and enough displaced persons of other nationalities to reach a total of 8,923 were processed. On 15 November 1945 the transient camp operated by XXII Corps was closed.(65)

225. War Criminals.

Both Theater Headquarters and Czech officials were eager to screen out from the 75,000 German prisoners of war held by the United States forces in Czechoslovakia all members of the Gestapo and other political offenders guilty of Nazi crimes. Counter Intelligence Corps agents carefully checked all German prisoners of war, in accordance with the

directives, to determine whether they should be discharged or held for further investigation. Among those detained were two notorious Nazis, who were captured on 9 May 1945: Hermann Frank, Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia, and Konrad Henlein, Nazi Party leader for the Sudetenland. Henlein later committed suicide to avoid trial.(66)

226. German Prisoners of War.

German prisoners of war in the established camps throughout the area, numbering about 70,000 men, were discharged so rapidly that by the end of July there remained but some 35,000. Under hospitalization in the area were some 16,000 German prisoners of war and 1,600 German civilians. The hospitals were staffed by German military personnel under the control of U.S. Medical Department supervisory teams.(67)

227. Expulsion of Germans from the Sudetenland.

a. By far the most serious problem faced by the occupying troops was that of the German-speaking population of the Sudetenland. This area, composing the northern, western, and southern borders of Czechoslovakia, had been included within the borders of the Republic since its formation in 1918. Since the people of this area had been used as a pawn by the Nazis in their systematic destruction of the Czech state in 1938 and 1939, it was not unnatural that the Czechs, on regaining their independence in 1945, should desire to expel these people from Czechoslovakia in order to safeguard themselves against any future repetition. While this was primarily a Czech problem rather than one affecting the United States troops, it nevertheless presented a problem, since the troops, unacquainted with the background of the matter, tended to consider the manner of expulsion unduly harsh. There was also the additional problem of border control, since the Sudeten Germans were nearly always expelled into the United States Zone of Germany.(68) While the expulsion of Sudeten Germans was temporarily suspended in the summer of 1945, pending a study by the Allied Control Council to determine how many German Expellees from liberated nations each national Zone could absorb, illegal crossings continued, and military units reported that only about one-tenth of the persons attempting to enter Germany illegally could be restrained.(69) The bulk of official expulsions occurred after United States troops had left Czechoslovakia at the end of November 1945; nevertheless, United States troops had made their sympathies sufficiently clear to cause the Sudetenlanders to believe that the former were in Czechoslovakia chiefly to shield the latter from

the Czechs.(70)

228. Relations between Czechs and Americans.

a. With the exception noted above, an excellent understanding existed between Czechs and United States Personnel, and continued efforts were made on both sides to maintain friendly relations. American trucks and gasoline were allocated to Czech agriculture in the summer of 1945; a heavy equipment school was established in Pilsen to teach United States forces and Czech civilian engineers the use and maintenance of heavy-working equipment, which had been supplied to the Czechs to assist in rehabilitation. The sending of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration supplies to Czechoslovakia was largely an American responsibility.(71)

b. Close contact and friendly relations were maintained with the Czech press. A continuous flow of information as to the activities of the United States forces in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere was given to representatives of the Czech press, and full coverage of all news events was obtained by close cooperation. Press representatives were given identification badges to permit them ready access to all events.(72)

c. Counterintelligence personnel maintained close relations with the Czech police and cooperated with them in uncovering and apprehending Axis war criminals and other personalities of counterintelligence interest. Many such persons were turned over to the Czech authorities for trial by them, including Monsigneur Tiso, the puppet president of Slovakia during the German occupation.(73)

d. The Czechs themselves did much to maintain the good relations between the two nations. An "American Institute" was established with a main office in Prague and branches in Marienbad and Pilsen. Its program, in addition to promoting better Czech-American understanding, was to bring together Czechs who had studied in the United States and to assist Americans interested in professional, social, and cultural activities.(74)

229. Relations with the Soviet Forces.

a. While the United States forces occupied the part of Czechoslovakia west of the Budejovice, Pilsen, and Karlsbad line, and including those three towns, the Soviet forces occupied the part of Czechoslovakia lying east of that line. Relations between the United States and Soviet

forces were friendly. Russian-speaking personnel in the XXII Corps were insufficient, however, to maintain liaison with the Soviet forces and to serve as interpreters. Consequently, a request was made to the G-2 Section of the Third Army for two Russian Military Interpreter teams. These were obtained, each consisting of two officers and four enlisted men. A Liaison station was established at Rokycany, a border point between the United States and Soviet zones of occupation and on the main highway between Pilson and Prague, and staffed with one officer and three men. Its mission was to facilitate crossings of the control line and to maintain liaison with the Soviet forces at this point. The remaining members of the two teams were retained at the Headquarters of the XXII Corps, where they could act as Russian Interpreters, translators, and couriers.(75)

b. For an effective control of the movement of Personnel in the Corps area or crossing the Soviet-American control line, a visitors' bureau was set up in the headquarters of the XXII Corps, operated under the supervision of the G-2 Section. The bureau was staffed with United States personnel and with Czech civilian interpreters speaking Czech, Russian, German, and English. Among its functions was the issue of XXII Corps circulation passes for travel within the corps area, and Russian-American control line permits for travel into the Russian zone of Czechoslovakia by U.S. Army personnel on official duty or compassionate leave.

c. The only point of disagreement between United States and Soviet authorities in Czechoslovakia arose in connection with the Soviet policy of "living off the country." The Czech Government had authorized the requisitioning by Soviet forces of local supplies and also supplies located within the United States zone of occupation. The U.S. Army, however, refused to permit requisitioning in their zone by members of the Soviet Army.(77)

230. Withdrawal of United States Troops from Czechoslovakia.

a. As early as June 1945 the question of withdrawal of United States troops was discussed. When the State Department raised the point, it was reported that President Benes, though desirous that both United States and Soviet forces leave the country, asked that United States forces remain for the present and that their eventual withdrawal be synchronized with that of the Soviet forces.(78) In the middle of July 1945, the Czech Government made a formal request that

United States troops be withdrawn, simultaneously with Soviet troops.(79) Toward the middle of September, however, it was noted that Soviet withdrawal from Czechoslovakia proceeded slowly, if at all, and Czech officials began to express considerable concern.(80) At this time President Benes informally requested the United States to draw up a withdrawal plan and request the Soviet Union to provide a similar plan. The President suggested that, if the Soviet authorities refused, the United States should give the widest publicity to the refusal. (81)

b. In early October 1945 plans for the withdrawal of troops were formulated. One corps with two divisions was to remain in Czechoslovakia until 15 November 1945. If complete withdrawal of United States troops by that date proved impossible, the occupational troop basis of the European Theater would have to be increased.(82) Later statements of Army officials suggested that the United States forces would leave as soon as the haphazard evacuation of Sudeten Germans could be changed into an orderly evacuation, regardless of Soviet plans for evacuation.(83) The State Department finally requested the War Department to postpone the date for the United States withdrawal to 1 December 1945, and the War Department agreed to this.(84)

c. Orders were issued for the initiation of the evacuation on 20 November 1945 and its completion by 1 December 1945. On 13 November all troops attached or assigned to the XXII Corps had been alerted to the fact that all United States troops would clear Czechoslovakia by midnight on 30 November 1945 and that all United States supplies and installations would be evacuated from Czechoslovakia. The move was carried out on schedule, and by 1 December 1945 all United States troops had left Czechoslovakia.(85)

Chapter X

GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE OCCUPATION

THE TERMS OF SURRENDER AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT

1. The Meeting at Reims.

Although surrender terms had long been the subject of study by the European Advisory Commission, the brief document signed at Reims at 0241 hours on 7 May 1945 was drawn up at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. It dealt solely with immediate military requirements. All forces under the German military control were required to cease operations at 2301 hours on 8 May. The German High Command accepted responsibility for issuing and carrying out the surrender orders. No ships, vessels, or aircraft were to be scuttled or damaged. In the event of noncompliance, the Allies were to take such punitive or other action as they considered appropriate.

2. The Signing at Berlin.

A number of circumstances led to the signing of a second instrument of surrender. Although the Supreme Commander had no intentions of accepting a surrender merely on behalf of the Western Allies, German propaganda was keyed to exaggerate the slightest appearance of a rift between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. Hundreds of German soldiers had surrendered in the propaganda-nourished expectation of being able to join with United States forces in an attack to the east. The Soviet authorities were disturbed by the 5 May broadcasts of Admiral Dönitz, while surrender negotiations were under way, in which he urged Germans to continue the war against the Soviet forces and at the same time not to resist the Allied forces in the West. (1) The Soviet Command was reassured by the Combined Chiefs

of Staff on 8 May that the unconditional surrender had been made jointly to the Soviet Union and the Allied forces and that it would be actively enforced on this basis, if resistance continued.(2) The surrender had been signed at Reims because this afforded the quickest end to hostilities and further loss of life. General Eisenhower was eager to cooperate with the Soviet leaders in scheduling a second ceremony in Berlin, and the official German and Allied surrender parties were flown there on 8 May. Although the document states that the surrender was signed "on the 8th day of May 1945," the actual signing took place a short time after midnight, which made it early in the morning of 9 May. This surrender act was signed at a slightly higher level than the earlier act had been. At Reims, General Jodl had signed on behalf of the German High Command, with General Sosulaparov and General Sevez as the Soviet and French witnesses and Lt. Gen. W. B. Smith representing the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. At Berlin General Admiral von Friedeberg, Wehrmacht High Command Chief Kcitel, and Luftwaffe Chief Stumpff signed on behalf of the German High Command, Air Marshal Tedder for the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and Marshal Zhukov on behalf of the Soviet High Command. Generals Spaatz and de Lattre-Tassigny, of the U. S. Strategic Air Forces and the First French Army, respectively, were witnesses.

3. Terms of the Berlin Surrender.

At the request of the Soviet leaders, the terms of the 8 May document were more specific in regard to the disarmament of the German forces. A clause was added requiring the defeated forces "to disarm completely, handing over their weapons and equipment to the local Allied commanders or officers designated by representatives of the Allied Supreme Command," and the clause forbidding damage of ships, vessels, and aircraft was extended to cover machines of all kinds, armaments, apparatus, "and all the technical means of prosecution of war in general." Apart from these modifications the basic terms were unchanged.

4. The Full Scope of the Surrender Terms.

a. Only the primary conditions of military surrender were set forth in the documents of 7 and 8 May. In both of these acts of surrender a later expansion was implied in a paragraph which stated that they were without prejudice to, and would be superseded by, any general instrument of surrender imposed by, or on behalf of, the United Nations and applicable to Germany and the German armed forces as a whole.

b. The Berlin Declaration signed on 5 June 1945 by General Eisenhower, Marshal Montgomery and General de Lattre-Tassigny defined in greater detail military requirements of the surrender and dealt also with Allied prisoners of war, displaced persons, and war criminals. It left the door open for further specifications of requirements of political, administrative, economic, financial, and military nature. Under the Berlin Declaration the four governments undertaking the occupation of Germany assumed supreme authority, including all powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command, and any state, municipal, or local government. It was announced, moreover, that they would determine the boundaries of Germany or any part of Germany and the status of Germany or of any area then included in German territory.(3)

c. Further agreement on the terms to be imposed on Germany was reached in the Berlin Conference of July-August 1945, and resulted in the "Potsdam Agreement," signed by President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee, and Marshal Stalin on 2 August 1945. After the Potsdam Declaration, the Allied Control Authority was established and became the machinery for the military government of Germany.

d. Additional requirements imposed upon Germany as a result of her defeat were announced in Military Government Proclamation No 2, issued on 20 September 1945.

5. Prevention of Further Aggression.

The Allies attempted to prevent further aggression by the German nation by requiring complete disarmament and disbandment of the German forces, the surrender of all war equipment and material, including naval shipping and aircraft, and the dismantling or conversion of all plants used in the production of war material. The Allies sought control of the German economy and future production and research, prevention of development of a war potential, destruction of Nazi organizations, including the Nazi Party and all its arms and agencies, removal from office of all Nazis, apprehension and trial of war criminals, and elimination of militarism from German education.

6. Controls over the German Economy.

The future of the German economy presented a two-fold problem to the Allies: first, development of war potential must be prevented; but, secondly, there must be sufficient industry to permit the nation to live. In addition to requiring industrial disarmament, the restrictive

provisions of the surrender terms included transfer of merchant shipping to Allied control and prohibition of further building of sea-going ships; removal of excessive productive capacity to other countries as reparations; decentralization of German economic organization to eliminate excessive concentration of power as exemplified by cartels and other monopolistic arrangements; rigid control of production of metals, chemicals, machinery, and similar items of potential war-making value; prohibition of the manufacture of aircraft; and control of all facilities for the generation of power. On the positive side, prompt measures were instituted to effect the repair of transport, enlarge coal production, maximize agricultural output, and make emergency repairs in housing and essential utilities. In the Potsdam Agreement, it was recommended that central administrative departments, to act under Control Council direction, be established in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade, and industry. Financial provisions required the surrender of German-held gold, silver, and platinum and of foreign notes and coins, and stipulated, among other requirements, that no Nazi property or assets should be disposed of without sanction of the Allied representatives.(4) Specific controls over transportation and communications also were included in the surrender terms.

7. Legal and Political Reform.

The Nazi legal and judicial system was abolished and replaced by a democratic system. Local political responsibility was gradually developed. Democratic political parties, with rights of assembly and of public discussion, were encouraged. Civil rights assured by the terms of surrender, subject to the maintenance of military security, included the formation of free trade unions and freedom of speech, press, and religion. Education was freed from Nazi and militaristic doctrines and was reshaped so as to foster democratic ideas.

8. Foreign Relations and Public Safety.

By virtue of the surrender, the diplomatic, consular, and commercial relations of the German state with other states ceased to exist. Consequently the Allied representatives undertook to regulate all matters affecting Germany's international relations. The surrender terms also provided for control of travel of persons in Germany and required that no person leave or enter the country without a permit issued on authority of the Allied representatives. For the maintenance of order and for guard duties, detachments of civil police, armed with small arms only, were to be designated by the Allied representatives. Reform of the

police system was envisaged by the terms of the Control Council Proclamation of 20 September 1945.

9. Problems of Persons and Property.

The complex human pattern in Germany and Central Europe, where Nazi importations of labor, wartime shifting of population, capture of Allied military personnel, and internment of a host of unfortunates in different categories had created a heritage of confusion, gave rise to a number of the surrender provisions. The German authorities and people were required to take appropriate steps to insure the safety and welfare of persons not of German nationality and to safeguard their property; to release all prisoners of war belonging to the forces of the United Nations, all other United Nations nationals under restraint, and all other persons who might be confined for political reasons or as a result of any Nazi action, law, or regulation which discriminated on the grounds of race, color, creed, or political belief. The surrender terms provided for the transfer to Germany of German populations in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. They laid down principles for determining the status of diplomatic, consular, and other personnel and the disposition of property of neutral nations and of enemy nations assisting Germany in the war.

10. Enforcement and Application.

The surrender documents contained provisions requiring full assistance on the part of the Germans. They were to give the occupation authorities access to all records, archives, buildings, and installations, to furnish technical assistance where needed, and to supply any type of labor requested.

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE OCCUPATION

11. Early Cooperation.

a. During the conflict, little stress was placed on the differences between the Western European and Soviet conceptions of democracy but after the fighting ended there was increasing evidence that Europe was dividing into two groups—one favoring the East and the other the West. To a certain extent the relations between these groups in

Europe were a reflection of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Atlantic Charter and a series of international conferences had provided a basis for cooperation after the defeat of Germany; the European Advisory Commission prepared the basic agreements on policy for the occupation of Germany; the Council of Foreign Ministers, established after the Potsdam Conference, undertook the task of writing the peace treaties. Although major disagreements were avoided during the first year, there were misunderstandings and conflicts on many points.

b. Much of the unity displayed by the Allies during the war was due to the ability of President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin to reach agreements. Relations between the United States and Great Britain were not seriously affected by the death of President Roosevelt in April 1945. In June 1945 Prime Minister Churchill expressed great pleasure in his dealings with President Truman, saying that the latter had been most cooperative in the Venezia Giulia and Trieste negotiations.(5) Churchill admitted, however, that he was discouraged over the Polish question and had little hope of close cooperation with the Soviet Union.

12. Control Commissions.

The most vital points of contact for the Allied Governments were in the Control Commissions, the first three of which were established in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. To a large extent the Soviet Union dominated the Commissions in the Balkan countries. The Soviet military representative in each of the three capitals was the permanent chairman and the United States and British members functioned in an advisory capacity. At the Potsdam Conference the United States asked for reorganization of these Commissions, but did not gain much influence in them. United States officials had this experience in mind when they undertook the organization of the Allied Control Authority in Berlin.(6)

13. Early Contacts between the United States and Soviet Forces.

a. Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Parks, who entered Berlin late in June to make advance preparations for the Potsdam Conference, met with considerable delay in his negotiations with the Soviet authorities, but all differences were finally resolved. The United States Sector in Berlin was occupied early in July, evacuation of United States troops from Soviet occupied territory in Germany having been previously completed at the insistence of the Soviet authorities.

b. More difficulty was encountered in entering Vienna. The Soviet authorities delayed allocation of air-field facilities there and extensive negotiations were necessary before the city was subdivided for international occupation. Goussev, the Soviet member of the European Advisory Commission, in explaining the situation in Vienna to his colleagues on 24 May 1945, stated that, in the absence of Allied documents on zones and control machinery the Red Army naturally solved in the way which appeared most expedient any practical questions which arose after the liberation of Austria.(7) Other members of the Commission were impressed with Goussev's apparent sincerity and desire to avoid further reproaches for alleged unilateral actions.

c. United States elements arrived in Vienna late in July, but it was September before the control authority was firmly established on a quadripartite basis. There were a number of shootings, arrests, and other disturbances at points where United States and Soviet forces were in contact. These incidents usually resulted in official investigations, but none of them visibly affected relations between the two nations.

14. The Emergency Economic Committee for Europe.

The Emergency Economic Committee for Europe was established in London on 2 June 1945 by the United States, Great Britain, France, and Belgium. Delegates from Norway and Czechoslovakia were present, although their governments did not officially join until later. One purpose of this group was to supplement and coordinate other organizations such as the European Coal Organization and the European Inland Transport Organization. It dealt with broad questions of policy referred to it by the governments involved.

15. Relations with the British.

Churchill's removal from office while the Potsdam Conference was in progress took the second of the three men who had directed the major war effort against the Axis Powers. There was still not much apparent change in United States-British relationships. Although the Palestine question was a difficult one for Great Britain, and Germany through her displaced persons camps became a focal point of the Jewish situation, the United States and British officials worked for both separate and joint solutions of the problems involved. The action of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Joint United States-United Kingdom Shipping Board in taking the British liners Queen Elizabeth and Aquitania from the redeployment run touched off some anti-British and anti-lend-lease reactions among United States troops awaiting

redeployment. Theater Headquarters took steps to inform the men that the removal of the ships was not a British decision alone and also to point out that Britain also had many men overseas who were anxious to rejoin their families.(9) The Soviet and Polish press charged that the British were keeping a million Germans in military units in the British Zone.

16. French Policies.

a. One explanation for French opposition to a central organization in Germany was that the French, who were not represented at Potsdam, connected the proposal with that meeting and disapproved it on the general principles that everything emanating from the Potsdam Agreement was bad. Some French statesmen, however, urged support of the Potsdam Agreement. The United States took the lead in advocating German centralization. Both Britain and the Soviet Union on a number of occasions appeared as supporters of French interests in international negotiations, causing the French public to believe sometimes that the United States opposed France while the other two nations favored her.(10) Some French political leaders considered that, if the Saar, Rhineland, and Ruhr were retained by Germany and became a part of a unified and strong Germany under the domination of the Soviet Union, it might be necessary for France to orient its policy toward the Soviet Union. Molotov, however, made it clear that the Soviet Union's chief concern was that the Ruhr should not in any way bolster a western bloc. He wanted the Soviet Union to participate in any international commission for administration of the Ruhr. He did not indicate any Soviet opposition to internationalization of the Ruhr.

b. France believed that for security reasons it should have control over the agricultural area north of the Saar, including the left bank of the Rhine through Cologne and one or two bridgeheads.(11) French Foreign Minister Bidault emphasized that control, not annexation, was desired. He feared that international control of this area might some day lead to the end of its occupation through some "majority vote" against France. He also pointed out that France wanted the Saar coal but did not desire to annex the Saar. Bidault thought the Ruhr should be under an international regime, but did not specify the nature of this regime.

17. Soviet Publicity.

During the final period of hostilities, the Soviet press carried little which would make clear to its public the scope and significance of what was happening in the

West.(12) The explanatory comment that did appear hammered incessantly at the theme that Allied successes were conditioned by the role of the Red Army in absorbing all available German reserves. The surrender of the German forces in northwest Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark was reported inconspicuously and without editorial comment in the Moscow papers for 5 May. It was buried in Izvestia under an item headed "Yugoslav Troops Take Trieste."

18. Soviet Policy Statements.

Soviet policy at the close of the war was not clearly defined, nor was that of any of the other nations. In his victory message, Stalin opposed any dismemberment of the Reich. Evidently the formal cession of large parts of German territory to the Soviet Union and Poland was considered an exception to this general rule. Points of policy which were touched upon in subsequent statements from Moscow included.(13)

a. Social reforms designed to undermine certain classes or groups in German society which had enjoyed special independence.

b. A radical reduction in the German standard of living.

c. Extensive use of German labor by the victor countries. No mention was made of a political framework.

19. Soviet Actions.

There were early complaints from United States officials regarding Soviet actions. It was charged that the Soviet Union endeavored to hold the western armies back, while Soviet troops occupied as much as possible of the remaining territory, and that Soviet occupation then was used to further Soviet political aims. Lack of cooperation was charged. Illustrations cited included Soviet refusal to permit United States civil or military representatives to make a preliminary survey in Vienna, and refusal to permit early communications with the Czechoslovak Government. Soviet recognition of the Austrian Government without consultation with the United States was considered a unilateral action.

20. Boundary Adjustments.

There were no major changes in the boundaries between the United States and Soviet Zones of occupation, but the adjustment in the frontier line in the vicinity

of Allendorf gave the U. S. Army exclusive right to use the 2.7-mile stretch of railway which ran from Göttingen in the British Zone to Rebra in the United States Zone, thus closing the gap in the railway line between the Bremen Enclave and Frankfurt. The agreement was signed on 17 September at Wanfried, Saxony, by Brig. Gen. W.T. Sexton, commanding the 3d U.S. Infantry Division, and Maj. Gen. V.S. Askalev, commanding the Soviet 77th Guard Infantry Division. In the exchange of territory effected by the lateration of the frontier line between the Kreise of Witzenhausen and Heiligenstadt, the Soviet Union received approximately four square kilometers of land east of Allendorf and the United States got approximately the same amount north of Allendorf.

21. Flights over Soviet-occupied Territory.

a. Repeated Soviet protests were received by Supreme Headquarters of violations of the border between Allied and Soviet forces by American and British air forces and also by individual American and British soldiers. The Military Mission at Moscow reported to General Eisenhower on 10 June 1945 that incomplete data from General Antonov for the period 1 May to 3 June listed nineteen such single and group flights at heights of from 300 to 1,500 meters. In reply General Eisenhower said that the specific instances reported were being investigated, but that similar violations on the part of the Soviet forces which had come to his attention had not been brought to the notice of the Soviet High Command since they were not considered important in a situation involving allies. He added that these could be detailed if desired. He requested the Military Mission at Moscow to pass this answer to the Soviet High Command and report the reaction. Meantime he requested from his forces as much information as possible on past Soviet violations and full reports on all future instances for possible discussion with the Soviet authorities. The air staff instructed all United States and British flying personnel to refrain from flying over or landing on Soviet controlled territory without obtaining proper clearance.

b. There was difficulty in establishing authorized air routes over Soviet-controlled territory. A corridor was granted from Stendal to Berlin, but Soviet navigators had to be picked up to supervise flights. A request of 25 June to set up immediately a daily courier service from Frankfurt, via Halle, to Tempelhof air field was refused. Requests by the Soviet Union for routine flights were authorized immediately by the Military Mission at Moscow and it was hoped that this would encourage expedition on the part of the Soviet authorities. General Eisenhower

instructed that all flights to Berlin be made only through the authorized corridor and that nonroutine flights be cleared through Supreme Headquarters.

c. When Supreme Headquarters wished to establish a regular air service from Frankfurt to Berlin with no stops en route to pick up the required Soviet navigators, the Military Mission at Moscow answered that they considered it unwise to ask clearance for scheduled air runs between Frankfurt and Berlin, as there should be access to Berlin by all means of transportation without special approval in each case. General Deane said that he had delayed asking for authority because he thought it would set a bad precedent. The request for clearance was therefore not made. For like reasons the Department of State requested General Deane to withdraw a request for clearance to Prague, stating that Czechoslovakia was a sovereign state and clearance should therefore be requested from its Government.

22. Polish Negotiations with Moscow.

a. Negotiations between the Warsaw Poles and the Soviet Union, which led to a pact and subsequently to a boundary dispute regarding the Oder-Neisse line, were conducted in April 1945. It was supposed that the Soviet Union would refuse to accept any treaty regarding German boundaries which did not recognize this line as the frontier of Poland. In justification of the incorporation of German territory into Poland, the Soviet Union contended, first, that only the Polish population remained in Silesia and Danzig, the German population having departed; secondly, that the basic population of these areas consisted of Poles; and, thirdly, that the transfer of the areas to Polish civil administration had no relation to the question of boundaries.(14) The United States did not accept these contentions as true.

b. United States observers charged that the transfers were portrayed to the public of both the Soviet Union and Poland as straight cessions of territory. The United States adhered to the protocol of 12 December 1944, which described the Germany to be occupied as that within her frontiers as they were on 31 December 1937.(15) It was the United States assumption that Polish-occupied German territory remained enemy territory under Soviet occupation and was subject to agreements and understandings of the Allied powers with respect to occupied Germany.

23. United States Relations with the Warsaw Government.

The United States established diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity on 5 July 1945.(16) As a result of this recognition Theater Headquarters discontinued official relations with the Provisional Polish Military Mission.(17) Prior to this time the United States had received from the latter and from the Vatican appeals not to abandon to the Soviet Union any Poles or other Eastern peoples who did not wish to return to their former homes or who sought refuge in the United States Zone of Germany.(18) The presence of large numbers of Poles who were unwilling to return to Poland proved to be one of the most complex of the displaced-persons problems. Both the United States and Great Britain organized Polish labor units to give employment to these persons. Those who wished to return to Poland were assisted in doing so, but no pressure was exerted on others.

24. United States Relations with Switzerland.

During the war the Swiss diplomatic service was charged with the protection of United States interests in Germany. At the time of the German surrender, even the Swiss Foreign Office was out of touch with many of its agents in Germany. The Swiss continued to handle routine United States matters in Germany until State Department representatives took over. Where possible, Supreme Headquarters accorded facilities to the Swiss for the discharge of these functions. After the occupation of Germany by the Allies, the principal interest of the Swiss was in the opening of the Rhine for traffic.

25. United States Relations with Belgium.

Belgium had special interests in the inland waterways, coal distribution, and other transportation. There was much need of labor in Belgium, and a program was worked out for the recruitment of workers among displaced and stateless persons.(19) The presence of King Leopold in the United States Zone of Germany resulted in a number of problems before he was provided with transportation to the Swiss border.

26. United States Relations with Denmark.

The principal concern of Denmark was the location of its southern boundary. Many persons in that country opposed any change which would take in former German territory without evacuating the German residents.(20)

27. United States Relations with the Netherlands.

When the war ended, sixteen battalions were being formed in the Netherlands for service in Germany.(21) Five battalions were serving under Supreme Headquarters Command at the end of the campaign and later were transferred to 21st Army Group.(22) At the same time, the Netherland Government was considering raising three divisions for service in the Far East. During August and September, more than 3,000 Dutch marines were sent to the United States for training in a program designed to help the Dutch merchant fleet.(23)

28. United States Relations with Luxembourg.

On 20 May 1945 three United States officers were attached to the Luxembourg Army to advise and assist in the formation of a small armed force. They served until the end of the year.(24) The French Government agreed to the employment of a Luxembourg detachment in the French Zone of Germany under the provisions of the quadripartite agreement of 5 June 1945, which permitted occupation powers to employ auxiliary contingents from the forces of other nations which fought Germany.(25)

29. United States Relations with Finland and Certain Balkan Countries.

Stalin's proposal of 27 May 1945 to resume diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, Rumania, and Finland, and later with Hungary, brought from President Truman a statement on United States policy. In his reply to Stalin, the President agreed that the period of armistice regimes should be as short as feasible and that prompt recognition should be given to efforts by these former enemy countries to align themselves with Allied democratic principles. The reply continues:(26)

By its elections and other political adjustments Finland has shown genuine devotion to democratic principles, so the United States is ready at once to resume diplomatic relations. Similar encouraging signs are not apparent in the three Balkan countries. The President has been disturbed to find, especially in Bulgaria and Rumania, governments which in his opinion are not responsive to, or representative of, the wishes of the people and which do not allow all democratic elements free expression.

30. United States Relations with Czechoslovakia.

Czechoslovak proposals for the expulsion of certain of the German and Hungarian minorities were a matter of early concern to both the United States and Great Britain. The subject came up for decision in the Potsdam Conference along with other minority question. Proposals for civil affairs agreements with the United States and Great Britain had been made by the Czechoslovak Government in 1944 and were renewed in April 1945. Many interested departments in Washington did not feel that the agreements were necessary. (27) In June 1945 the Czechoslovak Government presented a note stating that the U. S. Army had seized a quantity of food-stuffs, cattle, and horses at Domazlice and requesting return of the property. (28) The claim was investigated, but no evidence was found to substantiate the Czechoslovak charge. (29) United States proposals for the withdrawal of troops from Czechoslovakia received the approval of Marshal Stalin in November, and his suggestion that the departure be completed by the first of December was carried out. (30)

31. United States Relations with Hungary.

a. The Soviet Government reported the signing of an agreement with the Hungarian Government on 15 June 1945 calling for the delivery of reparations to the value of \$200,000,000 in goods and equipment over a six-year period. Subjects were being considered by the Allied Control Council in Hungary during July 1945, but on which decisions were not reached, included the repatriation of displaced persons other than prisoners of war and war criminals. (31) Marshal Voroshilov, Chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary protested in July 1945 against the arrival of three repatriation trains in Budapest, saying that the movement had not been coordinated with the Soviet authorities. (32) Although an investigation disclosed that the trains had departed under agreement with the Soviet Repatriation Unit at Liezen, Austria, the shipments were embargoed for several weeks until the matter could be cleared up.

b. The Soviet removal of plants producing radio and communications equipment and the Hungarian Communist Party's action in acquiring a motion picture monopoly and tight control over radio and press dispatches were interpreted in many circles as an effort to isolate Hungary from Western educational and informational facilities. (33) United States property also was an issue in Hungary. The United States informed the Hungarian Government that, although it did not object to the nationalization of natural resources by sovereign states, it believed that Hungary, while under an armistice

regime, should not take such a step affecting foreign-owned property. The United States stated further, that in the event of nationalization after a peace treaty was signed, the United States Government would be bound by its obligations to protect its nationals' interests to require compensation for United States property.(34) Hungarian Minister of Finance Cordon in December 1945 complained that the Soviet Union sought the economic collapse of Hungary in the belief that it would be followed by a revolution which Soviet occupying troops could turn to their advantage.(35)

32. United States Relations with Yugoslavia.

The proposed incorporation of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations into the European Theater made the Venezia-Giulia situation and agreements with Yugoslavia matters of concern to European Theater Headquarters. In December 1945 U.S. Forces, Austria, were holding about twenty tons of records of the Yugoslav general staff covering the period 1920 to 1941. These were the subject of considerable correspondence before they were restored to the proper authorities at Belgrade.(36) The United States protested against the holding and operation of United States property by the Yugoslav Government, declaring that Yugoslav declarations promising to uphold private industrial rights and to guarantee freedom for foreign investments were being ignored.(37) Yugoslav shipping on the Danube was the subject of extensive negotiations among the governments involved.

33. United States Relations with Bulgaria.

G. M. Divitrov, Secretary General of the Bulgarian Agrarian Party until March 1945, was the target of a number of verbal attacks by Communists who labeled him a "collaborator" and a "Fascist." After he was ousted as party head, his arrest was ordered by the Bulgarian Government, but he was given asylum by a United States official in Bulgaria. The order for Divitrov's arrest was regarded as a step in a steady drive to make a one-party state of Bulgaria.(38)

34. United States Relations with Rumania.

The repatriation of Rumanians was an urgent international problem. In July approval was given for the movement of 20,000 from western Germany and 1,000 from Italy. A special repatriation delegation was in Frankfurt in August 1945 in connection with this movement.

35. United States Relations with Italy.

In April 1945 Washington classed Italians as United Nations nationals. A directive to this effect was adopted by the European Advisory Commission and changes were made in Supreme Headquarters directives on this subject.(39) The United States was interested in obtaining Silesian coal for cotton mills in northern Italy, but after an investigation it was decided that the problem could best be handled by negotiations between the Italian and Warsaw Governments.(40)

Chapter XI
PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

MILITARY PERSONNEL

36. General.

The recasting of military manpower requirements for the occupation fell into two phases. The first, from V-E Day to the initiation of peace negotiations with Japan, was characterized by readjustment, reorganization, loss of skilled personnel, and retraining of personnel remaining in units of the European Theater to offset the crippling effects of redeployment and demobilization. The second, dating from 17 August 1945, was marked by several salient features: the sharp decline in numbers of military personnel from 3,069,310 on V-E Day to 342,264 on 1 July 1946; the home-front pressure to return the soldiers to the United States; the slashing of replacement sources by Congress through the Selective Service Extension Act of 1946; a drastic downgrading of the Occupational Troop Basis to the figure of 300,000 by 1 July 1946; limitation of procurement efforts to individuals immune to changes of sentiment at home; and a mounting trend toward the use of civilians in lieu of military personnel in the occupation.

37. Requisitions and Arrivals.

a. On 1 May 1945 the War Department halted the shipment to Europe of any new units not urgently needed for the mission of the occupation.(1) With some revisions, however, standing requisitions continued to be honored during the interim prior to V-J Day. For several months thereafter, the demands of redeployment raced far ahead of the availability of incoming troops, despite a War Department promise to deliver 240,000 replacements to

Europe between 1 October 1945 and 1 July 1946.(2) On 3 October 1945 the Theater requisitioned 135,000 men against this number, asking chiefly for specialists of the technical services.(3) At the end of 1945, reinforcements were substantially short of allotments and the slowness of their arrival usually left a wide gap between a redeployed soldier's departure and the assignment of his successor.(4)

b. The numerical strength of units continued to decline until late in February, when the inflow of replacements was accelerated to compensate for accumulated deficiencies.(5) At that time reinforcements were shipped in bulk without reference to requisitions and were lacking in specialist training and experience, though a little above the Army average in intelligence. They fell generally into two age groups---from 18 to 19 years of age, and over 30 years of age.(6) On 25 May 1946 the War Department relaxed its requirement that the Occupational Troop Basis be attained precisely by 1 July 1946.(7) As of the end of June, shipments were arriving on a current basis and, despite the magnitude of Army-wide personnel losses, the Theater's promised quota of 240,000 men had virtually been met. Forecasts placed the arrival of reinforcements at 10,000 per month, and the Theater planned to adjust its reception system to this stabilized inflow.(8)

38. Reception and Assignment.

a. Arriving reinforcements were minutely screened in an effort to seek out skilled personnel for withdrawal to the major commands.(9) Two military occupational specialty numbers were assigned to each soldier---one representing his primary, or actual, skill and the other his secondary, or potential, skill. In practice, men were often reclassified according to their secondary skill, trained accordingly, and assigned the number of the new specialty.(10)

b. The receipt of reinforcements was closely related to redeployment. In order to meet a target strength as of a given date, the Theater, in requesting shipping space from the War Department, had to make advance allowance for those men to be displaced by arriving reinforcements in any given month. Major commands were assigned quotas to meet this shipping and were forced to withdraw men from operational use at least fifteen days before their replacements were scheduled to arrive; a replacement could not possibly become an effective member of his unit in less than thirty days following his arrival in a port. Thus, the Theater's effective strength was made to lag continually behind its assigned strength.(11)

39. The Training Status of Replacements.

Handicapped by personnel shortages, the War Department could train men only to the minimum extent prescribed under Regular Army rate tables, which in their revised form were based on normal attrition. As the peak of redeployment approached, even this training was shortened to cover little more than basic training,(12) despite the new Selective Service requirement that inductees should receive not less than six months' training before serving overseas. (13) Completion of training requirements within the Theater was undertaken by the G-3 Division. Conduct of the training fell on units engaged in security missions, which could least afford extraneous infringements on time and manpower. (14) In December 1945 the Theater asked that all individual training, including specialist training, be given in the Zone of the Interior, at least until 1 July 1946, when the major difficulties of redeployment, readjustment, and the phasing-out of units would have been met.(15) This recommendation was not acted upon, however, and the Theater was left increasingly to its own resources--chiefly the recruiting and training of its own personnel--to provide the manpower requisite to its mission.

40. Specialist Training.

a. At the beginning of the occupation, a need arose for clerical and administrative skills.(16) Beginning June 1945, clerk-typist and stenography classes were conducted by the Ground Forces Reinforcement Command,(17) and soon after V-J Day the Office of the Adjutant General established a clerical school to provide basically trained administrative personnel.(18) Difficulties in procuring suitable recruits among arriving reinforcements led to discontinuation of the Reinforcement Command's classes by the end of January 1946.(19) Thereafter responsibility for the training of replacements as clerk-typists was borne on a reduced scale by the Adjutant General's School.(20)

b. By 1946 there had developed a critical need for parachute-trained infantrymen.(21) The War Department reported that suitable replacements would not be available in quantity until April 1946.(22) Therefore, Theater Headquarters directed the screening of all arrivals for parachutists, and qualified men who were willing to elect such an assignment were transferred to the airborne regiment for training.(23) The importance of this initiative on the part of the Theater in providing for the training of its own parachute specialists was heightened when it transpired that shipment of the troops promised for delivery by the end of June 1946 could not be completed before

August.(24)

41. Unskilled Surpluses in Negro Units.

a. Early in 1946 a problem of unskilled overstrength arose in Negro units, harassing all of the major commands and upsetting organizational tables in many branches of service.(25) Theater Headquarters received numerous representations concerning the desired replacement of personnel in Army General Classification Test Class V by named individuals of demonstrated ability.(26) Some preliminary steps were taken locally to review assignments. The real solution to the problem, however, rested with the War Department, which alone could stem the inflow of Negro enlistees, many of whom had signed for arms and services which were not included in the Theater's Negro Occupational Troop Basis.(27) It was expected that by 1 July 1946 there would be approximately 40,770 Negro soldiers in the occupation forces, representing an overstrength of approximately 75 percent, for whom there was no use. The War Department acknowledged the dilemma and agreed on 19 June 1946 not to ship any additional Negro replacements for assignment in Europe until a decision could be reached on the manner of their utilization. Meanwhile, Theater Headquarters proceeded to dispose of its current surplus by authorizing a 50 percent overstrength in all Negro units and by organizing a provisional Negro infantry regiment.(28) Toward the end of June, a plan was submitted to the War Department,(29) and subsequently approved on 3 July 1946,(30) whereby this provisional regiment and all Negro units slated for inactivation would be returned to the Zone of the Interior at 50 percent overstrength. Any remaining surplus was to be returned at the rate of 3,000 men per month.(31)

42. Recourse to Overstrength.

In order to effect the sudden reversal in mission from combat to administration, it was necessary to exceed authorized manpower allotments pending the inactivation of combat units and the consequent release of sufficient grades to staff the occupation agencies adequately. The assignment of overstrength grades facilitated the organization of these agencies, but entailed some administrative chaos in the form of hampered manpower planning, blocked promotions, and intricate methods of personnel accounting. These difficulties were lessened through the confinement of overstrength to organizations scheduled for early closing. As units were progressively inactivated, their grades were withdrawn and reallocated to cover overstrength in newer units; hence, as the old organizations were dissolved, the extra grades were gradually eliminated.(32)

43. Procurement of Officers.

a. Temporary Retention of Key Officers. The Theater policy was to effect the redeployment of as many eligible officers as possible where qualified low-score or volunteer officers could be procured through the replacement system. Officers declared surplus to the needs of specific units were, if they possessed special qualifications, reassigned within the Theater and not returned to the United States until suitable replacements were provided.(33) Shortly after V-J Day, the War Department sanctioned a delay in reporting as eligible for separation key officers who were both needed and willing to remain on active duty but who were unwilling to volunteer for the duration of the emergency plus six months.(34) Eventually, pressure from the home front caused a shift in War Department policy to permit more rapid redeployment in the professional groups, and in February 1946 the Theater was informed that officers could no longer be retained beyond their separation dates except where furnished quotas were insufficient.(35)

b. The Volunteer Plan. High-point officers eligible for separation were retained only through voluntary extension of their temporary commissions. They were first given the option of signing waivers which committed them to remaining on active duty until the end of the emergency—an indefinite date often defined as the declaration of peace.(36) Five volunteer categories, based on the length of extension desired, were created in January 1946,(37) following a protest from the Theater that the better-qualified officers were reluctant to sign the indefinite statement.(38)

c. Regular Army Integration. Meanwhile, the Theater was engaged in recruiting and selecting qualified applicants for commissioning in the Regular Army under Public Law 281, passed by Congress in December 1945, which authorized an increase to 25,000 in the number of Regular Army officers.(39) Six processing centers for applications were established in the United States Zone in January 1946,(40) and continued to function until 30 April 1946, by which date a total of 5,353 applications had been received, of which 4,600 were approved. Of the total number of applicants, 702 were rejected for failure to pass the physical examination or the general survey test. Fifty-one applications were sent to Washington without action, most of them because the applicants had left the Theater before final processing could be completed.(41)

d. Officer Training. Officer candidate schools were continued until mid-July 1945 by the Ground Forces Reinforcement Command at the 9th Reinforcement Depot, at Fontainebleau, France. Under this program, the first class had graduated less than two weeks before V-E Day, on 26 April 1945. The last two, Classes 29 and 29A, ended on 14 July 1945. During the school's brief history, commissions were awarded to approximately 4,000 candidates, who served opportunely to fill the officer ranks depleted by the redeployment exodus.(42)

e. Termination of Wartime Emergency Commissioning. Awarding of "battlefield" commissions to high-caliber enlisted personnel continued for a short time after V-E Day. Intended strictly as a wartime measure, it proved neither altogether satisfactory nor wholly defensible as a means of meeting peacetime exigencies, and so was abandoned at War Department direction after serving briefly as a stopgap.(43) After the proclamation of V-J Day, the authorization to appoint flight officers and warrant officers as second lieutenants was also discontinued by the War Department.(44)

f. Direct Commissioning. To augment the supply of officers, the Theater in August 1945 announced the temporary appointment of 1,500 second lieutenants, who were selected from among enlisted men then creditably performing work normally done by junior officers.(45) In December 1945 permission was sought to make additional appointments of this kind, the number suggested being 1,000. The War Department in February 1946 approved further appointments, but limited the number to 500 in specified technical branches where officer shortages were most serious.(46) In this instance, however, officer-candidate returns proved inexplicably sluggish, the final examining board receiving only seventy-seven applicants. Of these, 61 were named to second lieutenancies in various branches of service.(47) At the end of the first year of the occupation, the Theater was faced with a shortage of about 26 percent of its authorized officer strength. In June 1946, therefore, the major commands were instructed to report all officers not eligible for redeployment as of the end of August 1946 who were in excess of 74 percent of command quotas, so that an equitable distribution could be made proportionate to needs.(48) As outstanding cases of critical officer shortage had developed in phases of the occupation mission not connected with the technical services, the War Department on 17 June 1946 granted the Theater appointing authority in all branches and established a new appointment quota of 2,000 to be effected by the end of December 1946.(49)

44. The Procurement of Enlisted Personnel.

a. The Retention of Key Enlisted Men. When redeployment began after V-E Day, enlisted men qualified as skilled or semiskilled in scarce military occupational specialties were declared ineligible for separation, regardless of their adjusted service rating scores. On 10 June 1945 a list of twenty-one scarce categories was announced by Theater Headquarters.(50) Other enlisted men, not on the critical list, were also retained in service on the grounds of "military necessity." After V-J Day the number of essential military skills was reduced to three. Those holding critical specialty numbers could be retained for a maximum of six months after 14 August 1945.(51) After 20 October 1945 it was no longer possible to keep trained men in the Theater on grounds of military necessity, except that those with critical specialties could be retained for a maximum of six months after their eligibility for redeployment.(52)

b. The Enlisted Volunteer Program. In June it was announced that enlisted personnel whose scores toward discharge totaled 85 points or more could elect to remain in the military service until Japan surrendered.(53) After 22 August 1946 enlisted personnel desiring to remain in the Theater could volunteer in what was termed a "Class II status" for such time as their individual services were required, but not longer than the duration of hostilities plus six months.(54) From 17 October 1945, enlisted men were permitted to volunteer for the Class II category for periods of their own choosing.(55) Latitude in the naming of individual discharge dates proved disadvantageous from a planning point of view, it being simpler to deal administratively with specific groups committed to the Theater for designated periods. Consequently, in January 1946 Theater Headquarters accounted the creation of five subclasses, prescribing various set periods for which individuals could elect to remain on duty with the occupation forces.(56) The subclass system was amended in March 1946 by the addition of three subclasses involving termination dates up to 30 June 1948.(57)

c. The Regular Army Enlistment Program. The European part of the War Department's world-wide reenlistment drive was launched as a priority operation on 17 September 1945.(58) In October 1945 the enactment of legislation providing more favorable reenlistment benefits furnished the impetus for more aggressive prosecution of the recruiting program,(59) which was publicized in all parts of the occupied area.(60) Recruiting gained rapidly. November and December 1945 were record months in the Theater

drive, and the total number of enlistees as of the end of 1945 was 37,267,(61) or two-thirds of the number enlisted during the entire campaign. By April 1946 total enlistments had attained the figure of 48,434,(62) and by the close of the drive in July 1946 the total was 51,140.(63) Not all of these soldiers continued to serve in the occupation forces, as individual desires and military exigency took many of them to other Theaters.

45. Reduction of Theater Strength.

a. As of V-E Day, the occupation forces had an estimated strength of 3,069,310 men,(64) which had to be phased out by 1 July 1946, to accord with the War Department's stipulated Occupational Troop Basis of 404,554.(65) By 15 August 1945 the number of troops in Europe was reduced to 2,207,754 through reductions in bulk allotments to the major commands, inactivation of units not essential to the peacetime structure, and redeployment of surplus personnel and personnel with high adjusted service rating scores.(66) Intensive application to the task of consolidation brought about a further reduction to 1,328,000 by 1 November 1945.(67) On that date, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, set an initial ceiling for each staff division and separate command, based on current non-Table of Organization allotments. At the same time, a forecast of assigned strength was instituted to show the projected troop needs of each command for succeeding months.(68)

b. As of 1 January 1946, the Theater had an approximate strength of 622,000, which included 163,000 ineffectives. These were in the redeployment pipeline, on leave in the United States, sick in hospital, or otherwise not available for useful employment. Reduction in Theater strength occurred automatically and more rapidly than had been expected, due to the accelerated out-shipment of personnel and the rate of arrival of replacements.(69) In December 1945 the Troop Basis for 1 July had been lowered to 300,000, and the Theater Commander had laid down a plan of reorganization to reduce manpower requirements and accelerate redeployment.(70) The implementation of this plan was virtually completed by 1 April 1946 and the strength figure lowered to 401,684. To achieve this reduction, the British ports were closed and the former United Kingdom Base was redesignated the London Area to accord with its lessened geographical scope and curtailed responsibilities. Headquarters, Theater Service Forces, was inactivated and its functions absorbed by Theater Headquarters, while the base sections and the units in the liberated countries were combined in a newly organized Western Base Section with a single headquarters. The Seventh Army was inactivated on

1 April 1946 and its responsibilities were transferred to the Third Army, which became the sole army headquarters in the United States Zone.(71) The Theater rolls were thus cleared of a large number of persons who belonged to the occupation forces as a matter of record only and whose inclusion in strength reports hitherto induced a false impression of the number of troops actually serving in the occupation.(72)

c. By the end of May 1946 precision in the attainment of the Troop Basis was no longer required.(73) Nevertheless, the Theater attained a reduction to 342,264 by 1 July 1946,(74) as against the figure of 378,424 forecast by the G-1 Division in November.(75) It was expected that the surplus of 42,264 would be absorbed automatically by out-shipments during the next few months.

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

46. General Trends.

At the end of hostilities the term "civilian personnel" applied to all individuals other than United States troops and prisoners of war employed by the United States forces and federal agencies under military control in the European Theater. Because the fraternization ban at first severely limited the use of Germans, manpower needs were met from four main sources. Top priority was given to displaced persons. Second priority, applying particularly in liberated areas, was given to established residents of the vicinity in which the employing agency was located. Third priority was given British nationals, primarily female clerical workers. The lowest priority group consisted of United States citizens recruited from the Zone of the Interior.(76) Large-scale repatriation of displaced persons after V-E Day cut off this source of labor. Agreements with European governments did not provide for an adequate supply of personnel from Allied and neutral sources. Efforts to employ discharged military personnel were disappointing. Budgetary considerations made desirable the use of an economical source of labor. Hence, the employment of Germans in large numbers was the natural solution to the manpower problem. In September German civilians received an employment priority higher than that of Allied and neutral nationals. Thereafter our labor policies were fairly fixed, resulting in a steadily dwindling military force governing a large German

body of workmen. By June 1946 this body had risen to nearly a quarter of a million employees, or 60 percent of all civilian personnel.(77)

47. United States Civilians from the Zone of the Interior.

a. There were few United States civilian employees of the War Department in the European Theater on the day Germany surrendered. Some United States merchant seamen had been hired by Transportation Corps to operate tugs and tankers.(78) Other civilians, mostly on a 90-day temporary duty status, consisted of highly trained technical specialists.(79) Theater policy prohibiting recruitment from the United States of civilian personnel, except specialists, continued throughout the summer of 1945.(80) These were used only when equally qualified personnel was not available within the Theater. In September, under revised policy, both male and female citizens could be recruited from the United States, but were given the lowest priority. This priority was still in force on 30 June 1946.(81)

b. All requisitions were consolidated in one list by the Adjutant General's Office for submission to its employment representative in Washington.(82) Three types of personnel were requisitioned, namely, individuals requested by name by Theater offices, those recruited as specialists or technicians for a particular position, and skilled clerical employees brought over in groups to alleviate shortages. Personnel in the last category were generally in grades below CAF-5, and were assigned by the Adjutant General's Civilian Personnel Branch to whatever offices in the Theater were in need of them.

c. As the Theater lost key personnel through redeployment and the number of individuals electing discharge to work as civilians in the Theater declined, requisitions for personnel from the Zone of the Interior rose steadily. At the end of June 1946 there were 3,300 requests for civilians in the Washington recruiting office, but from January to June only 743 had arrived in the Theater.(83)

48. Discharged Military Personnel.

In July Theater Headquarters initiated a recruiting drive to convert military men and women into civilian employees.(84) By the end of December 2,154 former soldiers, including 351 of the Women's Army Corps, had actually been placed in jobs.(85) No ceiling was placed on the number of ex-soldiers who could be employed, but obstacles to the "military-civilian" conversion program were encountered.

These included slow processing procedures and the unwillingness of soldiers to sacrifice terminal leave. In October, when redeployment was in full swing, steps were taken to speed up processing by the delegation of discharge authority to the major commands.(86) At the same time, Congressional action permitted payment of the terminal leave bonus.(87) Because it was found difficult to establish quickly a well-organized program and because the bulk of the troops had been redeployed by the end of December, this source of manpower proved disappointing. The lack of key supervisory personnel sufficiently familiar with War Department policies and procedures, the turnover of personnel, difficulties of establishing definite written policy, delay of delegation of authority to lower echelons, and lack of proper coordination were all factors responsible for the retarded progress of the program.(88) After January, the number of discharged military personnel accepting civilian employment was small. Only 170 were placed during the first six months of 1946.(89)

49. Allied and Neutral Personnel.

The need for labor was so urgent when United States units moved into Germany that workmen of liberated countries were transported into Germany without awaiting the approval of the governments concerned.(90) By V-E Day the British Ministry of Labor had authorized the movement to the Continent of only 900 key female personnel, which was only a small fraction of the ten thousand who were carried on the Army payrolls in the United Kingdom.(91) Limited numbers of male citizens and non-citizen residents of the United Kingdom, were, however, permitted to volunteer for duty on the Continent subject to approval of the Ministry of Labor.(92) SHAEF Missions to the various European governments approached the national authorities in the matter of employing their citizens.(93) Belgium and France restricted the movement of their nationals to those already employed by the U.S. Army, that is, approximately 69,000 French(94) and 26,000 Belgians.(95) Luxembourg had no objection to the movement of its civilians.(96) The Netherlands restricted the movement to 2,000 administrative and clerical employees for both the United States and British forces. (97) Conditions of employment for all Allied and neutral nationals were standardized in June 1946.(98) By that time the number of French employees had dropped to about 18,700 (99) and Belgian to 7,400.(100) The total number of Allied and neutral civilian employees was 42,842 on 30 June 1946.(101)

50. Enemy Nationals.

By V-E Day the nonfraternization policy had been liberalized to allow the employment of Germans in 112 skilled and semiskilled trades and 15 clerical and supervisory occupations, but Germans were still restricted to tasks at which they did not come in contact with troops except for their supervisors.(102) In September, Germans were given employment priorities second only to United States discharged military personnel.(103) By October there were 149,000 Germans in the employ of the U.S. Army.(104) In November when redeployment cut deeply into the military strength, employment of Germans in positions where they did not have access to information classified "confidential" or higher was authorized.(105) German civilians were also hired as guards and armed with carbines to safeguard military supplies and installations.(106) Theater personnel officers relied more and more heavily on German civilians as an economical source of manpower, as other sources of labor continued to dwindle. In the spring of 1946 Germans comprised no less than 60 percent of all civilians employed by the United States forces.(107) On 30 June 1946 over 262,000 Germans were employed, as teachers, clerks, typists, technicians, mechanics, guards, drivers, interpreters, mess attendants, hospital workers, and laborers.(108)

51. Displaced Persons.

Before V-E Day displaced persons were used widely by the Army in labor battalions and as individual workers. At that time they received top priority and preferential treatment.(109) Their employment was not allowed to delay their repatriation, except when they were engaged in work essential to the Allied forces, in which case they were detained at their posts only until they could be replaced. (110) This source of manpower was never developed to the degree anticipated because of the large numbers repatriated after V-E Day. By October, when mass repatriation had come to an end, over 26,000 displaced persons were employed as drivers of military vehicles,(111) as guards of prisoners of war, and as workers at various Quartermaster installations.(112) Polish displaced persons were used in labor service companies and Polish guard companies, which replaced troops redeployed from the Theater.(113) At the end of 1945, 37,500 displaced Poles were working in guard companies, and an additional 13,750 volunteers were awaiting the activation of new companies.(114) Polish officers assigned to these units were in direct command. The total number of displaced persons employed in the European Theater at the end of June 1946 was 60,000, or 15 percent of the total civilian labor force.(115)

52. Administration of United States, Allied, and Neutral Civilians.

a. Responsibility for the procurement and administration of civilian personnel in the Theater was divided among the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1, and the Adjutant Generals of Theater Headquarters and Theater Service Forces. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, of Theater Headquarters formulated and directed over-all policies such as the order of priority according to which various groups could be employed and the general conditions under which they were to work. The Theater Adjutant General interpreted the applicability of over-all policies to the various groups of labor, submitted requisitions to the Zone of the Interior, administered United States and British civilians, and maintained locator files. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, of Theater Service Forces formulated policies and procedures regarding civilian personnel to include priorities, processing of requisitions, procurement, contracts, employees relations, and training; coordinated the activities of the Engineer Labor Procurement Service, the General Purchasing Agent, and the civilian personnel sections of the major headquarters; and compiled statistical information relative to the establishment of supply requirements of civilians employed by the Army, including clothing, feeding, quartering, and hospitalization.(116) The Adjutant General of Theater Service Forces supervised and assisted subordinate offices, tabulated reports and statistics, supervised the processing of United States and British civilians, and handled normal correspondence regarding civilian personnel. (117)

b. The Engineer Labor Procurement Service under the Theater Engineer controlled and operated the procurement and distribution of all civilian employees from Allied or liberated countries, except for United States and British civilians. The General Purchasing Agent negotiated agreements and established procedures with European governments for the procurement of civilian labor and for the settlement of labor disputes or questions. He also maintained liaison with the labor ministries of liberated governments. The Military Labor Service was responsible for civilians employed in organized mobile labor units. The assignment of personnel to these units was coordinated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, but the units were used chiefly by services for which the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, was responsible.(118)

c. To bring about greater uniformity in the hiring and management of civilian personnel, Theater Headquarters on 18 September defined the responsibilities of its

staff divisions and adopted a uniform system of terminology to be used in civilian personnel management. From that date, the G-1 Division controlled the procurement and management of all civilian personnel, analyzed future requirements, and coordinated the requirements of other staff divisions. The G-3 Division was responsible for organizing labor service units composed of civilians recruited in Allied or occupied countries. The G-4 Division was responsible for the administration of labor service units, the supply of goods to civilian personnel, and the maintenance of personnel forecasts for its own activities. The G-5 Division had jurisdiction only in occupied areas. It controlled German labor offices, supervised wage levels for indigenous and displaced persons, kept statistics on the over-all labor situation in the United States Zone of Germany, and allocated indigenous personnel and displaced persons to the employing agencies. (119)

d. A further change took place early in October, when the G-1 Division decentralized its supervisory functions and placed full responsibility for civilian personnel matters with commanding officers of subordinate echelons. (120) Commanding officers selected civilian personnel administrators, who supervised matters pertaining to placement of employees, employee relations, on-the-job training, and pay. (121) A Civilian Personnel Section was established in Headquarters Command to administer all civilians employed at Theater Headquarters. (122) The Theater Adjutant General's functions were confined to maintaining necessary locator files on all civilians employed by the United States forces, serving as a final receiving agent for all employment applications, keeping major commands and other United States agencies informed as the type and number of civilians available for employment, requisitioning personnel from the United States, and collecting and maintaining statistics concerning civilian personnel operations. (123) When Theater Service Forces were inactivated on 1 March 1946, the responsibility for civilian personnel matters was transferred to the Adjutant General at Theater Headquarters. (124)

53. Conditions of Employment of United States, Allied, and Neutral Civilians.

a. United States citizens were employed by the War Department under laws and regulations affecting federal employees in the United States, but subject to War Department or Theater regulations. A statement of standard conditions of employment applying to all United States citizens was issued 22 September 1945. (125) Contracts were generally for a minimum of one year, but persons discharged in the Theater were permitted to sign for six months. (126) Pay rates were the same as for other federal employees, but a

25 percent differential bonus was paid for overseas duty.(127)

b. Nationals of Allied and neutral countries were employed under special agreements between the United States forces and the respective nations. Employment was governed in general by a standard contract adopted in May 1945, but varying wage scales applied.(128) With the exception of British citizens, Allied and neutral nationals were required by their governments to receive payment of as much as two-thirds of their salary within their native country. Thus, a portion of their pay was deducted and transmitted to designated agencies of the various governments for transfer to an allottee or for eventual payment to the employees.(129) New uniform agreements were negotiated toward the close of the first year of the occupation. Compensation was thereafter in accordance with the Continental wage scale, applying to all non-Americans, who were permitted to draw up to one-third of their salary in the country in which they were employed.(130)

c. In Germany, civilians were under the jurisdiction of the various Offices of Military Government and subject to military law.(131) For reasons of security the wearing of a modified uniform---without military buttons and insignia---was compulsory until the spring of 1946, when the wearing of civilian clothes was permitted.(132) Quarters and accommodations were provided at a cost to the civilian employee of \$180.00 per annum.(133) Various welfare services, such as medical care, were provided through Army facilities at no cost to the employee.(134) Early in May 1946, councils were inaugurated to provide an organized medium for group expression on matters affecting the welfare and interests of civilian employees.(135)

54. Administration and Conditions of Employment of Enemy Nationals and Displaced Persons.

a. Management and administration of enemy nationals and displaced persons was largely the responsibility of local German labor offices, acting under military government regulations. Such civilian workers were divided into two categories: static and mobile. Static personnel resided within the area of employment and were often transported to and from work daily. The U.S. Army assumed limited, if any, responsibility for clothing, feeding, or sheltering members of this group, except that a noon meal costing 50 pfennigs was furnished. Mobile workers were employed under contract, organized into units under military command, and subject to being moved from place to place. For these the military forces provided quarters, subsistence, and clothing.(136)

b. Military units that required the services of indigenous civilians placed their requisitions with the nearest German labor officer or burgermeister, who met the requirements from local sources. Provision was made, in cases where demands could not be met locally, for German labor offices to request additional labor from outside areas.(137) Displaced persons and Germans applying for work had to pass a physical examination and were investigated by the Counter Intelligence Corps. They were not hired if they were members of the Nazi Party.(138)

c. Wage rates for enemy nationals and displaced persons were established by military government to conform to German standards. Displaced persons received the highest approved rate in each occupation.(139) The German authorities prepared payrolls, making deductions to cover charges for meals furnished, and contributions to health insurance, pensions, unemployment relief, taxes, and any other authorized German agencies. Displaced persons were subject to the same deductions as German nationals for social insurance, the German agency assuming the employer's obligation in their behalf.(140)

RECREATION

55. General Mission and Program.

a. Prior to V-E Day, detailed plans had been formulated to expand the recreational facilities in the European Theater for the men awaiting redeployment, and to establish a long-range program for the occupation troops. (141) An attempt was made to provide for the varying needs and tastes of individuals. Library service was increased, and handicraft workshops established. An enlarged entertainment program included motion pictures, shows, and music. Wider social activities, in the form of clubs, served as a morale-builder in large troop concentrations in liberated countries and as a weapon against undesirable fraternization in occupied territory. Leave and rest centers were changed from areas of recuperation to vacation spots and tours were instituted, so that the American soldier might have an opportunity to see some of Europe's important monuments and gain a better understanding of its cultures and peoples. Athletic activities were encouraged at all levels. To implement these plans, supplies were requisitioned and personnel trained or recruited from the Zone of the Interior.(142)

b. All fields of recreation were expanded during the summer of 1945. Vast numbers of men in the staging and assembly areas, suddenly finding themselves with leisure time, required entertainment. Special emphasis was placed upon the needs of the troops bound directly for the Far East, and efforts were made to provide them with recreation while they awaited shipment and to supply Special Services equipment for their transports. Welfare activities within the occupied zone were limited by the lack of facilities and also by security and nonfraternization regulations.

c. Although V-J Day simplified the problem to a certain extent, other factors arising thereafter made the fall of 1945 a particularly difficult period as far as recreation was concerned. The anticipated termination of lend-lease and reciprocal aid called for an examination of costs. The morale of men awaiting redeployment to the Zone of the Interior reached a low ebb. Recreational activities suffered from shortages of trained personnel. Lack of transportation hampered the delivery of supplies and limited the possibilities of travel to leave areas. The unstable situation, due to changing troop concentrations, made the routing and booking of shows difficult. Soldiers awaiting redeployment showed little enthusiasm for long-term activities. They were not interested in learning complicated crafts, acting in soldier shows, or forming part of an athletic team, since they hoped to depart from the Theater before such projects were completed. Furthermore, plans for expansion were limited by the knowledge that, although at the moment facilities and accommodations were taxed to the utmost, as soon as the Theater settled down to an occupation basis there would be fewer men with leisure time at their disposal. Thus, overextension to meet immediate, temporary needs could not be justified.

d. With the initiation of the stabilized occupation period in early 1946, the recreational program was changed from one intended to fulfill first a combat and then an emergency redeployment mission and was adapted to provide extensive and diversified activities for the occupation forces. Provision was made not only for members of the armed forces, but also for civilian employees, both American and Allied, and for dependents arriving in the Theater. Steps were taken to return recreation to a peacetime, rather than an emergency, basis. Library books became accountable property as of 1 February 1946. A Theater leave program not requiring appropriated funds was initiated in May. Arrangements were completed for the payment of admission fees to motion picture theaters, effective on 1 July 1946. All those moves were part of the return to a peacetime economy, where the individual receives better service, but shares in its cost.(143)

56. Administrative Organization.

a. Primary responsibility for broad policy in connection with recreation and maintenance of morale of the armed forces in the European Theater rested with the G-1 Division, specifically with the Morale and Special Activities Branch of G-1, U. S. Forces, European Theater, and with the Services and Special Activities Branch of Theater Service Forces, European Theater. Coordination was maintained, however, with other interested branches and staff sections.(144)

b. Over-all planning, coordination, and technical supervision were carried out by the Special Services Division, responsibility being divided, according to field of activity, between its Athletic and Entertainment Divisions, which were in turn divided into various branches and sections.(145) Responsibility for the execution of the program was delegated to command, division, and unit levels.

c. Several other organizations and agencies assisted in carrying out the recreational program. Chief among these were the American Red Cross, which continued its wartime functions in the field of clubs and cooperated in other recreational activities.(146) United Services Organization Camp Shows, Incorporated, presented shows which were an important factor in entertainment.(147) The French organization, Comite Francais de Bienvenue aux Armees Allies (Franco-Allied Good Will Committee), did much to make the American soldier's stay in France more pleasant by providing guided tours, making arrangements for the reduction of costs in French night clubs, and performing numerous other services.(148) Tours to European countries such as Switzerland, Denmark, and the Netherlands were made possible through the cooperation of their respective governments. In order to continue the leave and tour program in the spring of 1946, when the Army found it necessary to withdraw its funds and personnel, the American Express Company was permitted to take over a major part of this program.(149)

57. Library Service.

To provide recreational and instructive reading material, the Library Branch of Special Services greatly expanded its wartime operations. Unit libraries, collections for troop concentrations in leave and assembly areas, and hospital libraries were established. Small, isolated detachments were serviced by traveling "bookmobiles." Reading material was supplied by the automatic distribution of paper-bound books and magazines and by consignment of standard collections of fiction and nonfiction. Special book purchases augmented the available material, and brought

it up to date. Publication of certain periodicals in the Theater and loans of books by European libraries were arranged. (150) During combat and the redeployment period, emphasis was placed on the use of reading materials rather than on their preservation. Library books were considered expandable property, although measures were taken to insure that unnecessary dissipation of supplies did not take place. As of 1 February 1946, however, when redeployment was substantially completed, full property accountability for library books was imposed in the Theater. (151) To conserve and distribute reading matter, competent library staffs were necessary. Army Civilian Librarians were procured from the United States, and nonprofessional librarians were trained in schools established for the purpose. During 1946 increased use was made of German civilian employees as librarians, these being individually trained and supervised by the Army Civilian Librarian responsible for the area. (152)

58. Handicraft Program.

The handicraft program was announced in June 1945, little use having been made of this type of recreation during combat, except in hospitals and rest centers. (153) Workshops were established within hospitals, in clubs, and as separate entities. Craft materials were obtained from the United States, or from surplus, salvage, and captured enemy material. In order to provide skilled and trained supervisory personnel, training schools were established, field teams visited the various shops, and guides and manuals were widely distributed. The handicraft program suffered greatly from the instability due to redeployment, both because of loss of its skilled personnel and because of lack of incentive and interest on the part of the participants. In January 1946 a reorganization within the Handicraft Section of Special Services, combined with increased stability of troops within the Theater, permitted great expansion of the program. The number of shops rose from nineteen in January to fifty-nine in June, and by 30 June a weekly participation of 33,890 persons had been attained. (154)

59. Motion Pictures.

Motion pictures were the most popular of all forms of recreation in the European Theater. The trend throughout the first year of the occupation was toward an increase in the quantity and quality of films exhibited and improvement in methods of distribution and facilities for

exhibition. Films were made available through the Army Motion Picture Service, which negotiated rental agreements with the motion picture industry. Distribution was effected in the European Theater through the Motion Picture Branch of Special Services, the 6814th Motion Picture Company, and a series of film exchanges and subexchanges.(155) In June 1946 the USFET Motion Picture Service Section was established and charged with the supervision and technical operation of the motion picture program, its operating agency being the 6814th Motion Picture Company.(156) Films were exhibited by means of 16 mm. and 35 mm. units. The former were used widely during the war and the early stages of the occupation because of their mobility and adaptability to small and improvised theaters. As facilities for installing more permanent equipment became available, the use of the larger 35 mm. units increased. Various changes and adjustments were made in the regulations governing admission of different classes of persons. In January restrictions were broadened to permit attendance of United States citizens employed by United States embassies or other organizations. When uniform regulations were liberalized for civilian employees of the War Department, attendance was permitted by those wearing civilian clothes, provided identification was shown. In March authorization was received from the War Department for the admission of the immediate families of American personnel in Germany and Austria. The motion picture industry, however, remained cold to the suggestion that bona fide guests of military personnel, regardless of nationality, should be admitted to showings.(157) Films were exhibited free of charge to authorized audiences, payments being made with Central Welfare funds out of Army Exchange Service profits. As the recreation program returned to a pay-as-you-go basis, plans were laid for a system of paid admission to motion pictures. It was announced that beginning on 1 July 1946, the 35 mm. entertainment film program would be placed on a paid admission basis, profits to be used to finance the entire program, both 16 mm. and 35 mm., within the Theater.(158)

60. Shows.

a. Live entertainment was provided by United Services Organization Camp Shows, the Red Cross, and Allied civilian enterprise. These three forms of entertainment were strained to the limit during the early months of the occupation and phased out as redeployment progressed and the need for entertainment in the staging and assembly areas became less urgent. To take the place of departing United Services Organization units and decreasing Allied civilian and Red Cross entertainment, two new types of shows were instituted: Soldier Shows and German civilian entertainment.

b. Soldier participation in dramatic productions had the double value of offering entertainment to both spectators and participants. During the war, Jeep Shows were used with great success, but in the period immediately following V-E Day this type of entertainment suffered severely from personnel losses. To attain the planned level of twenty-five Soldier Shows touring the Theater, Civilian Actress Technicians were obtained from the Zone of the Interior. This group of experts worked out technical stage and costume details and acted with the soldiers. Little active interest was shown in the soldier program, however, during the fall of 1945. A subsequent reorganization of the project, upon a command basis, led to expansion and increased interest in the early months of 1946.(159) By May it became desirable to consolidate this activity upon a Theater basis. The USFET Soldier Show Center was established at Assmannhausen, Germany, and charged with the responsibility of providing all Soldier Shows for troops in the European Theater.(160)

c. The use of German nationals as entertainers was at first restricted by security and fraternization regulations. As these rulings were gradually relaxed and the need for entertainment within the occupied area increased, more German artists were employed. The local hiring of German bands was authorized in July 1945,(161) and permission to employ other properly screened Germans as entertainers was obtained in September.(162) In June 1946 a Standing Operating Procedure regularized the employment of German entertainers.(163) Under the supervision of Special Services, a unit was organized to produce shows with German artists. Bad Schwalbach was the location chosen for production and rehearsal. This group was to operate as a civilian agency and to present productions for military audiences, mixed audiences, and strictly German audiences. No show units were actually formed, however, during the first year of the occupation.(164)

61. Music.

The stimulating effect of music as a morale-builder was recognized in the encouragement of official bands, soldier orchestras, and group and individual musical activities. To combat personnel shortages due to redeployment, a Band Replacement Depot was established in June 1946 for the purpose of screening, testing, classifying, and assigning potential bandsmen. Field Music Corps bands were organized on regimental level. Members of these units often formed the nuclei of other, informal bands, orchestras, and musical groups. Instruments were procured and distributed by the Music Branch of Special Services. Music

Bulletins, the Army-Navy Hit Kit, a publication of current popular music, and numerous technical letters and musical guides were supplied. In the field of recorded music, phonographs, V-discs, and classical record library sets were issued.(165)

62. International Exchange of Entertainment.

To augment the variety of entertainment available to the armed forces, arrangements were made for the international exchange of theatrical troupes, which had the added advantage of improving the opportunities for friendly contacts between the American soldier and his Allied contemporaries. Particularly successful were the interchange of Franco-American entertainment and the arrangement at Bremen for an exchange of Soldier Shows with the British.(166)

63. Clubs.

a. Clubs in the European Theater were divided roughly into two main categories: nonrevenue-producing or Class "A" clubs, including Army Service, Allied Expeditionary Force, and American Red Cross clubs; and revenue-producing or Class "B" clubs, deriving income from their own activities and dues, contributions, or membership fees.

b. Army Service Clubs were operated by Special Services and staffed with Army Civilian Hostesses. This type of club was almost entirely a postwar development. On V-E Day there were only thirteen Army Hostesses in the European Theater, assigned to the Allied Expeditionary Force Clubs in Paris and Brussels. So great was the demand for this type of personnel that air priority from the Zone of the Interior was authorized for the transport of hostesses from May to December 1945. By January 1946 there were about one hundred Army Hostesses on duty in the Theater, assigned to the sixty-odd Service Clubs and assisting in the establishment of day rooms and unit clubs in areas where troop strength did not warrant the establishment of Service Clubs. Service Clubs ranged in size from small clubs in tents to installations in the staging areas accommodating up to 10,000 a day. They included such facilities as lounge rooms, games rooms, music studios, photographic dark rooms, handicraft shops, ball rooms, snack bars, mending services, shoe shine parlors, barber shops, and parcel-wrapping counters. The sale of food in snack bars was under the supervision of the Army Exchange Service. (167) From January to June 1946, there was no appreciable change in the number of hostesses employed in the Theater, although the number of clubs decreased.

c. During the war, several Allied Expeditionary Force Clubs had been established to provide recreation for enlisted personnel of Allied nations. After the dissolution of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and the reestablishment of United States and British forces as separate and independent commands, it seemed desirable to discontinue this type of club. The Paris club was closed on 15 August 1945, the Frankfurt club was turned over to the Red Cross and Special Services for joint operation, and the Brussels club was closed in October 1945.(168)

d. American Red Cross Clubs were an established part of the recreational program long before V-E Day. Immediately following the cessation of hostilities, plans were made to increase and extend this welfare program for the troops in the assembly and staging areas and for those in the occupied areas. After the termination of hostilities with Japan, the question of the future of the Red Cross in the European Theater was considered. General Eisenhower said that, as long as any American soldier was in the Theater, he desired the presence of the Red Cross.(169) In October the Red Cross submitted its plan for services during the occupation period. A gradual reduction of installations and personnel in the United Kingdom and the liberated countries, as need declined, and additional service within the occupied zone, was proposed.(170) A Standing Operating Procedure published in September consolidated all directives and policies governing Red Cross operations in the European Theater.(171) During the first six months of 1946, the Red Cross increased its activities within Germany and Austria, but, owing to the necessity for economy, began the reduction of its personnel.(172) Shortly before the end of June the War Department informed the Theater of policy decisions of the National Red Cross Headquarters, permitting operation by the Army of snack bars in Red Cross Clubs and admission to Red Cross Clubs of United States civilians employed by the War Department, and dependents of military and civilian personnel.(173)

e. The revenue-producing, or Class "B" club, included unit clubs for enlisted personnel, officers, and civilians. The management of these varied with their location, size, and general policy. They operated independently, in accordance with general Theater and local regulations.(174)

64. Tours.

a. The leave and furlough program reached its greatest expansion in the summer and fall of 1945, October being the peak month when 14 percent of Theater strength

participated. Facilities were expanded, tours organized, and transportation provided to the various centers. Existing rest centers, such as the U. S. Riviera Recreational Area and the Paris and Brussels centers, and the leave program in the United Kingdom were expanded.(175) The Switzerland Leave Tour commenced on 15 July.(176) A series of French tours, sponsored by the Comite Francais de Bienvenue aux Armees Allies, included trips to Marseille, Lourdes, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Limoges, the Chateaux de la Loire, Alp d'Huez, Val d'Isere, and Chamonix.(177) Luxemburg was opened as a leave center in August,(178) and exchange agreements with the Mediterranean Theater provided for visits to Italy.(179) The Denmark leave program was initiated by Bremen Port Command on 28 August, and the use of its facilities were extended shortly thereafter to other commands.(180)

b. With the cessation of hostilities in the Far East, and the anticipated termination of reciprocal aid, the cost of the leave program was examined. As the fall progressed, transportation became a critical factor, and it was realized that it would become more critical during the winter months. To discuss problems and to make an estimate of the requirements of occupation troops, a meeting was called on 26 October of representatives from U. S. Forces, European Theater; Theater Service Forces, European Theater; Special Services; and the major commands and base sections responsible for the operation of Theater leave centers.(181) In addition to making decisions to meet conditions due to redeployment, this conference formulated long range policy for the operation of leave centers during the occupation period. The projected basis for operation of leave centers and tours outside occupied territory after 1 June 1946 was announced to the Theater on 6 November. United Kingdom, Paris, Rome, Brussels, the Riviera, Switzerland, Denmark, and the French Alps were included, all operating at greatly reduced capacities.(182) Although the number of accommodations planned in November was a great reduction from original estimates, patronage fell off even more rapidly than had been anticipated.

c. After a second policy meeting on 16 January 1946, the major commands were informed of the complete revamping of the Theater leave and furlough program. Quotas were reduced, effective 1 February, and the target date of 1 April was set for the shifting of the leave program to a basis not requiring appropriated funds.(183) A license was issued to the American Express Company to establish offices within the United States Zone and to operate tours for the benefit of members and employees of the United States forces and attached civilian agencies and their families.(184) Agreements were reached between the American Express Company and the Special Services as to the manner of operation.(185) The American Express leave program was initiated on

8 May 1946, with the Paris and Riviera tours. A tour of the United Kingdom was added on 1 June. Tours currently under U. S. Army supervision and operation, through agreement with foreign governments, remained under Army sponsorship at the request of those particular foreign governments, although they were also placed on a pay-as-you-go basis and tour prices increased to insure operation at no expense to the U. S. Army. These included the Switzerland, Denmark, and Rome tours.

65. Unit Rest Areas and Tours.

Numerous units operated rest areas, established during the last months of hostilities for the benefit of combat troops. These existed both in the liberated countries and in Germany. The problem facing those responsible for the leave program was to consolidate unit centers in liberated countries, eliminating those rendered undesirable because of transportation difficulties or lack of disciplinary control, and to encourage the establishment of such facilities in the occupied area. Such rest centers were useful in France and Belgium during the summer of 1945, since they relieved pressure upon Theater accommodations, and few were closed down at that time, although the operation of new areas of this type was seldom approved. By fall, however, as the demand for leave accommodations eased, many were eliminated. The last unit installation, in Belgium, was closed during December.(186) Many unit rest areas were established within occupied territory, particularly in prewar vacation areas, such as the lake and mountain district south of Munich and the lake district of Bad Ischl in Austria. Persons were encouraged to use these rather than to expend time and overtax transportation by traveling to leave centers outside occupied territory. The unit program developed so rapidly that it was necessary for the Theater to supplement it. Among the most popular localities were Seventh Army's Alpine Chalet and Oberjoch, and Third Army's Garmisch, Berchtesgaden, Aussmannhausen, and Chiem See. Bremen Port Command, having no facilities available within the Enclave, established a leave tour to Denmark, which operated under its sponsorship until 1 June 1946, when U.S. Forces, European Theater, assumed the management of it. Third Army was assigned responsibility for the Munich-Rome tour in December 1945 and continued its operation until 20 April, but quotas for this tour were extended to other commands.(187)

66. Jeep Tours.

To add variety to the leave program Soldier Vacation Tours, or Military Vacation Tours, were authorized. Small groups of men, each under the leadership of a responsible noncommissioned or commissioned officer, were supplied with a vehicle, sufficient gasoline, and provisions and

permitted to plan their own excursions and be on their own for a brief period. This idea was recommended personally by Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, to General Eisenhower, (188) and was announced to the major commands in August 1945. (189) Although this form of tour never attained the numerical proportions of other recreational activities, and was limited by transportation shortages, disciplinary problems, and other factors, the feeling of temporary independence was appreciated by those officers and men who were able to participate.

67. Athletics.

a. The Theater athletic program was planned to provide extensive and highly diversified activities for individuals and teams on all levels. It was useful in aiding participants to maintain physical fitness, providing opportunities for spectator diversion, and giving vocational training to instructors. (190) In order that the program should be able to function on a broad scale immediately after cessation of hostilities, supplies and equipment were procured and stocked for distribution and personnel was trained to organize and supervise the various activities. A school for athletic officers was operated in Paris from 4 March to 7 July 1945. Thereafter instruction was given in sports clinics and unit schools. A Theater ski school and ski safety patrol school functioned during the winter of 1945-46. Water safety instruction clinics were established in the spring of 1946, and in April the Theater Athletic Staff School held sessions to prepare competent athletic officers and enlisted men for teaching, coaching, and administration of spring and summer sports. (191)

b. Leisure time activities included such sports as boating, hunting, skating, and skiing. Estimates place participation in athletics at 5,000,000 during the six-month period from October 1945 through March 1946. (192) The athletic program allowed participation during duty time in certain sports.

c. Exhibition athletics provided spectator entertainment and stimulated interest in the program. The largest planned program of organized competitive athletics in history was initiated in the European Theater shortly after V-E Day. Competition was carried on at all levels of command, culminating, by process of elimination, in Theater championship tournaments. Sports that did not result in Theater championships usually had their own intracommand or intraunit tournaments. Since all Theater contests began with unit play-offs and worked up through the various echelons of command, they represented the final phase of a series of games which

had involved thousands of members of the armed forces. The first Theater championship meet took place in July 1945, and in the following months events were held in some twenty different sports. Following a challenge by the Mediterranean Theater, the inter-Theater athletic program opened in August and September 1945.

d. A separate program was planned for the Women's Army Corps Athletic Advisory Committee. This program also culminated in championships.(193)

e. To encourage athletic competition among Allied troops in occupied territory and in the countries of Western Europe, invitations were issued to the armies of Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Denmark, Norway, Czechoslovakia, and Poland to send representatives to a meeting in Frankfurt in February 1946 for the purpose of organizing an international athletic council.(194) As a result, the Allied Forces Sports Council was formed, and by 30 June 1946 it had held several meetings and planned a program for the summer.(195)

68. Results.

a. Comparative participation in the various recreational activities is best shown by the table entitled "Attendance Theater Special Services Programs from V-E Day to 30 June 1946," on the following page. This tabulation shows the development of each field of entertainment, and indicates the proportionate importance and relation to Theater strength.(196)

b. Further details on the Theater recreational area and tour program appear in the table entitled "Leaves and Furloughs," on page 187 which gives the breakdown according to the various centers.(197) Figures on this program prior to July 1945 are not available.

ATTENDANCE THEATER SPECIAL SERVICES PROGRAMS FROM V-E DAY TO 30 JUNE 1946

FIGURES IN THOUSANDS

	May 45	%	June	%	July	%	August	%	Sept.	%
Special (a) Service Companies	3,338	10.3	2,511	6.3	1,730	5.5	3,045	9	1,482	5
Athletic (b)	1,200 (d)	3.6	1,750 (d)	4.4	2,300 (d)	7.3	2,500 (d)	7.4	1,487	5
Motion Pictures	26,631	80.7	30,668	77.4	22,814	72.1	22,231	65.7	22,216	74.3
Live Shows	1,259	3.6	2,711	6.8	2,117	6.7	3,118	9.2	2,220	7.4
Tours					251	4/5	265	4/5	235	4/5
Service Clubs	322 (d)	1	1,670 (d)	4.2	2,100 (d)	6.7	2,370 (d)	7	1,901 (d)	6.4
Libraries	10 (d)	.03	40 (d)	.1	100 (d)	.3	152 (d)	.45	321 (d)	1
Handicraft	5	.015	10	.25	11	.04	15	.04	20	.07
Music	25 (d)	.08	75 (d)	.2	100 (d)	.3	100 (d)	.3	300 (d)	1
Total Sp. Sv. Activ.	32,840		39,435		31,523		33,796		30,182	
Average Theater Strength	3,200		2,900		2,600		2,364		1,954	
Sp. Sv. Atten. per man per Mo.	10		13.7		11.9		14.3		15.3	

ATTENDANCE THEATER SPECIAL SERVICES PROGRAMS FROM V-E DAY TO 30 JUNE 1946

FIGURES IN THOUSANDS

	Oct	%	Nov	%	Dec	%	Jan 46	%	Feb	%
Special (a) Service Companies	1,137	3.3	770	2.5	246	1	127	0.7	.69	0.5
Athletic (b) Motion Pictures	6,653	19.1	2,373	7.7	2,235	9.2	2,844	14.9	1,326	9.5
Live Shows	21,907	63	23,172	75.3	17,172	70.5	11,817	61.7	9,185	65.5
Tours	1,495 (c)	4.3	892 (c)	2.9	737 (c)	3	466 (c)	2.4	353 (c)	2.5
Service Clubs	215	3/5	106	.34	66	.27	48	.25	27	.19
Libraries	2,529 (d)	7.3	2,780 (d)	9	2,789 (d)	11.4	2,962 (d)	15.5	2,422 (d)	17.3
Handicraft	450 (d)	1.3	460 (d)	1.5	475 (d)	1.9	496 (d)	2.6	452 (d)	3.2
Music	24	.07	20	.07	42	.17	28	.15	28	.2
Total Sp. Sv. Activ.	350	1	200	.6	609	2.5	358	1.9	160	1.1
Average Theater Strength	34,760		30,773		24,371		19,146		14,022	
Sp. Sv. Atten per man per Mo.	1,603		1,346		938		701		565	
	21.7		22.9		26.		27.3		24.8	

ATTENDANCE THEATER SPECIAL SERVICES PROGRAMS FROM V-E DAY TO 30 JUNE 1946

FIGURES IN THOUSANDS

	March	%	April	%	May	%	June	%
Special (a) Services Companies	19	.14	35	.35	79	.83	107	1.4
Athletic (b)	1,107	8.1	776	7.8	876	9.2	1,028	13.0
Motion Pictures	9,074	66.4	6,083	61.1	5,342	56.5	3,848	49.0
Live Shows	392 (c)	2.9	355 (e)	3.9	351 (e)	3.7	289 (e)	3.7
Tours	22	.16	16	.16	13	.13	8	10
Service Clubs	2,380 (d)	17.4	2,119	21.3	2,222	23.5	1,750	22.3
Libraries	423	3.1	387	3.9	332	3.5	427	5.4
Handicraft	29	.21	23	.23	34	.36	136	1.7
Music	219	1.6	163	1.64	214		267	3.4
Total Sp. Sv. Activ.	13,665		9,957		9,463		7,860	
Average Theater Strength	515		401		377		343	
Sp. Sv. Atten. per man per Mo.	26.5		24.8		25.2		22.9	

LEAVES AND FURLoughs

	<u>Riviera</u>	<u>U. K.</u>	<u>Paris</u>	<u>Lourdes</u>	X	<u>Brussels</u>	<u>Luxem- burg</u>	<u>Switzer- land</u>	<u>Denmark</u>	<u>Rome</u>	<u>Cham- onix</u>	<u>Total Leaves</u>	* <u>% of Theater Strength</u>
JUL 45	47056	83380	91027	8740		19649	-	2430	-	-	-	252,284	10%
AUG 45	47587	83943	97943	1008		18332	-	17030	-	-	-	265,843	12%
SEP 45	40014	72977	77883	1150		17537	1513	23751	-	-	-	234,825	12 $\frac{1}{2}$ %
OCT 45	27678	63016	74535	1002		19082	3403	26242	-	-	-	214,958	14%
NOV 45	12970	27777	23433	-		15542	1955	19765	2352	-	1200*	105,994	9%
DEC 45	6860	17169	14169	-		5994	-	18425	1378	-	1389*	65,384	8%
JAN 46	6956	8715	8786	-		-	-	16904	2130	3531	433	47,455	7 $\frac{1}{2}$ %
FEB 46	2386	3897	3660	-		-	-	12367	1696	2470	644	27,120	5%
MAR 46	1317	2591	2967	-		-	-	9836	1808	2600	334	21,453	5%
APR 46	907	1314	1151	-		-	-	8186	1780	2000	-	15,339	4.0%
MAY 46	516	1658	500	-		-	-	6446	1539	1970	-	12,629	3.4%
JUN 46	512	87	675	-		-	-	4434	931	1433	-	8,072	2.4%

X - Includes Chateaux de la Loire

* - Includes French Alps

THE ARMY EXCHANGE SERVICE

69. Planning.

a. The Army Exchange Service made no plans, either before or after V-E Day, for the postwar period in general. For the redeployment period, plans for the limited service that alone was possible were pushed forward quickly. The enormous numbers involved, and the speed with which the results had to be accomplished, made it impossible to do more than supply basic rations, such as tobacco, candy and toilet articles, and beer and coca-cola.(198)

b. Plans for the occupation were first submitted on 28 December 1945. They envisaged a greatly expanded service, to be attained by the setting up of Community Exchanges, which would supply all that was required, except food, including services such as tailoring and watch and radio repair. In order to cope with the greatly diversified service that the Army Exchange Service was to undertake, it was proposed that the Theater Chief of the Army Exchange Service should have complete supervision over the Community Exchange and the warehouse and dispersal points. Regional offices were to be set up, which would have limited supervision over smaller exchanges under the control of local commanders. Slight alterations were to be made in the internal organization of Headquarters, Army Exchange Service. (199) Theater policy dictated changes in this plan.

Community Exchanges were placed under the control of the community commander, and new building was forbidden as long as any adequate buildings could be found in the community.

(200) The final plan was submitted on 15 January 1946 and approved on 4 March. The directive prepared by the Army Exchange Service was submitted on 25 March and was published by Theater Headquarters in June.(201)

70. Financial Operations.

a. The Army Exchange Service had three sources of financial support: normal trading profits; the Army Exchange Service, New York, which provided loans at critical moments; and the Theater Central Welfare Fund, which temporarily took over the Army Exchange Service's bills for motion pictures when the Service could not meet them.(202)

b. At V-E Day the Army Exchange Service was allowed to charge a net profit of 5 percent on goods procured in the United States, and a gross profit of 20 percent, but no net profit, on goods supplied by the Quartermaster. On 18 August 1945, authorized net profits were increased to 7 per-

cent, and it was directed that the extra 2 percent be passed on to the Theater Central Welfare Fund. In March 1946 an increase to 10 percent was authorized, of which 2 percent was still to go to the Fund. For the first time since V-E Day, prices were actually increased. To simplify and speed this process a block system was introduced, the effect of which was that average gross profits of 25 percent on Post Exchange goods and 20 percent on clothing were charged. The Inspector General's Department contested these increases, but offered no practical alternative. (203)

c. The Army Exchange Service was in debt to a varying degree throughout the first year of the occupation. Sometimes it succeeded in reducing one or other of its debts at the expense of its liquid assets, but these bookkeeping devices made no real difference in its financial position.

d. Until August 1945 Post Exchange accounts had been balanced separately, and any Post Exchange which showed a profit might, with permission, make an appropriation to the fund of the unit which it served. This system was then altered. Army Exchange Service accounts were balanced as a whole and the surplus, if any, was paid to the Theater Central Welfare Fund. The Army Exchange Service was directed to mark up its net profit by 2 percent in order to transmit to the Central Welfare Fund sufficient profits to finance authorized welfare projects. These were calculated at \$5,523,395.32. Three million dollars of this was a debt to the Army Central Welfare Fund, payable over six months beginning in March 1946. In that month the Army Exchange Service reported its inability to meet this debt at once, and payments were postponed for six months. In the fiscal year of 1945-46, only \$518,679 was paid.

e. Inefficiency in accounting and other fiscal procedures caused considerable trouble to Army Exchange Service Headquarters. One of the important processes that was slowly or inefficiently carried out was the submission of cash. This tied up large sums in the "cash in transit" account, which could not be spared from the already scanty liquid assets of the Service. This shortage of liquid assets was the greatest financial difficulty of the Army Exchange Service. By cutting down its expansion and reducing its inventories and its debts it could have gone back to solvency, but with the prospect of dependents arriving in the Theater this was impossible. The Army Exchange Service was authorized to raise its prices and its capital, and meanwhile was granted a credit of \$12,000,000 by the Army Exchange Service, New York.

f. In the early postwar period the question of recovery of losses was neglected. In 1946, however, a representative from the Army Exchange Service, New York, arrived to help the Theater authorities institute claims and insurance procedure. In addition to this task he reported to the Theater authorities, and later and in more emphatic terms to the Army Exchange Service, New York, on certain deficiencies in the Theater and suggested remedies, such as checking old invoices to detect short shipments and not concentrating more merchandise in any single warehouse than was covered by the insurance policies held at the time. A Claims Division was activated to handle insurance and other claims before June 1946.(204)

71. Procurement and Local Services.

a. Procurement in Germany, despite its inconveniences, had one great advantage. German products were far cheaper than those of any other nation. Great efforts were therefore made to secure contracts with German manufacturers. Military government regulations had to be grappled with, permits secured for the manufacturers to operate, and raw materials procured in the United States Zone, in other zones, and abroad. In the first half of 1946 contracts to the value of nearly \$4,000,000 were placed. In the rest of Europe things were rather easier. In Switzerland especially the Army Exchange Service procured large quantities of salable goods, especially watches. In the same period \$20,000,000 worth of goods was ordered. In 1945 the armies procured their own goods, directly in Europe and through the Quartermaster in the United States. This arrangement was not altogether happy, and the Army Exchange Service in Europe took over the functions of the armies on 1 January 1946.(205) Efforts by the Quartermaster to send to the overseas Theaters goods that were unsalable in the United States led to the Army Exchange Service, New York, taking over the functions of the Quartermaster in April. Some goods were received from the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, the Army Exchange Service indicating what goods it wanted and these being transmitted if available.

b. The Army Exchange Service itself supervised production of beer, soft drinks, and ice cream, using German facilities as far as possible. The Community Exchange project greatly widened the range of local services provided by the Army Exchange Service. Auto maintenance and repair, tailoring, laundry and cleaning, hairdressing, and watch and radio repairs were the most important of the services undertaken.

72. Distribution.

a. One of the greatest difficulties under which the Army Exchange Service operated immediately after the German surrender was shortage of transportation. No vehicles were assigned to it permanently. A few were obtained in the next few months, but not until a year after V-E Day did the Army Exchange Service have what it considered an adequate number of motor vehicles. Before this time the difficulties involved in running Exchange vehicles in accordance with Army regulations had convinced the Chief of the Army Exchange Services that the Service must own its vehicles. By 30 June 1946, the process of equipping the Army Exchange Service with its own vehicles and turning back the assigned vehicles to the Army was well under way.(206)

b. Goods came to three bulk warehouses from manufacturers in Europe and from Bremen—the port where most, and finally all, of the goods from the United States were unloaded. From the warehouses they were transferred to eight Post Exchange Distribution Points, and from those to the Exchanges. For various reasons distribution was uneven in the early postwar months. Transportation was one cause of this, and another was the decentralization of control, which caused local variation in policy and difficulty in transferring goods from one Distribution Point to another. This decentralization also caused great variation in the efficiency of operation of the different exchanges.

c. The story of rationing in the Post Exchange in the Theater was one of gradual relaxation of restrictions and increase in the rations of goods that remained restricted. The policy was always that soldiers of all ranks and grades had equal, and first, priority for all scarce articles. Dependents were at first allowed basic rations only on condition that the rations of the soldiers were unaffected. Certain rare gift items were rationed by means of lotteries, some of them open to all United States nationals working in the Theater and some to men who had been in the Theater before V-E Day. Allied employees were at first barred from buying gift items, but as the supply increased they were allowed to buy all kinds of goods except cameras, watches, optical and electrical goods, and automobiles.(207)

d. Pilferage was one of the difficulties the Army Exchange Service had to face, and to combat this an international agency, the Societe Generale de Surveillance, was retained to guard goods in transit, in addition to other duties.(208)

73. Automobiles.

a. The main obstacle to the project of selling motor cars from the United States was the early refusal of the War Department to agree to the proposal. Once the War Department did agree to it, in March 1946, Theater Headquarters was able to get its scheme, already prepared, quickly into action. It was decided to distribute the cars by means of a lottery. Owing to conditions in the United States, however, no cars were delivered in the Theater before 30 June 1946. (209) War Department opposition also delayed the procurement of jeeps from the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner. This opposition was also withdrawn in March 1946, and the Army Exchange Service accepted the first deliveries in June. (210) These jeeps were in poor condition, but a workable scheme to guarantee the delivery of jeeps with minor deficiencies was produced.

b. The Army Exchange Service also took responsibility for the servicing and repair of private cars in the Theater. As the Ordnance Service could not supply spare parts for jeeps, steps were taken to procure repair parts for them, as well as for other cars, in the United States. German garages operating under Army Exchange Service supervision did repair work, the Quartermaster took responsibility for the sale of gasoline and lubricants, and the Army Exchange Service itself carried out all other servicing. Insurance was undertaken by the Army Exchange Service pending the arrival of representatives of two United States insurance companies. Gasoline for private use was at first limited to a ration of 104 gallons a month.

74. Personnel and Organization.

a. The normal loss of staff which all offices suffered from during the redeployment period was aggravated for the Army Exchange Service by the fact that it relied on local civilian labor more than any other staff division or agency. When the move into Germany was made, all French workers in the headquarters office had to be left behind. To fill their places, civilian technicians in large numbers were requisitioned from the United States. The results were not always satisfactory. The arrival of civilians requested from the Army Exchange Service, New York, was sometimes delayed as much as six months; many of those who arrived were not of high ability; (211) and in any case there were many positions in the Army Exchange Service where the place of an officer could not adequately be filled by a civilian. German labor was much used. Here too there were difficulties, especially the tendency to thievery, which no doubt was natural among employees who with their families, were underfed. Another handicap

was the fact that most Germans of sufficient caliber for skilled or executive work were ex-Nazis.

b. During the redeployment period, Post Exchange staff was provided by the expedient of training, 6,000 French workers at a school near Reims. During the three months before Christmas 1945, a school was open near Paris for Exchange officers. It was, however, closed for lack of support. (212)

c. The organization of the Army Exchange Service was altered considerably during the first year of the occupation. At V-E Day it was fairly simple, as the headquarters had no command functions and all the subordinate installations were under local control. As it took upon itself the functions of procurement, transportation, and warehousing, it grew more and more complex. In March the Army Exchange Service was placed under control of the Theater Chief of Special Services. (213)

FRATERNIZATION

75. Controversial Aspects of Nonfraternization.

The policy of nonfraternization, which lasted, with certain modifications during its final two months, from its initiation on 12 September 1944 until 1 October 1945, was one of the most controversial phases of the entire occupation of Germany. Although it was abandoned in October 1945 except as regards billeting and marriages, numerous questions remained as to social relations between Americans and Germans. The general failure of the nonfraternization policy after World War I, attributed largely to the American soldier's friendly nature, and to his being billeted with German families, stood as a warning to promulgators of non-fraternization orders in World War II to avert such a breakdown if possible.

76. Origins of the Policy of Nonfraternization.

a. The initial order establishing a nonfraternization policy was communicated through War Department channels to the Supreme Commander. The first official statement of the policy was made in the "Directive for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender," known as CCS 551, and communicated to the Supreme Commander by a letter of 28 April 1944, which stated: "You will strongly discourage

fraternization between Allied troops and the German officials and population." The principle of nonfraternization, expressed in the same words, was carried over in later basic directives on military government in Germany.

b. While the European Theater did not receive the order requiring nonfraternization until May 1944, British-American discussions anticipatory to the drafting of such policy were initiated late in 1943. A tentative draft of policy, emphasizing the need for vigorous efforts to make clear to troops the reasons for nonfraternization and the necessity for distracting troops from fraternization by an educational and recreational program, was communicated in July 1944 from the Civil Affairs Division, War Department, to the G-5 and G-1 Divisions of Supreme Headquarters. The Morale Services Division, War Department, prepared a Pocket Guide to Germany, containing a brief general statement of a nonfraternization policy, which was delivered to the European Theater in June 1944. A Handbook for Unit Commanders (Germany), also containing a brief statement of nonfraternization policy was published by the G-1 Division of Supreme Headquarters in the summer of 1944. All the discussions and preliminary drafting on this subject culminated in a directive on nonfraternization, prepared by the G-1 Division of Supreme Headquarters and issued over the signature of the Supreme Commander as an inclosure to a letter of 12 September 1944, which was disseminated to commanding generals of major commands.

77. Scope of the Policy of Nonfraternization.

The ban on fraternization was effective throughout all ground, air, and naval forces of the United States, Great Britain, and France, insofar as they were under the Supreme Commander and in contact with the Germans. Thus, the policy was established in both the United States and British Zones. Since no orders were issued within the French forces, the ban applied only to French elements under the Supreme Commander, and the policy was not established in the French Zone. The Soviet forces had a nonfraternization policy, but no orders prescribing conduct were issued.

78. Reasons for the Policy of Nonfraternization.

The nonfraternization policy was primarily a security measure to prevent leakage of information and a device to protect the lives of individuals, although it was intended also to prevent the Germans from influencing the minds of American soldiers. It was, in addition, conceived as insurance against a German campaign of propaganda designed

to divest Germany of war guilt and as a measure to promote respect for the Allied armies. Nonfraternization was believed to be a natural balance to the German character. A desire to impress upon the Germans the prestige and superiority of the Allied armies and to make them realize that they had earned the distrust of other peoples, and were completely defeated, were other reasons advanced in official documents for the policy. Nonfraternization was also urged as a means of avoiding unfavorable public opinion at home.

79. Promulgation of the Policy of Nonfraternization.

To inform the individual soldier more thoroughly as to what was expected of him a leaflet entitled "Special Orders for German American Relations," prepared by the G-1 Division of Supreme Headquarters was distributed to troops at or near the front in January 1945, and later at replacement depots and to all units arriving in the Theater. Soldiers were instructed to carry the folder at all times inside the helmet liner. Later editions of The Pocket Guide to Germany, mentioned above, carried a sticker on its cover designed to point up the orders against fraternization.

80. The Basic Directive.

The basic directive on nonfraternization, entitled "Policy on Relations between Allied Occupying Forces and Inhabitants of Germany," specified that high standards of conduct should be adhered to in Germany, specifically prohibited certain types of conduct, required orientation of troops on the subject, defined policy as to official contacts, and anticipated the need to substitute for friendly relations with the civil population an educational and recreational program and liberal policy of leaves and furloughs. Nonfraternization was defined as "the avoidance of mingling with Germans upon terms of friendliness, familiarity, or intimacy, whether individually or in groups in official or unofficial dealings."

81. Orientation of Troops in Nonfraternization.

Various modern publicity devices were used to explain the policy of nonfraternization. The soldier press gave much space to the subject—Stars and Stripes, Yank, Army Talks, all published numerous articles concerning it. The film "Your Job in Germany" was shown to all personnel in the Theater. The Allied Forces Network was used extensively for propaganda on nonfraternization after the beginning of the rapid advance into German territory in the spring of 1945.

82. Fraternization with German Military Personnel.

A Theater directive of 9 November 1944 forbade selling and bartering of articles between Americans and German prisoners of war, and made it clear that the ban on fraternization covered military as well as civilian personnel. When it was realized that this ban was in violation of existing War Department regulations, a directive of 5 February 1945 permitted the acquisition of souvenirs from German prisoners of war, provided the practice did not circumvent the policy of nonfraternization.

83. Observance of Orders on Nonfraternization up to V-E Day.

Violations of the nonfraternization rule were on a comparatively small scale and not serious in nature up to V-E Day, partly because troops were themselves convinced of the need for avoidance of contacts with Germans for security reasons and partly because rapid movement of troops left little leisure time for development of local contacts. The little documentary evidence available shows that violations were mostly cases of men seeking company of German women or visiting German homes. The cessation of hostilities, with an increase in the leisure time available to the troops, brought fraternization into the foreground as one of the major problems of the occupying forces.

84. Attitude of the Troops after V-E Day.

Intensified efforts to orient troops in the policy of nonfraternization, sometimes by exaggerated poster and radio campaigns, marked the period after the German capitulation. The reaction left much to be desired, as no amount of orientation or propaganda could have convinced the troops of the soundness of the policy. Although the vast majority of Americans were convinced of the necessity for the policy of nonfraternization as long as the campaign continued, there was a rapid change in attitude with the end of hostilities. The reaction from battle conditions, natural curiosity about the country they were occupying, a desire to obtain certain material benefits, a belief that members of Allied armies should have more freedom of action in the social sphere, some knowledge of the friendly relations between Americans and Germans after World War I, the redeployment program with its threat of further combat--each of these had its place in the change in attitude. Concerning the "temptations" placed by the German woman before the American soldier, it can be said that the American soldier found that German girls and women were, on the whole, willing to cooperate in his violation of the strict military orders against fraternization.

85. Employment of German Civilians.

a. In the summer of 1944 Theater Headquarters interpreted Supreme Headquarters policy as altogether excluding the employment of enemy nationals in liberated countries. As the occupied area of Germany increased, so did the labor problem. The transport of civilian employees from liberated countries was considered in Supreme Headquarters late in 1944 and early in 1945. Negotiations for the transportation of liberated civilians proved disappointing. A total of 80,660 were requested from France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, but the number authorized was much smaller, with the result that Supreme Headquarters was forced to liberalize its policy relating to the employment of Germans. The policy of nonfraternization was an important factor working against the authorization of German labor. A Theater Headquarters directive of October 1944 listed 112 skilled and semiskilled trades, 15 clerical and supervisory occupations, and 14 mess and hospital occupations in which the employment of German civilians was authorized. A controversy regarding employment of Germans in post exchange stores or welfare and recreational services was solved by the communication of policy to the effect that Germans could be employed in such services, provided that they did not come into contact with troops other than those engaged in their supervision. A further liberalization occurred when Supreme Headquarters stated that unskilled gang labor could be used for outside work where required and available, and skilled labor to the extent required and available and consistent with the policy of nonfraternization.

b. A retrogression in the liberalization of the labor policy occurred when Supreme Headquarters issued a statement to the effect that German civilians would be employed only as a last resort and then only in menial tasks where they would offer no temptation to fraternization. After thorough discussion of the necessities for obtaining labor and the effect of the employment of Germans upon fraternization, Supreme Headquarters again affirmed its former liberal policy. Germans were not to be limited to menial tasks; within the limits of the fraternization ban, the employment of Germans in professional, technical, and other skilled positions was authorized. This new policy was incorporated into basic directives published just before or soon after V-E Day.

c. By July 1945 employment of Germans in civil censorship, in bands and orchestras, and as other types of entertainers was authorized. The private employment of German civilians in officers' billets and messes was checked within the Frankfurt Restricted Area in August 1945, and

the employment of all domestic servants was placed under control of Headquarters Command. Use of German instructors in the Army education program was authorized at the same time. In September 1945, the employment of German civilians as drivers of military vehicles was permitted by Theater Headquarters.

86. Violations of the Policy.

a. Estimates of the extent of violations of the policy of nonfraternization can be based on only fragmentary evidence. The rising venereal disease rate and the increase in courtmartial cases involving fraternization indicate that violations increased weekly after the close of hostilities. All observers agree that violation of the rule of nonfraternization began with German children. Regulations to the contrary, soldiers could not resist passing out candy and gum and talking with children.

b. For understandable reasons, the vast majority of clandestine contacts were with German girls and women. Allied soldiers rarely sought out German men. Though it is impossible to state the percentage of Allied soldiers who associated with German women, unquestionably the vast majority of violations of the nonfraternization rule, after the relaxation of that rule as respects children, were in the nature of sexual contacts.

c. Pursuit of material advantages accounted for many of the violations. Laundry and sewing services were sought, and there was widespread barter for cameras, glassware, and other objects. Contacts once formed for these reasons often developed into friendly intercourse. Since all contacts had to be accomplished surreptitiously, problems of law enforcement and maintenance of public order confronted both American and German authorities. In September 1945 Military Government published a notice declaring it unlawful for Germans to acquire, sell, barter, or exchange articles supplied for the use of United States forces, placing upon the German civilian the burden of proof for showing that such articles found in his possession were legally acquired. The question of shopping in German stores was settled after long controversy when the list of articles which United States troops were prohibited from purchasing was extended to include clothing, footwear, textiles, soap, and fuel. A theater-wide prohibition against engaging in business, announced in the spring of 1945, applied in Germany as well as liberated countries and was calculated to prevent purchases of Allied troops from taking the form of a business for profit.

d. Troops with German relatives provided a difficult problem with regard to fraternization. A policy of transferring Americans having German relatives was never thoroughly enforced and was repealed shortly after abandonment of the nonfraternization policy.

87. Enforcement of the Rules against Fraternization.

a. Responsibility for the enforcement of the rules against fraternization passed through the chain of command to the company and platoon commanders. Severity in enforcement varied. The unit commander had at his disposal methods of company punishment as recognized in Articles of War 104, reprimand, withdrawal of privileges, or other disciplinary measures. A much used device was a rigorous bed check. Military police who had the task of observing and detecting violations and apprehending offenders usually overlooked all but the most flagrant violations. In some commands special nonfraternization patrols were used to enforce the rules. Many summary and special courts martial and a few general courts martial were held in all major commands; but, in spite of severe sentences, the threat of a court martial was not a sufficient deterrent. Regulations for the punishment of enlisted men were not precise, and no table of penalties for violation of the rules on nonfraternization was ever published.

b. As a means of enforcing the rules on nonfraternization, some persons advocated the punishment of Germans for their share in the offenses. After much discussion and experimentation, a directive issued by Supreme Headquarters on March 1945 stated that the punishment of Germans for fraternization was contrary to the policy of the Supreme Commander. This view was based upon the belief that nonfraternization was a policy internal to the Allied forces, which should be enforced solely by normal disciplinary action within the Allied forces. All efforts to prosecute Germans for fraternization were therefore discontinued.

88. Problems Produced by Violation of the Nonfraternization Policy.

Violation of the policy of nonfraternization produced a number of serious problems. Discipline became more lax. The predominant German reaction was not one of resenting that such a policy existed, but rather one of chagrin that there were Germans willing to associate with the conquerors. Manifestations took place in the form of assaults, and the circulation of handbills and posters criticizing and threatening German girls and women for association with American troops. Although the original impetus for the in-

crease in venereal disease rate among United States troops came from contacts outside of Germany, by the end of the summer contacts made within Germany were the chief source of infection. Use of penicillin in the treatment of infected Germans began in September 1945.

89. Fraternization with or by Special Groups.

a. Rules against fraternization were never enforced as seriously as in Germany. The ban lasted for only a short time in Czechoslovakia. Sudeten Germans and Czechoslovakia were difficult to distinguish and both were extremely friendly with American troops.

b. The basic directive prohibiting friendly relations with "Germans" was interpreted as meaning all persons dwelling or residing permanently in Germany. Later, fraternization with displaced persons became the rule in some areas; with this development the nonfraternization policy was undermined. The identity of a displaced person was difficult to prove and many Germans slipped under the line in the guise of displaced persons.

c. Reports indicate that Negro troops were enthusiastic fraternizers both before and after the ban was lifted. The well-known generosity of the Negro soldier often opened German doors more quickly than overtures from white troops.

90. Substitutes for Fraternization.

Many parts of the educational and recreational program planned and put into effect in the posthostilities period received added impetus from the nonfraternization policy. Orientation courses, sports programs, theater and motion-picture entertainment, and other activities were designed in large part to fill idle time and to remove the temptation to fraternize. The original directive on non-fraternization contemplated that rest centers would be established insofar as possible outside of Germany. Suggestions that membership in women's services should be increased greatly and early plans for shipment to the Theater of families of occupation forces in Germany were advanced in order to provide female companionship. A partial solution was the eventual admission of displaced persons to military social affairs.

91. Abandonment of the Policy of Nonfraternization.

Relaxation of the nonfraternization rules came piecemeal. Fraternization with children was authorized on 8 June 1945; on 15 June 1945 it was announced that venereal

disease infection was not prima facie evidence of fraternization; on 10 July Allied troops were authorized to "engage in conversation with Germans in public places"—a development which led to free and open fraternization in many localities. On 24 August all restrictions on fraternization in Austria were removed except for known Nazi elements of the Austrian population. Marriages with Austrian nationals were still not authorized. Effective 1 October 1945, all restrictions on fraternization with Germans were lifted by the Allied Control Council, except that marriage with Germans and billeting of troops with German families would depend upon authorization by the respective zone commanders.

92. Marriage and Illegitimate Children.

a. An administrative memorandum of June 1945 prescribed procedures to be followed by Allied nationals who wished to marry non-Germans in Germany and provided for the performance of such marriages by German authorities.

b. The idea of preventing marriages with Germans by prohibiting officials of the civil administration from solemnizing them was embodied in the draft of a law designed to be enacted by the Allied Control Council. The law was never enacted, however, as there were religious and moral issues involved. A regulation providing that a member of the Allied armed forces had to obtain consent for his marriage and go to the German marriage registrar with properly authenticated papers or be subject to disciplinary action was a simple solution to this complicated problem and one consistent with the continued ban on marriages with Germans.

c. Various loopholes were found by American soldiers in the restrictions against marriage with German women as early as the summer of 1945. The principal one was to marry a German girl in a religious ceremony without complying with the civil rules. Soldiers who were detected in this evasion of the ban on marriage were subjected to disciplinary action. Until it was made clear that civilians employed by or accompanying the armed forces were likewise subject to the ban on marriage, a few discharged veterans legally married German women. Another loophole was closed by the announcement of a policy that any renunciation of United States citizenship for the purpose of evading the prohibition against marriage with Germans would not be recognized as valid. Marriage between Americans and Austrians were authorized on 29 November 1945.

d. A German wife of an American serving with the occupation forces gained status as a war bride, and like any other alien wife had the right to be transported at govern-

ment expense to the United States. Whether or not the marriage was in contravention of military regulations, the German wife gained full rights to allotments from the soldier's pay and public funds.

e. The War Department policy regarding illegitimate children was that the Army would not concern itself with cases of disputed paternity of children. In cases of voluntary admission of parenthood, however, commanding officers were authorized to assist soldiers in providing financial or other assistance to the women involved.

SHIPMENT OF DEPENDENTS TO THE EUROPEAN THEATER AND ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COMMUNITIES

93. Planning for the Accommodation of Dependents.

a. Since maintenance of high morale among troops occupying a defeated country is of prime importance in the success of the occupation, shipment of families to Germany was one of the first concerns of occupation authorities.(214) In July 1945 naval officers stationed in the United Kingdom began making inquiries as to the possibility of bringing their families overseas.(215) In response to a query from the Navy as to Army opinion on the subject, the Theater Commander stated that he believed it was still too early for such planning.(216) All Army planning for the occupation, however, took into consideration the shipment of dependents at some future date as a necessary long-term morale measure.(217).

b. Late September saw the establishment of a Special Occupational Planning Board headed by the Deputy Chief of Staff, the purpose of which was to oversee general planning for the entire occupation. This Board considered such subjects as living quarters; recreational, medical, merchandising, and supply facilities; and the establishment of military communities.(218) All plans were aimed at creation of a standard of living equal to that prevailing on a U.S. Army post in 1937, and provided for military personnel and authorized War Department civilians and their dependents. (219)

c. Although it was impossible to predict the eventual Occupational Troop Basis, the figure chosen arbitrarily for planning purposes was 300,000. On the basis of the War Department decision that only dependents of officers, of noncommissioned officers of the first three grades and of civilians would be authorized to live in occupied territory, it was estimated that a total of approximately 90,000 dependents would arrive in the Theater.(220) It was anticipated that some accommodations would be ready for the first shipment of dependents by 1 April 1946. Troops and War Department civilians and their families were to be stationed in military communities of regimental size wherever possible. Planning duties were allocated to the various services—military communities, installations, and necessary facilities to the Chief Engineer; medical facilities for troops, civilians, and dependents to the Theater Chief Surgeon; merchandising and post exchange facilities to the Chief, Army Exchange Service; and commissaries to the Chief Quartermaster.

d. Basic planning assumptions were dispatched to the War Department. The reply of the Chief, Operations Plans Division, General Staff, indicated that the War Department was in general agreement with Theater planning already formulated.(221)

e. In October 1945 the Special Occupational Planning Board requested major commands to choose sites for communities to be established in their respective areas.(222) A total of 112 sites were chosen; of these 79 were tentatively approved.(223) Among the problems which confronted the Board were disposition of approximately 100,000 displaced persons then residing in forty-five of the chosen military communities, establishment of a system of priority for housing and transporting dependents, categorization of civilians for purposes of dispensing supplies, and establishment of a school system for dependent children.

f. In November 1945 the G-1 Division recommended that priority in shipment of dependents be based on the cumulative overseas service of the head of the family since September 1940, provided that the individual agree to remain in the Theater for a period of one year.(224)

g. A directive of 5 December addressed to major commands set forth planning assumptions and delineated responsibilities.(225) The War Department was apprised on 15 December 1945 of the status of Theater planning and was requested to approve the plans.(226) On 12 January 1946 the Theater received general War Department approval of the plans already promulgated except for two important points. The War

Department did not approve the Theater priority system and substituted another plan, whereby applicants with the least oversea service on their current tour would receive highest priority. In addition, the War Department ruled against new construction for the housing of dependents. The Department agreed to transport dependents to the port of debarkation upon receipt of priority lists from the Theater Commander.(227)

b. After considerable effort, the Theater convinced the War Department that some outside help was necessary for preparation of housing facilities for incoming dependents. On 4 May 1946 the Department allocated funds for this purpose.(228)

94. Development of Procedures and Policy.

Theater Circular No 17, published 12 February 1946, established application procedures and provided information on transportation and billeting accommodations for dependents of military personnel. Subsequent circulars stated that procedures for War Department civilians and employees of other governmental agencies were similar to those for military applicants.(229) Pending a change in the current rule, authorizing the transportation of dependents of enlisted men of only the first three grades, those of lower grades were authorized to bring their dependents over at their own expense if they so desired.(230) Effective 1 April 1946, the travel of dependents of military attaches in Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, France, and the United Kingdom was authorized, subject to established priorities for military personnel.(231) The question of the entry of dependents into Rumania awaited decisions of the Paris Conference regarding the status of that country.(232)

95. Planning for Military Communities.

a. A projected reduction in the Occupational Troop Basis, consolidation of commands, and changes in Theater organization rendered the selection of final sites for military communities more difficult. Communities serving the Air Force, the Constabulary, Theater Headquarters, Berlin District, and Vienna District were allotted first priority for development. Second priority went to all other communities. (233)

b. Since nonavailability of materials precluded any wholesale new construction, it was decided that the ability of a community to receive dependents would depend, in general, upon existing facilities. Potable water, a sewage disposal system, an adequate supply of electric power, sufficient fuel for household use, a commissary, a post exchange, utility

maintenance services, a community security organization, medical and evacuation facilities, a fire fighting organization—these were the facilities considered essential.(234) In the case of communities serving two headquarters, responsibility would be assigned to the secondary users to negotiate, for allocation of required facilities, with the command having primary responsibility.(235)

96. Supply Facilities.

The Theater set up categories of personnel for whom supply responsibility would have to be assumed. Dependents were classed as Category II personnel. Within the occupied areas of Germany and Austria, Category II personnel were to be completely supported. Elsewhere, Category II personnel would receive the same support as military personnel insofar as supplies existed over and above the requirements of the military force.(236) Merchandise and service facilities for military communities were to include post exchanges, commissaries, bakeries, shoe repair facilities, laundries, and dry cleaning plants. Post exchanges and commissaries were to be established in all communities, or in communities which could be reached by all dependents. They were, insofar as possible, to stock merchandise found in department stores in the United States—food, clothing, household furnishings, general merchandise, and automobiles.(237) Filling stations and garage service were to be provided at all communities. Post exchange ration cards and clothing cards were to be furnished to all dependents.(238)

97. Quarters for Dependents.

Although early planning had set the living standard of the military community at the level of an Army post in 1937, existing facilities in German towns in many cases fell far short of expectations.(239) A table of allowances allocating billets according to military ranks and civilian ratings was established by the G-3 Division.(240) Quarters were to be assigned in accordance with rank, with due consideration for the wishes of individuals within the same grade. Once assigned quarters, the individual was not to be displaced by reason of rank, nor was he to be reassigned for his own convenience.(241) Some difficulties in the requisitioning program were encountered; it was natural that German opposition should be evidenced, but the number of difficulties was small. Instructions were issued to major commands to inform German officials of the contents of directives pertaining to military communities and to disseminate a memorandum explaining the need for the requisition of German homes and requesting cooperation.(242) A critical housing shortage in the Paris area was solved by a liberal interpretation of the

rule permitting the grant of emergency government housing in cases where aid was essential.(243) Housing shortages and rehabilitation problems continued to be primary concerns of Theater planners throughout 1946.

98. Education of Dependent Children:

a. Planning for an educational system for dependent children in Germany was initiated in September 1945.(244) At the request of the G-1 Division, the Information and Education Division presented a plan of organization for schools in which provisions were made for kindergartens, six-grade grammar schools and six-year high schools. The original estimate of 17,000 pupils, exclusive of children of civilians, proved to be much too high.(245) A single salary schedule was recommended for all teachers, elementary and secondary, irrespective of their individual qualifications.(246)

b. Plans for schools were submitted to the War Department with a request for allocation of funds for the project, but the War Department made no such allocation.(247) The allocation of Class VI Supply Funds was then investigated as a possibility and approved in the amount of \$365,000 on 25 May 1946.(248) Tuition fees were set up on the following scale: free tuition for children of enlisted men of grades 5, 6, and 7; \$4.00 monthly for each child of enlisted men of grades 1, 2, 3, and 4; and \$8.00 monthly for each child of officers and civilians.(249) The Dependents Schools Service Fund was established 6 June 1946.(250)

c. The Dependents Schools Service itself, delegated to take over responsibility from the Information and Education Division, was activated on 4 May 1946.(251) It was established as a special staff section operating under the Dependents Section, G-1 Division, and was charged with the responsibility of organizing and maintaining schools on both elementary and secondary levels throughout the United States occupied area of Germany. A subsidiary function of the Service was to provide advice on private schools and colleges in Switzerland and other European countries.

d. All schools for dependents were to be open for observation by German teachers and school administrators, and thus serve German educators as models for reorganization and democratization of the German educational program.

e. It was planned to have only four schools in Austria. These would be under the jurisdiction of U. S. Forces, Austria, and related to the Dependents Schools Service only for coordination of certain administrative matters.(252)

99. Medical Service.

Plans for medical service for dependents included a system of community dispensaries in coordination with regular Army hospitals.(253) Medical and dental officers were to be provided from troops assigned to the community. Dispensaries were to provide preliminary attention to illnesses and injuries, while specialized treatment or long hospitalization would be provided in Army hospitals. A child health program was to be handled by Army physicians experienced in the field.(254)

100. Reception of Dependents.

Since all dependents were scheduled to arrive at Bremerhaven, extensive facilities were planned for that port. Accommodations for 500 dependents and 100 husbands were to be provided. Other features included information bureaus, Army Exchange facilities, barber shops, recreation facilities, nurseries, and playgrounds. Medical care and long-distance telephone facilities were to be provided. A peak load of 10,000 per week was planned.(255)

101. Conditions in Liberated Areas.

Conditions for dependents in liberated countries and the United Kingdom, were notably different from those in occupied territory, where the U.S. Army had complete control of services and facilities. A directive of 21 February 1946 was addressed to the Commanding General, Western Base Section, giving broad premises for planning for dependents and requesting that a plan for Western Base Section be submitted, covering provisions for reception, transport of persons and baggage, housing facilities, medical care, merchandising, and necessary visas. Applicants were required to make their own arrangements for housing accommodations. It was planned to establish a commissary in the Paris area, but dependents in other areas would be required to eat in military messes.(256)

102. Orientation for Dependents.

It was necessary to apprise dependents en route to the Theater of prevailing conditions. An informative letter, dated 28 March 1946, giving general information regarding living conditions, and service facilities, was prepared by the Dependents Section, G-1 Division, in coordination with G-4 Division, and forwarded to the War Department for dissemination to all dependents.(257) Radio scripts pertinent to separate communities were considered.(258) Some communities prepared letters or pamphlets on their areas; in addition, they established information bureaus.(259) A four-

hour lecture course was planned in May 1946 for newly arrived dependents.(260) The subjects to be covered in these lectures were: "The Occupation and Your Part in It," "The German and You," "The People on Our Side;" while a film, "Here is Germany," was to be shown in the fourth hour to tie together information given in the lectures.(261)

103. Provisions for Servants.

Quarters furnished to military and civilian personnel with dependents were to be provided with servants, including cooks, as required for the maintenance of the household. Additional servants as desired were to be obtained through labor offices under the same procedure as that applying to the procurement of labor paid from the German economy but to be paid for by the individuals concerned.(262)

104. Arrival of First Dependents.

The first dependents arrived on 28 April 1946. At that time nineteen of the fifty-two military communities chosen to accommodate dependents were ready to receive them.

SHIPMENT OF WAR BRIDES

105. War Department Policy.

The War Department early anticipated problems in connection with marriages contracted by soldiers in foreign service and warned that shipping shortages would delay transportation of dependents to the United States.(263) Government transportation was, however, authorized for the dependents of officers and enlisted men of all grades;(264) and wives and children could precede the person on whom they were dependent.(265) In a further extension of policy on 11 August 1945, the War Department listed wives, husbands, and children of military personnel, of honorably discharged veterans, and of civilian employees of the Army, the War Department, and the American Red Cross as entitled to transportation at government expense.(266) Financees were required to pay their own expenses. The movement of dependents of deceased persons was governed by Section XIV of War Department Circular 140, 1945. Those eligible for government transportation who traveled at their own expense were authorized reimbursement.(267)

106. Delegation of Authority.

The Theater Commander designated the commanding generals of Theater Service Forces and the United Kingdom Base as his authorized representatives in the war brides program.(268) In December 1945 the United Kingdom Base became the London Area Office, which continued to administer the war brides program in Great Britain. When Theater Service Forces was inactivated at the end of February 1946, its authority was decentralized to Western Base Section and Continental Base Section. The former supervised shipments of dependents from France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg, the latter dependents from other European countries, including occupied territory. On 23 January 1946, Theater Service Forces assigned Camp Philip Morris, at Le Havre, to Chanor Base Section as the staging area for war brides, and the staging area passed to Western Base Section upon the absorption of Chanor Base Section in February.(269)

107. Planning.

Representatives of bureaus and agencies concerned met in conference in London on 11-12 October 1945 and in Paris on 18-20 October 1945. At these conferences, representatives of the Operations and Planning Division of the War Department requested monthly reports on applications, with figures on the number processed.(270) It was decided to start the movement early in 1946, and persons interested were informed of the program through a publicity campaign.

108. The War Brides Act.

Petitions for nonquota immigration visas were filed with the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization in Philadelphia and, after approval by the Attorney General, were referred to the Department of State, which authorized consuls to issue the visas. This involved long delay and Theater Headquarters asked the War Department to sponsor legislation abolishing quota restrictions for the brides. This was done, and on 28 December 1945 Congress passed Public Law No. 271, the War Brides Act, which exempted alien dependents, except step-children and adopted children, from quota requirements. It eased the requirements regarding physical and mental condition, but did not remove the requirement of physical examinations. After a conference in Washington in late December 1945, immigration officials were sent abroad to establish liaison between the consulates and the Immigration Service and to prevent entrance of persons guilty of moral turpitude. Upon the recommendation of the Army, physical examinations and customs inspections were made at assembly areas. Abbreviated forms were prepared for shipping manifests, identification forms, medical certificates,

and fingerprint records.(271)

109. Modifications in Procedure.

Army or Navy transports were first priority ships for the project, with vessels of the War Shipping Administration second, and other ships of United States registry third. Commercial and foreign vessels could be used only in the event other ships were not available and with War Department approval. Application forms finally adopted gave all information needed for transportation of the dependents to their ultimate destinations rather than only to the port of debarkation, as had been the case earlier.(272) Applications could be made only by the person upon whom dependents was claimed, and the applicant could cancel his request any time prior to the embarkation of the dependent. Dependents of persons already deployed to the United States had priority over dependents of persons overseas. Within these two categories, precedence was given according to date of application. After the deaths of several infants, the War Department prohibited embarkation of women more than six months pregnant and of children under six months of age, and limited children under six years of age to 25 percent of the passenger loads.(273) Later amendments permitted children three months of age to sail if they were in good physical condition.

110. Staging Areas.

In Great Britain, Kingstom Lacy Camp, Parham Downe Camp, and Tidworth Camp were used as staging areas, as well as the Carlton Hotel in Bournemouth. Tidworth, which was the principal staging area in Great Britain, had accommodations for 4,000. On the Continent, Camp Philip Morris at Le Havre, France, and the Alien Dependents' Staging Area at Hanau, Germany, were used. Camp Philip Morris had a static capacity of 806, while Hanau could accommodate 200.

111. Welfare Agencies.

The Red Cross clubs at the staging areas, supplied canteen and first aid facilities at ports and transfer points, and furnished entertainment aboard ships. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration supplied layettes for needy brides who were displaced persons. Housing was available in displaced persons camps to women who were delayed en route by advanced pregnancy or by children too young for embarkation.(274)

112. Finances.

Brides whose husbands were in the United States could use military payment orders not to exceed \$200, which sum, together with funds derived from allotment checks, was entered on currency control books and later converted into dollar instruments. Spearhead deposits of \$200 were authorized for dependents whose husbands were still in the Theater.

113. Travel Permits.

European countries had different regulations on exit visas. Great Britain granted permits without much delay, and Western Base Section obtained permission from the governments of the liberated countries for dependents to cross their borders on presentation of military travel orders. War brides entering Germany required exit visas from their home governments and military entry permits issued by the Combined Travel Security Board in Berlin. The Adjutant General of Continental Base Section maintained direct liaison with the Berlin Board, and this facilitated the procedure, but slow mail service in the occupied countries caused frequent delays. (275) Military attaches of American embassies handled applications and arranged travel permits in countries where there were no Army installations.

114. Responsibilities of Base Sections.

Applications were checked by the Adjutant General of the base section and, if papers were in order, war brides were requested to confirm their intentions to travel. After confirmation was received, the Adjutant General issued travel warrants or military orders for movement to staging areas, where dependents were oriented on baggage, money exchange, vaccinations, and other matters. Passenger lists were sent to reach commanding generals of ports of debarkation before arrival of the ships. Continental Base Section sent war brides in groups of about one hundred from Hanau to Paris, where Western Base Section arranged their future movement. (276) All dependents who resided in Great Britain embarked in Southampton. Scandinavian brides were sent in one group in a transport which sailed from Oslo in June 1946. War brides residing in Czechoslovakia were processed in Prague by a representative of Continental Base Section, who arranged for their transportation on the Oriental Express direct to Paris after coordination with Western Base Section.

115. Start of Program.

Shipment of war brides was inaugurated from Southampton on 26 January 1946, when the Argentina sailed

with 626 on board. The Coethals, the first bride ship to leave the Continent, sailed from Le Havre with 450 passengers on 8 March 1946. By the end of June 1946, 45,285 dependents had embarked and applications had been received from 15,678 for whom travel accommodations had not been arranged.(277) Applications for about 740 others were expected, so that the total remaining in the Theater was about 16,418. Shipments from the three base sections from January until 30 June 1946 were distributed as follows:

Base Section	Adults	Children	Total
United Kingdom	28,299	10,424	38,723
Western Base	5,300	673	5,973
Continental Base	526	63	589
Totals	34,125	11,160	45,285

BUDGETARY AND FISCAL ASPECTS OF THE OCCUPATION

116. Establishment of a Budget System.(278)

a. Four types of funds were expended in the support of the occupation forces in Germany and of the purposes of the occupation. Appropriated funds of the War Department purchased supplies in the United States for dispatch to the Theater. Theater-appropriated funds were spent exclusively in Allied and neutral countries in Europe. Funds from the German economy provided for local purchases and services. In addition to these, there were the nonappropriated funds described in a later paragraph.

b. During the war, though appropriated funds were closely supervised, no budgeting or estimates of future expenditures were required. Soon after V-E Day supervision became closer, and on 28 September 1945 a War Department cable for estimates and justification for all expenditures for the last three quarters of Fiscal Year 1946 (i.e., October 1945 to 30 June 1946).

c. One of the factors that led to a Theater budget was the end of reciprocal aid, which came early in September, although reciprocal aid procedures, subject to eventual cash reimbursements, were continued up to 31 December 1945. Another factor leading to the budget was the necessity for closer supervision over German funds.

d. The Fiscal Director's Office was directed to prepare budget estimates pending the establishment of a Theater Budget Office. A letter was published ordering all procurement and contracting officers to obtain prior permission from the local fiscal officer before obligating any government funds. Civilian personnel strength in the Theater was more carefully watched.

e. The decision to activate a Theater Budget Division was taken at a conference of Assistant Chiefs of Staff on 11 October 1945. The Assistant Chiefs of Staff of the Theater also agreed to make their association for budgetary purposes a permanent one by forming the Budget Advisory Committee, of which they or their representatives were the members. General Order 306, announcing these actions, was published on 6 November 1945. On 29 November an officer from the War Department arrived to take over the post of Theater Budget Director, and on 7 December the table or organization and strength of the Budget Division, drawn up by him, was submitted, and later approved. The new Budget Division took over the last of the Fiscal Director's budgetary functions in February 1946.

f. Estimates for the 1947 budget were called for in November 1945, and were consolidated and ready for the War Department by January. The Budget Director took them to Washington on 25 January. They were approved, but in May a cable was received from the War Department saying that, owing to the general cutting of the War Department's own budget the Theater budget must be cut considerably. With some difficulty this was done.

117. The Theater Central Welfare Fund and Other Non-appropriated Funds. (279)

a. In October 1944 the Theater Chief Quartermaster reported that a dividend from the Navy, Army, and Air Force Institutes had been handed to him, and he proposed that the sum, amounting to over \$80,000, should be used to set up a charitable fund in Britain. This suggestion was submitted to the War Department, which disapproved it and suggested that the sum should be used to start a Theater central welfare fund, proposing that this fund should become

the depository of all surplus nonappropriated funds throughout the Theater. This suggestion was adopted, and the fund was established in February 1945.(280) A Board of Directors was set up, including the Fiscal Director as Chairman and the Chief of Special Services as the Custodian of the Fund. The other members were the Secretary to the General Staff, the Chief of the Army Exchange Service, and the Chief of the Information and Education Service. The Fund was expected to derive its income from surpluses of welfare and revenue-producing funds and from funds of units inactivated in the Theater. Its expenditures were expected to be loans and grants to the staff sections concerned with welfare activities, transfers to welfare funds of major commands and of organizations not under a major command, and loans to specific revenue-producing funds temporarily short of capital. At its second meeting, in April 1945, the Board agreed to request \$6,000,000 from the Army Central Welfare Fund,

b. In June 1945 a Theater Circular was published regulating all nonappropriated funds in the Theater.(281) One of its main provisions was that the Board of Directors of the Central Welfare Fund should have the power to inspect the books of all funds and to approve or disapprove any transfers of money between one fund and another. At its third meeting the Board anticipated the loan from the Army Central Welfare Fund by making grants totaling \$1,450,000 to the Chief of Special Services. In July a loan of \$2,000,000 (later increased to \$3,000,000) was granted from the Army Central Welfare Fund. In August, at the insistence of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, who had general staff supervision over the Fund, the Board of Directors was replaced by a new board, consisting of the Theater Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, and representatives (Deputy Chiefs of Staff or Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1) of the most important commands in the Theater. The Fiscal Director was named custodian, but was no longer a member of the board. An inspection was made by the Inspector General's Department in November 1945. The main delinquency reported was the failure of the Board to supervise the other appropriated funds in the Theater in accordance with the circular mentioned above.

c. In August 1945 the question of payment for motion picture rentals was raised, and the Chief of the Army Exchange Service suggested that his Service should pay for these through the Fund. In consequence, an order was published directing the Army Exchange Service to raise the net profit by 2 percent in order to cover this and other commitments of the Fund. With the end of the redeployment period and the reorganization of the Army Exchange Service so that it was earning some money, this became a main source of the Fund's income.

d. A large part of the loan from the Army Central Welfare Fund was distributed to the welfare funds of major commands. In January 1946 a Theater circular withdrew the direct supervision of welfare funds throughout the Theater from the Board of Directors of the Central Welfare Fund and gave it to the Inspector General's Department. In April 1946 central post funds were authorized for all military posts in occupied territory. Common central welfare funds were authorized to make grants to start these. In June 1946 another directive was published, restoring the power of inspection of other funds to the Board. (282) The only welfare funds that were never under the jurisdiction of the Central Welfare Fund were the Central Hospital Fund and the funds of each hospital.

118. Need for Currency Control.

a. Several factors led to the conditions that necessitated currency control. One was the great depreciation of most European currencies, and especially the German mark. Another was the very active German black market. In combat there were always chances for the unscrupulous soldier to enrich himself at the government's expense. Thus, there was always the necessity for measures to prevent the soldier with large quantities of almost worthless currency from changing it into dollars at the artificial rate which the Army had set up between the dollar and European currencies. Attempts to adopt such measures were sometimes thwarted. For instance, United States proposals might be opposed by an Allied power; a proposal sponsored by one staff division might be blocked by another; or the dealings of an Ally in a matter which apparently concerned only its own troops might bear heavily on the United States authorities.

b. War Department policy in this matter was founded on two main principles: dollars must not be used in areas where they were likely to fall into the hands of those who could use them against the interests of the United States Government, and opportunity must not be given to troops to exchange undue amounts into dollars. In liberated countries the War Department also tried to hold to the principle of paying troops in the currency of the country, but this eventually had to be abandoned. Owing to slow realization of the complexities of the problem, it was unsatisfactorily met.

119. Regulation of the Exchange of Currency.

a. Directives governing exchange of currency in the last months of the campaign made the following provisions: all persons below field grade had to apply for permission to

exchange foreign currency into dollars; permission was granted in writing and went on record as a permanent check against exchange of excessive amounts; no notes of types or denominations not issued through pay channels might be exchanged. These directives were challenged and finally withdrawn, on the ground that they were too restrictive and were unnecessary after the fighting was over.

b. When United States troops came in contact with Soviet troops in Berlin, it became clear almost immediately that currency exchange restrictions were by no means unnecessary. In July 1945 the garrison of the United States Sector of Berlin remitted three million dollars home. Its pay for period was one million. In August, therefore, a directive slightly more restrictive and more carefully worded was published. A definite limit was set to remittances to the United States in the provision that no person could exceed in any month that month's pay and allowances plus 10 percent, and for the first time it was clearly stated that only money derived from pay and allowances was eligible for remittance.

120. Introduction of Currency Control Book.

a. At the end of August the G-1 Division proposed a more drastic form of currency control.(283) This was the currency control book system, whereby all pay and allowances, and cash derived from dollar instruments, were entered on a permanent record, and purchases of dollar instruments were entered on the debit side of this record. This suggestion, approved by the Theater Commander, was forwarded to the War Department.

b. Meanwhile, the Theater Commander proposed to give men in the Theater who had saved money and were to be redeployed a chance to get it home before the system mentioned above went into effect. For the month of October all restrictions on the amount of money that could be sent home were lifted. This action was not concurred in by the War Department, but it had gone into effect by the time the opinion of the Department was received in the Theater.

c. Use of the currency Exchange Control Book became effective 10 November 1945.(284) The book consisted of a single sheet of paper folded over to make four pages. The inside pages were divided into nine columns, in which entries were to be made as follows: date, nature of transaction, amount paid in or exchanged into marks or schillings, amounts exchanged from marks or schillings into dollars, balance in marks and schillings, amount paid in or exchanged into other European currencies, amount exchanged from other

European currencies into dollars, balance in other European currencies, initials of person making the entry. The chief structural defects of the book were that it was too flimsy to bear hard use, and consequently had to be kept for the most part in company offices rather than on the owner's person, and that in the authentication column, there was space only for initials, which could easily be forged.

121. Operation of the Currency Control Book System.

a. The Fiscal Director's Office almost immediately reported the following defect to the Director: an individual could send his whole pay home and live in the Theater on black-market profits. To prevent this it was suggested that the cost of meals in messes should be deducted from officer's pay at the source instead of being charged in cash, and that purchases at official installations should be deducted from the currency control book if amounting to over two dollars. A month later the same office reported to the commanding general of Theater Service Forces that the system had undoubtedly been beneficial and that complaints in the Theater had been comparatively few.

b. As a control on money spent in official installations in the Theater, it was ordered later that all purchases of over \$10, and eventually \$5, should be entered on the debit side of the Currency Control Book. In spite of special instructions for safe custody of issued and unissued books, intended to prevent acquisition by one person of more than one book, many persons had in their possession two, three, or even four books.

c. A difficult problem for the Theater authorities was the conversion of marks and other currency for telegraph companies operating in Europe for the benefit of troops. It was decided that, with the exception of money received for transmission of messages ordering flowers, which were banned soon after the Currency Control Book was instituted, finance offices in the Theater would have to exchange the money involved into dollars. United States businessmen in occupied territory were authorized assistance from the Army insofar as it involved no financial burden on the Army. This was interpreted to mean that, though they might hold Currency Control Books and change dollars into marks or schillings, no reconversion would be allowed. Currency control in Switzerland proved another problem. The high cost of living made the methods that were effective elsewhere worse than useless there. The final decision was that, on departure of a person from Switzerland after a period of temporary duty, the balance on his Currency Control Book should be reduced to the actual amount that was in his possession.

d. Many minor infringements occurred at first. Men were sent on leave without books, or had money changed while on leave without entries being made. Ports and reinforcement depots neglected to issue books or certificates of exchange of currency. Cases occurred of grossly excessive initial declarations being approved without question.

e. Two months after the introduction of the Currency Control Book it was felt that the system should be revised. Major commands were instructed to make suggestions to be incorporated in a contemplated second circular.(285) The following changes were proposed: a much stouter book which could be retained by the individual; serial numbering of books; space for a full signature in the last column to prevent forgery; and entry in the appropriate debit column of all expenditures in official installations, if over fifty cents. But meanwhile the War Department had also got its currency control plans under way, and this Theater circular, although issued in April, never went into effect.

122. Scrip Currency.

a. In February the War Department announced to the Theater that the Treasury was recommending the introduction of a military scrip. The plan, as then announced, included the most important feature of the final scrip system, namely, that the scrip, which would be issued as pay and accepted in all Army installations, could be changed into local currency but could not be obtained in exchange for local currency under any circumstances. The Theater Fiscal Director's Office had come independently to the conclusion that introduction of scrip was desirable. Although the Office of Military Government opposed the plan, a message was sent early in April to the War Department to the effect that the Theater recommended the use of scrip. A conference held in Washington on 22 April 1946 finally decided in favor of this form of money.

b. In May the authorities in the British Zone announced the forthcoming introduction of a similar system. This led to rumors of like action in the United States Zone and also to a clear view of one of the problems that would be involved, one concerning persons in the zone not paid from United States official sources. Either introduction of scrip must be announced in advance, or such people must be given time to get dollar currency to exchange for scrip. To meet this problem, the inoperative circular that had been issued in April was reissued, with an extra paragraph directing all such persons to arrange for dollar backing for their marks by 1 August.(286) International agreements securing this backing were almost complete by that date. Meanwhile,

the War Department felt that too much money was getting out of the Theater through the unrestricted sale of postage stamps, and a circular was issued regulating this. Just before the actual introduction of scrip, all Currency Control Books were inspected and any holdings on them not backed by actual holdings in currency were canceled in the column showing balances.

c. In Japan an experiment was being carried out to test the reaction of the soldier to a nonreconvertible foreign currency. A type of military yen which had never gone into use was introduced in military installations, and issued as pay, and ordinary yen could no longer be converted into this or spent in messes or post exchanges. At the same time the scrip itself was being printed in the United States. The Theater was alarmed at the delay that the experiment would entail, but was reassured by the news that it would be possible to introduce scrip on 15 September. The extra time, it was claimed, would be well spent on making the scrip as good and forgery-proof as possible.

d. On 12 September 1946 the TOP SECRET classification on the proposed date of the scheme was lifted, and next day, under the protection of a moratorium which closed all official installations for three days, conversion began. (287)

e. There was little informed hostile criticism of the scheme. In Germany it was accepted with sorrowful resignation, and in France, where there was something to spend black-market profits on, with comparative calm. The total amount handed in for exchange was eventually estimated as about \$59,000,000.

f. In September Theater Headquarters was asking Military Government to issue a law prohibiting the possession by Germans of Military Payment Certificates, but the law was not passed until January 1947. (288) In Berlin a local ordinance to the same effect was opposed in the Allied Commandatura by the Soviet representative.

123. Other Systems.

a. The main differences between the British and American scrip systems was in the method of their introduction. The British authorities announced their scheme two months ahead, while one of the most important features of the American scheme was its secrecy. The reason for this lay in the difference in the earlier history of currency control in the two zones. While the amount that could be exchanged in the United States Zone was limited by the entry in the

Currency Control Book, only the amount of the last pay drawn might be exchanged in the British Zone. As this was only week's pay, it was felt that imposition of so small a limit without warning would be unfair. The only other difference in the systems was that, in certain circumstances, reexchange from marks into scrip was permitted by the British.

b. In Berlin District, from the beginning of August to the introduction of scrip, a validating coupon system was in use. The peculiarity of this system was that coupons were not used as a substitute for cash, but were surrendered along with cash. Coupon books were deducted from the Currency Control Book, and if unused might be restored to it. In Munich the same system was used, but with less good results since there were installations near by which were not affected by the system. In Berlin all the United States installations accessible to the whole command were controlled by the parallel action of Berlin District and the Office of Military Government. The disadvantage of this system was that the labor involved in accounting for coupons was almost as great as for cash. In a small area this might not matter, but it was a final argument against introducing the system throughout the Theater.

124. Relation between Income and Output.

The figures show that, up to September 1945, United States troops in Europe were spending more than they were earning; that in October and November they sent home and spent in official installations more than their pay; that for the months of December and January the balance was restored; but that in the next five months the situation grew worse, until in June 1946 they sent home and spent in official installations more than twice as much as the amount of their pay.

THE DISARMAMENT AND DISBANDMENT OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES

125. Formulation of Disarmament Plans.

When indications of a German surrender or collapse appeared in late 1944, Supreme Headquarters issued instructions outlining the policy and procedure governing the disarming of the German armed forces.(289) As the fighting

progressed, these general instructions were followed by directives giving in greater detail the procedure to be observed in disarming the enemy forces.(290) The plans which called for primary and secondary disarmament of the German armed forces, provided as follows: Enemy ground forces would be required to deposit their arms, ammunition, and other equipment in dumps guarded by their own personnel pending its transfer to the Allies;(291) enemy warships and other vessels would proceed to port; naval ammunition, warheads, and other explosives were to be unloaded and all personnel of warships were to go ashore except those needed for care and maintenance; merchant and fishing vessels were to wait for further instructions; naval forces on shore were to disarm completely, except for weapons needed for guard duty;(292) German aircraft were to be grounded and immobilized;(293) and disarmament of the German land forces, naval forces, and air forces was a responsibility of comparable allied forces, except that Allied ground forces were to give assistance to the Allied naval and air forces.(294)

126. Disarmament During Combat.

Most Germans were impelled by common sense and by instructions contained in surrender leaflets distributed by the Allies to surrender with their hands in the air and without weapons. Consequently, disarmament of individuals and of relatively small groups during combat consisted mainly in searching the prisoners for concealed weapons and explosives and in collecting abandoned weapons found on the terrain. Submachine guns, machine guns, antitank weapons, antiaircraft artillery, artillery, mortars, and rocket launchers were generally left in place when overrun by combat units and later collected and hauled to Ordnance collecting points, except those whose recovery value had been destroyed by the Germans.(295) Surrender of large groups of Germans was, however, more formal. Whenever a unit let it be known that it desired to surrender, its representatives were permitted to cross Allied lines to receive proper instructions. Surrender was always unconditional. The emissaries were usually told to disarm all enemy elements immediately, hold them in their areas with all mess and transportation equipment, and concentrate all personnel and equipment. Instructions were also given to retain under arms a force sufficient to guard arms and equipment and to preserve order.(296)

127. Disarmament of the German People.

As the Allied armies advanced into Germany, military government was established to enforce policies of the Supreme Commander and certain laws, ordinances, and notices were posted. One ordinance stated that all firearms,

including shotguns, and all other weapons, ammunition and explosives were to be surrendered immediately. Violations were to be punished by death or imprisonment.(297) When Supreme Headquarters terminated in July 1945, U.S. Forces, European Theater, which became the highest military authority in the United States Zone of Germany, announced that all military government rulings issued by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, would continue in force.(298) This automatically included provisions to disarm the German people in the United States Zone. When the Allied Control Council ratified a similar ruling in January 1946, a uniform system to disarm German civilians in the four occupied zones was established.(299) To further effect the disarmament of the enemy, large-scale search operations were conducted in July and November 1945. These resulted in the confiscation of small arms, ammunition, and other unauthorized items. The searches continued on a smaller scale, with decreasing numbers of weapons and other items being found.(300)

128. Long-Range Program to Render Germany Incapable of Waging War.

After the defeat of Germany in May 1945, steps were taken by the Allies to render that country incapable of ever again becoming a menace to the peace of the world. When Germany surrendered unconditionally, there was no central government in Germany capable of accepting the responsibility for maintenance of order, administration of the country, and compliance with the requirements of the victorious powers. Consequently, the representatives of the supreme commands of the four powers declared in June that their governments assumed supreme authority over Germany. They ordered that Germany and all German armed forces immediately cease hostilities in all Theaters, completely disarm, and hand over their weapons and equipment to local Allied commanders, and that all arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores, supplies, other implements of war of all kinds, and all war material in possession of the German armed forces be held intact for disposal as the Allied representatives might decide.(301)

129. Enemy Fortifications.

a. In accordance with the Berlin Declaration of 5 June 1945, the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, European Theater, announced in July the policy governing the demolition of fortifications and defensive works in the United States Zone. Major commanders, who were held responsible for this demolition and also for the location and clearance of mine fields in their areas, immediately started necessary operations to perform the tasks assigned to them.(302) Work

of systematically surveying and demolishing fortifications was started late in October 1945 and progressed satisfactorily, but because of the extent and number of fortifications the work of demolishing them was to be one of the long-range tasks of the occupation.(303) Progress was hampered by redeployment and the shifting of units from one area to another.

b. On 6 December 1945, the Control Council published Directive No. 22, which established two priorities for the demolition of enemy fortifications, defense works, and military installations, and set definite dates for these to be completed. In General, Priority I included those installations which presented an immediate security hazard or which were readily capable of adaptation for war purposes without extensive preparation. The deadline set for these to be destroyed was 6 June 1947. The second priority included installations which, though not an immediate security hazard, were an integral part of the German security plan. The deadline for the destruction of Priority II installations was 6 June 1951.

c. Great advances had been made toward the complete elimination of Germany's war potential by destroying war plants, by converting them to peacetime use, or by dismantling and removing them for reparations. By 30 June 1946, surveys and destruction work had been advanced sufficiently so that meeting the planned target dates seemed to be assured.

130. Formulation of Disbandment Plans.

Plans for the disbandment of enemy military formations were made in late 1944 concurrently with the plans for their disarmament.(304) The disbandment plan specified that the enemy forces, except prisoners of war and certain others, would be controlled by their own officers under Allied supervision; that captured troops would be used to satisfy the labor needs of the Allies in occupied areas and in Allied and liberated countries; and that, when discharge occurred, certain categories of laborers would be given first priority. According to the plan, responsibility for the documentation and discharge of personnel of all three branches was given to zone commanders. Briefly, zone commanders were to discharge individuals residing in their zones of occupation and to transfer others to their zones of residence, giving the Counter Intelligence Corps information on proposed discharges when requested and giving all individuals a discharge certificate to enable them to receive ration cards at home. Finally, the plan stated that stragglers, deserters, and personnel discharged without authority were to report to certain centers for registration without risk of disciplinary action,

and that non-Germans would be treated and disposed of in accordance with policies agreed upon with their respective governments.(305)

131. The Status of "Disarmed Enemy Forces."

To have taken into custody as prisoners of war, who would be entitled to rations equivalent to those of American base troops, the large numbers of Germans who were surrendering in April and May would have involved feeding patently beyond the ability of the Allies, even if all available German supplies were tapped. Moreover, it would have been undesirable to furnish troops with rations far in excess of those available to the civil population.(306) Consequently, the War Department approved treating all members of the German armed forces captured after the declaration of ECLIPSE conditions, or the cessation of hostilities, and all prisoners of war not evacuated from Germany immediately after the conclusion of hostilities, as "disarmed enemy forces," and specified that such captives would be responsible for feeding and maintaining themselves. This ruling did not apply to war criminals, wanted individuals, and security suspects, who were to be imprisoned, fed, and controlled by Allied forces. The War Department further directed that there be no public declaration made on the status of the German armed forces.(307)

132. Statistical Analysis.

In September 1944, German prisoners of war who had been captured by the Allied Expeditionary Force numbered 545,756.(308) Each day thereafter a few more thousand prisoners were apprehended, and when the year ended 811,796 had been recorded.(309) The one-millionth was captured on 8 March 1945(310), the two-millionth on 16 April(311), and the three-millionth on 1 May.(312) Supreme Headquarters authorized army group commanders on 4 May, to consider the great masses of German troops then surrendering, not as prisoners of war entitled to the privileges prescribed in the Geneva Convention, but as disarmed enemy forces. The captured troops were disarmed, retained in their own organizations, and moved into concentration areas to be disbanded as soon as practicable.(313) When hostilities ceased, 4,005,732 prisoners of war had been captured.(314) Additional prisoners continued to be reported after V-E Day, and revised statistics show that the total number captured was 6,155,468.(315) Of this total, 2,057,138 were prisoners of war and 4,098,330 were disarmed enemy forces.(316)

133. The Course of Events from V-E Day to the Slowing Up of Disbandment.

Members of the Volkssturm who were prisoners of war or who were wearing a uniform when captured were disbanded as members of the disarmed enemy forces. Others were permitted to go home.(317) On 15 May 1945, Supreme Headquarters gave authority to discharge certain categories of prisoners of war and members of the disarmed enemy forces. Those to be discharged first were all men of German nationality who were agricultural workers, coal miners, transport workers, and other urgently needed workers provided that they lived in the area in which they were imprisoned and were not war criminals, security suspects, or members of the SS. All women members of the German armed forces were also to be promptly discharged, provided that they lived in the area in which they were imprisoned and were not war criminals, security suspects, or members of the SS.(318) Three days later, Supreme Headquarters gave authority to discharge all prisoners of war over fifty years of age, provided that they lived in the area in which they were imprisoned and were not war criminals, security suspects, or members of the SS.(319) On 5 June 1945, nationals of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg who were prisoners of war or in the status of disarmed enemy forces and not wanted for war crimes by a country other than their own were released to their respective governments.(320) General discharge was authorized late in June for all Germans except war criminals, security suspects, and those in automatic arrest categories. Those whose homes were in the Soviet Zone were held until an agreement on their transfer could be reached. At the same time, it was announced that war crime suspects would be discharged and reimprisoned as civilian internees, and that automatic arrestees and security suspects might be discharged if held in custody for interrogation.(321) In July, authority was given to release to their governments all non-Germans who were not security suspects or wanted as war criminals by a country other than their own, with the exception of Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and Poles not claiming Soviet citizenship, and dissident Yugoslav and neutral nationals with ardent Axis sympathies. The last directive relating to the mass disbandment of the German armed forces was issued in August.(322) It required that automatic arrestees be discharged and reimprisoned as civilian internees before being tried as war criminals, and provided that SS members who had joined that organization subsequent to 1 August 1944 and who were privates could be discharged if cleared by the Counter Intelligence Corps.(323)

134. Situation in July 1946

a. In July 1946, 216,657 prisoners of war and 66,868 internees were in the custody of the U.S. Army. Of the prisoners of war, 29,900 were in Italy, 242 were in Austria, 176,265 were elsewhere in Europe, and 250 were in the Zone of Interior. Members of the SS still held as prisoners of war totaled 11,064 and consisted of all members of the Waffen-SS above the grade of ScharfGhrer (sergeant) and all members of the Allgemeine-SS above the grade of UnterscharfGhrer (corporal). They were held as members of an indicated organization pending decision of the International Military Tribunal with reference to the criminality of that organization. The total of 7,969 individuals held in the category of other automatic arrestees included General Staff Corps officers, senior members of paramilitary organizations other than the SS, and high officials of the Nazi Party. These were held in confinement nominally as prisoners of war but really as war crime and security suspects.

b. There were 42,498 prisoners of war who were in the process of discharge. They included individuals recently returned from the United States, personnel of Labor Service units recently rendered surplus, individuals released from hospitals, and those in the routine process of being disbanded.

c. In the United States Zone and in the liberated countries, there were originally almost 750,000 prisoners of war in Labor Service units. By July 1946 this number had decreased to 105,100, organized into 420 units. It was anticipated that Labor Service units in the United States Zone would be disbanded and the personnel discharged by 30 November 1946. Those units performing tasks in liberated countries were to be disbanded as the need for them ceased, and in any event by 1 July 1947.

d. Prisoners of war in hospitals totaled over 175,000 in August 1945. By July 1946 this number was reduced to 9,634. The hospitals were staffed to a considerable degree with technical personnel of the former German Medical Corps. Although the hospitals operated under the direct supervision of United States medical battalions, they were not military organizations in any sense and were preserved to render necessary medical service to prisoners of war. Individuals requiring hospitalization in excess of thirty days were discharged. The intention was to release all hospitals for civilian use when the military need no longer existed.

e. A total of 71,794 civilian internees of various Nazi and paramilitary organizations other than the SS were being held in internment camps throughout the United States Zone, awaiting decisions as to their culpability under war crimes provisions.(324)

Chapter XII

INTELLIGENCE

LAW, ORDER, AND SECURITY

135. General.

a. During the first year of the occupation, law, order, and security were maintained, in general, satisfactorily, except as respects security of material and information. In regard to material, pilferage attained alarming proportions reaching two million dollars for the month of December 1945. Security of information was often neglected, owing to indifference after the conclusion of hostilities. As the first year of the occupation drew to a close, nothing spectacular had happened to support or confirm the suspicions of those who had feared underground movements or zone-wide resistance to the occupation forces. The breaches of law and order which did occur received perhaps undue emphasis in intelligence reports.

b. Most effective in the maintenance of law and order was the policy of completely sealing-off Germany from the outside world and, in a somewhat lesser degree, sealing off the United States Zone from the rest of Germany. From the beginning, the U.S. Army maintained a strict border control. Originally designed as a security measure to prevent the movement of members of the German intelligence services, this later proved valuable in controlling the movement of displaced persons, prisoners of war, and refugees.

c. The zone-wide curfew for the civilian population was lifted on 30 March 1946. This action precipitated a controversy, as some major commands and the G-2 Division

of Theater Headquarters were in favor of reinstating the curfew. It was finally determined that the curfew could be reinstated by local tactical commanders, after consultation with Military Government, if the security situation warranted such action.

d. Unannounced check and search operations, covering at times areas as large as one of the two Military Districts, helped to maintain law and order. During an operation all troops in the area were alerted, road blocks were set up, and search parties systematically combed the areas for security suspects, firearms, and black-market operators.

e. The rapid redeployment of trained personnel left military police, the Counter Intelligence Corps, the Criminal Investigation Division, and the Judge Advocate's Offices greatly understaffed. This problem was in some instances so acute that the security and law enforcing functions of these agencies were seriously impaired.

136. The Counterintelligence Directive for Germany.

a. The basic policies for security were outlined in the counterintelligence directive for Germany, first issued by Headquarters, 12th Army Group, on 10 April 1945, and remained in force on a Theater-wide basis throughout the first year of the occupation. In addition to providing security for American military interests, the basic counter-intelligence missions of the United States forces in Germany were the following: to destroy the enemy secret intelligence services and all security or secret police and affiliated para-military organizations; to dissolve the Nazi Party and prevent its rebirth in any form; to aid in the disposal of the German General Staff Corps; and to detain selected enemy scientists and industrial technologists.

b. All personnel of the German intelligence services, including the secret field police and the security service, were to be interned. All security suspects and war criminals were in the automatic arrest category, as were all members of the Gestapo, all higher police officials, Nazi Party officials, high civil servants, the German general staff, and members of the German paramilitary organizations, with the exception of the lowest ranks.

137. Civilian Internees.

a. About 150,000 persons were arrested during the first year of the occupation, the large majority in the period immediately following V-E Day. The first decrease in the number of civilian internees, was in October 1945. By the

end of 1945 there were 128,000 civilian internees in internment camps in the United States Zone. Concentration of such a large number of security suspects, besides creating problems of supply and guarding, offered the danger that new Nazi cliques might be formed behind barbed wires. Many who had not been connected with the Nazi regime had been interned on technical grounds. In view of these considerations, the automatic arrest policy was amended several times during the first year. On 1 July 1946, the total number of civilian internees in United States enclosures had been reduced to about 70,000.

b. Internment camps were administered by the Theater Provost Marshal. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, was charged with providing trained personnel to screen the internees and to determine whether their confinement was in accordance with directives.

c. War Criminals were not segregated from other security suspects. All civilian internees were kept in enclosures, the population of which was constantly changing as new suspects were added and others released or brought to trial. The camp occupants were inconvenienced by serious overcrowding, unsatisfactory sanitary conditions, and lack of educational, religious, and recreational facilities. The war criminals, security suspects, automatic arrestees, and other internees received a basic food ration of 1,700 calories per day--a ration decidedly above that of the German civil population, which was first 1,500 then 1,250 calories per day. Workers in internment camps received an extra allowance of 700 calories per day, while a hospital ration of between 2,300 and 3,000 calories was provided. In the spring of 1946 Theater Headquarters began preparations for transferring civilian internment enclosures to German authorities.

d. On 20 June 1946 the Chief of Staff of Theater Headquarters ordered that the release of civilian internees be expedited. Accordingly, Third U.S. Army established a board of officers familiar with counter-intelligence processing. This board went into civilian internment enclosures in the Third Army area and reviewed the cases of all persons who had been arrested and were held solely on grounds of being security threats. In four weeks the board reviewed approximately 1,800 cases, of which more than 1,100 were ordered released.

138. General Trends in the Security Situation.

a. During combat it had been impossible to assess accurately the potentialities of German underground movements which were believed to exist. The first two months of occupation, however, proved that no major German opposition was to be encountered. Nazi plans for underground activities were not fully formulated at the time of the collapse. The early apprehension of members of the SS, SD, and Gestapo deprived a potential underground resistance of leadership. There were some signs of subversive activities, but they were uncoordinated and showed none of the characteristics of large-scale planning. The legendary Werwolf organization was soon exploded as a myth of Nazi propaganda. A greater nuisance to occupation authorities were the Edelweiss Piraten, who throughout the first year of the occupation figured prominently in field reports of subversive activities. While there was conclusive evidence of Edelweiss Piraten meetings and planning, the long-range aims of the group appeared to vary in different localities. Basically, the Edelweiss Piraten were groups of disgruntled youths who gathered to annoy occupation authorities, to threaten German women who associated with occupation troops, and to deal extensively in the black market. Other groups, similar in character, were the EORGA organization and the Bundschuh and Regenbogen groups.

b. In October 1945, the first signs of unrest were noted in the civilian population. Petty acts of sabotage such as wire cutting were on the increase and the wall-smearing campaign, more or less insignificant in scope, which had so far been directed against German women associating with American troops, now defied the occupation authorities. Furthermore, a slight increase was noted in the number of attacks on United States personnel. Generally, the Germans assumed a bolder attitude, which was expressed in a slight but growing disregard for military government legislation. Illegal mail traffic and other petty security violations increased, and revival of anti-Semitic feeling was reported.

c. From December 1945 until the middle of March 1946 there was a general improvement in the security situation, resulting largely, it appears, from the arming of the civilian police in many areas and the increased use of mobile patrols. Strangely enough, the dreaded winter months with their many hardships produced no adverse effects on civil security. The G-2 Division of Theater Headquarters reported also that the large-scale withdrawals of tactical troops under the redeployment plan did not cause the civil

population to disregard security controls and that apprehension in this respect had "proven to be unfounded."

d. During the last two weeks of March, the security situation deteriorated appreciably and remained at a lower level until the beginning of June 1946. The G-2 Division, reversing its previous position, stated that the hasty withdrawal of United States troops contributed "primarily to the boldness of the German people." With the disappearance of the symbol of authority, German self-confidence returned, together with the belief that the United States would soon withdraw from the occupation altogether. During the spring of 1945 security violations of all descriptions, from attacks on American personnel to curfew violations, were on the increase. There was some criticism by Germans of Military Government and of occupation policies. The number of civilians apprehended for carrying weapons increased. Although improvements in the situation were noted in the first week of June, the previous high level was not attained during that month.

139. The Theater Protective Security Plan.

a. A zone-wide security plan evolved by Theater Headquarters included an estimate of the situation in the United States-occupied areas of Germany and Austria and in adjacent territories, stated the courses of action open to the occupation forces in meeting civil disturbances, and set forth principles to be used as a basis for the security plans of the lower echelons. It was supplemented by a Theater alert plan, containing a checklist of actions to be taken by major commanders in the event of emergencies which were given code order designations. Both the security and the alert plans provided for mutual assistance among major commands and coordination of action by Theater Headquarters.

b. The security plan dealt in great detail with minor uprisings, in the event of which provision was made for vigilant frontier control and for demonstration flights by the Air Force, but reprisal action against German communities was forbidden. A major uprising was deemed less likely and was considered in less detail.

140. Security Aspects of the Displaced Persons Problem.

a. Displaced persons were responsible for some crimes of violence, for looting, pilferage, and a large amount of black-market activity. Establishment of camps, shake-down inspections, and stepping-up of patrol activities contributed to control.

b. From the outset the military authorities were responsible for the enforcement of law and order with respect to displaced persons. The agreement with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration of 18 February 1946 provided, however, that the military authorities would consult with camp directors, particularly when the displaced persons in the latters' care might be subjected to search, arrest, and detention. Search operations had to be approved by Military Government. The displaced persons were well aware of the stringent regulations covering the entry into and search of their camps and believed that they were relatively immune from action by law-enforcement agencies. Check and search operations were conducted, however, from time to time in displaced persons centers, and usually yielded large numbers of lethal weapons and black-market supplies.

c. Prior to 30 March, 1946, German police were permitted to conduct searches in displaced persons assembly centers, provided concurrence had been obtained from Military Government. But this caused friction, culminating in the Stuttgart riot of 29 March 1946, when displaced persons moved against German police conducting a search operation. Shots were fired from both sides and one Jewish displaced person was killed. Order was not restored until an armored car and several jeep loads of District Constabulary arrived. The immediate result was that the Theater Commander prohibited the use of German police in searches and seizures in camps housing persecutees. Six weeks later, on 16 May 1946, Theater Headquarters promulgated Standing Operating Procedure No. 81 on check and search operations in United Nations displaced persons centers, which was intended to establish uniform procedures throughout the United States occupied area of Germany. To prevent recurrence of incidents like the one in Stuttgart, authority to approve check and search operations in Jewish displaced persons centers was limited to the commanding generals of the Third U.S. Army and the Berlin District. Germans were not permitted to participate in such operations in Soviet-administered or Jewish centers, except when required to identify persons or material evidence. In this event their number was to be limited to one or two essential individuals. German police could participate in search operations in other than Soviet-administered or Jewish centers, provided that they did not exceed the number of United States troops engaged in the operation and that they remained under the direct supervision of United States personnel. Troops taking part in such an operation were to be commanded by an officer of at least the rank of captain and were to be carefully briefed as to their objectives, powers, and conduct.

d. Contributing to the security aspects of the displaced-persons problem was the fact that Allied and neutral nationals were assigned as static guards in depots and large military communities, and on prisoner-of-war details where United States manpower was insufficient. The men used for these purposes were almost entirely displaced persons, mainly from the Eastern European countries. Because of the large number of Poles employed, there organizations were often termed "Polish Guard Companies." This was a misnomer, as the companies were not composed entirely of Poles. During the last week of January 1946, the number of Poles used for guard duties was 23,340, but the total of foreign nationals so employed was 31,836. By 30 June 1946, the Theater total of foreign civilian guards had risen to 41,500 persons, organized into 199 units.

e. The widespread use of these foreign guards was not without perplexing ramifications. The Secretary of State questioned the wisdom of using Polish personnel inasmuch as political repercussions might result from it. Theater Headquarters had to assure the War Department that steps were being taken to effect the repatriation of these displaced persons, but recommended that, since they were available, foreign nationals be retained in service on guard detail until the prisoner-of-war labor companies were disbanded. A more immediate and no less disturbing problem was the conduct of these civilian guards. Frequent reports of crimes perpetrated by uniformed displaced persons, ranging from capital crimes to minor offenses, presented a problem with which the German police could not cope and which military police found difficult. Culprits were often mistaken for United States personnel and the American soldier was discredited in the eyes of the civil population. Theater Headquarters ordered in December 1945 that all uniforms in possession of non-Americans be dyed blue or brown, but it was not until April that this order was complied with.

141. War Criminals.

a. The first comprehensive directive on bringing war criminals to justice was the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1023/10 of 8 July 1945. By its terms, responsibility was imposed upon the Theater Commander to bring about punishment for the following crimes:

(1) Atrocities and offenses against persons or property constituting violations of international law, including the laws, rules, and customs of land and naval warfare;

(2) Initiation of invasion of other countries and of wars of aggression in violation of international treaties;

(3) Other atrocities and offenses, including atrocities and persecutions on racial, religious, and political grounds, committed since 30 January 1933.

b. The term "criminal" was defined as including all persons, "without regard to their nationality or capacity in which they acted," who had committed any of the crimes defined above. It included also all persons who had been accessories to these crimes, who took a consenting part therein, who were connected with plans or enterprises involving their commission, or who were members of groups or organizations connected with the commission of such crimes. With reference to crimes against peace, invasion of other countries, and wars of aggression, the term "criminal" included persons who held high political or military positions in Germany or one of its allies or cobelligerents.

c. The Theater Commander was directed also to cause the arrest of all persons whom he suspected of having committed other atrocities and offenses, including persecutions on racial, religious, or political grounds, and of all persons whom the Control Council, or any one of the United Nations or Italy, charged as criminals.

d. As a result of Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067/10, the Theater Commander not only was charged with the punishment of crimes committed against the laws and customs of war in connection with military operations or occupation, but also was directed to punish all crimes, except common law crimes, committed in Germany and territories conquered or annexed by Germany since 1933.

e. By Theater directive of 14 December 1945, the 970th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment was responsible for the apprehension of suspected war criminals and witnesses. The Counter Intelligence Corps was not to initiate investigations or uncover war criminals, but merely to apprehend those persons designated by the Theater Judge Advocate, intern them, and render an immediate report of arrest. Issue to counterintelligence agents of such items as food, gasoline, cigarettes, lipsticks, and similar supplies could be requested through channels when required to facilitate the apprehension of war criminals.

142. Military Justice.

a. The statistics of general court-martial cases from July 1942 to February 1946 revealed that the number of purely military offenses constituted 58.1 percent of all cases tried. The number of accused tried for murder and sex crimes was 10.17 percent of the total, and the rest were miscellaneous offenses, of which black-market deals accounted for the largest number. V-E Day brought a sharp drop in rape cases. The number of purely military offenses began to decline in a somewhat less marked manner in June 1945. There was, however, a corresponding rise in the number of noncapital common-law crimes.

b. Approximately 10 percent of all troops in the European Theater were Negroes. The amount of violent crimes, murder, and rape committed by this minority was far out of proportion to its numbers. An analysis of the death sentences executed in the European Theater through 31 October 1945 showed that, of 70 soldiers executed, 55 were Negroes, all of whom died for murder or rape, or both. The one soldier executed for desertion was white. During the same period of time a total of 260 white soldiers and 253 Negroes had been condemned to death, the sentences in the cases of 245 whites and 198 Negroes having been commuted. The largest number of Negro offenders had committed violent crime, while with white troops desertion, misbehavior before the enemy, and sentinel offenses were more prevalent.

c. The decline in serious offenses after V-E Day was not in proportion to the decline of troop strength in the Theater and the volume of court-martial cases did not fall as anticipated. In view of the fact that personnel in the Office of the Theater Judge Advocate had been diminished by redeployment, the processing of general court-martial cases through that office was considerably slowed down. Excessive delays often occurred between initial confinement and trial of military personnel. The shortage of trained officer lawyers in the European Theater was the most pressing single problem encountered in the administration of military justice.

d. At the end of the first year of the occupation, the total general-prisoner population of the European Theater was concentrated in the Wurzburg Rehabilitation Center, Wurzburg. On 30 June 1946 a total of 1,175 military personnel were in confinement.

CENSORSHIP

143. Censorship Policy.

Press censorship policy was formulated by the Press Censorship Branch of the Public Relations Division of Theater Headquarters and executed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, through the Censorship Branch. Operational censorship units in the theater were supervised by the Public Relations Division. From V-E Day until V-J Day, the main mission of military and press censorship was to safeguard information on troop movements from Europe to the Pacific.

144. Military Censorship of Private and Press Communications.

A week after V-E Day, Theater Headquarters notified all major commands of eased censorship restrictions. Locations and identities of units and descriptions of combat experiences could then be passed. Unit censorship for units not alerted for the Pacific was discontinued on 15 May. Base censors still made spot checks to determine whether personal communications contained vital information on the war against Japan or on the European occupation. Material that had been impounded or detained was reviewed and most of it forwarded to the addressee. All censorship stamps were destroyed on 30 May 1945. On V-E Day, there were 300 officers and 180 enlisted men engaged in censorship duties; by V-J Day, this number had been reduced to 250 officers and 125 enlisted men. All military censorship of mail and press in the European Theater was ended on 10 September 1945, and the last military censorship unit was disbanded on 25 September 1945.

145. Civil Censorship.

a. Civil Censorship was imposed on all forms of civilian communications—letters, books, maps, recordings, plans, etc. The purpose of this censorship before V-J Day, was to obtain all possible information of value in the prosecution of the war and to prevent the transmission of harmful information. After V-J Day, the censorship of German communications was continued as a valuable source of intelligence for the occupation authorities and as a means of controlling information. There were four phases in the control of communications in Germany. At first all communications were prohibited, all mail in the Reichspost was impounded, and all message service suspended. Later, communication facilities within Germany were reopened under

strict regulations which permitted no communication with the rest of the world except through prisoner-of-war, civilian-internee, or International-Red-Cross messages. Still later, restrictions for internal communications were relaxed and limited external communication was permitted. Finally, only moderate control was exercised over internal and external communications.

b. The Civil Censorship Division was under the operational control of the Censorship Branch of the G-2 Division. For operational purposes it was divided into four groups, located at Offenbach, Munich, Esslingen, and Berlin. From these groups, the Telecommunications Sections operated field stations and mobile teams, the former fixed, permanent stations, and the latter, as the name implies, staying a short time in one location and then moving on to another.

c. Civilians were recruited in the United States, beginning as early as February 1945, for censorship duty in Germany. Most of them had had censorship experience in America during the war. Those who left the United States in April and May received training in France before going to Germany. In July permission was granted for the use of 3,500 Germans in postal censorship. Many proved very efficient, and no evidence was found of willful failure to carry out instructions. Stateless persons were hired in England for work in Germany, and early in 1946 the first Danish employees arrived.

146. Methods of Censorship.

When an intercepted communication revealed information of interest, the information was reported on a form called a submission and passed to what was known as a user agency, i.e., one which could make use of the information either for action or for information. There were about 150 user agencies, which submitted their requirements to the Civil Censorship Division. Censorship maintained a watch list of persons or firms whose communications were to be given special attention.

147. Postal Censorship.

a. Resumption of postal communication within the United States Zone was authorized in October 1945; in December mail between the United States and displaced persons was authorized; international postal service, except between Germany and Spain or Japan and their dependencies, was resumed 1 April 1946. During June 1946, civil censorship examined 3,500,000 international postal communications and prepared 105,000 submissions on them.

b. On being received from the Reichspost, mail to be censored was checked against the watch list for both sender and addressee. If either name appeared on the list, the communication was examined in a special unit. Mail containing no reportable information seldom remained in the censorship station for more than twenty-four hours; that on which a report had to be prepared might remain almost fifty. Small bits of objectionable matter were excised and the communication was released. An objectionable enclosure was extracted. An objectionable communication which could not be rendered unobjectionable by excision or extraction was condemned. An impression of the examiner's stamp was placed on each communication before it was released to the Reichspost. Documents carried by travelers were examined by the postal censorship department.

148. Telecommunications Censorship.

a. Telephone service in Germany was slowly re-established. Intracity service was functioning in Frankfurt by the end of June 1945. Intrazonal service for essential civilian needs was authorized in the United States Zone in October, and in February 1946 interzonal service was established. Telegraph service was opened in November 1945. International telecommunications had not been opened by the end of June 1946 because the Allied powers had not been able to reach an agreement.

b. Civilian and common-user telephone lines were monitored, selected lines being connected with observing sets. In Frankfurt, which had 7,000 subscribers, 300 lines were under observations. Recordings were made of conversations which might be of interest to user agencies, and submissions were prepared.

c. Telegraph messages were delivered by the Reichspost to the censorship station and were checked against the watch list before being examined.

149. Accomplishments.

During the first year of the occupation, Civil Censorship served as a security and intelligence agency, and revealed the trend of German thinking. Its findings were of special value to the Finance Division, police and fire officials, officers engaged in denazification, and the Decartelization Branch of the Economics Division.

PUBLIC SAFETY

150. Responsibilities and Administration.

a. When the Allied Armies swept across the German border in September 1944, public safety was the responsibility of the Public Safety Branch of the G-5 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. Administration was carried out through normal staff and command channels, the principal operational agencies being the Public Safety Branches of the armies. The Supreme Headquarters handbook for Civil Affairs and the technical manual Public Safety contained detailed instructions applicable to this field of operations. With the dissolution of Supreme Headquarters on 16 July 1945, control passed to U.S. Forces, European Theater.

b. Full responsibility for the maintenance of public safety rested with the field forces from V-E Day to 31 December 1945, at which time responsibility for all military government operations in the field passed to the Offices of Military Government for the three German Lander. (1) From 1 January 1946, some public safety functions, relating to displaced persons and the maintenance of security of the forces, remained the responsibility of Military District Commanders. (2) After 1 April 1946, the staff supervision of some public safety responsibilities continued under the Public Safety Branch of the newly reestablished G-5 Division of Theater Headquarters. (3) These included execution of policy for the establishment and maintenance of law and order; denazification, reorganization, and reactivation of the German police and fire-fighting forces; supervision of German police operations; investigation of public officials; enforcement of security measures; disposal of staffs, guards, and internees of concentration camps in conjunction with the Counter Intelligence Corps; and control of refugees and displaced persons. (4)

151. Public Safety in Liberated Countries.

The policy placing the responsibility for the establishment of public safety agencies and the restoration of law and order upon the national authorities of each country liberated from German domination was agreed upon at the Quebec Conference in August 1943 and carried out in combined operations in Europe in 1944-45. National police authorities, therefore, restored order in liberated countries and cooperated with the Counter Intelligence Corps and the Provost Marshal in the general maintenance of law and order and in apprehending delinquent soldiers

and staging raids where United States soldiers were involved in criminal activity.

152. Public Safety Operations in Aachen.

a. Principal Problems. As the first large German city to surrender to United States forces, Aachen became the proving ground for military government policy. Military Government Detachment FlG2 administered the city under the First Army and tackled many problems which were to face all public safety authorities, namely: the reorganization of the police force and the maintenance of law and order until it could assume responsibility; the selection of personnel that would meet the tests of political reliability and efficiency; the opening of police schools for the training of police in democratic police practices and procedure and for the training of police in democratic police practices and procedure and for the training of cadres for use in later police schools; the designing of police uniforms to mark a break with authoritarian traditions; the rearming of the German police; formation of policy on the character and extent of duties to be assigned to the German police, and the type and amount of supervision to be given in order to assure a high degree of cooperation, discipline, and conformance with Allied directives.

b. Denazification. The denazification of police in Aachen was carried out by the Special Branch of Public Safety, established on 30 December 1944. By the end of the year denazification was generally complete, but some Nazis were retained because no other professional police were available.(5)

c. Prison Administration. Public safety officers were responsible for the supervision of prisons. Difficulties in administering the Aachen prison arose as a result of its use by the First Army, the Counter Intelligence Corps, the Public Safety Branch, and the local German police. On 5 December, a German penal expert was appointed for the prison under the supervision of public safety officers.

d. Fire Fighting and Civil Defense. As retreating Nazis had removed all fire-fighting equipment from Aachen to the east bank of the Rhine, there was considerable delay in reorganizing the fire department. Civil defense plans were prepared in November for use in case of air raids, but they were never required.(6)

e. Administration of Justice. Military government summary courts tried German and other civilians pending the reorganization of German courts. German civil law which existed prior to 1933 was reinstated by the Allied and, together with military government laws and ordinances, provided the legal basis of the courts' decisions.(7) Heavy fines and long sentences soon impressed upon the population that violations would not be tolerated.

f. Crime Control. Owing to the apprehensive attitude of Aachen residents, crime control was not a pressing problem. In December an alarming increase in juvenile delinquency was controlled by making the parents responsible for their children's offenses.(8) Incidents involving looting by United States troops, over whom German police had no power, were soon brought to a minimum by military police.(9) Black-market activity was negligible, as was at first the problem of displaced persons. As tactical operations proceeded, however, millions of displaced persons were uncovered and they became involved in numerous criminal incidents in the vicinity of Aachen. Steps were taken to gather them into centers, and tactical commanders assumed responsibility for their care, control, and repatriation. Policy developed in the Rhineland by the Public Safety Branch, G-5, Fifteenth Army, for the handling of displaced persons proved valuable in operations east of the Rhine.

153. Reorganization and Supervision of the German Police.

a. On V-E Day not only displaced persons, but also criminals, refugees, and surrendering Wehrmacht personnel roamed the countryside, and practically no German police force existed to control them. Public safety officers coordinated their activities with other security agencies of the Army to control this unhealthy situation, and tactical commanders assigned combat troops to assist.(10)

b. Plans for the reorganization of the German police and fire-fighting forces became effective with the issuance of a Theater directive on 7 July 1945.(11) United States policy for the reorganization of German public safety agencies was based on the concepts of decentralization, demilitarization, denazification, and the abolition of the national command hierarchy of the German police, fire, and civil defense agencies.(12) All central control of the German police system was abolished by turning over responsibility to the municipalities and the Lander, and by abolishing altogether certain Nazi organizations, such as those which had formed a part of the SS.(13)

c. The Railway and Waterways Police and various other units were reconstituted as separate units. The Border Control Police, abolished by the first forces entering Europe, was reorganized within each Land with authority over German civilians only. By May 1946 the Border Control Police had a strength of 3,723, with 1,000 employed in carrying out customs police duties.(14) Land Bureaus of Criminal Identification were organized in December 1945 to assist in the control of crime.(15) Strictly civilian in character, these bureaus operated under the Land Ministers of the Interior and served as mediums for exchanging information among police departments. During the last six months of 1945, German civilian police increased in strength from 12,000(16) to 24,500.(17)

d. Public safety officers screened appointed and trained municipal and rural police and supervised their operations. Procedures developed during operations in liberated countries were carried over and used successfully in Germany. Prastic limitations were placed upon the powers of the new police, especially in their relations with Allied personnel.(18) All remaining records, property, and equipment were reclaimed for the use of the new police, and suitable persons dismissed by the Nazis were reappointed and gave willing cooperation. A monthly Police Situation Report and a monthly Crime Report were required of all police chiefs and were the basis for supervising arrest procedure, booking of charges, actions in bringing offenders before the proper court, and inspection of prisons.(19)

154. Denazification and Training.

By December 1945 denazification of the police, carried out through investigation of information given in their individual cuestionnaires, or Fragebogen, was officially announced as complete in the United States Zone, although dismissals continued for months.(20) In March responsibility for further denazification passed to the Germans. The shortage of politically reliable experienced personnel made it necessary to set up basic training schools. By the end of January 1946, twenty schools were in operation throughout the zone.(21) Courses were conducted by German police instructors under the supervision of the police chiefs and public safety officers, and were supplemented by in-service training. Special courses were conducted to train German civilian investigators.(22) A selected group of prisoners of war was trained for police work at Chateau Tocqueville, near Cherbourg, France. The program for the training of German prisoners of war for government service, including police work, known as Special Project No. 2, or the "Sunflower Project," was initiated on 30 July 1945.(23)

155. Uniforms and Arms for German Police.

The newly formed police suffered loss of prestige and morale because they were without uniforms. Third and Seventh Armies therefore expedited the release of captured enemy stocks of material to be used for uniforms.(24) The German police authorities were permitted to design their own uniforms, subject to the approval of public safety officers. By 30 April 1946 all police, including the newly formed border police, were uniformed. The rearming of the German police was undertaken first on a local basis upon the request of local public safety officers. Without weapons the German police were helpless to cope with many local situations such as robbing, burning, looting, and murdering of German civilians by displaced persons. A majority of German police remained unarmed through October 1945, but on 6 November the Allied Control Council reached an agreement whereby weapons and limited amounts of ammunition were subsequently supplied to the German police.(25) Progress made in extending and perfecting means of communication and transportation also improved the efficiency of police operations.

156. Reorganization of German Fire-Fighting Agencies.

a. In general, German fire agencies had suffered severe damage as a result of bombings, and the equipment which had been moved by the Nazis to the east side of the Rhine in the early days of the occupation was dispersed in small towns and on the outskirts of municipalities for their protection. The shortage of fire-alarm systems, fire-fighting vehicles, hose, pumps, gasoline, oil, nozzles, and other requirements for efficient fire fighting created serious problems in rehabilitation. The situation was met in various ways, and policies were adopted for the strategical distribution of fire-fighting equipment throughout the Eastern and Western Military District.(26)

b. Upon entry into cities and towns, specialist public safety officers proceeded with the reorganization of German fire-fighting forces. Obligatory fire services were dissolved. All fire chiefs and personnel were screened in accordance with regulations relative to the removal from office of Nazis and militarists. As raw recruits often made up the majority of the fire departments, schools and in-service training programs were established. To assist chiefs in clothing their personnel, tactical commanders released captured German stocks of uniforms which were dyed and remodeled before use.(27)

c. Fire protection in each Stadtkreis, in each Gemeinde of 20,00 population or more, and in each smaller city having its own professional fire-fighting service before 1938 was made the responsibility of the Burgermeister. The Landrat was responsible in rural areas and in all Gemeine not possessing their own fire-fighting forces. Public safety officers maintained constant liaison between the agencies concerned at their level of government in order to insure that military government instructions were carried out. Land Bureaus of Fire Prevention were organized as purely statistical and advisory agencies exercising no administrative or operational control over German fire services. They submitted monthly reports to military government authorities, who used them in supervising the fire services. (28)

d. By the end of December 1945, Bavaria had 7,144 fire companies; Grosshessen 2,746, and Wurttemberg-Baden 1,301. (29) These companies were required to render assistance to United States military fire-fighting units to augment the protection of military installations.

157. Maintaining Public Safety.

To facilitate the maintenance of law and order and the enforcement of security controls (30), the following restrictions were placed upon the German civil population: curfew and travel restrictions; exclusion from designated military areas; prohibition of meetings, parades, and public assemblies; and a ban on possessing certain articles. Public safety authorities were more concerned with crimes incident to or affecting the military occupation than with crimes among the German civil populace. Objectives were, however, the same in both cases--crime prevention, control, investigation, and prosecution. Although the German police were made responsible for the detection and investigation of crimes among the civil population, (31) assistance was given them by military police and by security guards employed by local commanders of tactical forces. (32) Three classes of crime--juvenile delinquency, black-market operations, and depredations of displaced persons--constituted the greatest threats to the maintenance of law and order in the United States Zone. As time went on, there was a steady increase in burglary and thievery of all kinds.

158. Juvenile Delinquency.

Disillusioned, drifting, sometimes homeless, Nazi indoctrinated German youth was a threat to the security of the occupation. There was no evidence during the first year of the occupation, however, to indicate that this lawlessness was organized. The problem was attacked by both military government and local tactical groups, and American correction

techniques were introduced. First offenders were remanded to welfare workers or their parents. Parents were made responsible for second offenses of their children under Military Government Notice 23-222.(33) These measures helped German institutions and civil authorities to cope with the problem.

159. Black-Market Operations.

The black market was one of the most serious threats to the orderly maintenance of the occupation. It offered a means of subsistence for possible subversive groups intent upon creating resistance and at the same time led to a vicious circle in that it devaluated the mark and undermined German economy,(34) which resulted in increased use of the black market by the citizenry. Public safety authorities tried in every way to check these activities. Attempts were made to bolster the German economy and to support the efforts of the civil administration to ration food and clothing.(35) A price-control police was organized(36), and violators of price regulations were tried before military government, rather than German civil courts, sentences being imposed on both seller and buyer.(37) Prompt action of local tactical commanders and security agencies kept localized operations in check. Cooperation of German civil authorities and police with Army agencies through public safety officers was valuable, and one of the most important control measures was the restriction of displaced persons.

160. Depredations of Displaced Persons.

The depredations of displaced persons created such a menace to public safety that all agencies concerned took decisive, coordinated action.(38) When responsibility for military government passed from tactical commanders on 1 January 1946, the Army retained responsibility for the control of displaced persons camps.(39) Every effort was made to segregate displaced persons into centers where they could remain until repatriation. As time went on, conditions grew worse. Security guards posted at displaced persons camps, raids by military police and tactical units, and road blocks set up to recover stolen vehicles from displaced persons were only a few of the control measures undertaken. Under operation SYNDICATE, informers were placed in camps to gain information.(40) In May 1946 a Theater directive ordered the prosecution in military government intermediate or general courts of displaced, stateless, and other persons possessing firearms or other deadly weapons. Forced repatriation followed conviction.(41) Curtailment of aid to certain classes of displaced persons was finally restored to in the effort to stem the resurgent tide of plundering. In May 1946 approximately 336,000 registered and 100,000 unregistered and uncontrolled displaced persons were still in the United States Zone.(42)

CHAPTER XIII

THE EDUCATION AND TROOP INFORMATION PROGRAMS

1. Mission and Scope of the Education Program.

The education program as planned for the post-hostilities period had a double purpose: first, it was the redemption of a debt to the men and women of the armed forces, so many of whom had been interrupted in their studies; secondly, it was a major weapon in the campaign for maintaining a high morale among the men eligible for demobilization and awaiting redeployment from the European Theater. It was estimated that approximately 600,000 men would be eligible for demobilization after the defeat of Germany, but none of them was to be shipped to the United States, except as casualties to fill up shipping spaces, until all troops to be redeployed to the Pacific had departed. Planning for the program had begun early, and by V-E Day the blueprints were in existence for extensive activities, including unit schools, technical schools, university study centers, the U.S. Armed Forces Institute, and courses in civilian colleges, universities, and technical schools.

2. Organization and Personnel.

The organization responsible for the program was the Information and Education Division, which had been established as a special staff activity at Theater and Communications Zone levels in April 1945. In August of the same year, the program was made the responsibility of the commanding general of Theater Service Forces. On 1 February 1946, the Information and Education Division was transferred to Headquarters, USFET, in line with the close-out of Theater Service Forces. In April 1946 it was redesignated the Information and Education Service. In the

field, Information and Education officers with enlisted assistants were authorized in the Table of Organization and Equipment of army, division, and corps headquarters to be designated "Assistant G-3, Information-Education Officer," while each regiment or equivalent unit was entitled to a staff officer of the grade of captain designated "Assistant S-3, Information-Education Officer," with enlisted assistants. The training of personnel for these positions and of instructor personnel was carried out by the 6819th Army Information-Education Staff School from V-E Day until December 1945, at an average weekly rate of 600. After December, the use of civilian instructors from the United States had increased so that there was no longer any need for a wide-spread training scheme, and when the Information and Education Staff School opened in January 1946 in Hochst, Germany, the curriculum was limited to a Discussion Leaders' course, designed to prepare men to operate the Troop Information Program.

3. Operation of the Education Program until V-J Day.

a. By V-E Day plans for Theater-level education were well advanced, and on 1 August 1945, only 85 days after hostilities in Europe had ceased, Shrivenham American University opened in England with a registration of 3,641 students. Three weeks later, the second Army university opened at Biarritz, France, with 3,901 students, while preparations for the centralized technical school at Warton, England, were sufficiently advanced to allow its opening in early September. The organizational feat that had led to the establishment of these three university-level institutions which formed the bulk of the Theater-level program, was an outstanding achievement of the education program. Another major feature was a system called Training within Civilian Agencies, under which soldiers were placed as students or apprentices in civilian universities, colleges, professions, and industries. The range of subjects offered by this scheme ran from surgery to dressmaking, from law to wholesale distribution. Cooperating institutions were located in France and the United Kingdom, and the first courses began in June 1945. Another Theater-level branch of the education program was a system of on-the-job training offered by Medical, Ordnance, Chemical Warfare Service, and Signal Corps units. All these activities involved absences of from two weeks to two months on the part of the soldier students. As quotas were necessarily limited, a high standard of prerequisite qualifications was called for.

b. The education program was not entirely on the Theater level, however; a wide network of command schools existed, and the self-teaching and correspondence courses of the U.S. Armed Forces Institute served the troops who were

unable through their location or duties to participate in other branches of the program. Command schools were set up in various units as soon as hostilities ceased, with such instructors as were available within the units and such material as was obtainable. They varied from small schools offering one or two courses to fifty or less pupils to the large division-level schools like Rainbow University, with an enrollment of several hundred and offering college-level courses in a wide range of subjects.

The U.S. Armed Forces Institute services were provided by the European Theater of Operations Branch, which had been set up in England in 1944, and by its sub-branches and mobile unit. In addition to courses and tests, the Branch provided the machinery for accreditation in institutions in the United States for all educational work accomplished in the European Theater.

4. The Effect of V-J Day on the Education Program.

On this widespread and ambitious program the early coming of V-J Day had a tremendous effect. The end of hostilities meant that the entire energies and purpose of the Theater were redirected toward the redeployment of those troops eligible for demobilization. The position quickly changed from one where there were large numbers of troops in the Theater requiring purposeful occupation to one where there were insufficient troops to perform the Army's mission. All branches of the education program felt the impact of the change: members of the overhead detachments, military instructor staff, and students at the Theater-level schools were redeployed, and difficulty was experienced in replacing the overhead and instructor personnel; units offering on-the-job training were alerted for movement and the students had to be transferred to other units for completion of their training; command schools closed down because of the redeployment of instructor staff or lack of students. Radical changes were required to fit the program to the new situation, and the War Department and Theater policies were, accordingly, redirected to this end.

5. Educational Policy for the Occupation Period.

In September 1945 the War Department notified the Theater that severe cuts were to be imposed on the education program for the occupation period, involving elimination of all activities requiring the extended absence of personnel from their units. The drastic nature of these measures aroused considerable alarm among Theater education authorities, and Brig. Gen. Paul W. Thompson, Theater Chief of

Information and Education, was sent to Washington to confer with War Department officials on the future program. He took with him a plan providing for the following: an augmented and improved command school program; extensive use of U.S. Armed Forces Institute services, with emphasis on supervised correspondence course study, especially in unit schools lacking qualified personnel for the usual type of classroom instruction; details to civilian institutions (this to be counterbalanced by the closing of all Theater-level schools); maintenance of a restricted scheme of Training within Civilian Agencies for military personnel on a leave status and for discharged personnel desiring to study in civilian universities and professions under Public Law No. 346 (the G.I. Bill of Rights). The War Department agreed to all the principles outlined by General Thompson and authorized an annual expenditure of \$19,300,000. It was provided that there should be one centralized Army university and one centralized Army vocational school, with capacity for approximately three thousand students each and courses of two months' length, both to be located eventually in occupied territory.

b. Manpower difficulties continued, however, and the plan had to be revised. By January the decision had been made not to retain any Theater-level schools for the occupation forces. In February command schools were suspended until July, except for literacy training and skills of value in the occupation, although other subjects might be continued at the discretion of the commander concerned. These measures, together with the closing of Theater-level schools and the decrease in Training within Civilian Agencies, reduced the overhead personnel of the program from 4,100 to 1,173, and student capacity to 700. General McNarney, Theater Commander, communicated with General Eisenhower at the War Department, explaining his intention to proceed along this line of ruthless curtailment on the ground that "the education program was primarily to occupy troops otherwise idle and awaiting redeployment and, therefore, it is not now justified for the purpose for which it was originally intended." The War Department accepted the general policy proposed by the Theater Commander, who conceded that, providing the situation improved, the education program could again be expanded. These curtailments were based upon the certainty that, until 1 September 1946, the Army would be severely strained from the manpower standpoint, so that it would be essential to reduce the number of non-effective military personnel during that period.

6. Implementation of Policy.

a. The first Theater-level school to close was Shrivenham American University, which was discontinued on 5 December 1945. The last term of Warton American Technical School ended on 12 January 1946, while Biarritz American University closed on 9 March 1946. Training within Civilian Agencies, which had expanded in January 1946 to include Swiss institutions, ceased operation in Switzerland by 31 March, in France by 25 March, and in the United Kingdom by 30 April 1946. To counterbalance this, efforts were made to improve the command school program and to increase the use of U.S. Armed Forces Institute services.

b. The culmination of the improved command school program was the Consolidated School Plan drawn up by the Information and Education Division. This plan divided the occupation territory into areas based on troop strength. These were further subdivided into districts, each of which was to be serviced by either a consolidated or a district school. To meet particular needs, special schools could be set up on a temporary basis. Instructors were to be United States civilians, many of whom had previously taught at the Theater schools, German nationals, authorized to teach only in a limited subject field, and qualified military personnel. The plan also made provision for administrative and supervisory personnel in the form of area superintendents and district supervisors. Courses were to be standardized and brought into line with those offered by the U.S. Armed Forces Institute, so that a student transferring from one district to another would not need to interrupt his studies, which could be continued either at another school offering his subject in the new district or through the U.S. Armed Forces Institute. Statistics covering all branches of the education program are given on the following page.

7. Mission and Scope of Troop Information.

The Troop Information Program was designed to make the American soldier the best-informed soldier in the world. Its aim was to present facts convincingly--so convincingly that false promises, vicious rumors, and negative or adverse attitudes would fall before it. Further objectives were to teach good citizenship, to give the soldier a knowledge of the Army and its history and customs, and to arouse in him a pride in his nation and his outfit. To accomplish its mission the Troop Information program was designed to present timely subjects to military personnel through periodic

TABLE I
STATISTICS OF PARTICIPATION IN EDUCATION PROGRAM
THEATER-LEVEL SCHOOLS

<u>School</u>	<u>Enrollment</u>	<u>Graduation</u>
Shrivenham	7,805	6,782
Biarrits	10,447	9,473
Warton	6,100	5,544
TOTAL	24,352	21,799

TRAINING WITHIN CIVILIAN AGENCIES

<u>Course</u>	<u>Enrollment</u>	<u>Graduation</u>
Educational courses	7,779	
Professional courses	3,236	
TOTAL	11,015	

U.S. ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE

<u>Course</u>	<u>Enrollment</u>	<u>Graduation</u>
Including university extension	118,060	
Excluding university Extension		6,521

COMMAND SCHOOLS AND ON-THE-JOB TRAINING

<u>Course</u>	<u>Enrollment</u>	<u>Graduation</u>
For month of June 1946		
On-the-job Training	1,823	
Command Schools	13,435	
TOTAL	15,258	

NUMBER OF INSTRUCTORS IN MONTH OF JUNE 1946

<u>Course</u>	<u>Enrollment</u>	<u>Graduation</u>
On-the-job Training		154
Command Schools		653
TOTAL		807

discussions, conferences, and lectures. In addition, the program offered a certain amount of news, of current events, to insure that the soldier was kept well informed on domestic and world developments. During hostilities, Troop Information, or Orientation as it was then designated, was the major weapon in the battle against the Fifth Column, and formed an important feature of military training. Even before hostilities ended, plans were formulated to continue this type of training after V-E Day.

8. Mediums of the Troop Information Program.

The principal mediums of the Troop Information program in the European Theater were motion pictures supplied by the War Department; the American Forces' Network; unit stories which were a series of unit histories produced by the Information and Education Division, fifty-seven in all, designed to inculcate in the soldier pride in his outfit; Army Talks, a Theater publication that appeared weekly until March 1946, when the distribution of commercial, periodicals such as Time and Newsweek had improved to such an extent that there was no longer a need for a separate periodical; and the Information Bulletin, redesignated the Information and Education Bulletin, in March 1946, which was the official organ of the Information and Education Division and furnished discussion outlines and supplementary material, including maps, on the current troop information topics. Unit Newspapers, also were encouraged throughout the Theater, and the Information and Education Division produced from time to time special materials in the form of booklets and pamphlets on specific orientation subjects, which were distributed throughout the Theater. The Allied Liaison Section and the Lecture Bureau were two sections of the Information and Education Division devoted to implementing Troop Information policies. Through their services, speakers were obtained from the United States and from Allied and neutral countries to give talks and hold panel discussions as a part of the Troop Information program.

9. Program Subjects.

The timely planning for the posthostilities period was manifest in the inauguration on 12 May, four days after cessation of hostilities, of a special six-weeks' program covering the redeployment and readjustment plan, a review of the campaign in the European Theater, backgrounds to the Pacific war and to the occupation of Germany, appreciation of the accomplishments of other nations and services and the achievement of the home front, and an outline of peace

objectives. A further four-months' program was ready to go into operation on 12 August, but the sudden collapse of Japan necessitated a revision of this on a long-range basis. The subjects covered by the final program were: accomplishments during the war, problems facing the soldier, problems facing the nation and the world, and the continuing mission of the Army. In addition to this routine program, there were special programs designed for troops being demobilized, for reinforcements arriving in the Theater, for civilian employees, and for dependents. Also, from time to time, supplementary programs stressed special aspects, such as the treatment of redeployment problems given in February 1946 after the large-scale demonstrations throughout the Theater, and the commemoration of V-E Day, which was organized on the first anniversary of that day.

10. Operation.

These various programs were conducted in a weekly period which was conducted on duty time and was mandatory for all troops. The period comprised two one-hour sessions until March 1946, when it was reduced to one hour. The directive issued in March 1946 specified that the size of discussion groups was to be not more than a platoon, except that, where there was a lack of qualified personnel to conduct the period, the group might be larger. Sessions were to consist of discussions or lectures followed by question periods, and discussion leaders were trained in a one-week course at the Information and Education Staff School at Höchst, Germany. Staff supervision of the conduct of the program was the responsibility of the Information and Education Officer of the unit, but the efficient use and development of the program was a command responsibility. To promote an increase in command support, a series of three-day conferences was held for field-grade officers at the Information and Education Staff School.

GERMAN YOUTH ACTIVITIES

11. Preliminary Work on the Program.

In the conviction that a positive program of German youth activities would be needed, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, before D-Day delegated to the

Education and Religious Affairs Branch of its G-5 Division responsibility for supervising (1) such a program. During the period immediately after V-E Day, however, no youth organizations were permitted without the consent of the Supreme Commander, (2) U.S. Forces, European Theater, by letter of 7 July 1945, authorized religious organizations to conduct welfare and athletic activities for young people; and a few weeks later Theater Headquarters directed German officials to "prepare a program of useful work for children. . . . pending the reopening of schools." (3) Bombings and evacuations during the war had caused thousands of children to be orphaned, injured, or lost; such war-born tragedies rendered imperative the administration of welfare and relief work in the summer of 1945 throughout the United States Zone. To meet the problem, Military Government authorities established Jugendämter, or youth offices, to provide institutional care for orphaned, needy, or delinquent youths, and supervised the organization of other such agencies by the Germans. It was soon evident that, because of the magnitude of the complex social problems engendered by the war, a policy of more direct participation by Military Government was necessary to cope with the situation.

12. Contributions of Individual Army Units.

When the ban on fraternization with German children was relaxed on 8 June 1945, many units of American soldiers on their own initiative provided athletic events and discussion groups to entertain and instruct youngsters. Such spontaneous efforts were particularly successful in the Bremen Enclave, where the Office of Military Government encouraged the movement by supplying facilities and equipment. In the fall of 1945 Lt Gen Geoffrey Keyes encouraged his officers and men of the Seventh Army to support the program in the Western Military District, comprising Grosshessen and Württemberg-Baden. To make it possible for Germans to gain an understanding of the American way of life through contact with his troops, General Keyes promoted the establishment of German youth organizations by subordinate commanders. (4)

13. Operation of the Program on the Theater Level.

To guarantee a continuity of interest in the project, and a certain degree of uniformity in its activities, as well as to prevent the subversion of the groups by undesirable political elements, it was considered advisable to launch the program on a Theater-wide basis. Plans made by military government officials of Grosshessen were

incorporated by Theater Headquarters in October in a directive which included a complete set of regulations on youth groups and a standard application form for admittance into the contemplated clubs.(5) By terms of the directive, youth committees composed of responsible German adults were to be established at the Kreis level under the supervision of Military Government. Commanders of the Eastern and Western Military Districts were directed to foster the growth of voluntary organizations for adolescent children for cultural, religious, and recreational purposes. Membership was to consist of German youth between ten and eighteen years of age, and the young people were to be permitted to form branches of such international organizations as the Boy Scouts, the Young Lion's Christian Association, and their counterparts for girls. Appended to the directive was a list of forbidden practices, which included parades, marching, and any form of premilitary or paramilitary training.(6)

14. Difficulties Encountered in Executing the Program.

By the end of 1945, three problems were pressing: expansion of the program to combat the high rate of juvenile delinquency; procurement of supplies and equipment; and adequate leadership. On 2 April 1946 the Theater Commander directed that a staff duty be compiled on the problem posed by juvenile delinquents, who were found to be less numerous in areas where an active youth program was in effect.(7) Attempts were made to find a way to obtain supplies from captured enemy materials and surplus Army stocks for use in the project. Securing competent leadership proved difficult, as many otherwise qualified Germans had Nazi affiliations, while a number of Americans who had evinced interest in the program were due for redeployment. By the end of January 1946, however, committees of adult Germans were directing the project in every Kreis of Württemberg-Baden and in almost every Kreis of Grosshessen. Similar committees were later formed on the Land level. In spite of all efforts to interest native persons in the movement, the number of sponsors, both German and American, failed to keep pace with the increase of membership in youth groups.

15. Amplification of the Program.

Prepared in collaboration with military government officials, a Theater letter of 15 April 1946 provided for more active participation in the movement by the major commands and led to the establishment of a Youth Activities Section in the G-3 Division of Theater Headquarters. The directive authorized the transfer of surplus Army athletic equipment to German youth clubs, halted requisition of such

supplies from the indigenous economy by occupation troops, provided for the full-time services of an officer in each command to work on the project, and requested the submission of monthly reports from the commands on the progress made with youth activities.(8) Reports prepared in accordance with the letter indicated that by August of 1946 2,901 groups had been organized. From a total of approximately 2,100,000 German adolescents between ten and eighteen years of age, the program had attracted an estimated 481,000.(9) Under the stimulus of greater encouragement from Military Government, the German populace took the initiative in establishing such groups as the Wandervogel, and Pfadfinder. Youth hostels, long popular in pre-Nazi Germany, were revived, and a number of summer camps were opened. The U.S. Army permitted the use of sports areas and buildings which were not needed during the summer months. In spite of all such endeavors, however, disturbing reports reached Theater Headquarters concerning the mounting rate of juvenile delinquency, an aftermath of war not offset by constructive activity. The Office of Intelligence of Military Government gave warning in July that a more imaginative and comprehensive policy toward the program was essential if German youths were to acquire an understanding and acceptance of democratic ideology.(10)

THE UNITED STATES CONSTABULARY

16. Early Experiments.

The concept of a police-type occupation of Germany arose from the consideration of plans for the most efficient employment of the relatively small force available. The speed of redeployment in the fall of 1945, and the certainty that the Occupational Troop Basis would have to be reduced quickly, pointed to the necessity for economy in the use of manpower. The idea that the lack of strength in the forces of occupation could be offset by careful selection, rigid training, and high mobility cannot be attributed to any single individual, or indeed to any single agency. Before any plans were worked out for the organization of the U.S. Constabulary, units of the U.S. Army assigned to occupation duties in Germany had experimented with the organization of parts of their forces into motorized patrols for guarding the borders and maintaining order in the large areas for which they were responsible. In September 1945 the G-2 Division of Theater Headquarters put forward a plan, which was carried into effect toward the end of the year, for the organization of a special security force known as the District Constabulary. In October 1945 the War Department asked Theater Headquarters to consider the feasibility of organizing the major portion of the occupation forces into an efficient military police force on the model of state police or constabulary in the United States.

17. Later Planning.

Ideas crystallized rapidly. At the end of October 1945, General Eisenhower, then Theater Commander, announced to the proper authorities, that the population of the United States Zone of Germany would ultimately be controlled by a superpolice force, or constabulary. In early November the strength of the proposed constabulary was announced as

38,000. Planning was well advanced by the end of 1945, when Theater Headquarters notified the War Department that the constabulary would be organized as an elite force, composed of the highest caliber personnel obtainable under the voluntary reenlistment program, and that it would be equipped with an efficient communications network, the most modern weapons, and sufficient vehicles and liaison airplanes to make it highly mobile. During the paper stage, the organization was known by a series of names. "State Police" was discarded for "State Constabulary." Then it was thought that "State" would be confusing, although the main United States Zone of Germany had been divided, for purposes of civil administration, into three states, or Lander. When the organization emerged from the planning stage, it was known as the "Zone Constabulary." This term did not include the Constabulary units in Austria and Berlin.

18. Appointment of Commander.

On 10 January 1946 Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon, distinguished wartime commander of the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions and the XXII Corps, was appointed commanding general of the United States Constabulary. At the direction of Lt. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, Commanding General, Third U.S. Army, a small group was detailed to assist General Harmon in carrying forward the planning for the new force. The headquarters of this planning group was established at Bad Tölz. Theater Headquarters had already announced the principle that the Constabulary would be organized along geographical lines to coincide as nearly as possible with the major divisions of the German civil administration, in order to facilitate liaison with the German police and the U.S. Offices of Military Government. Thus, Theater Headquarters had decided that there would be one Constabulary Headquarters for the entire United States Zone, a brigade headquarters at each of the capitals of the three German Lander, and group, squadron, and troop headquarters established at points selected for ease in performing the mission. Theater Headquarters had also directed that the Table of Organization of the Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron should be used in planning the organization of the Constabulary.

19. Organization.

As had been planned, under a corps-type headquarters were three brigade headquarters at the Land capitals. Each brigade consisted of three regiments, with headquarters established at or near Regierungsbezirk capitals. Each regiment included three squadrons, each of which was located so as to cover one or more of the basic political

subdivisions, the Kreise. Each squadron comprised five troops. Thus, the U.S. Constabulary at the end of 1946 included three brigades, nine regiments, twenty-seven squadrons, and 135 troops, as well as headquarters and service units. Early estimates of needed strength had been revised and a total of 32,750 officers and men was authorized.

20. Equipment.

The primary unit of the Constabulary, the mechanized troop, was organized on the pattern of the mechanized cavalry troop used in the war. In view of its tasks of road and border patrolling and policing, the Constabulary needed a greater number of hand weapons and light vehicles such as jeeps and armored cars. Each troop was divided for patrolling purposes in sections or teams, each of which was equipped with three jeeps and one armored car, the latter serving as a command vehicle and as support in case of emergency. A mobile reserve of one company equipped with light tanks was established in each Constabulary regiment. Horses were provided for patrolling in difficult terrain along the borders and motorcycles for the control of traffic on the superhighways (autobahn). Static border control posts were established at the crossing points.

21. Uniform.

The uniform of the Constabulary trooper was designed both to make him easily recognizable and to distinguish him as a member of an elite force. It was highlighted by a bright golden yellow scarf, combat boots with smooth outer surface, and helmet liner bearing the Constabulary insignia and yellow and blue stripes. The lightning-bolt shoulder patch in yellow, blue, and red combined the colors of the cavalry, infantry, and artillery.

22. Personnel.

Redeployment made it very difficult to obtain troops of high caliber to form the nucleus of this new organization. Furthermore, practically all the forces in the zone were engaged in static duties, particularly the care of displaced persons. Certain of the units designated for the Constabulary could not be reorganized and trained until released from their static commitments. The mechanized cavalry units assigned to the Constabulary were already operating as mobile patrols in certain trouble spots and could not be spared for proper training before their integration into the Constabulary. Practically none of the units was located exactly where it was wanted under the Constabulary plan, which called

for the blanketing of the entire United States Zone. Some of them were moved four or five times within a period of a few months before they finally settled in the area which they were to patrol. Barracks, many of which were being used by displaced persons, had to be obtained for the Constabulary units; new equipment had to be drawn from depots as far away as France and the Low Countries, and, most difficult of all, the personnel had to be selected and trained.

23. Nucleus Units.

To create high morale in the Constabulary as quickly as possible, elements of the famous 1st and 4th Armored Divisions and certain cavalry groups were assigned to form the core of the new organization. The units converted into Constabulary squadrons and regiments included cavalry squadrons and armored infantry, field artillery, tank, tank destroyer, and antiaircraft battalions.

24. Headquarters.

The headquarters of VI Corps, which had engaged in three major amphibious operations—Salerno, Anzio, and Southern France—and in 524 days of combat in Italy, France, and Germany, and Austria, became the U.S. Constabulary Headquarters. The 1st Armored Division, which was activated at Fort Knox, Kentucky, in June 1940 and which had become a veteran, hard-fighting unit during the first four months of operations after the invasion of North Africa, supplied many tank and infantry units.

25. Brigades.

The 4th Armored Division, which furnished the three headquarters for the Constabulary, landed in France on 28 July 1944, and for the next two months spearheaded the drive of General Patton's Third Army across France, arriving in September at the German line along the Mosel River. Other high lights in the outstanding combat record of the 4th Armored Division were its link-up with the beleaguered airborne forces in Bastogne, the dash to the Rhine River early in 1945, and the rapid crossing of Germany in the period before V-E Day. It was one of the few divisions in the U.S. Army cited by the President of the United States for "extraordinary tactical accomplishments."

26. New Tasks.

These veteran units, seriously depleted by redeployment, now approached a task quite different from that of

waging war, but one demanding initiative and high standards in training and discipline. Some of the combat units assigned to the Constabulary were carried temporarily as mere paper organizations, redeployment having taken all their officers and men. Although some units had up to 75 percent of their allotted strength, total strength was only 25 percent of that authorized.

27. Beginning of Organization.

In February 1946 Constabulary Headquarters was established in Bamberg. During the period when tactical units, released from the Third and Seventh Armies, were being redesignated as Constabulary units, the main tasks were training and reorganization. Continuous training was prescribed for the trooper so that he might attain an acceptable standard of discipline and all-around efficiency in the use of weapons, vehicles, and communications equipment.

28. Constabulary School.

a. Early in the planning it was realized that a Constabulary School would be necessary, for the Constabulary trooper must not only be a good soldier but must also know police methods, how to make arrests, and how to deal with a foreign population. An esprit de corps must be developed among the members of the Constabulary to foster high standards of personal appearance, soldierly discipline, and personal integrity.

b. The Constabulary School was established at Sonthofen, Germany, in a winter sports area at the foot of the Allgau Alps. This citadel had been formerly used as a nazi school to train youthful candidates for positions of leadership in the Party. The curriculum for Constabulary officers and noncommissioned officers included instruction in the geography, history, and politics of Germany; technical and specialist training covering the theory and practice of criminal investigation, police records, self-defense, and the apprehension of wanted persons; and indoctrination in the mission and functions of the Constabulary and the responsibilities of the trooper. The standards of the Constabulary School were comparable to those of Army Service Schools in the United States. A graduate of Sonthofen was qualified not only to perform his duties but also to serve as an instructor in his unit.

c. no replacement center for the Constabulary was established since it was felt that, after the Constabulary settled down to operations and personnel problems had been

eased by the assignment of long-term onlistees, the school could operate as a combination school and replacement center. After March 1946, the school capacity was approximately 650 students per month. It was hoped that this number would be sufficient to replace the normal monthly attrition in the Constabulary.

29. Trooper's Handbook.

The basic rules to be followed by Constabulary troopers in the execution of their duties were incorporated in a manual called the Trooper's Handbook. Col. J. H. Harwood, formerly State Police Commissioner of Rhode Island, collaborated in the preparation of this manual, which benefited from many practical ideas gained by him in his broad police experience. His expert advice was of great assistance in the development and early training of Constabulary troopers.

30. Training.

The date of 1 July 1946 was set as that on which the Constabulary would become operational. The training program as originally planned aimed at the progressive development of the Constabulary so that a common standard of efficiency would be attained throughout the organization. The program was divided into three phases. During the first phase, prior to 1 April, attention was concentrated on the training of cadre and on the establishment of regimental and squadron headquarters, so that the Constabulary would be prepared to receive the approximately 20,000 men expected to fill the ranks. The second phase, between 1 April and 1 June, was a period of intensive training in the duties of both individuals and units. The final phase was planned as on-the-job training during June. The last phase, however, was omitted because of delay in receiving reinforcements, the necessity of moving units to their stations as accommodations became available, and the difficulties in obtaining essential supplies and equipment. During June, the three brigade headquarters were formed, each of them taking over the direction of three regiments. The progressive development of the command organization upwards from the squadron level was necessitated by the lack of trained officers and enlisted men for staff and command positions. By mid-June the organization was complete and control was highly centralized. The Constabulary became operational on 1 July 1946 as scheduled, despite the fact that its training program had not been completed.

TRAINING PROBLEMS AND TECHNICAL SCHOOLS

31. The Training Problem.

Prior to V-J Day the course of training history in the European Theater was dictated by redeployment, re-adjustment, reorganizations, and reevaluations of missions. The period was marked by an effort to keep training problems abreast of the constantly changing situation. Planning was first centered on training units for service in the Pacific, while training of occupation troops was considered secondary in importance. After the surrender of Japan, all activities were centered on rapid redeployment to the United States. The troops remaining in Europe were undergoing readjustments and shifts. After the peak of redeployment had passed there were successive reductions in the occupation force, each of which required changes in the training program. The units remaining found that occupation duties had to be placed first and that training could be conducted only in time left after the occupation mission had been accomplished. There were progressive reductions in the amount of training given re-placements in the Zone of Interior and a decline in the quality of this training. Because the situation defied prediction, there were times when the futility of publishing anything was recognized by Headquarters; training directives were known to be outdated by the time they were distributed. As a result, the whole training program was largely decentralized to units and was generally not uniform.

32. Redeployment Training.

a. Planning for redeployment training was started in January 1945, when the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, submitted to the Chief of Staff a plan which provided that units to be redeployed for combat in other Theaters should be qualified to perform their primary mission prior to departure from the European Theater. Special training plans were to be

prepared for units which had undergone excessive turn-over of personnel or major reorganizations. The United States element of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, at Supreme Allied Headquarters, was made responsible for planning, while development of the detailed redeployment plan was the responsibility of the Commanding General, Communications Zone. It was first planned to provide a training command, and the 6th Army Group was assigned to this duty, but it was later decided that each major command could be responsible for training the units assigned or attached to it. The situation moved too rapidly for even the decentralized scheme to be carried out.

b. An Officers Posthostilities School was opened in July 1945 but proved ineffective, since many senior staff officers, returning late to the Theater after graduating from the course, were assigned to work which had little connection with their training. Quotas were difficult to fill because many officers were attending other schools.

c. Many German and Austrian facilities formerly used by the German Army were taken over by United States forces. The French authorities opposed use of additional United States training areas in France and it was the policy of the U.S. Army to return to the French as many as possible of those used.

d. The method of redeployment had a strongly adverse effect upon training. No redeployment troops were trained according to plan. Readiness dates were frequently advanced so there was not sufficient time, training was subordinated to the sailing schedule, and ships were filled regardless of the units concerned. The rapid tempo of the redeployment did not permit the training of high grade technicians, and units were cleared without them. First plans provided for a redeployment program of eighteen months; This was later cut to twelve months, still later to nine. Initial directives from the War Department indicated that replacements would be available in the Zone of Interior, but they were not.

e. A directive of 15 June 1945 outlined a training plan for units to be redeployed, those to be inactivated, and those remaining in the Theater. Commanding generals of major commands were responsible to their immediate superiors for the training of all units under their jurisdiction. An eight-weeks training period was outlined, and this was later increased to twelve weeks. Major commands were permitted to establish specialist schools with means available to them, but the directive provided for closing officer candidate and officer retraining schools on graduation of students then in training. Training readiness reports, training status

reports, and training progress reports were devised to keep Theater Headquarters informed as to the training status of organizations. These were discontinued as of September 1945.

33. Readjustment Period, 15 August 1945 to 1 January 1946.

a. After Japan's collapse, a period of readjustment ensued. Instead of rapid redeployment of low-point men to the Pacific, there was a rapid return of high-point men to the Zone of Interior. The period was marked by a kind of paralysis. Troops did little or no training, owing to pressure of occupation duties and a general apathy toward things military. No training inspections were conducted during this time.

b. The training directive in effect at the time of the surrender of Japan provided for forty-four hours per week of training, which was later reduced to thirty-three hours, and stressed maintenance of efficient combat and service teams, military security, and preparedness to quell civilian disturbances. Participation in education, athletic and recreational programs was required of all men marked for relatively long service in the occupation.

c. The Training and Education Branch, G-3, made a study of the feasibility of setting up a Theater Mountain Training Center.

34. The Training of Replacements.

a. A survey of the effects of War Department policy of releasing men in critical military occupational classifications indicated that a shortage of clerks, typists, and stenographers could be expected. Major commands were directed to place in those positions personnel with low scores, where possible, and to make surveys to determine probable future shortages. The burden of training typists and stenographers eventually fell upon the Adjutant's Administrative School and upon units through on-the-job instruction.

b. On 11 January 1946 the War Department directed that replacement training be placed on a thirteen-week cycle. On 24 January 1946 the War Department requested Theater views regarding further reduction in the training cycle in the Zone of Interior and type of training given. The Theater concurred with the War Department proposal that training for newly inducted replacements should be reduced to eight weeks of forty hours each, but stated that training of specialists would take

a longer time and could not be successfully carried out in the Theater. On 30 January 1946 the War Department announced that replacement training in the Zone of Interior had been reduced to eight weeks, but that the War Department could provide certain trained specialists.

35. Period of Adjustment to Occupation Mission, I

January to 30 June 1946.

a. Many organizational changes which were reflected in the training program occurred between 1 January and 30 June 1946. The Constabulary was in the process of formation and units in the Theater were settling down to the occupation missions.

b. Training in military government directives dealing with the maintenance of law and order and control of the German population by assistance to the military and civil police was initiated in February 1946. About the same time, training was begun in radio telephone procedure, including communications, in shooting with practice ammunition, and in recognition of the more common types of United States, British, and Soviet airplanes. A ski instructors school was set up in the winter at Garmisch-Partenkirchen. In the spring of 1946, tactical units were directed to devote a minimum of forty hours per week to their work and training programs. Nondivisional service units were to give each individual a minimum of three hours basic and two hours technical training per week in addition to the troop information program.

c. Notes on Leadership and Command, a pamphlet covering basic doctrines for officers, company housekeeping, administration, supply, and military justice, designed to explain and supplement Army Regulations, field and technical manuals, and Theater directives, was distributed to officers on 1 June 1946.

d. The training of the Constabulary was one of the most successful parts of the entire training program. Training and Education Branch, G-3, prepared a program of training and a draft of the Troopers Handbook and delivered it to the VI Corps, from which was formed Headquarters, U.S. Constabulary. Expanding on the data received, the Constabulary set up a comprehensive training program, which was carried out after 1 April 1946. About 1 June 1946, G-3 Division sent out three inspection teams—one to each brigade—to survey the results of Constabulary training. Their reports were favorable; Constabulary training had been highly

successful.

36. Tactical and Technical Schools.

a. On V-E Day ten Countersabotage Instructional Teams, mobile training units of the Military Intelligence Service, were engaged in educating troops in prevention, recognition, and neutralization of enemy sabotage devices.

b. A Military Intelligence School was established on 7 May 1945 at Dreux, France, stressing subjects important in the disarmament of Germany. The European Intelligence School providing an Occupational Counterintelligence Corps Course was opened on 21 January 1946. In February a Russian Liaison Agents' Course opened at this school, and in April the first Advanced German Language Course was initiated.

c. An Army Athletic Staff School was established in Paris in June 1945. Other schools were a Night Vision Testing School at Bamberg, a familiarization school in recoilless weapons, a school for liaison aircraft mechanics, an artillery gun mechanics school, and an Ordnance general supply school.

d. An Infantry training center was organized at the 9th Reinforcement Depot of the Ground Forces Reinforcement Command in Fontainebleau, France, on 26 February 1945. Three types of courses were given: one for officer candidates, one for officers commissioned on the battlefield, and one for retaining officers from other branches for service in the Infantry. The Ground Forces Reinforcement Command instituted a program within the various replacement depots to train specialists for whom there was a great demand.

e. The Ground Forces Training Center inaugurated on 25 May 1945 the Adjutant General Administrative School of one week's duration, giving classes in personnel records and assignments. An Adjutant General Clerical School, giving one month's instruction in typing, military correspondence, and allied subjects, was started in Frankfurt on 1 March.

f. Responsibility for training Ordnance replacements was left to the major commands, which relied for the most part on on-the-job training.

g. To prevent an imminent shortage in trained military police, an over-all training program was set up by the Theater Provost Marshal's Office in July 1945. The complete course in functional training lasted four weeks. Training was the minimum required to enable the student to perform

the duties of a military policeman or a criminal investigator.

H. The Theater Chief Signal Officer established a special Signal Corps School for training specialists in skills in which shortages existed. It was under the administrative control of Third Army, but under the operational control of the Theater Chief Signal Officer. It consisted of three divisions: administrative, radio, and wire.

I. After V-E Day, the Medical Training program was altered to emphasize training needed in the Pacific war. An intensive on-the-job training program was initiated on 2 February 1946 to train medical technicians.

J. Quartermaster training in the Theater was a continuing process. A Training Division, Office of the Chief Quartermaster, operated and supervised a Quartermaster School and a Cooks and Bakers School in France. Teams travelled throughout the Theater and attempted to improve messing by inspections, demonstrations, advice, and assistance to personnel operating messes.

K. Major commanders were responsible for the conduct of chemical warfare training within their commands. No chemical warfare school was planned for tactical or service troops because units were already hard pressed to carry on assigned missions owing to the shortage of officer and enlisted personnel.

L. Excellent facilities existed for mountain training. Ski training courses, military ski training, winter mountaineering, and six-day cross country tours were initiated at several schools for the purpose of providing qualified unit ski instructors. More advanced skiers were trained to conduct ski patrols in inaccessible terrain during winter months.

M. In January 1946, a two weeks course for the parachute infantryman, which included five jumps, was given for the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment. The 82d Airborne Division conducted ground training and practice jumps and three special airborne reviews at Tempelhof Airdrome, Berlin. A parachutist and glider school was established, from which one class was graduated.

CHAPTER XIV

SERVICES

SUPPLY, PROCUREMENT, STORAGE, AND ISSUE.

37. Extent of Operations.

At the end of hostilities in Europe there existed a farflung supply system which had grown up during more than three years of American effort in Europe to supply United States troops deployed from the shores of the Atlantic to the banks of the Elbe. The base of this supply system, which was constantly being adjusted to changing conditions, was in the Zone of the Interior, from which supplies were sent to the European Theater in accordance with an elaborate system of requisitioning or automatic shipment. From the European ports they flowed to depots and thence ultimately reached the troops they were to serve.

38. Command Channels.

a. The supply organization, like the combat organizations, had its command channels. Since the war effort in Europe was an allied effort, Supreme Headquarters (SHAEF), commanded by Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, exercised general supervision over the whole supply system, and in certain classes of supply, notably solid fuels and petroleum products, made the over-all allocations to the various national forces and civilian economics. Supply channels were principally national, however, the the policy of the United States supply organization was, for the most part, controlled by Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, also commanded by General Eisenhower.

b. Operationally, supply was the responsibility of the Communications Zone under Lt. Gen. John C.H. Lee, with its principal headquarters in Paris. In this headquarters were located the offices of the Theater chiefs of services, who exercised technical control over supply within their services, and under it operated the various base, intermediate, and advance sections, which had responsibility for supply installations and operations within their areas.

39. Advance and Base Sections.

The immediate supply support of the armies came from the Communications Zone advance sections, Advance Section (ADSEC) and Continental Advance Section (CONAD), which extended their activities into Germany but had no area responsibility there. They maintained the advance points from which the armies drew their supplies. Behind them, Oise Intermediate Section stretched along the whole length of the front, controlling the intermediate depots and the transportation lines to the ports. Seine Section was responsible for the Paris area and the depots located therein, while the ports and base depots were operated by the following base sections: Delta Base Section in the south, with activities centering around Marseille and Toulon; Normandy Base Section in the center, handling the port facilities at Cherbourg, Rouen, and Le Havre; and Channel Base Section in the north, operating to a large extent in territory in which the principal tactical forces were British, and maintaining United States installations at the Belgian ports of Antwerp and Ghent. Channel and Normandy Base Sections were consolidated in June to form Chanor Base Section. In addition, there was the United Kingdom Base handling supply and administrative functions in the British Isles. Within over-all allocations to the armies, army groups made decisions on allocations to the various armies under their command and acted as coordinating headquarters with Communications Zone.

40. Level of Supplies.

Under this system, the Theater was authorized a certain level of supplies within the depots, which was maintained either by automatic flow or by requisition on the Zone of the Interior. These Continental levels were 50 days for Class I; 60 days for Classes II, III, and IV; 30 days for gasoline; 45 days for other petroleum products; and 75 days for Class V supplies. In the case of Class V supplies, 15 days supply was authorized in the hands of troops, which allowances were included in the Theater level of 75 days. In addition to the Continental level for petroleum products, 30 days' reserve was maintained in the United Kingdom. The chiefs of supply services at Communications Zone Headquarters were responsible for

maintaining these levels of supply within their services in the Theater. The exact amounts calculated as a day of supply were based on factor on factors of troop consumption and replacement computed from experience in the preceding years of combat. A large portion of these supplies came by automatic shipments based on determined consumption factors and were supplemented by requisitions only in the case of special needs. Requisitions on the United States were reviewed at Communications Zone Headquarters by the General Purchasing Agent to determine which could be made available from local procurement. Stocks obtained locally were then classified and entered into the depot system and requisitioned by using agencies, in the same manner as other supplies. Local procurement was also used in an emergency by troop commanders in the field.

41. Movement of Supplies to Continental Europe.

The quantities of supplies in long tons unloaded at Continental ports during April 1945 were:

Antwerp	628,227
Le Favre	165,438
Cherbourg	181,043
Ghent	277,553
Rouen	240,708
Marseille Area	484,451
Other Ports	47,722
<u>Total</u>	<u>2,025,142</u>

The sources of supplies are indicated in the following figures for the month of April 1945:

<u>Long Tons</u>	<u>Source</u>
1,049,939	United States into northern ports
490,752	United Kingdom
484,451	United States and North Africa into Marseille Area
<u>2,025,142</u>	Total unloaded on Continent

42. The Depot System.

a. The lack of intermediate depots led to a congestion of supplies in the port areas and delayed the unloading of ships. When high ranking officials of the Army Service Forces in Washington, including Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, visited the Theater in early 1945, they were very critical of the existing depot system in depth. The policies governing this system were announced in a Standing Operating Procedure published by Theater Headquarters in March 1945. There were

to be four kinds of depots--issue, filler, base, and key. Issue depots were to be located in the advance sections and were to be responsible for storing supplies within the levels prescribed and issuing them when required to meet the needs of the armies. Filler depots were to be located further to the rear, normally in an intermediate section, and were expected to store the major portion of Theater stocks and replenish the stocks of the issue depots. Base depots were to be located adjacent to the ports and were to be responsible for receiving, classifying, and storing supplies received from the ports or from local manufacturers, for serving as warehouses to clear the ports and store excess Theater stocks, and for replenishing supplies in the filler depots upon direction of the chief of service concerned. Key depots were to be responsible for the storage and issue of items where the Communications Zone stocks of the item were such as to require centralized storage or stockage.

b. As the cessation of Hostilities approached, this system was gradually being put into effect. But on 6 April 1945 Advance Section turned over all its installations to Oise and Channel Bases and moved into Germany and established its headquarters at Fulda, although it assumed no area responsibility. From that time on there were virtually no Advance Section depots. Advance Section had planned to operate an army maintenance area in Germany, but this did not work out because transportation prevented the forwarding of more than minimum daily requirements to the armies. As of V-E Day, the advance sections had very few supply establishments within Germany and these had only small quantities of supplies in them. The net result was that, at the end of hostilities, the system of depots as outlined in the Standing Operating Procedure was incomplete, though better organized than at any previous time. Many filler depots were also serving as issue depots, and some base depots were serving all three functions, as for instance the Quartermaster Depot for Class II and IV supplies at Lille-Mons in France. From the issue depots or from depots which were designated for the purpose, the supplies passed to army supply points, which in turn passed them on to the using units in the combat zone. The establishment of a depot system in occupied Germany was a post-V-E problem.

43. Flow of Supplies.

a. The supply policies stipulated that armies were normally to place requisitions or demands on designated key or issue depots through regulating stations. The replenishment of issue depot stocks was to be accomplished by submission of requisitions on filler depots, thus making the

flow of supplies forward from filler, key, and issue depots a matter of actual requirements. Replenishment of filler and key depots was to be accomplished by shipping orders or shipping directives issued by chiefs of services and based on stock status reports; replenishment of Theater supplies in ports and base depots was to be accomplished by requisitions placed by Communications Zone Headquarters on the Zone of the Interior or by local procurement. Thus, the movement of supplies into the rear depots was to be controlled by the chiefs of services.

b. In the detailed matter of requisitioning of supplies, the regulating stations played a key role. Regulating stations serving each army were set up by the advance sections to provide for the systematic and orderly movement of supplies to railheads or truckheads, and thus generally to control the flow of supplies from Communications Zone to the armies. The regulating officer at each station was to serve as a liaison officer between the advance sections and the armies.

44. Supply Situation at End of Hostilities.

On V-E Day the armies were operating on strained transportation lines and carrying rather low reserves, and the reserves behind them in Communications Zone depots were very distant, owing to the rapidity of the advance. The supply position of the Theater as a whole was very good, however, and it was only the impossibility of developing the system in the rear areas behind so rapid an advance which was rendering the situation at all difficult. It is probably fortunate that reserve supplies were far behind, since V-E Day was to change the whole picture of the basic needs of the armies, and to reverse the priorities so that much material had to be shipped back to the Communications Zone for redeployment. Moreover, the United States was occupying considerable German territory from which it would have to withdraw in favor of other powers, and it was undesirable that large reserve stocks should be built up in those areas. With V-E Day, the requirements of the armies for petroleum products, rations, clothing, and individual equipment continued as before, but the need for combat equipment of various sorts, Chemical Warfare Service supplies, and ammunition was greatly decreased.

45. Changes in Supply Policies Occasioned by Victory in Europe.

The approaching defeat of Germany led to the development of rather complete plans for redirection of the supply effort. War Department policy laid down the principle that first priority would be given to requirements in the Pacific until the defeat of Japan. Existing policies and procedures for supply were to remain in effect to the maximum extent practicable, and supplies actually at sea on V-E Day were to continue to their destination. Except for supplies necessary in an inactive Theater, such as rations, individual clothing and equipment, and medical and certain civil affairs supplies, outstanding requisitions and shipment orders were to be cancelled and not resumed until revised requisitions based on new needs were received. In Germany, Communications Zone was to be responsible for administrative support of the United States forces, establishment of such installations as were required and determination of authorized supply levels for the army of occupation. Every effort was to be made to establish supply installations in their permanent locations as soon as possible. The first depots to be located in Germany were to be issue depots established by Advance Section, Continental Advance Section, Berlin District, and Bremen Port Command. Gradually, depots in southern Germany and Berlin would be converted into combination filler and issue depots, while those in the Bremen Enclave would be converted into base depots. In Germany, existing installations were to be utilized to the maximum and construction limited to the minimum. Construction was to be accomplished as far as possible by utilization of German labor and materials.

46. Priorities.

To use the supplies in the Theater to the best advantage, the War Department on 14 May 1945 set up the following priorities on troop equipment:

- (1) Equipment for troop units under movement directives for shipment directly to active Theaters.
- (2) Equipment and supplies directed shipped to active Theaters by War Department shipping orders.
- (3) Equipment for occupation-force needs.

- (4) Equipment as directed by movement orders, for troop units to be returned to the United States for station.
- (5) Equipment necessary for training of units for redeployment pending movement out of inactive Theaters.
- (6) Equipment and supplies directed shipped to the United States by War Department shipping directives.
- (7) Equipment, as directed by movement orders, for units being returned to the United States for inactivation.
- (8) All other requirements.

47. Organization Plan.

Originally, the Theater organization plan contemplated the establishment of the chiefs of services at Theater Headquarters. Apparently this would have entailed too much of a shift in the method of doing business under which the well-knit Theater service organization had been operating since the beginning of the war, under General Lee. Consequently, the plan was revised on 12 June 1945. The chiefs of services were placed under the Commanding General, Communications Zone, and advisers to the Theater Commander, to be a definite part of the Theater Headquarters at Frankfurt, were named for each service. The plan provided for the establishment by Third and Seventh Armies of military districts in Germany which would handle all supply matters within the United States areas of Germany, including those for the Navy and the Air Force. Theater Headquarters was to be the sole channel of communication with the War Department on matters of supply, policy, but Communications Zone was authorized direct communication with Headquarters, with Army Service Forces, and with the New York Port of Embarkation.

48. Theater Reorganization.

a. Before the discontinuance of the Combined Command on 14 July, the new Theater Headquarters was established, on 1 July 1945, as U.S. Forces, European Theater (USFET). By 11 July all United States forces in Germany were in the areas assigned to the United States for occupation. On 20 July 6th Army Group was disbanded, and on 1 August, 12th Army Group. The two military districts were established ~~as~~ ^{on 1 August 1945} as the major ground force commands in Germany constituted the Eastern Military District,

control of Third Army. The Western Military District, under the control of Seventh Army, was made up of Grosshessen, the parts of Baden and Württemberg not occupied by the French, and the Bremen subdistrict. On 21 May, U.S. Headquarters, Berlin District, was established. The Bremen Port and Enclave Commands were set up in June. U.S. Forces in Austria was established as a command for which Theater Headquarters had logistical responsibility, though no responsibility for military government and political problems.

b. With the establishment of all these commands, the transition to an occupation organization was relatively complete. Liquidation of the two advance sections was begun on 10 June, and by 10 July their functions had been taken over by the armies. Logistical support to Austria was made a responsibility of Third Army at first, while that to Bremen and Berlin was at first a Ninth Army responsibility, then transferred to Seventh Army with the realignment into zones of occupation. Later Bremen Port Command was to assume this responsibility.

49. Establishment of Theater Service Forces.

a. In July a new plan was drawn up providing for an organization known as Theater Service Forces, European Theater (TSFET), to replace Communications Zone. The chief services, theoretically directly under the Theater Commander, were to maintain offices in Frankfurt and Paris. As Army operation of the depot installations in Germany had not proved entirely satisfactory, Theater Service Forces was assigned responsibility for the operation of all fixed installations in occupied Germany and in the liberated countries, and command of all service troops.

b. This plan was put into effect on 20 September. Theater Service Forces was made responsible for all supply operations in the Theater, except for the immediate supply of troops, which was the responsibility of the Military Districts and Berlin District, while Theater Headquarters was responsible for over-all policy and for allocation of resources to the various commands.

50. Further Reorganization of Major Service Commands.

a. On 21 November the Bremen Subdistrict was redesignated the Bremen Port Command and placed directly under the command of the Commanding General, Theater Service Forces, except for military government matters. As of 15 April 1946 the Bremen Port Command ceased to exist and the units therein were attached to the 17th Major Port or to the largest service

units located in the Enclave. The area itself was redesignated the Bremen Subsector (of Continental Base Section) with the same geographical boundaries as the Enclave. As far as supply was concerned, the 17th Major Port was now given the additional missions of receiving all supplies for the occupation force and forwarding them to the areas of occupation as required to maintain the authorized supply levels, and of developing the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven. Bremen was to be used for receiving and forwarding military government and UNRRA supplies until Military Government could make arrangements to have German civilian agencies assume this responsibility. Beginning on 6 June, base depots in the Bremen area were closed out gradually and stocks removed to depots in the United States Zone proper, leaving Bremen only as a port, staging, and transit area.

b. On 3 December the Advance Section, Theater Service Forces, was set up at Bad Nauheim, twenty miles north of Frankfurt. This headquarters became on 29 December Continental Base Section, Theater Service Forces (CBS, TSFET). On 2 February Theater Headquarters announced that Continental Base Section, which was to take over the majority of the functions of Theater Service Forces by 15 March, would have the mission of logistical support of the occupation forces in Germany and Austria; the command of base and filler depots and Bremen Port Command, and the responsibility for bulk storage and distribution of supplies. It would operate as a separate command under Theater Headquarters. The Theater Commander would enunciate Theater supply and administrative policies. Certain logistical functions, such as determination of stock disposition, would be retained at Theater Headquarters. All communications with Headquarters, Army Service Forces, and with the War Department would be by Theater Headquarters.

c. Western Base Section, formed as a combination of Seine Section and Oise Intermediate Section on 15 January 1946, with Headquarters in Paris, absorbed Delta Base Section on 25 January 1946. Chanor Base Section and London Area Office were reassigned to Western Base Section on 15 February and 1 March 1946, respectively.

d. The Theater chiefs of services were transferred to Theater Headquarters from Headquarters, Theater Service Forces, upon the discontinuance of the latter on 1 March 1946.

e. Seventh Army was inactivated on 31 March 1946 and its troops, installations, and area were transferred to Third Army.

51. Plan for Military Communities.

On 19 November Theater Service Forces Headquarters published a letter regarding the logistical support of the United States occupation of Germany which outlined a plan for subdividing the United States area into small posts called communities. This plan called for 112 military communities (including 25 for the Air Force) in 79 cities in Germany and three military communities in Austria. For planning purposes, each community was assumed to have a strength of 3,000 troops. Each community would establish its own station complement, made up of Military District or Air Force troops, which would receive and distribute supplies and store whatever amount of reserve supplies had to be held in the community. In addition, station complements would perform all maintenance below fourth echelon and would furnish local hospitalization. When practicable, small garrisons or installations would be attached to the nearest community for supply, maintenance, and hospitalization. Theater Service Forces would distribute supplies to communities and to isolated units which could not be attached to a community, would perform fourth and fifth echelon maintenance for all occupation forces, and would provide fixed hospitalization in addition to that furnished by the station complements.

52. Supplies for the Redeployment Program.

a. Concurrent with the problem of supplying the forces in Germany and setting up a permanent supply structure for the occupation, was that of supplying redeploying forces and developing the Theater as a distant base for the support of the war against Japan. The supply of the redeploying forces held first priority. First, the necessary supplies for troops being redeployed had to be assured, then supplies had to be provided for forces remaining in Europe and last, reserves had to be built up for the forces of occupation. Supplies remaining after these needs were met were to be made available for shipment to the Pacific or return to the United States for use as a part of the strategic reserve. If a surplus still remained, it was to be declared to the Army-Navy Liquidation Commission for sale.

b. The program as a whole called for the maximum utilization and repair and economic disposal of supplies in the Theater, with a minimum of dependence on the Zone of the Interior for replacement. Such a program was difficult of fulfillment in view of the deterioration of most mobile equipment, the shifting about of troops, the general let-down which came with V-E Day, and the redeployment of service troops.

c. Of the supplies to be handled and shipped in bulk rather than as a part of troop supply, the most important single item was ammunition. Commitments to the Pacific were generally met. Up to the end of September some 320,000 tons of ammunition had been shipped either to the Pacific or to the United States. Large quantities of special purpose vehicles, such as amphibious trucks and small cargo carriers designed for operation in snow, the entire equipment for an armored division, 40,000 tons of spare parts, considerable shipments of greases and lubricants, and some 500,000 drums of oil were shipped to the Pacific.

53. Repair of Equipment for Redeploying Units.

a. The main supply problem of the Theater in redeployment was that of providing redeploying units with equipment serviceable for combat and with reserves sufficient for sixty days. Sources were depot stocks and equipment then in the hands of troops. While there was apparently enough material in the Theater to meet all needs if occupation forces were cut to a minimum, maintenance was the major problem, since most of this equipment was in unserviceable condition. In general, the Theater found itself pushed to meet the needs of redeployment while continuing operations in Germany. Demands for efficient and economic operation and repair were not so easy of fulfillment with the let-down which troops inevitably felt after V-E Day. Use of transportation facilities for recreational demands as well as for the achievement of military objectives cut heavily into the supply of vehicles and other equipment available for redeployment. Battleworn equipment unsuited for further use in active combat swamped the repair facilities of every service. Critical shortages of spare parts also complicated the picture. Only the early advent of V-J Day prevented a crisis in the matter of the Theater's meeting the redeployment supply demands.

b. The greatest bottleneck in the whole redeployment supply program lay in the out-movement of vehicles. Most vehicles in the hands of troops on V-E Day were considerably the worse for wear and required a great deal of repair work. At the end of July it was estimated that the Theater would be 6,000 behind for that month. This was explained by the slowness of the armies in releasing vehicles and by the fact that reconditioning was not progressing as fast as needed. On 19 July only 250 of the vehicles requested from the armies had arrived at Marseille. Communications Zone requested U.S. Forces, European Theater, to push the armies for better performance. Deficiencies were apparently not due to the armies, however, but resulted largely from shortstopping of vehicles by Communications Zone sections, which were taking them for

housekeeping and other local work instead of feeding them into the redeployment pipelines. Maintenance establishments were overloaded with equipment in unserviceable condition. The question of service troops to man these establishments became more and more critical as time went on, and prisoner-of-war and civilian labor was inadequate for the task.

54. Packaging and Construction Material for the redeployment Program.

A second pressing problem of redeployment supply was that of packaging materials and, especially, lumber for crating and for the construction of redeployment camps. For the most part these materials were not in the Theater wartime stocks, and therefore had to be obtained by local procurement and requisition on the Zone of the Interior. For the most part all construction needs for the forces in Germany were subordinated up to V-J Day to redeployment needs.

55. Progress in Redeployment of Supplies.

For the most part, commitments for direct redeployment up to mid-August were met, and the outlook for meeting schedules of out-movement of vehicles in the near future was good. In July most units being indirectly redeployed had gone without their full allotment of clothing and individual equipment.

56. V-J Day Adjustments.

Relief from the pressure for redeployment of supplies came with the unexpected surrender of Japan. Whereas fairly elaborate planning had taken place prior to V-E Day for a redirection of the Theater's effort, plans for the most part did not take into consideration the changes which would come after V-J Day, as it was expected that the war in the Pacific would last for at least a year longer. Therefore adjustments had to be made on the basis of immediate decisions of the War Department rather than on prearranged plans. The first instructions on the post-V-J period were received in the Theater on 12 August. These directed that all bulk shipments were to be suspended, while supplies en route to ports would continue and supplies at ports would be loaded. Ships destined for the United States were to sail as scheduled, while ships destined for active Theaters were to be held in the port area pending further instructions. The small remaining requirements for the Pacific continued to have first priority over Theater requirements. In addition to directing adjustments in redeployment supply, the War Department forwarded on 12 August

a general policy plan of supply for what was designated as Period 2, the period between the defeat of Japan and the time that the bulk of wartime forces was withdrawn to the United States. This plan prescribed that existing policies and procedures should be continued and that existing levels of supply in inactive Theaters should be maintained. It also provided for a maximum disposition of property declared surplus by the War Department.

57. Supply of Occupation Forces.

During the early months of the occupation, there was a large force in Germany engaged in clean-up or occupation duties, or in work connected with redeployment. This force, much larger than the first Occupational Troop Basis for which supply plans had been drawn up, had second priority for supplies, first priority being allotted to the redeploying forces. For the troops in Germany, the existing lines of supply through the ports of the liberated countries continued well beyond B-J Day. The shift toward use of the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven for receipt of supplies and handling of supplies through a depot system completely within Germany had just begun by the end of September. Bremen was so badly damaged that the complete opening of the port area was delayed until 11 September well beyond the contemplated opening date of V-E plus 60. Conditions at Bremerhaven were not so bad, and it was opened on 22 June 1945, but the previously announced goal of supplying all occupation troops through German ports after V-E plus 60 was not realized. Nevertheless, Bremerhaven received 22,203 tons of the 1,147,884 tons of supplies landed on the Continent in June, and 165,942 tons of the 845,940 landed in July, and 193,436 of a total of 728,884 landed in August.

58. Depot System.

Plans were progressing for the establishment of a permanent depot system under each Military District and for the liquidation of Communication Zone functions in Germany. It was agreed that the armies would designate the installation sites, but that Advance Section personnel and Communications Zone methods would be used in establishing the depots. It was also agreed that the Advance Sections would turn over depot operations to the armies on 10 June, but continue their other activities until 1 July. Actually the depots were developed by coordination between the armies and the Advance Sections. In addition to setting up a depot structure in the Military Districts to store a 45-day supply and, ultimately, to serve as filler depots, it was planned to develop base depots in the Bremen Enclave for the storage of a 15-day

supply. By 2 July, Bremen Port Command reported that this was completed.

59. The Experiment in the Operation of Supply Installations by Armies.

The transfer of supply activities in Germany from Communications Zone Headquarters to Theater Headquarters was one which involved a number of adjustments. Communications Zone had planned to remove Advance Section and Continental Advance Section service troops from the army areas back into Communications Zone to aid in the redeployment program, while the armies were expected to operate their supply establishments with organic service troops, supplemented by combat troops and prisoners of war where necessary. In the final distribution of units, the armies retained most of the Advance Section and Continental Advance Section troops, while many army service troops rendered surplus by formation of the Military Districts were transferred to Communications Zone. Experience showed that the armies were not altogether effective in the unfamiliar role of handling fixed supply installations. The efficiency of the chiefs of services in coordinating the supply organization of the Theater as a whole, was weakened by their peculiar position in Communications Zone Headquarters, much as it had been weakened during hostilities by the existence of Supreme Headquarters, with which they were not in constant contact and which assumed some of their functions in making direct contacts with the combat forces. As a matter of fact, the whole experiment in army operation of the depots and the supply system in Germany did not turn out well. It was decided in late July that operation of depots and command of all service troops should be turned over to Theater Service Forces so as to restore centralized supply control.

60. Supply Levels and Channels.

a. Theater Headquarters directed in late September that each chief of service should establish the disposition level for items authorized to be stocked and should establish storage facilities in occupied territory to accept such supplies as would be required. Supplies necessary in Germany were then to be moved from the depots in the liberated countries. General disposal centers were to be set up in which other supplies were to be earmarked for local consumption, for shipment to the United States, or for disposition as surplus. Each service was to present a tentative phased program for movement of supplies into occupied Germany.

b. The new revised Standing Operating Procedure No. 7, covering depot and requisitioning procedures, which had been pending since July, was finally published on 24 September. This publication covered all supply activities. The depot system was now defined as containing base, key, and filler depots, issue of supply to be made by supply points under control of the armies. Base depots were to be in the Bremen Enclave, while the major portion of theater stocks was to be stored in the filler depots in Eastern and Western Military Districts and in Berlin. Filler depots in the liberated countries were to continue as long as necessary to furnish supplies for troops awaiting redeployment and to dispose of surplus property by shipment to Germany, by out-shipment, or by sale.

c. Theater levels were prescribed as 60 days for Classes II, III and V, and 50 days for Class I for both occupation and redeploying forces, though replacement factors for the latter were to be based on Zone of the Interior factors. Class IV supplies were to be based on approved projects. Base depots in the Bremen Enclave were to maintain a 35-day supply of Class I, a 45-day supply of Classes II and III, and a 60-day supply of ammunition. The supply channels as of 31 December are illustrated in the study in this series entitled: "Supply, Procurement, Storage, and Issue."

61. Loss of Trained Men.

The operation of service installations during the last quarter of 1945 was hampered especially by the redeployment of trained personnel. Constant revision of point scores and continuing readjustment of personnel created major difficulties. The shortage of service troops was somewhat alleviated by use of indigenous labor, prisoners of war, and displaced persons. Manpower shortages were particularly marked with respect to the maintenance of aircraft and automotive equipment.

62. Air Lift.

The amount of freight received in the Theater by air from the United States averaged approximately 285 tons per month from May to August 1945, 194 tons in September and October, 92 tons in November, December, and January, and 15 tons in February 1946. The cargo consisted mainly of spare parts for use in reestablishing transportation and communication lines, and for bringing unit equipment up to full operating condition, but it included also serum, vaccines, antitoxin, and medical equipment for the Chief Surgeon.

63. Storage in Germany.

a. In planning a permanent supply system for the occupation forces, it seemed desirable that as many as possible of service installations such as depots, dumps, hospitals, and maintenance shops should be concentrated in a rather compact area. The Hanau-Darmstadt-Aschaffenburg triangle was selected as the principal area for the location of such installations, and by the end of June 1946 all services except the Ordnance and Quartermaster Corps had their base depots in this area. Designation of the mission of each installation remained a responsibility of Theater chiefs of services until 15 March 1946, after which Continental Base Section assumed the responsibility, keeping Theater Headquarters advised of these missions.

b. In Germany, 1,783,400 tons of supplies were stored in supply services depots at the end of January 1946, 2,044,800 at the end of March, and 2,471,500 at the end of June, at which time storage space was ample. As of 15 May 1946, 1,599,900 long tons of Theater reserve were in the desired location in occupied territory and 197,800 long tons remained to be moved.

64. General Nature of Supplies.

Tonnage shipped before 1 July 1946 to the United States Zone in Germany from France and Belgium consisted mainly of rations, petroleum products, clothing, a few types of artillery ammunition, lumber and prefabricated housing, equipment for manufacturing and repairing clothing, salvage and repair equipment, especially for the repair of shoes, mobile laundry units, material-handling equipment for use in the depots, and vast stocks of aluminum, brass, copper, and other equipment for use in electrical and plumbing work and in the manufacture and repair of refrigerators and heating units. Approximately 95 percent of these supplies were shipped by rail and the remainder by truck.

65. Pilferage.

The amount of pilferage of supplies in the Theater per month was reduced from \$869,000 in April to \$414,000 in June. Reports initiated by the Theater Provost Marshal indicating deficiencies in loading rail cars had been forwarded to appropriate major commands for corrective action. Security measures were stressed in inspections of installations and improvements recommended where security was deficient. When pilferage reports indicated inadequate security measures within a command, the command was directed to investigate and take

corrective action.

66. Supply Levels.

Levels for each class of supply established for the Theater by the War Department in June 1946 were:

Class	<u>Days of Supply</u>		
	<u>Minimum</u>	<u>plus</u>	<u>Operating</u>
I	30		30
II	30		30 plus that authorized in War Department Tables.
III (Gasoline)	15		35
III (other)	120		60
IV (Quartermaster Salos and Ex- change Service only)	30		30
V	None		60

These levels were adequate to meet the known Theater operating requirements. In addition, the War Department authorized the retention of Class II and IV supplies required through 30 June 1949.

67. Military Communities.

By the end of June 1946, fifty-three military communities were established, supply responsibilities being limited, for the most part, to commissaries, post exchanges, and recreational facilities. The first dependents arrived on 28 April. Considerable difficulty was experienced in procuring sufficient household furniture for family quarters. Electric and other refrigerators were especially scarce. The total requirements for lumber in communities for the period 1 April 1946 to 31 March 1947 were estimated at 252,611,500 board feet. This was being supplied by imports and by German production. Up to the end of June 1946, the term "Military communities" was commonly considered to apply to a locality in which dependents were housed and supplied, rather than to a subdivision of a Military District, as conceived in the organization plan. It was not until much later that the provisions of the original plan became fully effective, and at that time the military communities were redesignated "military posts" and greatly reduced in number.

68. Austria.

While Austria had been technically in the Mediterranean Theater at the end of hostilities, it was occupied by Third Army troops and for a time normal supply lines from Third Army were established. Eventually command relationship was worked out so that U.S. Headquarters in Austria, under Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark, was to be the United States authority on all military government and political matters, reporting directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, while on matters of supply and administration, it was subordinate to Theater Headquarters. Eastern Military District was assigned the responsibility of supplying United States troops in Austria. This responsibility was limited to movement of supplies to railheads in the vicinity of Salzburg and Linz and operation of the necessary installations at these railheads. Headquarters in Austria was responsible for the handling and distribution of supplies after they left the railheads.

69. Supply of Berlin District.

Original plans for the supply of Berlin contemplated support by Ninth Army. Berlin District Headquarters entered Berlin on 3 July 1945, however, and the main responsibility for supply soon passed to Seventh Army. On 17 August the Bremen Port Command took over the responsibility for providing Class I and III supplies, although overlapping shipments from Seventh Army continued for several days thereafter. After that date Berlin District requisitioned on the Bremen Port Command for Classes I and III, and on Western Military District for Classes II and IV. After 1 February Berlin District was supported as a military community and supplied primarily by the depots in the Bremen Enclave, the balance of the supplies coming from the depots in the United States Zone.

70. Procurement in Germany.

a. Plans prior to V-E Day called for the U.S. Army in Germany to be subsisted as far as possible on German resources. These plans had to be abandoned. It was at first thought that at least some potatoes and other fresh vegetables would be available, but after an investigation in May 1945 Seventh Army reported that there would not be a surplus of foodstuffs in the near future, but more likely a shortage. Not even the needs of displaced persons, prisoners of war, and other elements expected to subsist on indigenous resources could be met from these sources and it was necessary to supplement them with U.S. Army stores.

Units in the field had procurement programs on a small scale, and often instituted production programs of their own to meet shortages, particularly to obtain spare parts.

b. In view of the fact that production facilities were being used primarily for German civilian demands, in late August the whole production control program was placed under the G-5 Division which was to consolidate Army requirements with those for the maintenance of a minimum German economy and those established to provide exports to the liberated countries. Procurement for the Army was to be rigidly restricted to items necessary and ordinarily used in the military service. No procurement for military use of any items needed for the minimum civilian supply requirements of the German population was not to be undertaken if the procurement was in quantities likely to conflict with the maintenance of the minimum civilian economy.

71. Procurement in the Liberated Countries.

Local procurement in the liberated countries was of two principal types: emergency procurement by commanders in the field of critically needed supplies, and long-term production programs which were arranged by the chiefs of services through the General Purchasing Agent. Local procurement had reached a high point prior to D-Day in the United Kingdom. After France and Belgium were overrun, their industries were enlisted to aid production for the needs of the U.S. Army, and incidentally the French Army, since it was operating through United States supply channels. In addition to the products resulting from the program specifically set up, other civilian produce might be secured to fill military needs. This type of local procurement was also undertaken by the chiefs of services under the control of the General Purchasing Agent. After V-E Day, coal shortages seriously hampered France's ability to produce for Allied military needs.

72. Curtailment of Local Procurement.

Even prior to V-E Day, steps were taken to curtail local procurement. At the end of October 1945, Theater Service Forces reported that all procurement programs in Europe were cancelled except for 1,700 aircraft engine cases, 550,000 mugs for the American Red Cross, 1,300 tons of dried onions, 68,000 assorted flags, 14,000 tons of ice, 70 public address systems, and a few smaller purchases. It was estimated that procurement in European countries for April, May, and June, 1946 would approximate the following amounts:

France	\$600,000
Belgium	\$400,000
Czechoslovakia	\$500,000
United Kingdom	\$500,000
Switzerland	\$200,000

73. Rations.

The Quartermaster Corps' task of supplying rations was rendered more, rather than less, difficult of fulfillment by the end of hostilities in Europe. This was due partly to the sudden increase in the numbers of displaced persons, recovered Allied military personnel, and prisoners of war who had to be fed. It was due partly also to many categories of persons who were subsisted by the Army. Each of these required a different menu, eleven of which were in force from one time to another: French Moslem menu; Continental Allied civilian menu, Italian service unit menu, Prisoner-of-war menus (one for workers, one for nonworkers), Continental menu for Allied forces operating with the United States, Soviet prisoner-of-war menu, civilian ration for German employees of the occupation forces, and the "A", "B", or operational ration for United States troops. Keeping of ration accounts, rederring of returns, breakdown from bulk shipments, and further distribution to the consumers were all made immeasurably more complex because of the issue of so many different types of rations. In September, owing to the termination of supply support to different foreign groups, the Quartermaster was able to reduce the number of menus to three: the standard "A" ration for United States military personnel, the Continental Allied menu, and the enemy or ex-enemy menu.

74. Balanced Stocks of Rations.

There was always the problem of maintaining balanced stocks for the purpose of issuing "A" rations, and of getting these balanced stocks to the troops. Several crises developed in this regard. In the armies and Advance Section immediately after V-E Day stocks were rather short and the issuance of balanced "A" rations was difficult. Most food supplies procured from sources within Germany had to be used for the subsistence of the various non-American elements for which the Army had supply responsibility. Soon, however, it became possible to reduce the high percentage of operational rations—"C", "K", and "10-in-1"—issued and gradually the point was reached where virtually all troops were receiving "A" rations most of the time. After numerous complaints that some soldiers were not getting enough to eat, the 10 percent reduction in the military "A" ration previously directed for those in sedentary occupations was discontinued on 19 September. As a result

of this and of an improvement in balancing of stocks, menus during September were much more satisfactory. Some fresh fruits and vegetables were procured locally and fresh eggs and butter were received from Denmark.

75. Wastage of Food.

In April 1946, the Theater Commander reported to Washington that he was continuing his efforts to reduce over-drawing of rations and waste of food. He stated that he proposed to reduce the amounts of flour and fats available to snack bars and pastry shops by approximately 25 percent, as well as to cut the purchasing allowance of type "B" and private messes. In addition, he proposed that the military field ration in the Theater be reduced from 4,200 to 3,900 calories. He stated that the Theater Surgeon was of the opinion that this reduction could be made without any detrimental effect on the health of the Command.

76. Limitations upon the Local Procurement of Food.

At the Theater Commander's weekly staff conference on 23 April, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, stated that since September 1945 local procurement of Class I items had been limited by War Department policy of supplying all available items from the Zone of Interior; by military government policy of approving local procurement only in case that the required food was surplus to German needs, and by reluctance of the War Department to purchase supplies in Europe with dollars. Notwithstanding these limitations, substantial purchases of food in Europe had been programmed. Purchases from Denmark included: 1,000 tons of butter for delivery prior to 30 June 1946, 2,000 tons for delivery between 1 July and 30 November 1946, 1,000 tons for delivery from 1 December 1946 to 28 February 1947; 1,500 tons of cheese for delivery prior to 31 December 1946. Orders had been placed for 2,000 tons of onions from North Africa for delivery in April and May 1946. Approximately 300 tons per month of fresh fruits and vegetables were being procured by Western Base Section for local consumption. Purchases from Germany included: 5,800 tons of vegetables and fruits for delivery during the first half of 1946, and enough potatoes to supply all forces in occupied territory from 1 July through 31 October 1946. Negotiations were in progress with Italy to provide fresh fruits and vegetables for United States forces in Austria. The procurement of fresh milk had been delayed by the reluctance of the Danes to enter into a contract because deliveries of large quantities of milk would necessitate reorganization of their butter and cheese industries. Beginning about 25 June, 500,000 litre bottles of German

manufacture were to be procured monthly making possible the procurement of 200,000 litres of milk weekly by 25 July, and the full Theater requirement of 750,000 litres weekly by 1 October.

77. Coal.

a. Next to food, the most important item in the whole postwar European economy was coal. Coal was the key to industry, to rail transportation, to the heating of homes, offices, and factories. The U.S. Army required considerable amounts of coal for its own use and in many cases had to arrange for its issue to the civilian population. The Army was also interested in the rehabilitation of the liberated countries, particularly those from which it was procuring supplies. Coal could be supplied only in small quantities from the United States, owing to its bulkiness and to domestic requirements.

b. The allocation of coal from sources in the liberated countries was made by the G-4 Division of Supreme Headquarters, working through the Missions to the various governments. Allocations were made to military and civilian authorities on the basis of coal available from import from the United States and Great Britain and that available on the Continent. At the end of hostilities, Communications Zone Headquarters was receiving an allotment of coal from the French Government. Coal was needed by the Army principally to carry out the manufacturing program and to operate the railroads though it was also required for heating. It was directed that use for heating be kept to a minimum so that needs might be more nearly met in the liberated countries where the supply of coal was insufficient to keep the industries going.

c. The German coal mines were found to be badly damaged. Most of the labor supply had been absorbed by the Wehrmacht, and returning miners did not have sufficient incentive to go back to work. Shortage of food for the miners and lack of mining equipment also rendered a resumption of production on a large scale difficult.

d. The only German miners under United States control were in the South. They were for the most part inferior miners producing a relatively poor brown coal, suited for use by small industries and for heating purposes, but most of it not suitable for being made into briquets and shipped. So the needs of the U.S. Army as well as the requirements for maintaining the minimum civilian economy in the United States Zone had to be met by allocation from the

other zones. In order to promote the production of coal in the United States Zone, inferior though it was, miners were given food rations of 4,600 calories when working above ground, and 4,000 calories when working underground. Transport of coal and of mining equipment was given a priority next to redeployment and essential troop maintenance, and the use of brown coal was directed in all installations where it could be used.

78. Wood.

On 13 August Theater Headquarters, noting that "the shortage of coal in the United States Zone of Occupation in the coming winter will be critical," directed that a wood-cutting program be expedited to provide 100 percent of the requirements for heating and shelter. Figures for the United States Zone show that about 40,000 cords were collected in August and about 50,000 more in September. This, however, was not a sufficient stockpile for the winter, as total requirements for Seventh Army were estimated as 248,000 cords and Third Army 265,500 cords. By the end of the following June the situation was satisfactory, with a stockpile in the Theater of approximately 80,000 cords.

79. Transportation of Coal and Wood.

Use of army vehicles was authorized in the collection of coal and wood, but the armies, with all their other commitments, were unable to provide many vehicles. While the coal problem in its long-range aspects was one of production, until the end of September the lack of transportation was the most important immediate cause of shortage in supply. Movements by barge were scheduled by the Rhine Interim Working Committee, whose headquarters was at Duisburg. Barge movements to the United States Zone consisted chiefly of coal, which was handled at the rate of approximately 230,000 tons per month.

80. Shortage of Vehicles.

The needs of the Theater for general-purpose vehicles were hardly diminished by V-E Day. Need for $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trucks (jeeps), $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trucks, weapon carriers, sedans, vehicles suitable for civilian transport, remained pressing. Such vehicles were used to transport displaced persons, prisoners of war, supplies, persons engaged in police and Military Government work, and in production control activities. They were used in the lumber and wood-cutting program, as emergency transport for coal, for recreational and Information and Education activities, and for other miscellaneous

purposes. For the most part, vehicles were war weary and in need of repairs. War Department policy provided that no general-purpose vehicles, except those already approved for shipment, would be shipped to the Theater for one year after June 1945. The Theater would have to meet the needs of direct and indirect redeployment with combat serviceable vehicles. Captured vehicles were one resource for administrative uses, but Supreme Headquarters ordered in late May that all these be used for maintaining German units waiting to be disbanded or for military government purposes. A great number of vehicles were unfit for use, both in the armies and in the Communications Zone, owing to shortages of properly qualified maintenance personnel and of spare parts. The Theater Commander continuously stressed the maintenance of vehicles, emphasizing the necessity for the improvement of first and second echelon maintenance. The Ordnance Department started several schools to train mechanics in all echelons of maintenance. By the end of March 1946 it was reported that the total number of vehicles in Ordnance Third echelon shops had been reduced materially.

81. Petroleum Products.

The consumption of petroleum products in the European Theater decreased only slightly during the months immediately following the close of hostilities. Petroleum products were at no time in short supply, but difficulties were often experienced in delivering them to units. After liquidation of the international organization which had operated under Supreme Headquarters and through the British War Office in allocating petroleum products to the Allied and liberated countries, petroleum products were brought directly from the United States and distributed through Quartermaster channels within Germany.

82. Pipelines.

Supply of gasoline to the Army in Germany was accomplished mainly by three pipelines, one from Cherbourg to Mainz (the Major System), and the third from Marseille to Sandhofen (the Southern System). Supplementing these systems were storage tanks with a total capacity of approximately 700,000 barrels. Plans immediately after V-E Day called for a rapid liquidation of the Cherbourg and southern lines and the continued use of the line from Antwerp until storage facilities in the Bremen Enclave could be set up and tank cars procured for hauling petroleum products to the armies.

83. Temporary Shortages of Gasoline.

a. Although gasoline target levels of 60 days' supply had not been reached by the end of October, stocks were never seriously short. Delivery to the armies, however, did not proceed smoothly. Supplies were rather low in the armies at the end of the campaign but by the end of May they had been built up again by priority shipments.

b. The situation continued to be satisfactory through June, but a crisis of major proportions developed in Third Army on 16 July when the stock level had shrunk to 656,378 gallons of MT-80 from the 5,515,425 gallons on hand at the end of June, and the Army reserve was completely exhausted. Third Army was forced to institute a rationing program which cut consumption 50 percent, and the Chief of Transportation's Office went to work in cooperation with the Army to straighten out the transportation snarl. A program was arranged whereby the Theater Chief Quartermaster supplied a bulk reserve of gasoline to the Army for the period 26 July to 25 August.

c. At approximately the same time, a lesser crisis in the gasoline supply developed in the Seventh Army due to the slowness of tank-car turnaround. Shipment of gasoline to the Giessen Depot was embargoed for seven days while the tangle in rail transportation at that point was straightened out. On 22 July Seventh Army cabled that shipments of gasoline were only 50 percent of the amount requisitioned and requested that gasoline not shipped during the embargo be shipped to make up the deficiency. The Chief Quartermaster's Office answered that shipment had been delayed by a temporary shortage of tank cars at the Wesel pipe-head, caused by failure to unload promptly in the Giessen area.

d. During the final quarter of 1945 the Theater experienced a critical gasoline shortage. The authorized 60-day level of motor gasoline, 96,000,000 gallons, was reduced by 29 December to 29,000,000 gallons, the decline in stock being caused by failure of tankers to arrive as scheduled. Quick action was taken to alleviate the condition and prevent complete collapse of operations due to lack of gasoline. Gasoline was rationed to the major commands at the rate of one gallon per man per day. This lasted until 9 March, when gasoline allowances were increased for each command by block allocations based upon consumption reports during the preceding three months.

84. Clothing.

Immediately after V-E Day the armies instituted a drive to get all their units properly equipped with authorized clothing through replacement of battlefield losses and salvage of all worn-out stocks. A considerable shortage of clothing developed particularly in Third Army. Existing depot stocks were inadequate to replace combat-worn items and to outfit the units being redeployed. In an attempt to bring procedures back to normal, it was ordered that no issues of Quartermaster supplies be made except on salvage receipt, report of survey, or statement of charges. One of the most important items issued in the period under consideration was the new European Theater, or Eisenhower, jacket issued in June and July 1945. Efforts were made to provide the proper sizes in order to promote smartness in dress.

85. Housing.

Redeployment requirements for tentage and other materials for constructing necessary winter quarters made supply to the armies difficult. Until V-J Day, most lumber available in Germany was taken for construction, packaging, and crating in the liberated countries. For September, however, winterization of accommodations for troops was given priority over redeployment, and the Engineers reported that winterization would probably be complete by 15 October. For the most part, existing housing was used for the troops rather than new construction or tentage. Engineer supply was generally satisfactory except for construction materials.

86. Situation at End of First Year of Occupation.

By 1 July 1946 supply problems were no longer so serious and the whole picture was approaching that of the Zone of the Interior in peacetime. The most important problems remaining were: avoidance of periodic shortages in gasoline and some items of food, keeping gasoline and food from falling into unauthorized hands; procurement of sufficient fuel and construction material; and procurement or training of qualified maintenance personnel.

TRANSPORTATION

87. The Transport Situation on V-E Day.

a. When hostilities ended, thousands of railway cars and trucks of ammunition, food, and fuel were moving to forward areas. Everywhere there was congestion; railroad yards were crowded with cars, and traffic was bottlenecked at the Rhine bridges.

b. The railways were transporting 80 percent of U.S. Army needs in spite of serious shortages of equipment. Most of the lines had been repaired to the Rhine. Bridges over the Rhine were open at Wesel, Mainz, Ludwigshafen, Karlsruhe, and Duisburg. A line in the Rhine Valley connected Marseille with the armies in southern Germany, and another major line connected Cherbourg and Antwerp with the railheads across the Rhine. (1)

c. Motor trucks were moving 18,000 tons daily on lines of communication averaging 110 miles in length. About 13,000 motor cargo trucks assigned to the service forces were clearing the docks and distributing supplies from the forward railheads. In spite of damage to bridges and highways, motor trucks could operate any place in Europe; but the truck companies were grouped at the two ends of the supply lines, the ports and the railheads. A portion of the cargo trucks assigned to the service forces were being used to augment transportation within the armies, which had 244 company-equivalencies as organic transportation. (2)

d. The inland canals and waterways of Germany were paralyzed by war damage. Efforts were being made to restore transportation on the Rhine and Danube Rivers. The canal systems of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands had been restored to operation and returned to the control of their own authorities.

88. Missions.

After V-E Day there was a reduction in the supply requirements of the armies, but this was more than offset by the demands of redeployment and civil affairs. Displaced persons repatriated from the United States Zone by rail prior to August 1946 numbered 2,889,740; 267,763 refugees had come into the Zone while 326,535 had been removed. In addition 1,183,605 expellees and 247,819 German nationals from Austria had been transported. The number of passenger and freight trains on a typical traffic day had reached 5,000 in December 1945 and increased to over 6,000 by April 1946.

89. The Chief of Transportation.

a. The Office of the Chief of Transportation was a special staff division of the headquarters of both the European Theater of Operations and the Communications Zone and had divisions dealing with supply, marine operations, movements, inland waterways, control and planning, motor transport service, and military railway service. The Chief of Transportation and his subordinates worked in close

cooperation with the Acting Chief of Staff, G-4, of European Theater of Operations and Communications Zone, as well as with the G-4 Divisions in the armies and lower echelons. The Chief of Transportation was responsible for the formation of new agencies within lower echelons when those were necessary to carry out the transportation mission.

b. Communications lines passed through all echelons of command. Ships were unloaded at the ports and supplies were hauled through the base sections to the intermediate section and from there to the advance section for distribution to the armies. The Theater Chief of Transportation was the coordinating agent for this movement. During the period of combined command his channel of communication with the armies was through Supreme Headquarters.

90. Transportation Officers in the Communications Zone.

Transportation officers in each of the base sections of the Communications Zone supervised transportation within their areas. Their authority, however, did not extend to long-haul traffic. They frequently had direct contact with the office of the Chief of Transportation in Paris, bypassing the section headquarters. The base sections exercised considerable autonomy in distributing responsibilities among the staff sections.

91. Phases.

From a military standpoint there were three phases in transportation. In phase I operations were exclusively military. In Phase II military agencies controlled operations, but civilian organizations participated as they became operational and were able to resume their normal functions. In Phase III transportation facilities were operated by fully responsible civilian agencies. Motor transportation was largely a Phase I operation. Rail transportation in the liberated countries at first was largely in Phase II, and in Germany there was a gradual restoration of operations to the Germans. There was an early shift to Phase III railway operations in France following the end of hostilities. Phase III generally prevailed in the operation of the inland waterways of the liberated countries, with a greater degree of military operation in the occupied countries.

92. The Military Railway Service.

The General Headquarters, Military Railway Service, was an exempted command, responsible to the Chief of Transportation, except for certain administrative authority

retained by Base Sections of the Communications Zone.(3) It supervised the 1st Military Railway Service, operating south and west of Paris and the 2d Military Railway Service, operating north and east of Paris. Railway grand divisions, usually coinciding with base sections, operated the railways and were allocated troops on the basis of track mileage. Operation of hospital trains was a Transportation Corps responsibility, but the trains were under the command of the Theater Chief Surgeon.

93. Military Railroads in Occupied Territory.

In the United States Zone of Germany there were two main railway lines, one from Hanau through Würzburg to Nürnberg and the other from Karlsruhe through Ulm to München and beyond. The line from Bremen by way of Hanover and Göttingen to Eichenberg, near Kassel in the United States Zone, was opened in June 1945 and its capacity had reached 24,000 tons daily a month later. United States military railway service to Vienna started 7 August 1945 with two trains operating between Linz and Vienna. A third Train, providing fast passenger and mail service, made its first run from Salzburg on 15 September 1945. Other lines in the United States Zone of Germany carried traffic into Austria by way of Passau in the north and Salzburg in the south.

94. Personnel.

When the campaign ended there were 161,268 members of the U.S. Army working under the Transportation Corps. By January 1946 much of this personnel had been replaced by locally procured labor.

95. Rolling-Stock.

After V-E Day the Transportation Corps generally required car-for-car interchange in movements out of the United States Zone of Germany, and this policy was reaffirmed by the Theater Commander on 26 September 1945. September inventories indicated that there were 8,000 locomotives in the Zone, of which only 2,500 were serviceable; and that of 166,000 cars slightly more than 118,000 were serviceable. There was an acute shortage of rolling stock and repairs were delayed by shortages of material and the damaged condition of six of the main repair centers.

96. Restoration of Tracks.

By 31 July 1945 78.6 percent of the first-line track in the United States Zone had been restored. By January 1946 this had increased to 96 percent, where it remained during the first half of that year. Repair of war damage to tracks in the United States Zone of Austria was 93.9 percent complete by 30 June 1946.

97. Development of the Ports of Bremen-Bremerhaven.

United States forces started using the port of Bremerhaven in June 1945, when 22,000 tons of cargo were discharged. By July 162,000 tons, or approximately 20 percent of the military cargo unloaded at Continental ports, came through this port. The peak was reached in April 1946 with 181,000 tons. Thereafter the decrease in Theater strength was reflected in reduced shipping. The total declined in June 1946 to 58,000 tons. By the end of June 1946, all personnel and cargo to and from occupied territory was being handled through Bremen-Bremerhaven.

98. Berlin District.

The 11th Traffic Regulating group sent a transportation section to Berlin in July 1945. Transportation officers were established at rail stations, depots, and airports.(4) The District Transportation Officer was a member of the staff of the Berlin District Commander, but was not responsible for the operation of rail or barge terminals, which were under the Theater Chief. The first United States supply train entered Berlin 27 July 1945. On 28 July a detachment of the 2d Military Railway Service arrived to assist in the supervision of Allied and German agencies. As Soviet officials refused to permit United States dispatch offices to operate along the line in the Soviet Zone, there was no way for Berlin transportation officers to know the location of freight trains. Passenger trains, which started running into Berlin on 15 October 1945, kept in touch with Berlin officials by radio. The Provost Marshall assumed responsibility for guarding supplies en route to Berlin during the first quarter of 1946.

99. Priority Committee.

On 7 June 1945 major commands formed a committee to allocate shipment priorities, a task which previously had been performed by the G-4 Division of the Communications Zone.(5) This committee, after it authorized movements, consolidated shipping requirements and compared

them with Transportation Office estimates of capabilities. The executive committee was discontinued on 1 November 1945, and bids for movements were thereafter submitted to the G-4 Division of Theater Service Forces, which adjusted estimates and transmitted the information to the Chief of Transportation, who made the detailed adjustment of the program. This procedure was followed until 1 January 1946, when the monthly movements program was transferred to the Office of Military Government.

100. European Central Inland Transport Organization.

The European Central Inland Transport Organization was established on 8 May 1945 to allocate transportation resources in western Europe.(6) In November 1945 it called attention to rail car shortages in the Netherlands and Belgium, and Theater Headquarters curtailed rail loadings in those countries. The agency arranged for the transfer of cars from France to the United States Zone in April 1946, when there was a serious shortage in United States-occupied areas of Germany and Austria. It received bids for movement across the United States Zones of Germany and Austria and transmitted these bids to United States Agencies, which included them in the monthly movement programs.

101. The Motor Transport Service.

The Motor Transport Service had operational control of motor transport units within the Communications Zone. Base Section commanders had direct supervision of motor transport units, although the Chief of Transportation could recommend, but not order, the assignment and reassignment of units. Highway Transport Divisions, which supported the armies, received movement instructions from the Advance Section Highway Movement Division. Each Division operated between 3,500 and 4,000 trucks, was a direct command channel for all battalions and companies assigned to it, and maintained liaison with the G-4 Division of the army it served. Truck companies and battalions usually were formed into pools at railheads and dumps and Divisional Headquarters maintained a truck pool.

102. Motor Freight.

The XYZ freight hauling program was using nearly two-thirds of the eighty-six trucking companies assigned to line of communications hauls in Advanced Section and Continental Advanced Section during May. As this activity approached an end, a large number of trucks was loaned to the armies. Large-scale freight movements from the ports

in northern France and Belgium were carried out from May until September 1945 in a new ABC movement, similar to the ABC truck-movement program which had operated from January to March 1945. United States units in Berlin were supplied by truck until July, but the use of trucks gradually diminished thereafter. Long distance motor freight hauls, frequently made when units were transferred, were organized as needed. During February and March rail operations from Bremenhaven were hampered by floods, and gasoline was moved by truck from Farge in the Bremen area to Giessen in the United States Zone. Roads were bad and the total of 2,700 tons moved was far short of the original targets.

103. Inland Waterways Division.

After V-E Day branches of Inland Waterways Transport Service in Paris, Brussels, and Rotterdam chartered barges and coordinated military movements. The Rhine River Branch of the Division at Wiesbaden had been activated on 15 April 1945. It conducted reconnaissance up to V-E Day, after which it supervised ship repair and aided Engineer units to clear the river. The Danube Branch, opened at Linz, Austria, on 27 May 1945, took charge of captured craft in the Third Army area and maintained a river patrol. The Transportation Section of Third Army was responsible for the restoration of the Danube waterway. Unsuccessful efforts were made to form a joint Danube commission under which international traffic could be reestablished.

104. Rhine Navigation Agency.

The Rhine Navigation Agency, made up of United States, British, and French elements, was established on 7 May 1945 to coordinate efforts to open the Rhine to navigation. (7) This agency, which included Engineering and Navigation Sections, formulated basic policies regarding the Rhine during the period of combined command. Army groups, in their respective areas, implemented the Agency's decisions. On 29 August 1945 the Inland Waterways Committee of the Directorate of Transport, Allied Control Authority, absorbed the functions of the Rhine Navigation Agency and an Interim Working Committee held meetings twice monthly at Duisberg, but subsequent effort to organize a permanent Allied control organization for policy-making purposes were fruitless, owing to lack of international agreement.

105. Rhine Clearance.

The U.S. Army opened the Rhine from Koblenz to Karlsruhe and the channels of the Main and Neckar Rivers.

This work was completed by 15 August, but the British portion of the Rhine was not cleared until 1 September and the French portion not until October. About 85 percent of the German floating equipment on the Rhine had been sunk, but by 20 May 1945 a considerable portion of this had been restored. It was augmented by conversion of Army equipment and use of craft formerly of French, Netherland, or Belgian ownership, which had been returned to those countries.

106. Military Districts.

Transportation officers, who represented the Theater Chief of Transportation, served on the staffs of the commanding generals of the two Military Districts. Each Military District maintained four subdistrict transportation offices, which were responsible to the District Officer. The Rhine-land, prior to the transfer of that territory to the French, was a fifth subdistrict of the Western Military District, and Austria at one time was a fifth zone under the Eastern Military District. In March 1946 the number of subdistricts was reduced to four, with headquarters in Munich, Nürnberg, Mannheim, and Bad Nauheim. All of these came under Third Army, which also opened offices in Koblenz and Hanover to control traffic through the British Zone. Continental Base Section took over the Third Army Transportation Section in June 1946.

107. Military Government.

Military Government assumed many of the transportation functions in the occupied areas early in 1946. The Theater Motor Transport Service, the Theater Military Railway Service, and the Theater Inland Waterway Transport Service were discontinued as technical services on 1 January 1946. Germans gradually assumed more of the responsibility for the operation of transportation agencies under military government policies.

COMMUNICATIONS

108. Coordination of Signal Communications.

Supreme Headquarters in March issued instructions covering communications responsibilities for the period following the German surrender. (8) Instructions prepared by the Signal Division of Supreme Headquarters allocated responsibilities for communications for the press, disarmament units, prisoners of war, and displaced persons. (9) Prior to the termination of combined command, the Combined Signal Board coordinated signal communications for all forces under the Supreme Commander. Following the termination of combined command, the United States, British, and French military authorities established a Provisional Multipartite Signal Board, which replaced the Combined Signal Board. The Soviet Union was invited to join but did not send representatives. The Provisional Tripartite Board allocated radio frequencies and coordinated interzonal wire circuits, while another agency, the U.S. Joint Signal Board, coordinated signal matters affecting United States headquarters and services within the Theater.

109. The Military Network before V-E Day.

The Allied Expeditionary Force Long Lines Control, with offices at Paris and Brussels, represented the Supreme Commander in controlling main trunk telecommunications facilities on the Continent. Underground cable rehabilitation in the liberated areas had made possible the limitation of open wire lines to a few vital circuits. Cross-Channel submarine cables provided more than a hundred circuits. High frequency (HF) radio provided stand-by facilities to back up long distance wire circuits, while very high frequency (VHF) was used in mobile tactical situations. Major headquarters in the Theater were connected by teletype with the world-wide Army Command and Administrative Network. The Signal Messenger Service delivered messages by air, ship, train, and motor.

110. Development of Signal Communications.

In mid-April work was started at Frankfurt on signal communications for Supreme Headquarters. A 1,200-line Siemens automatic telephone system was available in that city. Three exchanges, with a total of 7,000 lines, formed the backbone of the military exchange system in Berlin. An advance party of Signal Corps technicians entered Vienna late in July to

install communications prior to the arrival of the headquarters. Installations in Germany and Austria were connected by wire, radio, and messenger service and similarly with the War Department and with main headquarters in the United Kingdom, western Europe, and Italy. Within occupied Germany, where lines of communication had radiated from Berlin, United States need required the development of lateral circuits from Frankfurt to Bremen and Munich. Each military headquarters was responsible for providing communications down to the next lower echelon. Headquarters, 12th Army Group, maintained radio link communications, as well as wire and cable communications, to army and other major headquarters during the early months of the occupation.

III. Theater Signal Communications Service.

On 17 July 1945 the Theater Signal Communications Service was established to carry out Theater-wide construction, maintenance, and operation. Long lines liaison and administrative responsibilities formerly under Supreme Headquarters control at Paris were brought within the new agency. Specific responsibilities assigned to Theater Signal Communications Service included: construction, maintenance, and operation of Theater long lines open-wire systems; rehabilitation, maintenance, and operation of cables in the Theater main line network; installation, maintenance, and operation of all frequency, very high frequency, super high frequency, and ultra high frequency radio systems between major headquarters in the Theater and between the European Theater and other Theaters or the Zone of the Interior; Installation, maintenance, and operation of all communication services at Theater Headquarters; preparation of procedures for control of main line telephone and telegraph traffic; establishment and operation of trunk messenger service for the Theater; coordination with military government officials in the reestablishment of the long lines system of the former German Reichspost; and command of all Signal troops assigned to these functions.
(10)

II2. Development in Communications Plant.

In the final quarter of 1945 a Theater-wide network of telegraph carrier systems was developed and United States terminal equipment formerly used on these systems was 95 percent replaced by German equipment. During the first quarter of 1946 extensive changes in the long lines circuits were made necessary by the move of Stars and Stripes from Paris to Germany, by the establishment of Continental Base Section at Bad Nauheim, by the disbandment of Chanor Base

Section, by inactivation of Seventh U.S. Army, and the transfer of long lines responsibilities to the German Reichspost began on a "demonstration" basis with the transfer of the first group of long distance cables on 22 March 1946. Extensive installation and rehabilitation projects were carried through, despite a continuing lack of trained personnel and the shortage of transport and equipment. In the second quarter of 1946, transfer of long lines and associated repeater stations to the German Reichspost relieved the Theater Signal Communications Service of much of its responsibility for signal plant development in occupied Germany.

113. Signal Communications Traffic.

Principal telephone switching centers were established during the late spring or summer of 1945 at Berlin, Bremen, Frankfurt, Kassel, Mannheim, Munich, Nurnberg, Stuttgart, and Heidelberg. Average daily peg counts increased from 13,801 in October to 20,040 in June. At the end of September 1945 the Frankfurt Signal Center was handling 3,800,000 teletype groups per week. During the week ending 26 January 1946 the total was 6,540,684. From this time on, teletype traffic steadily declined, and the number of groups for the week ending 29 June 1946 was 3,637,064.

114. The German Civil Communications Agency.

ECLIPSE signal instructions provided for Military Government control of the Reichspost to insure that communications needs of the military forces and of Military Government were met, and that essential communications were made available for German civilian use. After the surrender, civil communications were restored on a limited scale under controls established by the G-2 and G-5 Divisions of Supreme Headquarters and the military Signal authorities. Reichspost employees, including released prisoners of war, were returned to their former posts when possible. Soon after V-E Day reorganization of the Reichspost in the United States and British Zones was undertaken on a regional basis. Military assistance given in the Eastern Military District included fuel, captured enemy material, and training of civilian switchboard operators. During 1946 long lines facilities in the United States Zone were transferred to the German Senior Directorate of Communications and Posts for operation under Military Government supervision and control. The Army thereafter obtained the greater part of its telephone services from the Reichspost on a preferred-customer basis.

115. Commercial Facilities.

Commercial telegraph companies were assisted in opening offices to handle press traffic and provide personal cable service for members of the occupation forces. Commercial transatlantic telephone service was added early in 1946. By the end of June 1946 requests were pending to establish twenty-nine commercial stations.

116. Special Projects.

The Signal Corps provided communications for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the Department of State, the American Red Cross, and other agencies and governmental departments. Special facilities were provided for the Potsdam Conference and the War Crimes Trials at Nurnberg. The Theater Chief Signal Officer assisted in planning communications requirements for the Constabulary and collaborated in technical planning for military police radio systems in Berlin, Munich, Heidelberg, Wiesbaden, and Frankfurt. Agreements concerning interzonal circuits involved consultation with Signal staff officers at Theater level.

117. Signal Supply.

Repair and packaging of Signal supplies for shipment to the Pacific was a major supply problem from the end of hostilities in Europe until V-J Day. Redeployment of Signal troops caused large amounts of equipment which had been issued to units to accumulate in warehouses and depots. Shipments from depots in western Europe to the United States and to Germany continued throughout 1945, but was largely completed by the end of March 1946. Of an estimated total of 160,000 tons of surplus equipment, approximately 95 percent had been declared surplus by 31 March 1946. By the end of June, Signal depots held 141,671 tons of surplus property. Within Germany permanent signal depots were established at Mannheim, Nurnberg, and Neu Aubing. Disposal of captured enemy equipment and furnishing equipment required by the Constabulary were major supply projects during the first half of 1946.

118. Redeployment.

As of V-E Day there were approximately 75,000 Signal troops in the European Theater. By the end of July, 85 percent of the construction troops among the 33,000 Signal troops assigned to Communications Zone had been redeployed, and comparable losses had been suffered in depot

and repair personnel. During the winter, critical shortages developed in repairmen, powermen, teletypewriter mechanics, telephono repeatermen, and radio repairmen. Not enough replacements were received to fill shortages and many communications units were staffed with "branch immaterial" replacements whose only training was that received on the job. Employment of United States, Allied and German civilians went far toward meeting the shortages in operating personnel. The Theater Signal Corps School, established at Neuendettelsau in November 1945 and transferred to Ansbach in the spring of 1946, was one of the encouraging factors in the personnel situation during 1945-46.

REAL ESTATE AND CONSTRUCTION

119. Real Estate Holdings.

On V-E Day there were 58,688 pieces of real estate in the European Theater being held by the United States under requisition procedures which had been developed in the United Kingdom and revised during the campaign on the Continent.(11) Requisitioning of property in the United Kingdom had practically ceased and property was being deroquisitioned wherever possible. Donor nations pressed for return of property, and an investigation was conducted in September with a view to accelerating release. By 31 January 1946, 91 percent of the property which had been held in Belgium and 95 percent of that which had been held in France on the preceding 1 July had been deroquisitioned.

120. Records.

Prior to August few records regarding requisitioned property were kept and town majors in the occupied areas sent requisition forms direct to the General Purchasing Agent's Office. In that month, C.E. Lloyd joined the Real Estate Branch of the Office of the Chief Engineer in Frankfurt and assembled records on property used in occupied territory. These showed that on 29 October 1945 United States forces were occupying 51,732 pieces of property in Germany, 1,904 in Czechoslovakia, and 1,496 in Austria.(12)

121. Redeployment Camps and Ports.

After V-E Day, first priority in construction was given to redeployment camps and to the rehabilitation of the Bremen and Bremerhaven ports. Eighteen camps with a total

capacity of 249,000 were being constructed in the vicinity of Reims, three camps with a capacity of 17,000 in the vicinity of Marsille, and eleven camps with a capacity of 151,000 in the vicinity of Le Havre and Antwerp. Two leave camps with a capacity of 10,000 built in Southampton, England, were converted into redeployment camps.

122. Procurement.

In April 1946 all purchases in Allied and neutral countries were placed on a cash basis. In Germany difficulty was encountered in procuring construction supplies because most German factories were short of coal, raw materials, and transportation; and few plants capable of producing the desired supplies were in operation. Purchases in the various countries were as indicated below:

PURCHASES OF CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS IN 1946
(Approximate*)

Country	1 Jan-31 Mar	1 Apr-30 Jun
France	\$ 77,941	\$ 450,000
Belgium	6,642	400,000
Czechoslovakia	*	312,295
United Kingdom	*	170,000
Switzerland	*	2,013,232
Germany	886,599	1,161,986

* Exact figures not available for this study

123. Railroads.

Nearly all railroads of military value in the liberated countries were in operation by V-E Day and had been returned to civilian control. The U.S. Army had repaired or rebuilt the equivalent of 10,466 miles of single-track lines in liberated and occupied areas.

124. Waterways.

The clearance of the most important waterways of France and Belgium, such as the Seine, the Meuse, and the Albert Canal was a major task performed by the Army with the assistance of civilian engineer agencies. This work which consisted chiefly of removing demolished bridge spans and piers, had been substantially completed by May 1945 and responsibility for the waterways had been returned to the countries in which they located. The inland waterways in the

occupied area were rehabilitated by the German Inland Waterways administration under the supervision of the Theater Chief Engineer.

125. Highways.

By V-E Day U.S. Army troops, assisted by prisoners of war and civilians, had repaired and maintained a total of 7,688 miles of two-lane hard-surface highways in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg. The military highway network totaled 4,160 miles, of which 621 miles were under active maintenance. In the occupied area, highways were constructed and maintained by civilians under the supervision of Military Government. In liberated and occupied areas, 328 permanent-type highway bridges had been constructed.

126. Air Fields.

Some Allied governments complained of delay in the return of air fields and the matter was the subject of extended negotiations. As of 30 June 1946, Headquarters, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, controlled forty-one airports, of which thirty-eight were in the occupied area. All airports in the United Kingdom had been disposed of.

127. Hospitals.

After a survey in Germany and Austria, plans were made for twenty hospitals, including eight general hospitals of 1,000 beds, ten station hospitals of 750 beds each, one station hospital of 250 beds, and one station hospital of 150 beds. The total of 15,900 beds represented 4.3 percent of the planned troop population of 370,000 for the occupation forces. Seven of the sites selected already were hospitals. Construction standards were established on a 10-year operational basis, although construction materials to meet these standards were not available. The Engineer Corps supervised construction, using German and Austrian artisans. On 30 September 1945 fifteen of the hospitals were functioning, four others were opened on 10 December 1945; and the one at Bremen was placed in operation during January 1946. The institutions were opened, but much work remained to be done. Although several hospitals were closed and others reduced in size as the estimate of the strength of the occupation force was reduced, the construction program in June 1946 was only 77.9 percent complete.

128. Petroleum Pipelines.

Prior to May 1945, the Army had laid 1,306 miles of 4-inch, 2,251 miles of 6-inch, and 19 miles of 10-inch petroleum pipelines. No pipes were laid after May. The daily capacity of storage tanks of the five systems of pipelines was equivalent to nearly as many barrels of oil products as were required by the U.S. Army for the entire period of World War I.

129. Ports.

The port of Bremerhaven was opened on 22 June 1945 when the first United States ship to enter the harbor unloaded 7,692 tons of cargo. Other ports were closed and returned to the donor nations as soon as Bremen and Bremerhaven were able to handle the incoming and outgoing cargo. The construction program adopted at Bremerhaven for the period of January to June 1946 called for 423,000 man-hours of labor and 1,210 long tons of supplies, but by June 1946 only 66,710 man-hours had been completed.

130. Military Communities and the General Construction Program.

a. On 19 September 1945 Headquarters, U.S. Forces, European Theater, created a special planning board to set standards for accommodations in military communities, and on 11 October 1945 tentative statements of standards were sent to major commands for consideration.(13) Technical standards for all types of housing, including recreational facilities, were the responsibility of the Theater Service Forces and the Theater Chief Engineer. On the basis of findings of the Special Planning Board on Military Communities and the estimated requirements sent in by the major commands for general construction, the Theater Chief Engineer published the following construction program for the period of January 1946 to June 1947:

Requirements

<u>Installations</u>	<u>Man-Hours</u>	<u>Long Tons of Supplies</u>
Military Communities	69,175,000	434,800
Headquarters	1,845,000	22,885
Command Schools	1,845,000	22,885
Hospitals	4,600,000	17,200
Depots	3,600,000	52,096
Shops	332,000	6,250
Special Installations	360,000	4,860
Bridges		
Highway	2,376,000	4,515
Railway	686,000	1,600
Railways	2,560,000	45,400
Highways	1,572,000	31,900
Utilities	2,760,000	38,200
Ports	432,000	1,210
Inland Waterways	400,000	25
TOTALS	92,543,000	683,826

b. By December 1946, military communities were 52.7 percent complete; depots 59.9 percent, hospitals 47 percent, air force technical facilities 48.6 percent, and special installations 51.9 percent. The tentative date for the completion of the construction program was set forward to January 1948.

c. Authorized special installations, including laundries, radio stations, beverage plants, receiver (wireless) sites, cold storage warehouses, reproduction plants, and schools, had used 487,792 man-hours of labor by June 1946 and were estimated as 86.7 percent complete. The following list shows the number of man-hours spent in the construction program to the end of June 1946:

Military Communities and Camps	2,269,713
Headquarters	199,499
Command Schools	44,591
Hospitals	590,135
Depots and Shops	285,999
Special Installations	487,792
Utilities	41,992
Railway and Railway Bridges	10,795
Highway and Highway Bridges	86,671
Ports	66,710
Inland Waterways	302,200
Miscellaneous	19,480
POL DEPOTS	
Total	4,209,577

SURPLUS PROPERTY

131. Situation on V-E Day.

a. Production, storage, and eventual sale of vast amounts of United States property, manufactured as war material and lying idle in depots everywhere in the world, constituted a serious problem at the end of hostilities. The commanding general of the Communications Zone had been responsible during the war for disposal of certain surplus material throughout the European Theater of Operations; he in turn had delegated authority to the General Purchasing Agent, a member of his staff, who disposed of items excess to the needs of the Theater upon completion of certain phases of combat, as well as that material considered excess through obsolescence. All other excess property in the Theater was reported to the War Department; after world-wide requirements had been determined, that which was not needed was declared as surplus to an authorized agency for disposal.(14)

b. As of 8 May 1945, the General Purchasing Agent was the only authority charged with the disposal of surplus material. He was negotiating with liberated countries to insure the proper use of scrap originating with the Army, as the scarcity of raw material was aggravated by widespread black-market trading in scrap in all the liberated countries.

132. Amount and Value of Surplus Property in the European Theater.

On 8 May 1945 no good estimates existed as to the amount and value of surplus property. All service chiefs were directed by the Theater Commander to determine their needs, coordinate with other services, fill their requirements from available stocks, and report any remainder as excess to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. Even after this was done, no accurate estimate of the amount of surplus property was possible. Much later, it was estimated that the total amount of surplus property in the European Theater on V-E Day was 2,914,000 long tons, valued at \$2,228,000,000.

133. Establishment of Office of Army-Naval Liquidation Commissioner in the European Theater.

On 1 February 1945 the War and Navy Departments established the post of Army-Navy Liquidation Commissioner and delegated to the holder the authority vested in the War and Navy Departments for disposal of surplus property outside the United States and its possessions, and for

supervision of the settlement of claims based on contracts in foreign countries involving surplus property.(15) The following day the Commissioner appointed a representative, the Central Field Commissioner, for Europe, to whom he delegated authority to dispose of all United States surplus property in Europe and the United Kingdom.(16) At the request of the Central Field Commissioner in June 1946, the American Ambassador to France appointed agents of the State and Treasury Department, Foreign Economic Administration, and Maritime Commission to act as an advisory council.

134. Agencies Participating in the Disposal of Surplus Property.

The General Purchasing Agent continued to operate a surplus property disposal agency under policies laid down by the Central Field Commissioner. The latter was responsible for fixing policy pertaining to disposal of surplus property, carrying on negotiations with United States government agencies and foreign countries, prescribing methods for handling and settling claims against the United States Government, establishing prices, and issuing instructions concerning appraisals, fiscal records, and prices. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Headquarters, Communications Zone, was responsible for determining what property was surplus. The supply services were responsible for submitting to the General Purchasing Agent declarations of property as surplus, as well as for appraising, guarding, inspecting, and selling it. The Fiscal Director, Communications Zone, was responsible for receiving and accounting for funds collected from sales and for preparing reports required by the Theater Commander, the War Department, and the Central Field Commissioner.(17) Until November 1946 the General Purchasing Agent was responsible for reporting upon and supervising the activities of the supply services in carrying out the actual disposal of property.(18) In September 1945 the State Department was given the responsibility for disposal of surplus property, and the Office of the Army-Navy Liquidation Commissioner was abolished. As of November 1945, Headquarters, Central Field Commissioner for Europe, Office of Army-Navy Liquidation Commissioner, became Headquarters, Central Field Commissioner for Europe, Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner.(19)

135. Operations of Army-Navy Liquidation Commissioner.

a. Field Commissioner Guide No. 1, published on 15 June 1945, stated that the prime objective of the program was to make the most advantageous sales within the regulations of the Surplus Property Board. Proper channels for

contacting governments were diplomatic missions and consular officers, who carried on negotiations in behalf of their governments. Sales were to be made first to purchasers able to pay immediately in United States dollars.(20) By January 1946, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) had bought surplus property worth \$60,000,000.

b. To make possible payment in United States currency, credits were established with European nations, especially the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium. The last had a credit of \$45,000,000 from lend-lease transactions and was anxious to acquire surplus property. Sales on an over-the-counter basis to any purchaser who could qualify consisted mainly of jeeps, trucks, tires, and other items readily available in supply depots. In some instances it was necessary, because of lack of dollar purchasing power, to transfer certain installations and equipment to liberated governments on a loan or rental basis pending settlement at a governmental level. Transfers of the port facilities at Cherbourg, was an instance of this.

136. Procedure in Disposal of Surplus Property.

a. Criteria for Identifying Property as Excess. Specific criteria were set up for identifying property as excess; exceptions to these were some categories which could be declared surplus automatically, such as items not appropriate to the climate and shipped inadvertently to the Theater.(21)

b. Power of the Theater Commander. The Theater Commander was authorized to declare surplus all items for which there was a commercial equivalent or civilian market, and also perishable subsistence items or other property prompt disposal of which was necessary to avoid spoilage or loss through rapid deterioration. No items of purely military value for which there was no commercial equivalent or civilian market, or any nonperishable subsistence items, were to be termed surplus by the Theater Commander without War Department authorization.

c. Responsibilities of Supply Services. Chiefs of supply services were responsible for determining requirements for materials furnished by their services and for coordinating with other services in order to make available to them any excess in their services.(22) Property determined to be surplus was their sole responsibility until it was delivered to purchasers. All echelons of the services were responsible for collecting, maintaining, guarding, reporting, and moving all surplus property supplied by their services, as well as

reconditioning repairable items. When necessary, they were to use troops to determine serviceability and condition of materials. A designated officer remitted proceeds to a disbursing finance office.(23)

137. Handling of Surplus Property before Delivery to Purchaser.

a. Procedure in Collection and Identification of Excess Property. The first step was to collect into depots all property appearing to be excess. Property subject to collection included items not yet issued, equipment in the hands of using troops and property turned in by inactivated units. Rapid deployment greatly hampered collection, segregation, and marking of all of this material. Inactivation of increasing numbers of units multiplied the quantities to be handled, and make it impossible to prepare accurate inventories and to label the property.(24) Occasionally, new material found its way into scrap heaps, and was likely to be sold at great loss to the government.(25) As late as June 1946, errors as high as 50 percent were revealed in inventories. New inventories were essential. The G-4 Division was constantly concerned with remedying the situation.(26)

b. Storage of Surplus Property. Property turned in by inactivated units increased daily. Storage space decreased alarmingly owing partly to demands by liberated countries for the return of storage facilities. It was imperative to obtain as much storage space as possible in Germany. Items least affected by weather were diverted to uncovered stands.

c. Documentation of Shipments of Surplus Property. Installations responsible for shipping surplus property prepared waybills and issued vouchers and other documents required for movement.(27) The consignee provided and paid for transportation, except in the case of reciprocal aid property or decision of the General Purchasing Agent that it was to the best interest of the Theater to provide transportation.

d. Guarding Surplus Property. Redeployment caused a shortage of manpower for the guarding of surplus property in storage and transit. Polish guard companies proved not entirely satisfactory and were replaced where possible by United States troops. Guarding and maintenance costs borne by the Army were estimated at \$3.90 per ton per month.(28)

e. Accounting, Reports, and Records. Technical Manual 38-420 prescribed methods of accounting, handling financial transactions, and filing reports and records.

f. Maintenance of Surplus Property. Redeployment also affected the maintenance of surplus property. Equipment turned in uncleaned and unprepared for storage deteriorated rapidly. Training of German civilians partially solved the problem, and every effort was made to deliver surpluses sold as speedily as possible.

137. Progress on the Continent.

By the middle of November 1945, surplus property disposal centers had been established in France at Reims, Metz, Charleville, and Juvincourt, and by the end of November approximately 75,000 tons of material had been shipped to the Zone of Interior from Marseille alone. Officials felt that the program was moving well. The program included the shipment for distribution through UNRRA, of 975 vehicles and equipment for two hospitals to Czechoslovakia, and equipment for twelve hospitals to Poland.(29) In November 1945 the War Department was in the process of turning over to various countries and to UNRRA 51,000,000 pounds of canned meat.(30)

138. Ordnance.

As of 2 November 1945, 453,000 tons of ammunition had been shipped from the Theater; 380,000 tons of the remainder were to be shipped to the United States by the first of the year if shins could be obtained. It was expected that approximately 208,000 tons of explosives in France and Belgium would be sold. If the sale was not accomplished, 134,000 tons could be dumped at sea, 42,000 tons burned, and 54,000 tons disassembled.(31) It was, however, difficult to find old hulks for the purpose of dumping excess ammunition, since most outmoded naval units could still be used for other purposes.

139. Medical.

Disposal of the approximately \$85,000,000 of surplus and excess medical stores was a command and staff concern. Of the \$31,000,000 surplus, \$1,155,000 worth was disposed of to buyers.(32) Excess supplies were to be returned to America.

140. Signal.

By early December 1945, 30,000 tons of Signal equipment, to be held in Theater reserve, were ready to be shipped to locations in Germany; 60,000 tons were to be shipped to the United States; and 110,000 tons were to be declared surplus.

141. Surplus Post Exchange Items.

Post exchanges began to experience difficulty in disposing of some items after hostilities ended. The War Department policy that certain excesses would be shipped to the United States was changed on 1 December 1945, after which date no excesses could be returned to the United States. Army Exchange officials estimated that the major portion of post exchange equipment not required for operations in Germany could be disposed of by 1 February 1946.

142. Sale of Surplus Items to Members of the Armed Forces.

In November 1945 it was expected that certain items in demand by soldiers, such as barometers, magnifying glasses, electrical spotlights, and telegraph sets, would be requisitioned by the Army Exchange Service with payment direct to the United States Treasury.

143. Situation at the End of 1945.

By December 1945 the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner reported that, of all the property to be disposed of in liberated countries, only about one-fourth had been declared to him. In Great Britain, only a few items of surplus property remained to be declared at the end of the year. Shipping shortages caused a serious lag in shipments to the United States. More than half of the surplus already shipped from the Continent was ammunition, with vehicles and wheeled equipment making up the bulk of the remainder. Equipment disposed of locally was small in quantity. Chiefs of services were asked to speed up movement of supplies to ports. Delta Base Section had on hand in the middle of December 591,000 tons of material, of which only 7.7 percent had been declared surplus by chiefs of services. Redeployment, taking manpower from the depots, delayed the shipment to the United States of the scheduled 12 percent.

144. United Kingdom.

The Central Field Commissioner was held responsible for the disposal of all surplus property in the United Kingdom on a bulk basis in settlement of lend-lease accounts. In the middle of December, United States property in British depots totaled 156,286 tons; material awaiting shipment to the United States totaled 19,113 tons, and to the Continent, 28,775 tons.

145. Recovery of Property from Air Force Installations.

By the end of 1945 thirty abandoned air fields were surveyed with disappointing results, as few items of worth were discovered. The same situation held throughout the Theater.

146. Disposal of Scrap.

By early January 1946, scrap tonnages in Theater Service Forces depots amounted to 13,000 tons--all but 1,000 tons being Ordnance material. Thirty-five thousand tons were available in Air Force depots. Disposal of scrap in Great Britain was well-organized. Theater Service Forces staff members desired to set up a similar system in France, but were hindered by French unwillingness to pay cash for the material. Pending instructions from Washington, it was finally decided that scrap would be collected around main seaports such as Antwerp, then transshipped from barges to ships and used as ballast in transatlantic shipping operations.(33)

147. Negotiations for the Sale of Rhone Valley Pipe Line.

The Rhone Valley Pipe Line, running 550 miles from L'Avera (Marseille area) to Saarburg, France, was a \$9,000,000 installation awaiting disposition at the end of the war. After varied and contradictory proposals and decisions which caused expensive delays and involved the War and State Departments both politically and financially, and France, Switzerland, and Argentina as well, the pipe line was dismantled and its material scattered among several depots, where it was mixed with other pipe-line parts and finally sold to individuals and a few European countries.(34)

148. Negotiations for the Sale of Surplus Rolling Stock.

a. Numerous and varied propositions for the purchase of the thousands of United States freight and tank

cars and locomotives were made by UNRRA, the Netherlands, Belgium, and other willing purchasers. Negotiations were halted when the Transportation Corps announced in early December 1945 that rolling stock was no longer classified surplus. The reason for this was that French-owned rolling stock in use in Germany during hostilities was returned to France, leading to a severe rolling-stock shortage in Germany. After a few weeks, great quantities of rolling stock were again returned to the surplus list.

b. About half of the \$60,000,000 spent by UNRRA for surplus goods to be used in relief and rehabilitation work in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Balkans, had gone for transportation equipment needed in distribution work; included in this were 200 locomotives, and railroad equipment for maintenance and repair. By May 1946 all but sixty United States-owned locomotives had been declared surplus; forty of these had been loaned to Austria, and twenty were in use in Czechoslovakia. Little progress had been made in completing the sale of surplus locomotives, but all other surplus rolling stock had been disposed of with the exception of some cabooses.

149. Property Disposal Status in January 1946.

Segregation of materials was virtually complete by middle January 1946. Reciprocal-aid property remaining in England was returned to the British Government by 1 February.

150. Causes of Delays.

Delays in disposal were charged to a number of causes--failure to provide disposal instructions, discrepancies in transfer of depot stock figures, delays in counting of material in the various depots, poor mail service in France.

151. Charges of Wasteful Destruction.

Charges of wasteful destruction, upon investigation, were found groundless in every reported instance. By the middle of January, Western Base Section had sent to all units in the field information on the degree to which property might be destroyed, but units were advised to contact the mayor of the nearest town to determine whether the property might be of benefit to the civilian population.

152. Disposal of German Ammunition.

By 18 January 1946 the United States had destroyed 450,000 tons of German ammunition and had authorized the

destruction of 400,000 more. French unwillingness to pay for German ammunition, together with difficulties of transport to France, resulted in the report in January 1946 that no ammunition had been shipped to liberated areas.

153. Negotiations with Various Countries and Agencies for Sales in Bulk.

On 15 February 1946 Norway and Finland agreed to purchase the property of Task Force A, formerly located in Norway. (35) An agreement of 25 February 1946 between the Central Field Commissioner and the Joint Procurement Mission, a charitable organization, authorized purchase by the latter of surplus property in the Theater. (36) Credits for the purchase of surplus property were granted, as follows: Poland--\$50,000,000; Hungary--\$10,000,000; and the American Joint Distribution Committee--\$5,000,000. The Central Field Commissioner was authorized to exchange surplus for real estate for diplomatic purposes in Europe. A United States-French Joint Agreement of 28 May 1946 provided for the sale in bulk of surplus property estimated to have cost originally \$1,500,000,000. By 30 June 1946, no conclusion had been reached in the discussions between Belgium and the United States regarding the 822,000 tons of surplus property valued at \$526,783,410, then located in Belgium. (37) By 30 June 1946, the sale in bulk to Great Britain was well on its way to completion after more than six months of negotiation.

154. Status as of 30 June 1946.

Only a small amount of material had been delivered to France, and none of the property ultimately to be delivered to Belgium had been transferred. Of the approximately 2,914,000 long tons of material on hand in the European Theater on V-E Day, which was ultimately to be declared surplus, 2,295,000 long tons worth \$1,590,000,000, had been declared by 30 June 1946. The value of the 619,000 long tons still undeclared was set at \$698,000,000. Up to 30 June 1946, operations of the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner had resulted in the disposal of 943,000 tons of material which brought \$758,000,000 in world markets. (38)

CAPTURED ENEMY MATERIAL

155. Handling of Captured Material during the Campaign.

a. Prior to the German surrender, the Supreme Commander was authorized to use, for the forces under his command and for equipping national forces in European countries, both surrendered and captured equipment. (39) If he

could not use it, he was authorized to destroy it or to reduce it to scrap. Material of interest for intelligence or for scientific or military research was to be carefully guarded and its existence and location reported, for purposes of immediate exploitation, to the Combined Intelligence Subcommittee. Final disposition was to be directed by the Allied Control Council when that body assumed control of the conquered territory.

b. It was believed that some captured material could be used in the prosecution of the war against Germany and Japan. An international board, the London Munitions Assignment Board, studied the needs of the Japanese War with a view to making allotments against the captured material.(40) Expendable items such as food, petroleum-oil-lubricants (POL), medical supplies, and clothing could be used to support the disarmed German Army or funneled into civil affairs channels for use in relief of civilian distress. Frequently, considerable time elapsed between the capture of material and the establishment of control over it by the supply authorities. Haphazard handling of parts, souvenir hunting, lack of trained technical personnel, and inadequate security hampered exploitation of the material. (41)

156. Captured Material in Liberated Countries.

Enemy war material found in liberated countries was divided into three categories. Category "A" consisted of material of local origin used by the Germans for military purposes; Category "B", material ordered produced in the liberated countries by German military authorities; and Category "C", all other material, including that of German origin brought into liberated countries. Material in all three categories surplus to the demands of Supreme Headquarters and the London Munitions Assignment Board was eventually to be turned over to the country where it was found. In the case of Category "A" property, the process was almost automatic; screening for other demands became progressively greater in the cases of "B" and "C" items. All "C" material was assumed to be the property of the United Nations rather than of the country where found, though it was normally turned over to that country if it had no direct military use.(42)

157. Administrative Procedures Used by the Armies.

Procedures of the several armies for reporting, classifying, safeguarding, and using captured enemy material were generally uniform, conforming to the "Standing Operating Procedure for Maintenance and Salvage" published

by Theater Headquarters. Except for technical intelligence agencies of Supreme Headquarters no organized personnel was provided to deal with captured material. Its use was coordinated by subsections of army and higher echelons supply staffs. Thus, the Quartermaster was charged with locating, safeguarding, classifying, and inventorying all Quartermaster-type material in the army area, as well as maintaining records of all inventories, transfers, and releases. He was not charged with physical transfer of the property. Technical personnel of maintenance, repair, and service organizations working with the armies inspected captured materials and reported their intelligence possibilities. Detachments of technical intelligence sections of Communications Zone were attached to the armies, usually operating at corps headquarters. Scientific and economic representatives from higher headquarters were generally interested in targets which had no immediate interest to the army.

158. Kinds of Stores and Equipment Captured and Their Use.

Class I ration dumps were captured as the armies advanced through France. Many of these were in underground storage, therefore well preserved. Class II and III supplies constituted the bulk of captured enemy material and, next to Class V, offered the greatest difficulties in disposal. Captured American-and British-manufactured vehicles were used to augment both field and service force transport. Unserviceable vehicles and many types of enemy combat vehicles were destroyed to prevent their use by hostile groups which had been by-passed. Considerable quantities of captured construction materials substantially augmented similar supplies of the U.S. Army. Enemy tools and equipment taken in occupied countries and Germany were used if possible; if not required by the United States forces, they were returned to their original owners (if these were nationals of liberated countries) or to their governments. Captured bridge materials, specifically bridge dumps, aided greatly in rapid bridge construction. Captured electric generators formed a valuable complement to those possessed by the forces. Captured railway locomotives, cars, trackage, and shops, both enemy and those belonging to the liberated nations, were important to the transportation service. Insofar as possible, captured ammunition was concentrated in a few dumps, where certain types were made available to recognized resistance groups in liberated countries. United States sentries were required for security of the dumps. Chemical Warfare Supply Class V was a major problem; toxic gases had to be carefully guarded until neutralized or dropped at sea. Ordnance Class V could be disposed of by detonation in small quantities.

159. Activities Subsequent to V-E Day.

After V-E Day commanders in the field were concerned with searching their areas for by-passed installations, concentrating scattered stocks into central locations, and destroying material prejudicial to military security and public safety. Stores of captured enemy material represented both an asset and a problem in the supply picture.(43) Problems of collection and disposal of this material were complicated by the fact that they were Allied rather than strictly American problems; handling had to be governed by Supreme Headquarters instructions so long as that body was in existence, and afterward by governments on a political level. Authorization for commanders to destroy war material or reduce it to scrap lapsed on V-E Day.(44) Instructions issued on 6 August 1945 by Theater Headquarters indicated that army commanders would be responsible for the proper use and disposal of captured material, and that they could retain and use such material as required by the army, with the exception of items required for technical research; the rest they were not to destroy or reduce to scrap until further orders.(45)

160. Allocation of Material for Use in the Pacific Theater.

Immediately following the end of hostilities in Europe, some captured enemy material was set aside to meet assignment lists of the London Munitions Assignment Board. Plans were made to ship this material to the Pacific, but Japan's surrender halted the program.(46)

161. Decisions of the Potsdam Conference.

At the Tripartite Conference held at Potsdam 17 July-2 August 1945, it was decided that all arms, ammunition, and implements of war, and all specialized facilities for their production, would be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed, and that the maintenance and production of all aircraft, arms, ammunition, and implements of war by Germany would be prevented. The three governments agreed to appoint experts to work out detailed plans for the program. Use and disposal of surrendered German war and merchant ships was agreed upon.

162. Transfer of Administrative Responsibility.

Executive Order N. 9630 of 27 September 1945 transferred to the Department of State all functions of the Army-Navy Liquidation Commission and of the War and Navy Deparment relating to the disposition abroad of property captured from the enemy.

163. Inventory of Captured Enemy Material.

On 10 August 1945 an inventory of serviceable war material on hand was forwarded to the War Department. This was about 50 percent of known enemy war material in Germany and Austria at the time. New dumps and caches of supplies were being uncovered daily.(47)

164. Use of Captured Enemy Material.

Considerable amounts of various kinds of property were used by the United States forces for the maintenance of prisoners of war, disarmed enemy forces, and displaced persons. Substantial quantities, including a large number of vehicles, were turned over to the military government authorities for distribution to civil agencies and civilians.

165. Field Force Activity.

All captured enemy material had to be stored and guarded--a considerable burden for a force rapidly losing vital strength through redeployment.(48) Nevertheless, the process of taking inventory of unserviceable enemy war material continued satisfactorily. It was hoped that pending negotiations dealing with destruction of all unneeded war material would effect complete elimination of this material as a war potential.(49) Lists of war material required in the United States for postwar study, and as war memorials and trophies, were issued and instructions given to collect and ship this material.(50)

166. Responsibility for Air Force Material.

On 28 December 1945 the U.S. Air Forces in Europe was advised that the U.S. Forces, European Theater, would take over responsibility for enemy material peculiar to the Air Forces. A coordinating committee was to administer the program.

167. Captured Enemy Material to be Treated as Surplus Property.

On 10 January 1946 the War Department directed that German war material other than aircraft, and surplus to Theater requirements be processed in the same manner as surplus property.(51) Chiefs of supply services were to declare to the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner all captured German war material surplus to Theater needs. Prisoners of war were to be screened for personnel familiar with handling ammunition.

168. Reduction of Material to Scrap.

Although on 22 October 1945 Theater Headquarters directed the responsible commanders to proceed with the destruction of German war materials, a War Department cable of 31 October directed that destruction in areas occupied by United States forces should be halted until such time as new instructions were received. After weeks of inactivity the Theater Commander directed an inquiry to the War Department and received the answer that continued destruction of war material dangerous to public or military security was still authorized.(52) It was estimated that it would take three years to destroy the approximately 175,000 long tons of ammunition on hand in the Third Army area in January 1946. Dumping at sea where possible was advocated by Third Army.(53) On 21 February 1946 Theater Headquarters authorized major commands to begin destruction of all enemy ground forces material of a warlike nature, with the proviso that the destruction not be undertaken until all Theater requirements for such material had been determined by Theater chiefs of technical services.(54) In March authority to dispose of captured enemy ammunition to Allied nations as hazardous scrap was refused by the War Department on the objection of the State Department. On 28 May 1946 a meeting between representatives of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.) (OMGUS) and German officials resulted in tentative plans to turn over all remaining captured enemy ammunition to OMGUS for demilitarization and salvage of component parts for use in the German economy. The Theater disposal program then ceased, except for a small amount of scuttling. It was expected that demilitarization of all captured enemy ammunition would be accomplished prior to 30 June 1947.(55)

MEDICAL POLICIES AND OPERATIONS

169. The System.

a. The whole vast medical system in the European Theater was guided by the Theater Chief Surgeon and his staff. Policies affecting the American forces emanated from his office, which was organized in special divisions, including operations, evacuation, hospitalization, professional services, preventive medicine, dental, nursing, veterinary, supply, and medical intelligence.

b. On V-E Day there was on duty a body of some 15,700 Medical Corps officers, 170 Veterinary Corps officers,

500 Sanitary Corps officers, 350 physical therapy aides, 470 hospital dieticians, 17,900 nurses, and 212,00 enlisted men. In addition, approximately 17,000 civilians of western European countries and thousands of German prisoners of war were employed.

170. Transition from Combat Conditions.

After hostilities ended and treatment of battle casualties fell off, there was a marked increase in the number of medical patients, and many soldiers had to have surgery as the result of motor vehicle accidents.

171. Redeployment.

Medical units first had to be categorized in the four redeployment categories set by Theater Headquarters. Then individual officers and enlisted men had to be "adjusted" on the basis of the adjusted service rating scores and then shipped to the Pacific, directly or indirectly, or to the Zone of the Interior for a strategic reserve or for discharge, or kept in Europe for the forces of occupation and the closing-out forces in liberated countries. General and station hospitals--which were called fixed hospitals, to distinguish them from the more mobile field and evacuation hospitals--were closed out more rapidly in the United Kingdom and more slowly in western Europe, and gradually grew in number in the occupied areas of Germany and Austria. Medical units were redeployed on the basis of the Theater's bed requirements estimated at 6 percent of the total troop strength on V-E Day, 5 percent on V-E-plus-60-day, and 4 percent on V-E-plus-90-day.

172. Readjustment.

The readjustment of individuals after V-E Day was begun on the assumption that a soldier or officer whose adjusted service rating score was eighty-five or higher and a nurse with a score above fifty-five was eligible for discharge from the military service. Thus, personnel with the lowest scores and those who possessed professional skills which the War Department declared essential to its needs were assigned to units leaving for the Far East.

173. Records.

Although, on the whole, the redeployment and readjustment of officers and men proceeded with all the efficiency and speed possible under prevailing conditions,

a number of unavoidable hardships and maladjustments in individual cases occurred. Some of these resulted from the failure of the machine records unit to have a roster giving up-to-date information on the adjusted service rating scores of all Medical Department personnel. Only 60 percent of the machine records unit's roster was correct. Officers whose adjusted service ratings did not appear, even though they met all the necessary qualifications for redeployment, were not redeployed for separation until much later. Other difficulties were encountered when each major command was authorized to make personnel adjustments within its own jurisdiction. When the supply of qualified officers became exhausted, in a command, it had to appeal to the Theater Surgeon to supply its deficiencies. Soon an attempt was made to have commands trade personnel on a voluntary basis. When that failed, a card file was established for each medical officer in the Theater. This proved to be, in spite of some shortcomings, the most workable means of reconstituting medical units on the basis of the four redeployment categories.

174. Capacity.

Just before V-J Day, 66 general and station hospitals provided close to 58,000 beds, of which 28,000 were occupied by patients. Numerous mobile units provided additional medical service to the large bodies of troops in the staging and assembly areas of the Assembly Area Command. Extensive hospital facilities had to be provided also for German prisoners of war, recovered Allied military personnel, and displaced persons. Patients in these categories totaled as many as 450,000 in May and some 103,000 by V-J Day.

175. Evacuation.

a. The evacuation of hospitalized military personnel was at first based on a 60-day policy, which, together with a liberal availability of sea and air lift, made possible the evacuation of 41,600 patients in May and some 21,700 in July. With the inauguration of a 120-day policy, evacuation tapered off to approximately 9,500 patients during August.

b. Cherbourg and Southampton were first the principal ports through which patients were evacuated to the Zone of the Interior. When the line of communications was shifted to Germany, however, Bremen and Bremerhaven became the main ports of evacuation. Patients whose condition called for air evacuation were flown from Orly Field in Paris. Hospital trains traversed western Europe, carrying patients from hospital to hospital and from hospital to port. The

transfer of hospitalized prisoners of war at times made up the majority of hospital train moves. This was true in the autumn of 1945, when approximately 16,000 were moved from France to Germany and from Bremerhaven on their arrival from Norway.

c. The reduced troop strength and the 120-day hospitalization policy reduced the scale of evacuation operations in 1946. One ship a month provided sufficient sea lift to handle all evacuation in the spring. This was supplemented by an air lift of one plane a month. A patient who needed to be evacuated to the Zone of the Interior had to wait no more than thirty days for transportation. On the Continent, Diesel auto-rail cars were used in addition to hospital trains. Over 5,000 U. S. Army patients and some 19,000 sick prisoners of war were transported by rail during the first six months of 1946.

176. Health of the Command.

The health of American troops during the months between V-E Day and V-J Day was, on the whole, excellent. With the exception of venereal disease, there was a low incidence of communicable disease. No major problem existed, although infections hepatitis showed an incidence somewhat above normal. Common respiratory disease, which failed to show a seasonal rise until late in November 1945, rose to 175 per thousand per annum in March 1946 and then declined to 83 in June. Although considered normal, the average rate for 1946 remained far above that for the corresponding period of the year before--a fact attributed to the youthfulness of the new draftees who were replacing the battle-hardened veterans. Primary and atypical pneumonia presented no special problems. Influenza did not become troublesome, as some medical authorities feared. Diphtheria, reported from scattered places throughout the Theater, was no more prevalent in Europe than in the United States and no clinical differences existed. It showed generally a fatality rate of below 2 percent. The diagnosis and therapy of this disease proved in some ways confusing late in 1945, a difficulty that was in part attributable to the use of penicillin, which served to mask the local manifestations of the disease. Of the intestinal disease--typhoid and paratyphoid--only sporadic cases were reported. Dysentery infections were on a low level, and outbreaks of common diarrhoea were infrequent. The incidence of such communicable disease as scarlet fever, measles, and German measles was low. On the other hand, scabies, which was widespread in the German population, was similarly widespread among United States troops --one of the results of association with German women.

177. Venereal Disease.

a. Without question, the most serious medical problem with which the U. S. Army in Europe was faced was the control of the venereal diseases. Only where strong measures to repress clandestine prostitution were instituted did the incidence of the diseases remain within reasonable bounds. In other areas the policy of nonfraternization, educational programs, increased recreational facilities, and a wide set of prophylactic stations failed to check the contraction by United States troops of gonorrhea and syphilis. Leave centers and redeployment areas were the heaviest contributors to the number of infections, Paris and Marseille along contributing some 48 percent of all cases contracted in France just prior to V-J Day. A little over one-third of all the infections were contracted in Germany.

b. From a rate of below 50 per 1,000 per annum during the last weeks of combat, the incidence of the venereal diseases rose to 182 in October and 251 in December, reaching a peak of 264 in June 1946. The rates of infection in Negro troops were particularly high throughout the entire year of the occupation. Whereas, for example, the white rate of the Theater's high week (ending 21 December) in 1945 stood at 179 per thousand per annum, the Negro rate stood at 1,029; and, when the over-all Theater peak of 264 was reached during the week ending 14 June 1946, the Negro rate was at 895 and the white rate at 197. The Negro rate never fell below 512 per thousand per annum; the white rate never rose above 197.

c. All major commands contributed to the high rate of venereal disease. In 1945, when large bodies of American troops passed through the redeployment camps in France, that country contributed close to 46 percent of the total incidence, or over 56,300 infections from July through December 1945. Germany became the chief country of infection when troop concentrations shifted to that area in 1946.

d. Penicillin was provided to German civil authorities and all German physicians and diagnostic and treatment centers were instructed to report all cases of venereal infection coming to their attention.

178. Administration Subsequent to V-J Day.

A new period in Theater administration was entered when V-J Day was announced. Although redeployment was still the biggest task that confronted the Army in Europe, all operations began to be conducted with an eye to the long-

range occupation of Germany. Phasing out of liquidation force medical installations was accelerated and planned hospitalization facilities for the forces of occupation in German and Austria were reduced. Responsibility for fixed hospital installations, base filler medical depots, and captured enemy medical supply dumps was transferred from the Surgeons of the two Military Districts to Headquarters, Theater Service Forces, and at the end of 1945 to the Theater Surgeon. Some functions, however, were decentralized --rather than centralized--the newly activated Continental Base Section was charged with the responsibility of medical supply to the forces of occupation and of operations in the fields of hospitalization and evacuation. In June 1946, the West African District's medical facilities and problems were integrated with those of the rest of the Theater. The adjustment of individual officers and enlisted men of the Medical Department became the responsibility of the Theater Surgeon.

179. Supplies.

To keep medical supplies and equipment constantly flowing to where they were needed, a network of medical supply depots, filler depots, and base depots was maintained. This was gradually reduced until there were only a few consolidated depots by the end of June 1946. A reorder point of 180 days was established, which was based upon an authorized 60-day level of stocks on hand plus a 120-day allowance to provide for ordering and shipping time from the date of the depot inventories to the actual receipt of stocks from the Zone of the Interior. To build up levels of reserve in all medical depots in Germany, large stocks were transferred from depots in liberated countries. Supplies not needed for the forces of occupation were declared surplus and turned over to the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner. Large stocks of medical supplies especially designated for Civil Affairs and Military Government were issued to civil authorities as the situation demanded.

180. Hospitalization.

The U.S. Army's medical and dental facilities in the European Theater were made available to all members of the armed forces and their dependents; to all personnel of the armed forces of the Allies in United States areas of occupation when medical facilities of their own national government were not available; to employees of the American Red Cross and UNRRA; to United States and United Nations citizens employed by the United States Government; and to citizens of the United States who were not employees of the

Government but were in the Theater on officially authorized missions. Patients who needed no more than 72-hours' hospitalization were usually confined to general dispensaries. Field and evacuation hospitals provided 30-days' hospitalization, and station and general hospitals provided hospitalization of from 30 to 120 days. At the end of June 1946, thirty-six hospitals were in operation in the European Theater, with a total of some 5,600 patients.

181. Prisoners of War.

The hospitalization of German prisoners of war was the responsibility of the military medical authorities in the Theater. A number of prisoner-of-war general and station hospitals were maintained, staffed by German doctors and nurses under the supervision of U.S. Army medical officers. Similar medical responsibility was exercised over hospitals and dispensaries in displaced persons camps.

182. Nutrition.

Placing all troops on a peacetime diet became an important responsibility of the Theater Surgeon. For a time after V-E Day the reduced troop strength created excess stocks of food of the "C" and "K" ration types, which had to be integrated into the troop menus. Importance of replacement, wherever possible, of the preserved and dessicated items of the ration with increased quantities of fresh fruit and vegetables, frozen fresh meat, and shell eggs was stressed, however. Special diets were prepared for patients in hospitals who needed specific dietary therapy. Army nutrition experts studied the nutritional status of recovered Allied military personnel and made recommendations concerning the necessary preventive and therapeutic measures required for proper nutritional management in both medical and nonmedical cases. Special rations were prepared for German prisoners of war. The nutritional state of the command in the Theater continued good throughout the first year of the occupation. The caloric intake was adequate. The rations for both troops and civilians employed by the army improved with time and the number and types of food items increased. The feeding of prisoners of war and enemy civilian internees presented some problems, since a large proportion of them suffered from malnutrition. Displaced persons fared well nutritionally, being provided a diet of 3,000 calories per day.

183. Sanitation.

Special problems of sanitation arose first in connection with redeployment and later in establishing

military communities to house the families of personnel making up the forces of occupation. A gradual shift took place from the treatment of water by field methods to the use of properly treated municipal supplies as repairs to war-damaged distribution systems progressed. Likewise, pit latrines gave way to waterflushed toilet facilities. Damaged sewer systems were reconstructed. Garbage and rubbish were disposed of either in existing civilian dumps or in sanitary fills.

184. Typhus in the Civil Population.

The most serious public health threat was the louse, transmitter of typhus. To check its spread, particularly in the immediate posthostilities months, when hundreds of thousands of displaced persons trekked across Europe, the U.S. Army's medical authorities had all people moving into and out of Germany through the border control points sprayed with DDT powder. A similar procedure was followed when check points were established at crossings of the Rhine, and the river was made a cordon santeire against the migration of the body louse from one part of Germany to another. Chief foci of typhus infection were the concentration camps, especially Dachau and Mauthausen. Field teams, supplied to lower medical units by the Office of the Theater Chief Surgeon, were used widely in investigating reported cases of typhus and in discovering unsuspected ones.

185. Tuberculosis among Displaced Persons.

The prevalence of tuberculosis in displaced persons camps seriously affected the health of the population of occupied Germany. U.S. Army medical officers were faced with the stupendous problem of X-raying entire groups of people for identification, diagnosis, and therapy. Those suffering from the disease were treated by the latest methods.

186. Food for the Civil Population.

The lack of food constituted potentially the greatest single menace to public health in the occupied areas of Germany and Austria. This was true particularly in industrial areas, where hard work and little nourishment reduced the resistance to disease to dangerously low levels.

187. Professional Services.

To enable the Theater Chief Surgeon to maintain high standards of professional service in military medical installations, his staff included consultants in orthopedic

and plastic surgery, infectious diseases, tuberculosis urology, neuropsychiatry, and other specialties, who acted as technical advisers in the various fields of surgery and medicine. When redeployment drastically depleted the staff, the number of consultants was reduced proportionately until by June 1946 only the consultants in surgery and medicine remained.

188. Dental Service.

A particularly heavy load was thrown on the Dental Corps when fighting came to an end. In redeployment staging areas large dental clinics were organized, which were to a considerable extent staffed by officers who were themselves awaiting redeployment. For troops remaining with the forces of occupation, dental clinics were established in important cities in and near which there were heavy troop concentrations.

189. Veterinary Service.

a. The chief function of the Veterinary Corps was to inspect the tons of food which the forces consumed. Although, like the other branches of the medical service, the Veterinary Corps worked with a shortage of officers and enlisted men, it accomplished prodigious tasks. Several billions of pounds of meat products and hundreds of millions of pounds of nonanimal products were inspected.

b. The care of animals, particularly of dogs acquired by members of the forces as pets, also fell to the Veterinary Corps. Before animals could be shipped to the United States they had to undergo thorough examinations for the presence of parasitic diseases. Veterinarians cared also for army horses and for pigeons used by the Signal Corps.

190. Army Nurse Corps.

The Army Nurse Corps entered a somewhat hectic period when active combat came to an end. Continuing to provide excellent service to hospitalized troops, it was faced with the problem of reducing the Theater nurse strength from the peak of some 17,800 in May without impairing the service in fixed and mobile installations, dispensaries, leave centers, school centers, hospital trains and trains carrying dependent families, displaced persons camps, and public health.

Chapter XV

CIVIL AFFAIRS

STAFF RELATIONSHIPS IN CIVIL AFFAIRS AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT UNDER THE G-5 DIVISION

191. Early Developments.

a. To administer enemy territory and to aid in the reestablishment of civil government in liberated countries, the Civil Affairs Division of the Supreme Allied Command was reorganized as the G-5 Division of the general staff of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, on 15 February 1944, with thirty-five officers allotted to it.(1) The G-5 Division of Supreme Headquarters became the policy-making and coordinating body on all matters pertaining to civil affairs in liberated countries and to military government in occupied territory. As originally established, the Division comprised the following sections: Fiscal, Legal, Supply, Economics, Civil Affairs Operations, and Staff Duties. A Special Staff Division on civil affairs was also instituted outside the framework of the G-5 organization;(2) this unit was later fused with the United States element of the Allied Control Authority in Berlin. A Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer directed activities of the Special Staff Division. His duties included supervising the training schools, controlling the Country Sections, which were set up for the liberated countries as well as for Germany, and commanding the rear echelon of the G-5 Division. When the United States Group Control Council took over the functions of the Special Staff Division on civil affairs, the Country Sections were placed under the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, for operations and planning.

b. It was the expressed desire of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander that the civil affairs organization should be closely integrated with the regular military staff throughout the chain of command. Not only at the level of Supreme Headquarters, but also in lower echelons, the G-5 Division became an integral part of the Army organization. Civil affairs and military government staffs were authorized general staff status in armies and corps on 3 May 1944, and the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, was accordingly established at those headquarters. As new armies and corps were activated in the Theater thereafter, their tables of organization included provisions for G-5 Divisions.

192. G-5 Structure in the Spring of 1945.

a. On 7 May 1945, the functional pattern for the G-5 staffs at the various command levels was prescribed in Appendix "G" to SHAEF Administrative Memorandum No. 39.(3). This plan of organization divided staff functions according to the following sections: internal affairs; economics; displaced persons, refugees, and welfare; legal and financial; and reparations, deliveries, and restitutions. This plan was followed rather closely at all echelons of the command, with minor deviations to permit adjustment to varying local conditions.

b. On V-E Day the strength of the G-5 Divisions of Supreme Headquarters and the various subordinate commands was as follows:

<u>Headquarters</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
SHAEF	120	5	148
Com Z	31		39
Base Sections	63		77
12th Army Group	67	1	82
First US Army	31		44
Third U.S. Army	24	1	40
Ninth U. S. Army	28	1	47
Fifteenth U.S. Army	32	1	31
Corps (Fifteenth Army)	39		43
Division (Fifteenth Army)	201		267
6th Army Group	40	1	107
Seventh U.S. Army	18		20
First French Army	8		10
Corps (Seventh Army)	12		96
Divisions (Seventh Army)	72		96
Corps (First French Army)	2		2
Division (First French Army)	5		5

193. Reorganization of the SHAEF G-5 Division.

The establishment of military government in Germany posed several major problems which the planning staff of the G-5 Division of Supreme Headquarters attempted to solve by reorganizing its staff structure. Subsidiary objectives of the move were threefold; coordination of the G-5 organization with that of the Allied Control Council for Germany, adaptation of the Division to the different type of operations required in occupied territory, and utilization of manpower assigned to the staff so as to attain maximum economy and efficiency. The plan, which became effective on 1 March 1945, provided for seven functional branches, representatives from five of which composed a planning committee.(4) The last major change in organization of the G-5 Division under the combined command, 30 April 1945, provided for eight branches: Supply, Displaced Persons, Legal, Public Health, Finance, Economics, Public Relations, and Administration.(5) This final reorganization constituted merely a regrouping of functions. Responsibilities of the G-5 Division of Supreme Headquarters included formation of policies on civil affairs and military government; mobilization, training, and assignment of personnel to implement those policies; and supervision of execution of policies.

194. Role of the G-5 Division at Theater Headquarters Level.

The G-5 Division of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, functioned in the Communications Zone as an area command subordinate to Supreme Headquarters. Because army groups were under the operational jurisdiction of the Supreme Command, the G-5 Division of Theater Headquarters played but a minor role in the early development of military government in Germany. Only on personnel and administrative matters did the chain of command lead from the G-5 Divisions of army groups to Headquarters, European Theater of Operations. The G-5 Division of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, eventually merged with the United States element of the G-5 Division of Supreme Headquarters to form the G-5 staff of U.S. Forces, European Theater.(6)

195. G-5 Staffs in Army Groups.

a. The organization of G-5 Divisions in army groups anticipated to a large extent the form prescribed for them in Appendix "G" of SHAEF Administrative Memorandum No. 39.(7) After its reorganization on 17 March 1945,(8) the G-5 staff of the 12th Army Group conformed almost completely

with the provisions of the directive. The only changes necessary subsequent to the publication of Appendix "G" were the reduction of the Public Safety Branch to the status of a subbranch under Internal Affairs and the reallocation of several functions of the Economics Branch. The most critical of the problems faced by the G-5 Division of the 12th Army Group was the lack of personnel for its military government detachments. On 6 May 1945 Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, authorized a temporary overstrength in order to activate provisional military government units.(9) Personnel comprising the overstrength were attached to the European Civil Affairs Division for administrative purposes, and allocated to the First, Third, and Ninth U.S. Armies. When the 12th Army Group was inactivated on 1 August 1945,(10) officers of its G-5 Division were assigned to Theater Headquarters, which reassigned several of them to the G-5 Division of the Theater General Board.(11)

b. When the 6th Army Group became operational on 15 September 1944, its Civil Affairs Section was granted general staff status in accordance with the policy of the Supreme Command. The 6th Army Group established a training center to provide specialists in the different phases of military government to supplement military government officers received from the European Civil Affairs Division.(12) When 6th Army Group was inactivated on 21 July 1945(13), its G-5 activities were absorbed by the G-5 Division of Headquarters, U.S. Forces, European Theater.

196. G-5 Staffs in Armies.

a. The organizational pattern for civil affairs and military government sections in armies was established by a Table of Distribution and Allowances published on 15 April 1944.(14) The Table provided for an army G-5 division with a staff of thirty-one officers and fifty enlisted men of specific qualifications. As the European Civil Affairs Division was not authorized to secure military government personnel from other than its own resources, army G-5 sections frequently were unable to obtain men of the grades and ratings indicated by the Table. Deviations from requirements imposed by the Table were made in the organization as well as the personnel of the G-5 staffs. The G-5 Division of the Third U.S. Army was established with only five of the twelve branches recommended by the Table of Distribution and Allowances. The First and Ninth Armies made similar adjustments. Through army groups, the Supreme Command attached specialists on monuments, fine arts, archives, and military histories to the army G-5

sections. Naval officers with specialized training in military government work were pressed into service. Further supplementing the G-5 staff were American Red Cross workers in civilian war relief and field directors of UNRPA. Operational control of all military government detachments was vested in the army commanders, although company headquarters handled matters of supply and administration for the units. To obtain additional military government personnel, the commanders of each of the four armies established training centers in their respective areas.

b. In accordance with instructions initiated by the Supreme Command, the First, Third and Ninth U.S. Armies mobilized about 130 provisional military government units for temporary deployment in the Soviet area.(15) When the Soviet forces assumed responsibility for military government on 4 July 1945, the American provisional detachments were withdrawn and disbanded.

c. With the formal confirmation of the Eastern Military District on 12 August 1945(16), the G-5 Division of the Third Army was reorganized as the Office of Military Government for Bavaria, and consolidated with Regional Military Government Detachment E-201. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, of the Third Army became Deputy Director of the new organization. The G-5 Division of Seventh U.S. Army was reorganized at the same time. A staff memorandum of the Seventh U.S. Army placed the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, on a Deputy Chief of Staff level and made him responsible to the army commander for all military government of Western Military District.(17) When the Seventh U.S. Army was phased out on 1 April 1946(18), its area, units, and functions were put under Third Army control. On 1 January 1946 the G-5 Division of the Third Army was re-established with Administration, Military Government, and Displaced Persons Branches. The most important functions of the new G-5 Division were the control of displaced persons and acting as liaison between the independent units of military government and tactical forces, whose only other tie was the Theater Commander.

197. The G-5 Division of Theater Headquarters.

a. After final determination of the exact limits of the United States Zone of 17 July 1945, the functions assigned to the G-5 Division of Theater Headquarters rapidly increased. When the German Economic Control Agency was abolished on 1 August 1945(20), its functions and personnel were assigned to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, of Theater Headquarters. On 10 August 1945, the Theater G-5

Division assumed control of all German plants which processed or stored food and beverages.(21) With the elimination of the Production Control Agency on 24 August 1945, the Industry Branch was established to take over its responsibilities under the direction of the G-5 Division. The Industry Branch planned for the industrial disarmament of Germany and supervised all activities of military government agencies in the control of industry. These responsibility were of brief duration, however, for on 1 October 1945 the G-5 Division of Theater Headquarters was redesignated as the Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone) and its personnel and functions were absorbed by the new organization.(22) This move resulted in a complete break between military government and the tactical forces, the only remaining liaison being the Theater Commander, who was also Military Governor of the United States Zone.

b. Consolidation of the varied divisions and branches of military government Berlin early in 1946 led to the reestablishment of the G-5 Division at Headquarters, United States Forces, European Theater. Accordingly a general order recreating the G-5 staff of the Theater Commander was published on 7 March 1946 to become effective on 1 April.(23) At the same time, the Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone) was disbanded and its functions were divided between the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.) and the new G-5 Division of Theater Headquarters. Fifty-eight officers and two warrant officers were assigned to the G-5 staff on 28 March 1946.(24) The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, held also the post of Chief of the Displaced Persons Branch. The organizational chart of the Division provided for seven branches: Plans and Coordination, Reports and Information, Administration, Economic Affairs, Government Affairs, Supply, and Displaced Persons. The G-5 Division was charged with the following staff responsibilities: advising the Theater Commander on military government matters affecting the occupation forces; coordinating the activities of field forces with those of military government agencies; maintaining liaison with the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.); caring for displaced persons in the United States Zone and repatriating them in accordance with arrangements made by the Combined Repatriation Executive of the Allied Control Authority; establishing liaison with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in the United States Zone and also for Germany as a whole; and conducting civil affairs in countries other than Germany.

198. G-5 Division of the General Board.

The General Board of Theater Headquarters was established on 17 June 1945 as a special unit within the Headquarters of the Fifteenth U.S. Army, which became a station complement for the Board.(25) The purpose of the General Board was to analyze the campaign in the European Theater and the tactics and administration of the U.S. forces in the European Theater, and to make studies and recommendations on such special problems as were referred to it by Theater Headquarters.(26) Brig. Gen. C. E. Ryan headed the G-5 section of the General Board, which was staffed by a group of historians, analysts, and research specialists, assisted periodically by special consultants.

DISPLACED PERSONS

199. Origin of the Displaced Persons.

a. In 1939 Germany lacked adequate manpower for prolonged total war, and it was only through the use of foreign labor that the Nazis were able to maintain simultaneously a large military force and a high level of industrial and agricultural production. It was estimated that before the war the Reich was employing half a million foreign workers, largely Italians. Large-scale recruitment of additional workers dated from the autumn of 1939, after the outbreak of the war. These consisted mostly of forced laborers and prisoners from the conquered countries. By the close of 1940, a million foreign laborers were in Germany, and the number had increased to an estimated five million by June 1943.

b. In obtaining laborers throughout the occupied countries the Nazis employed recruitment methods which varied from enticement to indirect compulsion and open conscription. They described all foreign laborers as volunteers, but they divided them into three categories and had a distinct standard of treatment for each group. The first group, coming from France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, received virtually the same pay and treatment as German laborers. The second group, the Poles, received only the lowest customary rate of pay and were subject to many restrictions in public places. The third group, composed of Russians and Ukrainians, received the worst treatment of all, as they were denied the few benefits extended to most foreign workers.

c. In June 1944 it was estimated that there were 11,332,700 displaced persons and refugees (exclusive of German refugees) in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Luxemburg, and Germany. Of this number, 8,935,400 were displaced persons in foreign countries and 2,397,300 were refugees within their own countries. They spoke at least twenty different languages, came from twenty countries, and were the concern of as many governments.

200. Plans for Dealing with Displaced Persons.

a. Plans for handling displaced persons were being studied by the United States cabinet as early as 29 October 1942. The broad policies and procedures with respect to these individuals were comprehensively stated in the "Outline Plan for refugees and Displaced Persons," published by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force on 4 June 1944. This provided, among other things, that machinery in liberated territories would be set up so as to prevent, insofar as possible, movement of displaced persons and refugees from hindering operations of the armies. The care, control, and repatriation of these persons was made the responsibility of the Allied national authorities concerned, subject to supervision by the military. The principles of this plan remained in effect during most of the operations in France and Belgium. The policies announced in June 1944 were, in general, reiterated in an administrative memorandum of Supreme Headquarters, dated 18 November 1944 and revised 16 April 1945. The revised policies, designed to serve as a guide for operations in Germany, differed in many respects from those of the "Outline Plan." During the period of combat operations, Supreme Headquarters assumed over-all administrative supervision of the care, control, and repatriation of displaced persons and control of refugees, but after military government was imposed, responsibility for United Nations displaced persons was vested in field commanders.

b. The Yalta Agreement, concluded on 11 February 1945 at Yalta, in Crimea, by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States, and Great Britain, included plans for the care of displaced persons of the three countries concerned. As it gave to liberated Soviet citizens the same maintenance scale as that authorized for Allied military personnel, the Yalta Agreement created a privileged class of persons whose handling became more and more difficult.

201. Early Experiences in Handling Displaced Persons.

a. The displaced population encountered during the period just after V-E Day consisted mainly of refugees rather than displaced persons. During December 1944, the first displaced persons were moved from army areas into the French Zone of the Interior. Agencies, other than the military and Allied national authorities concerned, which assisted in the care and control of displaced persons and refugees were UNRRA, Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees, and Mission Militaire Liaison Administrative. The Displaced Persons Executive was that part of the civil affairs organization assigned to specific tasks in connection with the discharge of the Supreme Commander's responsibility for refugees and displaced persons.

b. The displaced persons program in France was at all times handicapped by inadequate housing, food, fuel, medical supplies, and clothing, and transportation was not always available for bringing supplies into camps. The knowledge gained in movements of displaced persons in France and other liberated countries proved to be invaluable in organizing the mass movements which characterized the program of repatriation from Germany.

202. Experience in Handling Displaced Persons Gained in the Rhineland Campaign.

a. Under the "standfast" policy directed by Supreme Headquarters prior to the invasion of Germany, no uncontrolled movement of displaced persons was to be permitted. Western Europeans were to be returned to their countries as soon as possible, and eastern Europeans were to be collected and held in assembly centers pending completion of arrangements for their crossing Soviet lines for repatriation.

b. As the United States armies advanced into Germany east of the Rhine, the numbers of liberated displaced persons increased considerably. Housing, transportation, and communication facilities were inadequate. It became apparent that existing plans for displaced persons centers were not feasible in view of conditions encountered and personnel available. Experience gained in France and in Germany indicated that plans for executing large scale movements should take into consideration the need for careful synchronization of transport and movements, study of traffic flow and available routes, and planning of reception arrangements.

203. The Displaced Population as of V-E Day.

On 8 May 1945 there were over 2,320,000 displaced persons in the part of Germany under American control (areas held by the 12th and 6th Army Groups). Maintenance of law and order was a problem of grave concern to military authorities, as many displaced persons went on a rampage on being liberated. This usually took the form of wild and unauthorized shooting, and widespread looting of German homes, stores, and warehouses. When tactical units could be used, order was rapidly established.

204. Readjustment and Changes in Administration after V-E Day.

Staff responsibility for displaced persons operations during the period of combined command was assigned to G-5 Division, Supreme Headquarters. The staff element with primary responsibility was known as the Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Welfare Branch, redesignated in March 1945 as the Displaced Persons Branch. Upon the dissolution of Supreme Headquarters on 14 July 1945, U.S. Forces, European Theater, assumed control of the United States Zone of Germany. A new agency, known as the Combined Displaced Persons Executive, continued operations with respect to displaced persons. The Combined Displaced Persons Executive ceased to exist on 1 October 1945, on which date the Combined Repatriation Executive came into being. The new agency was a quadripartite body under the Allied Control Authority, with the function of coordinating interzonal and repatriation movements. After this change, displaced persons operations became zonal functions, staff responsibility in the United States Zone being exercised by the Displaced Persons Branch, G-5 Division, U.S. Forces, European Theater. The Combined Repatriation Executive was the operating agency of the Prisoner of War and Displaced Persons Directorate of the Allied Control Authority.

205. Reduction of the Displaced Population.

a. During the period of combat operations, repatriation of displaced persons was undertaken only when operations permitted or required. Upon termination of hostilities, however, repatriation became an undertaking of high priority and major importance. Displaced persons returned home in many types of transport. Organized movements were made by truck convoy, train, air, and boats, but there were also many repatriates who traveled on foot, by bicycle, in automobile and horse-drawn conveyances.

b. In May alone, more than half of the French, Belgians, Netherlanders, and Luxemburgers were repatriated, and by 15 June 1945 the greater part of the displaced western Europeans had been returned to their native countries. Soviet citizens constituted the largest single category remaining to be repatriated from the United States Zone. Although the movement of Soviet citizens homeward did not get under way until May, almost 99 percent of those uncovered in the United States Zone had been repatriated by the end of August. This record was possible because of agreements concluded between Soviet and United States authorities. Mass delivery through army lines officially began with the signing of the Halle Agreement on 22 May 1945. Informal movement of Italians began early in June, and, as a result of conferences held at Bolzano and Rome, the repatriation of Italians progressed rapidly from June through September. By the end of September 1945 more than 97 percent of all known displaced Italians in the United States Zone had been sent home. Polish repatriation actually started about mid-July 1945, but progressed very slowly. Other agreements facilitated the repatriation of Yugoslavs, Greeks, and Balkan ex-enemy nationals.

206. Disposition of Special Categories of Displaced Persons.

a. Soviet citizens uncovered in Allied military operations originally were treated in the same manner as other United Nations nationals. However, the Yalta Agreement contained special additional provisions for their benefit, one being that they were in all cases to be segregated in special centers as soon as their claims to Soviet citizenship had been accepted by the Soviet repatriation representative.

b. In June 1945 the Supreme Commander directed that immediate plans should be made to establish special camps for stateless and non-repatriable persons and those whose repatriation was likely to be deferred for some time. In August 1945 this policy was restated more completely. The established policy of U.S. Forces, European Theater, was that stateless and non-repatriable persons should be granted the same assistance as United Nations displaced persons.

c. Special considerations were asked for persecutees, including Jewish displaced persons. In October 1945 special rations were authorized for certain persons who had been persecuted by the Nazis. Persecutees who so desired were to be accommodated in special centers apart from other

displaced-persons installations, and those living in approved centers were to receive a food ration of 2,500 calories per person a day, instead of the regular ration of 2,300 calories. Persecutees residing outside approved centers were entitled to a ration card one category higher than the German rations which would otherwise have been authorized for them.

d. The policy affecting ex-enemy displaced persons provided that they would be returned to their countries of nationality or former residence, without regard to their personal wishes, with the exception of persecutees among them who were assimilated to United Nations status.

207. Care and Maintenance of Displaced Persons.

The care and maintenance of United Nations displaced persons was from the first the responsibility of the senior military commander. Upon termination of hostilities, field commanders were directed to execute fully the plan for care and control of displaced persons. In the summer of 1945 the Theater Commander reviewed the problem of displaced persons and established the standard for their care and maintenance. It was emphasized that the care of United Nations displaced persons and assimilees still remained a major military objective. Provisions were made for obtaining necessary supplies and for furnishing displaced persons with medical care, educational opportunities, and employment. Special attention was given to the care and protection of displaced children uncovered in Germany, with particular reference to those who were not accompanied by a parent or legal guardian.

208. Relationship between the Army and UNRRA.

a. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration program in the United States Zone of Germany was limited to the performance of certain functions delegated to the agency by the Theater Commander. The military assumed responsibility for basic supplies for the care of displaced persons, which included food, clothing, and shelter, and supplies necessary to maintain health and sanitation within the camps. It also was responsible for transporting supplies to the camps, maintaining security, and providing communication facilities. The Army also agreed to furnish necessary facilities for the maintenance of administrative operations of UNRRA at team level and at necessary headquarters within the United States Zone. UNRRA provided the necessary personnel for camp administration and supervision above the team level, and also agreed to furnish such supplies as cigarettes, soap, and razor blades

for the displaced persons. During the first few months of the occupation, there existed some confusion with respect to the relationship which should exist between the Army and UNRRA, but this relationship was on a much more satisfactory basis during the latter part of 1945.

b. The agreement made between the Supreme Commander and UNRRA on 25 November 1944 continued in effect even after the dissolution of the combined command in July 1945. The draft of a proposed new agreement between the military authorities in the United States Zone and UNRRA was submitted to the War Department for approval in September 1945, and an approved draft was released by the War Department in January 1946. This was amended and signed as the new agreement on 19 February 1946.

209. Changes in Administrative Structure in 1946.

a. On 1 January 1946, the Offices of Military Government for the three German Lander in the United States Zone became independent commands under their respective directors. However, the Commanding Generals, Eastern and Western Military Districts, and the Commanding General, Theater Service Forces, retained existing responsibilities for the administration of displaced persons, including the management of camps, disciplinary control, supply, and movement of such persons. With this change in administrative structure, responsibility for displaced persons was transferred from military government units to units of the occupational forces. The 1st Armored Division assumed control of all camps and assembly centers in the Wurttemberg-Baden area, and the 3d Infantry Division assumed control in Grosshessen.

b. On 1 April 1946 the Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone) ceased to exist, and simultaneously there was established in Theater Headquarters a new G-5 Division with primary staff responsibility for displaced persons. The G-5 Division was charged with the supervision of control, maintenance, and care of displaced persons in the United States Zone and their repatriation in accordance with announced policies and in accordance with arrangements made by the Combined Repatriation Executive of the Allied Control Authority for coordinating group movements between the United States Zone and other zones or other countries.

210. Outstanding Problems in the First Six Months of 1946.

a. During October 1945 it became apparent that Jews were infiltrating into the United States Zone of Germany in substantial numbers. This migration continued for weeks attaining peaks in December 1945, in February 1946, and in the following spring. The exodus was generally from eastern Europe, predominantly from Poland, where, it was estimated, as many as 90 percent of the infiltrates originated. Early in January there were approximately 40,000 Jews in the United States Zone. The policy in regard to these persons, initially, was to admit them to special centers apart from other displaced persons and accord them reasonable care until their status had been clarified. Infiltration of displaced persons into the United States Zone showed a marked increase during the month of May 1946 and continued at a steadily accelerating rate from all directions in June.

b. An increasing amount of lawlessness and crime throughout the fall of 1945 indicated the inadequacy of existing policies for maintaining law and order among displaced persons. New directives on maintenance of law and order were issued in January and again in March 1946. In May the Theater Commander expressed dissatisfaction with existing control over displaced persons, as evidenced by the many reports of their participation in armed aggression, theft, and black-market activities, and ordered a resurvey of all control measures then in effect.

211. Review of Status of United Nations Displaced Persons in 1946.

a. In order to clarify the doubtful status of many displaced persons and to encourage repatriation, a review of the status of all persons who had been accorded United Nations displaced persons treatment was proposed in November 1945. The plan, as determined in January 1946 with the approval of the War Department, was simplified to consist of a thorough screening of all inhabitants of United Nations assembly centers and of future applicants for admission thereto. Plans were laid for a full-scale screening to begin in June 1946. By the end of June, approximately 12 percent of the displaced persons in the United States Zone had been screened. Approximately 8 percent of these had been found unqualified for displaced persons status.

b. Theater policy on the repatriation of Soviet citizens as restated early in January 1946 provided that certain categories would be repatriated without regard to their personal wishes and by force if necessary.

c. The proposal to discontinue United Nations displaced persons care and treatment for certain categories of displaced persons, considered in November of the previous year, became effective on 15 May 1946. The provision was applicable to nationals of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway, but certain exceptions were made.

d. The President of the United States issued, under date of 22 December 1945, a directive on immigration, which had the effect of setting in motion preparations for the early resumption of immigration to the United States. It was realized, however, that the established quotas for immigration would not permit entry to any appreciable number of displaced persons.

e. On 30 June 1946 there were in the United States Zone of Germany 368,000 United Nations displaced persons in camps and 115,000 (estimated) outside camps, for a total of 483,000; in the United States Zone of Austria there were 23,029 in camps and 20,489 out of camps, for a total of 43,528.

f. In June 1946 the responsibility for displaced persons was delegated to the Third U.S. Army, which in turn delegated the responsibility to field units. Actual camp operation was performed by UNRRA, which had approximately 143 assembly center teams supervising about 454 separate displaced persons camps.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

1. See pars 14-23.
2. Ibid.
3. Seventh Army, Report of Operations 1-31 May 1945, G-2 History.
4. Stars and Stripes, 9 May 45.
5. Ibid, 8 May 45.
6. Ibid, 10 May 45.
7. PII, 13 May 45.
8. SHAEF, Press Releases Nos 1455, 1456, 1457, 10 May 45; and Nos 1458, 1459, 1460, 1461, 11 May 45.
9. SHAEF, G-3 War Room Daily Summary, Op 9/10 May 45..
10. SHAEF, G-3 Monthly War Diary, May 45, file GCT 314.81-1 Excc.
11. Stars and Stripes, 14 May 45, Router from Allied Mediterranean Headquarters, 11 May 45.
12. Baltimore Sun, AP, Oslo, 20 May 45.
13. Newsweek, 25 June 45.
14. Stars and Stripes, 6 Jun 45.
15. Ibid., 5 Jun 45; Chicago Sun, 28 May 45; Letter of Instruction No 23, Hq, 12th Army Group to Armies.
16. Fifteenth Army, Report of Operations, 16 Apr-10 Jul 45.
17. Third Army, Report of Operations, 9 May-30 Sep 45.
18. Ninth Army, Report of Operations, 1 May-15 Jun 45.
19. Fifteenth Army, Report of Operations, 16 Apr-10 Jul 45.
20. SHAEF, G-3 Monthly War Diary, May 45, file GCT 314.81-1 Excc.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER I (continued)

21. SHAEF, G-3 War Room Daily Summary, Op 13/14 May 45; SHAEF Press Release No 1513, 17 May 45.
22. Fifteenth Army, Report of Operations, 16 Apr-10 Jul 45.
23. G-3 Battle Studies, Summary of Operations 12th Army Group; Third Army, G-3 Historical Report, 9-31 May 45.
24. Stars and Stripes, 9 May 45, AP, London, 8 May; SHAEF Press Release, Naval Terms of Surrender, May 45.
25. SHAEF Press Release No 1496, 15 May 45.
26. SHAEF, G-2 Weekly Intelligence Summary, 6 May 45.
27. SHAEF, G-3 War Room Daily Summary, Op 10/11 May 45.
28. Ibid, Op 11/12 May 45.
29. SHAEF Press Release No 1496, 15 May 45.
30. Stars and Stripes, 18 May 45.
31. SHAEF, G-3 War Room Daily Summary, Op 18/19 May 45.
32. Stars and Stripes, 17 May 45.
33. Ibid, 7 Jun 45, UP, Lisbon, Portugal, 6 Jun.
34. SHAEF, G-3 War Room Daily Summary, Op 3/4 Jun 45.
35. Stars and Stripes, 27 May 45, Reuter, 26 May.
36. Ibid, 8 May 45.
37. Ibid, 10 May 45; Third Army, G-3 Historical Report, 9-31 May 45.
38. Stars and Stripes, 9 May 45.
39. G-3 Battle Studies, Third Army Operations in Bavaria; Cable QX-31966, 6 May 45; 12th Army Group to Third and Ninth Armies, sgd Bradley; Third Army, G-3 Historical Report, 9-31 May 45; SHAEF, G-3 Monthly War Diary, May 45, file GCT 314.81-1 Exec.
40. G-3 Battle Studies, Third Army Operations in Bavaria; Third Army, G-3 Historical Report, 9-31 May 45.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER I (continued)

41. Third Army, G-3 Historical Report, 9-31 May 45.
42. Stars and Stripes, 15 May 45.
43. Third Army, G-3 Historical Report, 9-31 May 45.
44. Third Army and Eastern Military District, Report of Operations, 9 May-30 Sep. 45.
45. For more detailed information, see monograph, "Civil Affairs," Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46, Chap III.
46. Cable S-96715, 6 Jul 45, SHAEF Main sgd Tedder to 12th Army Group, AGWAR, AEHQ, 15th Army Group, Com Z.
47. Third Army, Information Bulletin, "Intelligence Review," 8 May 45 (21 Army Group); Ninth Army, G-2 Periodic Report, May 45, annex No 3, No 240 dated 2 May 45; Weekly Intelligence Report, Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff Admiralty, HM Navy, No 270 dated 11 May 45.
48. SHAEF Press Releases, 2 May 45.
49. SHAEF Press Releases, 1-10 May 45.
50. Cable FWD-20714, 6 May 45, SHAEF Fwd sgd Eisenhower to 30 Military Mission, Moscow.
51. Cable FWD-20904, 7 May 45, SHAEF Fwd sgd SCAEF to EXFOR Main.
52. Cable FWD-21068, 9 May 45, SHAEF Fwd sgd SCAEF to EXFOR TAC.
53. Ltr Orders, SHAEF, G-3 Div (Fwd), 13 May 45, file GCT 387-8 Ops (C).
54. Cable FWD-21085, 9 May 45, SHAEF Fwd sgd SCAEF to EXFOR.
55. Cable MX-24345, 17 May 45, Military Mission, Moscow, sgd Archer to SHAEF Fwd to Eisenhower, AGWAR for CCS and AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff.
56. Ltr Orders, SHAEF, 11 May 45, file GCT-7 Ops (C), to General Rooks.
57. Cable FWD-21082, 9 May 45, SHAEF Fwd sgd Eisenhower, to 30 Military Mission, Moscow.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER I (Continued)

58. Cable 2, 10 May 45, SHAEF Fwd Sgd Eisenhower to OKW.
59. Ltr, SHAEF, G-3 Div. (Fwd), 13 May 45, file GCT 387-8 Ops C, to General of Infantry Fangehr, OKW Liaison Detachment.
60. Cable FWD-21456, 14 May 45, SHAEF Fwd to SHAEF Control Party (OKW) for Rooks.
61. Cable FWD-21475, 14 May 45, SHAEF Fwd, sgd SCAEF to SHAEF Control Party OKW for Rooks.
62. Cable FWD-21947, 14 May 45, SHAEF Fwd sgd SCAEF to 6th, 12th and 21st Army Groups; SHAEF Control Party OKW; and ANXCF Main.
63. Cable FWD-22091, 21 May 45, SHAEF sgd SCAEF to 12th and 6th Army Groups; Cable FWD-22222, 34 May 45, SHAEF Fwd sgd SCAEF to SHAEF Control Party OKW.
64. Ltr, SHAEF G-3 Div, 17 May 45, file GCT 388-3-1/GPS; Cable FWD-22322, 24 May 45, SHAEF Fwd sgd SCAEF to SHAEF Control Party OKW.
65. Admiral Dönitz and most members of his staff were members of several arrest categories determined upon prior to the occupation of Germany. For instance, Joint Chief of Staff Directive No 1023/6 provided that all members of the Reichskabinet, all members of the High Command, including Army, Navy, and Air Force, all members of the General Staff Corps, all high officers of the Nazi Party, all members of paramilitary organizations, and all members of the German Intelligence Service should be automatically arrested when apprehended. Most members of the Dönitz "government" fell into several of these categories.
66. Cable FWD-21846, 18 May 45, SHAEF Fwd sgd Eisenhower to AGWAR to CCS.
67. Cable FWD-21899, May 45, SHAEF Fwd sgd Eisenhower to AGWAR to CCS.
68. Ltr, SHAEF, G-3 Div. (Fwd), 22 May 45, file CCT 322.01-2/GPs.
69. Time, 4 Jun 45.

FOOTNOTES—CHAPTER I (Continued)

70. Cable S-91271, 17 Jun 45, SHAEF Main sgd Eisenhower to Ministerial Control Party OKW South for Watkins.
71. Plan GOLDCUP; 4 Feb 45.
72. Cable FWD-21531, 15 May 45, SHAEF Main to ANCXF.
73. Cable FWD-21531, 15 May 45, SHAEF Fwd to SHAEF Main, ANCXF; Cable FWD-21758, 17 May 45, SHAEF Fwd sgd Eisenhower to major commands.
74. Cable 67, 26 May 45, SHAEF Control Party OKW for Rooks to SHAEF Fwd for Bull.
75. Cable FWD-22568, 28 May 45, SHAEF Fwd sgd Eisenhower to Ministerial Control Party OKW (Flensburg) for Watkins, Ministerial Control Party OKW (Munich) for Waring.
76. SHAEF, G-4 Div Report, 2 Jun 45.
77. Cable FWD-23664, 5 June 45, SHAEF sgd Eisenhower to 12th Army Group Main for G-1 for Robertson, US GGC, Höchst, SHAEF Main for British CC Component SHAEF Special Echelon.
78. Ltr, SHAEF Fwd, 13 Jun 45, file AG 370-7 GCT-AGM, sub: "Ministerial Collecting Center," to CG, 12th Army Group.
79. SGS Files No 091.1 Germany, 31 Jan 45-16 Nov 45, "Disposition of German Ministries and Agencies;" Ltr of Instructions Sent to Director of Intelligence, USGCC by Byran L. Milburn, Brig Gen, GSC.
80. "Minutes of Meeting Concerning Troop Requirements for Ministerial Collecting Center," G-3 Div, Hq USFET (Main), 15 Oct 45.
81. Ltr, USFET G-3 Div, 19 Oct 45, file GCT. 350.05/GPs, subj: "Ministerial Collecting Center (Kassel);"
Cable S-28810 22 Oct 45, USFET sgd Eisenhower to OIGUS; Cable S-33552, 2 Dec 45, USFET sgd McNarney to OIGUS, Hq Berlin District, CG 7th Army.
82. Ltr, OIGUS, 5 Jan 46, file AG 322-132 (DI), subj: "Movement of Ministerial Collecting Center to Berlin."

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER I (Continued)

83. "Account of the Activities of the Ministerial Collecting Center," by Major John F. Reineck of the 7771st Document Center.
84. A list of enactments prior to 14 July 45 is to be found in USFET, OMGUS, MG Regulations, title 23, "MG Legislation," part II.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. Stars and Stripes, 29 May 45.
88. Third Army, EMD, Report of Operations, 9-31 May 45.
89. USFET, OMGUS, History of OMGUS (USGPCC, May-Nov 45).
90. See Par 101, below.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter II

1. Memo, SHAEF, 11 Jul 44, file SHAEF 21234/0 & E, or SGS 322 ETOUSA, subj: "Reorganization in the ETO."
2. Memo, SHAEF, 21 Jul 44, file SGS 322 ETOUSA, to the C/S, sgd DDE.
3. GO 66, ETOUSA, 17 Apr 45.
4. Memo, SHAEF, 22 Jul 44, file SGS 322 ETOUSA, subj: "Administration of American Theater."
5. Memo, SHAEF, 11 Jul 45, file SGS 322, subj: "Reorganization in the ETO."
6. Staff Study, G-4 SHAEF, 18 Sep 44, file SGS 322 ETOUSA, subj: "Organization and Command of US Forces" to C/S, sgd R. W. Crawford, Maj Gen, USA, ACofS, G-4.
7. Ltr, ETOUSA, 5 May 45, file 322.011 OpCS, subj: "Duties and Responsibilities of the Deputy Theater Commander."
8. See Par 3d, above.
9. Memo, SHAEF, 16 Jul 44, file SGS 322 ETOUSA, subj: "Draft General Order of the Organization of the ETO," sgd MBS.
10. Ltr, SHAEF, 11 Jul 44, file SGS 322, ETOUSA, subj: "Responsibilities and Functions of CO, COM Z."
11. GO 118, COMZ, 29 Jun 45, Sec I.
12. The breakdown into corps and divisions as given in this section is taken from the Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff for period 1 Jul 43 to 30 Jun 45.
13. Cable 4168, 13 May 45, London sgd Winant to State Dop.
14. Cable W-23985, 28 Jun 45, AGWAR from MARCOS to ETOUSA Main.
15. Memo, US Pol Adv to Lt Gen W. B. Smith, C/S, SHAEF and Lt Gen Lucius D. Clay, Dop Mil Gov, Germany, 11 Jul 45.

FOOTNOTES-- CHAPTER II (Continued)

16. EAC, 26 Jul 45, Minutes of Meeting held at Lancaster House, London, SW1, on 26 Jul 45 at 1900 h.
17. Cable WK-24456, 29 Jun 45, AGWAR from CCS to SHAEF Main to Eisenhower, AFHQ to Alexander, US Mil Mission to Deane and Gammell.
18. Fifteenth Army, Report of Operations, 1-31 Jul 45.
19. Cable S-12796, 17 Jul 45, USFET Main sgd Eisenhower to AGWAR for JCS.
20. 12th Army Cp, G-3 Report No 401, 11 Jul 45.
21. 12th Army Cp, G-3 Report No 399, 9 Jul 45.
22. See Monograph on "Supply, Procurement, Storage, and Issue, "Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46.
23. Cable FWD-2445, 10 Jun 45, SHAEF FWD sgd Eisenhower to AGWAR for CCS.
24. Fifteenth Army, Report of Operations, 1-31 Jul 45.
25. Cable S-12796, 17 Jul 45, USFET Main sgd Eisenhower to AGWAR for JCS.
26. USFA, Report of Operations, 8 May-20 Sep 45.
27. Ibid.
28. See monograph, "Civil Affairs", Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46, chap III.
29. Cable WK-24456, 29 Jun 45, AGWAR from CCS to SHAEF Main to Eisenhower, AFHQ to Alexander.
30. Cable GO 159A, 30 Jun 45, EXFOR Main to VIII Corps Dist, XXX Corps Dist, TAC 7 Armd Div.
31. Cable S-12796, 17 Jul 45, USFET Main sgd Eisenhower to AGWAR for JCS.
32. USFA, Report of Operations, II Corps, 8 May-30 Sep 45.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER II (Continued)

33. Cable S-12796, 17 Jul 45, USFET Main sgd Eisenhower to AGWAR for JCS.
34. See monograph, "Civil Affairs," Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46, chap III.
35. Cable S-95715, 6 Jul 45, SHAEF Main sgd Tedder to 12th Army Gp, AGWAR, AFHQ, 15th Army Gp, COM Z.
36. See monograph, "Civil Affairs," Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46, chap III.
37. Cable EX-24456, 29 Jun 45, AGWAR from CCS to SHAEF Main for Eisenhower, AFHQ for Alexander.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter III

1. Crimea Conference Communiqué, 3-11 Feb 45, sgd Winston S. Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, J. V. Stalin.
2. See Par 155, below.
3. See Pars 53-57, below.
4. ID, 30 Jun 44, Spec Planning Div, Report on the Status of Demobilization and Postwar Planning.
5. EAC Report, 14 Nov 44.
6. Ltr, SHAEF, 17 Apr 45, file GCT/388-3/US, subj: "US Theater Organization."
7. Memo, SHAEF, 8 Jun 45, subj: "US Theater Organization Aspects of the Problem."
8. Cable FWD-22471, 28 May 45, SHAEF from Eisenhower to AGWAR for Marshall.
9. Cable E-58393, 17 Jun 45, ETOUSA Main sgd Dovers to ETOUSA FWD.
10. GO 130, ETOUSA, 20 Jun 45, Secs II, III, IV.
11. Cable FWD-22132, 22 May 45, SHAEF to ETOUSA.
12. JCS 1400, 28 Jun 45, subj: "Command Directive for Germany and Austria."
13. GO 154, USFET, 14 Jul 45, sec I.
14. Staff Study, 12th Army Gp, 4 Jan 45, file 323.33 (G-3), subj: "Territorial Organization of US Zone of Occupation, Germany."
15. Memo, SHAEF, G-3 Div, 26 Jan 45, file GCT-387.46/PHP, subj: "Territorial Organization of the United States Zone of Occupation, Germany," approved, 27 Jan 45, by W. B. Smith, CofS.
16. Cable EX-51512, 30 May 45, COM Z to SHAEF FWD.
17. Cable CA-11685, 25 May 45, CONAD to COM Z.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER III (Continued)

18. COM Z, 28 Mar 45, Planning Directive Series K, Operation ECLIPSE.
19. Cable E-11668, 22 Feb 45, ETOUSA from Lord to SHAEF for Crawford.
20. Staff Study, SHAEF, 23 Feb 45, file 231/OOP-1, subj: "Analysis of COM Z Nonconcurrence."
21. Ltr, COM Z, 14 Jul 45, file AG 322 OpGD, subj: "COM Z Service Commands."
22. GO 159, USFET, 17 Jul 45.
23. Cable S-13239, 20 Jul 45, USFET to COM Z.
24. 12th Army Gp, G-3 Report No 345, 16 May 45.
25. 12th Army Gp, G-3 Report No 405, 14 Jul 45.
26. GO 168, USFET, 21 Jun 45, sec I.
27. 12th Army Gp, G-3 Report No 416, 26 Jul 45.
28. GO 306, USFET, 6 Nov 45, sec II.
29. 12th Army Gp, G-3 Report No 344, 15 May 45.
30. 12th Army Gp, G-3 Report No 352, 23 May 45.
31. USFET, AG Oprs Card Files, Frankfurt, Germany.
32. 12th Army Gp, G-3 Report No 375, 15 Jun 45.
33. 12th Army Gp, G-3 Report No 398, 7 Jul 45.
34. USFET, AG Oprs Card Files, Frankfurt, Germany.
35. Cable EX-52150, 1 Jun 45, COM Z to DBS.
36. Chanor Base Sec, Report of Operations, 8 May-20 Feb 46.
37. USFET, G-3 Div, Redeployment Branch, 31 Oct 45, "Monthly Redeployment Progress."
38. Ibid.
39. USFET, G-3 Div, 30 Jun 45, "Monthly Redeployment progress."

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER III (Continued)

40. USFET, G-3 Div, Redeployment Branch, 31 Oct 45, "Monthly Redeployment Progress."
41. Ibid. Throughout this section, figures for actual shipments are taken from the Theater Headquarters, G-3 Division, Redeployment Branch, "Monthly Redeployment Progress" for October 1945, while the forecasts for June shipments are taken from the report by G-3 Division for June. Actual figures for shipments for May and June are taken from the October report rather than the June report because of the fact that, during early redeployment, statistics were difficult to keep and thus subject to inaccuracies. In order to obtain an accurate set of figures, statistics were worked over in September of 1945. These were published in the October "Monthly Redeployment Progress."
42. USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov. 46.
43. USFET, G-3 Div, 30 Jun 45, "Monthly Redeployment Progress."
44. USFET, G-3 Div, Redeployment Branch, 31 Oct 45, "Monthly Redeployment Progress."
45. Ibid.
46. USFET, G-3 Div, 30 Jun 45, "Monthly Redeployment Progress."
47. USFET, G-3 Div, Redeployment Branch, 31 Oct 45, "Monthly Progress Report."
48. USFET, G-3 Div, 30 Jun 45, "Monthly Progress Report."
49. USFET, Redeployment Coordinating Group, Report of Operations, 17 Apr 45-28 Feb 46, annex "B".
50. USFET, G-3 Div, 30 Jun 45, "Monthly Progress Report."
51. USFET, IS, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
52. USFET, G-3 Div, 31 Oct 45, "Monthly Progress Report."
53. USFET, G-3 Div, 31 Jul 45, "Monthly Progress Report."
54. USFET, G-3 Div, Redeployment Branch, 31 Oct 45, "Monthly Progress Report."

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER III (Continued)

55. Ibid.
56. USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
57. See chap I, pars 14-23, above.
58. "12th Army Group Plan for Operation ECLIPSE," 4 May 45, annex 7.
59. Ltr, Hq, ETOUSA, 8 Apr 45, file AG 383.6 OpGA, subj; "Liberated Citizens of the Soviet Union."
60. COM Z, Progress Report, May 1945, sec I.
61. ECLIPSE Memo 17, 16 Apr 45, par 20, sec F.
62. SHAEF Disbandment Directive, 15 May 45, Nos 1 & 2.
63. SHAEF Disbandment Directive, 18 May 45, No 3.
64. SHAEF Disbandment Directive, 5 Jun 45, No 4.
65. SHAEF Disbandment Directive, 30 Jun 45, No 5.
66. SHAEF Disbandment Directive, 6 Jul 45, No 6.
67. Ltrs, ETOUSA, 25 Oct and 11 Nov 44, file AG 383.6 OpGA, subj: "Repatriation, Recovery, and Rehabilitation of American Prisoners of War in Europe."
68. SHAEF, 15 Mar 45, "Strength of POW Camps in Germany as known to PWX-G-1 Div."
69. SOP 58, ETOUSA, 3 Apr 45, subj: "Reception, Processing, Maintenance, and Disposition of Recovered Allied Military Personnel."
70. TSFET, Staff Conference Report, 7 Sep 45.
71. Cable NX-70557, 20 Apr 45, AGWAR to SHAEF et al.
72. SHAEF, 3 Jun 44, file AG 383.7-IGE-AGM, Outline Plan for refugees and DP's.
73. SHAEF Administrative Memo 39, 25 Nov 44, appendix "C", subj: "Employment of UNRRA Personnel with Military Forces."

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER III (Continued)

74. Handbook for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender, Dec 44, part III.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. Ltr, SHAEF, 8 Jul 45, file AG 383.7-1 GE-AGM, subj: "Combined DP Executive."
78. Ltr, SHAEF, 18 Dec 44, file AG 383.7-1 GEAGM, subj: "Responsibility for Assembly Centers for DP's and Refugees."
79. For further information, see monograph, "Displaced Persons," Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46, chap I.
80. USFET, General Board, Study No 35, Undated, DP's Refugees, and RAEP's; see also DP Rpt No 40, appendix "A".
81. Ibid.
82. The source for table I is ONGUS, DP Div, Status of DP's (US-British and French Zones), 31 Jul 45. The figures for DP's outside camps are estimates carried forward from 24 June, after which date no estimates are available for Eastern or Western Military Districts.
83. General Board Study No 86, p 9.
84. General Board Study No 86, p 9.
85. Cable WX-18961, 19 Jun 45, AGWAR to SHAEF.
86. Judge Advocate File: War Crimes Trials and Procedure after Trial, item 13.
87. Ltr, USFET, 1 Aug 45, file AG 250.4, subj: "Authority to Appoint Military Commissions."
88. Ltr, USFET, Undated, file AG 000.5 WCB-AGO, subj: "Trial of War Crimes Cases."
89. USFET, Theater JA, Report of Operations, 8 May-30 Sep 45, pp 1-2.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER III (Continued)

90. Crimea Conference Communiqué, 3-11 Feb 45, sgd by Winston S. Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and J.V. Stalin.
91. New York Times, 13 May 45.
92. Executive Order No 9547, 22 May 45.
93. Cable WX-18961, AGWAR to SNASF.
94. JCS 1023/10, 8 Jul 45.
95. GO 128, ETOUSA, 17 Jan 45; amended by GO 182, USFET, 7 Aug 45; GO 312, USFET, 20 Nov 45.
96. GO 312, USFET, 20 Nov 45.
97. GO 128, ETOUSA, 17 Jun 45.
98. GO 144, USFET, 4 Jul 45.
99. GO 289, USFET, 14 Oct 45.
100. Ltr, USFET, 6 Aug 45, file AG 334 GDS-AGO, subj: "Establishment of the Office of the Army-Navy Liquidation Commission."
101. Stars and Stripes, 13 Jun 45.
102. PRD Release No 15, USFET, 14 Jul 45.
103. Ltr, SHAEF, 22 May 45, to Brig Gen Marion Van Voorst, American Embassy, sgd J. B. Moore III, Col, Secretary General Staff.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter IV

1. For later developments, see also chap VI, pars 152-54, below.
2. Cable W-75375, 5 Aug 44, JCS to SHAEF.
3. GO 80, ETOUSA, 9 Aug 44.
4. LTR, SHAEF, 17 Feb 45, file 322, subj: "Hqs Command for USGpCC(G)."
5. GO 28, ETOUSA, 5 Mar 45.
6. Cable CC-12381, 20 Mar 45, USGpCC(G) to SHAEF.
7. GO 22, USGpCC(G), 15 May 45.
8. USGpCC(G), Minutes of Meeting of 10 Mar 45.
9. Ltr, ETOUSA, 31 Mar 45, file 322, subj: "Mission of the USGpCC(G)."
10. Ltr, ETOUSA, 26 Apr 45, file GCT. 322.01, subj: "The Relationship of the Deputy Military Governor and the US Group Control Council (Germany) to the Theater Staff."
11. See chap I, pars 1-5, above.
12. Berlin Declaration, 5 Jun 45.
13. BD, CG Diary, BD/FAA, 29 Jun 45.
14. TMO No 39, BD/FAA, 30 Jun 45.
15. BD/FAA, C/S Diary, 1 Jul 45.
16. BD/FAA, C/S Diary, 7 Jul 45.
17. Cable W-24669, 30 Jun 45, AGWAR from WARCOS to COMGENETO; see also chap II, pars 45-51.
18. ACC (Germany), Minutes of Meeting, 30 Jul 45.
19. EAC, Minutes of Meeting, 14 Nov 44.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER IV (continued)

20. History of OMGUS (USGpCC(G)), chap III.
21. History OMGUS (USCpCC(G)), chap II.
22. Moscow Declaration on Austria, 1 Nov 43.
23. Cable F-46412, 16 May 44, AFHQ to AGWAR.
24. Cable TX-20896, 27 Jan 45, MTOUSA to SHAEF.
25. USFA, USACA Sec, Military Government, Austria, 30 Sep 46.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Cable FX-17725, 5 Jul 45, AFHQ to 15th Army Gp.
29. 12th Army Gp, G-3 Report No. 400, 10 Jul 45.
30. GO 1, USFA, 5 Jul 45.
31. JCS, 28 Jun 45, Command Directive for Germany and Austria.
32. Cable FX-17725, 5 Jul 45, AFHQ to 15th Army Gp.
33. Cable C-727, 14 Jul 45, 85th GpAAF to subordinate units.
34. GO 154, USFAT, 14 Jul 45.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter V

1. Ltr, Hq ETQUSA, 16 Jun 45, to US Rcn Party to Berlin.
2. Hq Berlin District (Masterwork), Strength Returns, 16 Jul 45.
3. USHq Berlin District & Hq First Airborne Army, History and Report of Operations, 8 May-31 Dec 45, pt I.
4. Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control Council and Coordinating Committee, Allied Control Authority, Germany, vol, 1945, p 23.
5. Ibid, p 26.
6. Ibid, p 20.
7. Ibid, p 20.
8. Ibid, p 75.
9. Ibid, p 75.
10. GO 168, USFET, 21 Jul 45, Sec I.
11. GO 177, USFET, 1 Aug 45, sec I.
12. USFET, G-3 Rpt No 31, 25 Aug 45.
13. See also par 147.
14. GO 262, TSFET, 21 Sep 45.
15. GO 361, TSFET, 12 Dec 45, sec I, II, IV.
16. Bremen Port Command, Report of Operations, 9 Dec 45.
17. GO 380, TSFET, 29 Dec 45.
18. GO 317, USFET, 26 Nov 45.
19. GO 115, USSTAF, 16 Aug 45.
20. See also Shantou TTT secs III, IV.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER V (Continued)

21. Ltr, USFET, 21 Jul 45, file AG 322 GCT-AGO, subj: "US Theater Organization."
22. GO 167, TSFET, 21 Jul 45.
23. GO 355, USFET, 29 Dec 45.
24. TSFET, 1 Aug 45, Planning Directive Series L, No 1.
25. TSFET, Progress Report, Aug 45.
26. See para 29-40.
27. GO 179, USFET, 2 Aug 45; sec also GO 199, TSFET, 16 Aug. 45.
28. GO 244, USFET, 15 Sep 45.
29. GO 259, USFET, 22 Sep 45.
30. For specific examples see pars 97-100 and 102-104.
31. USFET, OMGUS, Proclamation No 2, 19 Sep 45.
32. Ltr, USFET, 5 Jul 45, file AG 014.1-1 (Germany), GE, subj: "Assumption of Certain Military Government Responsibilities."
33. GO 283, USFET, 8 Oct 45, Sec II, III.
34. See also chap IV, Pars 91-96.
35. GO 283, USFET, 8 Oct 45, sec I.
36. Staff Memo, USFET, OMGUS, (USZ), 17 Oct 45, file GE Plans 322 (MG), subj: "Separation of Military Government Organization from Army Tactical Field Forces and Administrative and Supply Service."
37. GO 331, USFET, 11 Dec 45, sec II.
38. Third Army, G-5 Sec, Quarterly Report of Operations, 1 Oct-31 Dec 45.
39. For details on the early occupation of Austria, see Pars 97-100.
40. USFA, USACA Sec, MG Austria, 30 Sep 46.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER V (Continued)

41. Map, Austria, 1:100,000, Bezirk Boundaries - Vienna.
42. USFA, MG AUSTRIA, Rpt of the US Commissioner No 1, Nov 45.
43. Monthly Report of Military Government, US Zone, 20 Sep 45.
44. Ibid.
45. Stars and Stripes, 28 Jan 46.
46. Monthly Report of Military Government, US Zone, 20 Oct 45.
47. Monthly Report of Military Government, US Zone, 20 Nov 45.
48. Monthly Report of Military Government, US Zone, 20 Dec 45.
49. Monthly Report of the Military Governor, US Zone, 20 Aug 45.
50. Monthly Report of the Military Governor, US Zone, 20 Sep 45.
51. USPET, PRD Release No 352, 15 Sep 45.
52. For further particulars see monograph "Fraternization," Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46.
53. See also monograph, "The Care and Repatriation of Displaced Persons," Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46.
54. Hq, COM Z, ETOUSA, Progress Report, June 45.
55. Cable MG-1718, 20 Aug 45, EXFOR to I Corps et al.
56. Cable S-18908, 22 Aug 45, USFET Main sgd Eisenhower to TSFET Rear for USFET Mission France.
57. War Crimes Committee, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 8 Aug 45.
58. Memo, Chief International Law Section, TJA, for Theater JA, 16 Oct 45, subj: "Organization for Proceedings Against Axis Criminals and Certain Other Offenders," par 11.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER V (Continued)

59. Ltr, USFET, 20 Sep 45, subj: "Identification and Apprehension of Persons Suspected fo War Crimes or Other Offences, and Trial of Certain Offenders."
60. Memo, Chief International Law Section, TJA for Theater JA, 16 Oct 45, subj: "Organization for Proceedings Against Axis Criminals and Certain Other Offenders," par 10.
61. WD Cable WCL-38715, 18 Jan 46, AGWAR to USFET.
62. Control Council, Law No 10, 20 Dec 45, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes against Peace, and Crimes against Humanity.
63. Baltimore Sun, 30 Aug 45.
64. USFET, G-2, Weekly Intelligence Summary No 11, 27 Sep 45.
65. USFET, PRD Release No 438, 27 Sep 45.
66. USFET PRD Release No 707, 13 Nov 45.
67. Cable, COM Z, ETOUSA, Progress Report, June 45.
68. Ibid.
69. Cable, USFET, S-29064, Eisenhower to EMD, WMD, BD, USFA, USAFE, TSF (Rear), COMNAVFORCER, 24 Oct 45.
70. Ltr, Hq USFET, 22 Dec 45, file AG 371.2-4 GCT-AGE, subj: "Police-Type Method of Occupation;" and cable, USFET, S-30332, Eisenhower to AGWAR for WARCOS, 1 Nov 45.
71. Cable, USFET, S-30332, Eisenhower to AGWAR for WARCOS, 1 Nov 45.
72. Provost Marshal, Report of Operations, 8 May-30 Sep 45.
73. Ltr, Hq USFET, 22 Dec 45, file AG 371.2-4 GCT-AGE, subj: "Police-Type Method of Occupation."
74. Cable Hq USFET, S-32630, Patton to AGWAR for WARCOS, 24 Nov 45; Ltr, Hq USFET, 22 Dec 45, file AG 371.2-4 GCT-AGE, subj:
75. Ltr, Hq USFET, 22 Dec 45, file AG 371.2-4 GCT-AGE, subj: "Police-Type Method of Occupation."

FOOTNOTES

Chapter VI

1. Unless other references are given, the source for any statement in this section is the monograph "Redeployment," Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46, Chap III and IV. For further information see this monograph.
2. USFET G-3, Redeployment Branch, Monthly Progress Reports; 31 Jul and 31 Oct 45.
3. USFET G-3, Redeployment Branch, Monthly Progress Reports; USFET Redeployment Coordinating Group, Report of Operations, 17 Apr to 28 Feb 46.
4. Cable W-47214, 10 Aug 45, AGWAR to USFET and Theater concerned; cable WX-47209, 10 Aug 45, AGWAR from Marshall to USFET Main personal for Eisenhower and MTOUSA personal for McNarney.
5. Cable 1410, 14 Aug 45, AGWAR to Theaters concerned; cable WX-49784, 15 Aug 45, AGWAR to USFET.
6. USFET G-3, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Cable EX-80003, 18 Aug 45, USFET to major commands. The point system was the result of investigation by the War Department into soldier opinion on the subject of priority for release. Four types of credit were recognized: service credit, based on the total months of Army service since 16 September 1940; overseas credit, based on the number of months of overseas service; combat credit, based on the first and each additional award of a decoration; and parenthood credit, which allowed for each dependent child under eighteen years up to the limit of three children. For each of those credits the soldier was awarded a certain number of points, the total of which made up his adjusted service rating score, which in turn decided his eligibility for release. The exceptions to this were certain types of irreplaceable specialists whom the Army was unable, on grounds of military need, to release.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER VI (Continued)

10. Cable W-49576, 14 Aug 45, AGWAR to USFET Main, personal to Eisenhower.
11. Cable W-49544, 14 Aug 45, AGWAR to USFET, personal to Eisenhower; cable S-17802, 15 Aug 45, USFET to AGWAR.
12. Cable EX-81337, 23 Aug 45, USFET to Base Sections and Bremen Fort Command.
13. USFET, Interim Directive for Redeployment and readjustment Following the Defeat of Japan, 22 Aug 45.
14. USFET G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
15. Cable EX-80003, 18 Aug 45, USFET to major commands.
16. Cable S-20076, 28 Aug 45, USFET to AGWAR.
17. USFET G-3, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
18. Ibid.
19. Cable S-20075, 28 Aug 45, USFET to AGWAR.
20. Cable WX-57182, 30 Aug 45, AGWAR to USFET.
21. USFET G-3, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
22. Cable WX-57162, 30 Aug 45, AGWAR to USFET.
23. USFET G-3 Div, Redeployment Br, Monthly Progress Report, 31 Oct 45.
24. USFET G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
25. Telephone Conference, Washington (Maj Gen Craig and Maj Gen Henry) with Frankfurt (Brig Gen Eyster), 2 Sep 45.
26. Special TWX Conference, AGWAR and USFET, TT-4059, 3 Sep 45, subj: "Redeployment."
27. USFET G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
28. Ibid.

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39. Cable IX-60240, 6 Sep 45, AGWAR to Theaters, Commands, and WD Staff Divisions.
40. USFET G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. USFET G-3 Div, Trps and Redeployment Br, Redeployment Progress Report, 30 Sep 45.
44. USFET G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. USFET G-3 Div, Trps and Redeployment Br, Redeployment Progress Report, 31 Oct 45.
48. Ibid.
49. USFET G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
50. USFET G-3 Div, Trps and Redeployment Br, Redeployment Progress Report, 30 Nov 45.
51. USFET G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
52. Ibid.
53. USFET G-3 Div, Trps and Redeployment Br, Redeployment Progress Report, 31 Dec 45.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Cable MAR-81908, 9 Nov 45, AGWAR to USFET Main Personal to Eisenhower.
57. Ibid.
58. USFET G-3 Div, Trps and Redeployment Br, Redeployment Progress Report, 31 Dec 45.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER VI (Continued)

49. USFET G-3 Div, Trps and Redeployment Br, Redeployment Progress Report, 31 Dec 45.
50. USFET SGS, Report of Operations, 8 May to 30 Sep 45.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. G-3 Report No 89, USFET, 22 Oct 45, par 3a.
54. USFET SGS, Report of Operations, 8 May to 30 Sep 45.
55. G-3 Report No 130, USFET, 2 Dec 45, par 3a.
56. Cable, S-25879, USFET to AGWAR and major Commands.
57. Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report, USFET No 7, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
58. Bremen Port Command, Report of Operations, Oct to Dec 45.
59. Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report, USFET No 1, 18 Dec 45, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
60. Cable W-75415, 1 May 45, AGWAR from Hull to ETOUSA personal for Eisenhower.
61. USFET SGS, Report of Operations, 8 May to 30 Sep 45.
62. Cable S-14945, 1 Aug 45, USFET to major commands.
63. Memo, USFET, ACofS, G-3, 8 Oct 45 for CofS.
64. USFET G-1, Report of Operations, 1 Oct to 31 Dec 45.
65. AG Non-T/O Allotment Letters, No 501 A, Jun 45 to Jul 46.
66. IRS USFET, OCQH to AG Mil Pers through G-1, 18 Aug 45; cable S-21115, 1 Sep 45, USFET to AGWAR; cable 74437, 29 Sep 45, ASF sgd Henry C. Wolfe, Brig Gen, USA, Dir Planning Div; Memo, Maj Gen Daniel Noce, Acting CofS, ASF, for Lt Gen John O. H. Lee, CG TSFET.

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67. USFET G-1, Report of Operations 1 Oct to 31 Dec 45.
68. Ibid.
69. Memo, ACofS, G-3, 6 Dec 45, for CofS.
70. Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report, USFET No 1, 18 Dec 45, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
71. USFET G-1 Div, Report of Operations, 1 Oct to 31 Dec 45.
72. Cable ETX-4015, 23 Oct 45, USFET to AGWAR.
73. Cable W-80642, 2 Nov 45, AGWAR to USFET.
74. Cable S-34223, 8 Dec 45, USFET to AGWAR.
75. Memo, USFET, 24 Nov 45, for major commands; USFET G-1 Div, Report of Operations, 1 Oct to 31 Dec 45.
76. Memo, USFET OTIG, 23 Jan 46, subj: "Method of Assigning Replacements," for CofS.
77. IRS, USFET, G-1, 13 Feb 46, subj: "IG Report on Assignment of Replacements," for SGS.
78. Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report, USFET, No 1, 18 Dec 45, Rpt of the ACofS, G-1.
79. USFET, G-3, Report of Operations, Oct-Dec 45.
80. Ltr, USFET G-3 Div, 29 Nov 45, file GCT 370 JPS, subj: "Estimates on Future Troop Basis, ET," to MD, sgd A. S. Nevins, Brig Gen, GSC A/ACofS, G-3.
81. Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 1, 18 Dec 45, and No 2, 2 Jan 46.
82. Unless other references are given the material in this section is drawn from the monograph "Manpower," Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46, pt II. For further information see this monograph.
83. Ltr, USFET, 21 Aug 45, file AG 230 GAP-AGO, subj: "Employment of Civilians."
84. Civ Pers Cir 15, USFET, 20 May 46, subj: "Civilian Employment Priority."

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER VI (Continued)

85. "G-1 and its Role in the Fight against Nazism in the ETO," USFET G-1 Div, 1945.
86. USFET G-4 Div, Report of Operations, 8 May to 30 Sep 45.
87. Third US Army, G-2 Sec, Historical Report, Jun 45.
88. Staff Study, USFET G-1 Div to Cofs, 15 Sep 45, subj: "Employment of Civilians in the Occupied Zone."
89. Ltr, USFET, 21 Aug 45, file AG 230 GAP-AGO, subj: "Employment of Civilians."
90. Ltr, USFET, 22 Sep 45, file AG 230 GAP-AGO, subj: "British Civilian Volunteer Clericals."
91. Ltr, USFET, 15 Sep 45, file AG 230 GAP-AGO, subj: "Employment of Civilians."
92. SOP 29, ETOUSA, 26 May 44, subj: "Procurement, Utilization and Administration of Civilian Labor in Liberated or Occupied Territory"; Staff Memo No 45, USFET, 18 Sep 45, subj: "Staff Responsibilities for Civilian Personnel," appendix 1; ltr, USFET, 8 Sep 45, file AG 322.011 GAP-AGO, subj: "Delegation of Civilian Personnel Authority," appendix 2; ltr, USFET, 3 Oct 45, file AG 322.011 GAP-AGE, subj: "Responsibility for Civilian Personnel Administration."
93. Cable 125, 17 Jul 45, SECSTATE to USFET Main.
94. SOP 49, ETOUSA, 9 May 45, subj: "Employment of PW's."
95. USFET G-4, Notes of G-4 Daily Conference, 15 Mar 46.
96. Ltr, USFET, 23 Oct 45, file AG 322 GCT-AGO, subj: "Policy for Employment of Disarmed Enemy Units and Labor Service Units."
97. Ltr, Hq USAFE, 2 Nov 45, subj: "Luftwaffe Signal Battalion."
98. TSFET PM, Report of Operations, 8 May to 30 Sep 45.
99. TSFET Progress Report, for August and December 45.

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1. Gf charts in chaps IV and VIII.
2. GO 1, USFET, 2 Jan 46.
3. GO 26, USFET, 30 Jan 46, II.
4. Memo, TSFET, 19 Nov 45, subj: "Logistical Support of US Occupation of Germany."
5. CBS, Report of Operations, 15 Jan-31 Mar 46.
6. GO 374, TSFET, 26 Dec 45.
7. GO 16, TSFET, 22 Jan 46.
8. Ltr, USFET, 12 Jan 46, file AG 322 GAP-AGO, subj: "Inactivation of GFRC."
9. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference No 2, 8 Jan 46,
10. GO 18, 26 Jan 46, I, III.
11. GO 19, TSFET, 29 Jan 46.
12. GO 66, USFET, 13 Mar 46.
13. GO 24, TSFET, 5 Feb 46.
14. GO 103, USFET, 11 Apr 46.
15. GO 18, USFET, 18 Jan 46, I.
16. GO 63, USFET, 8 Mar 46, I.
17. GO 36, USFET, 8 Mar 46, I.
18. Ibid, I.
19. Stark-Lee Agreement, 31 May 45.
20. The material for this paragraph was furnished by the Naval Liaison Office, Hq EUCOM, June 1947.

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21. GO 61, USFET, 7 Mar 46.
22. Ibid.
23. Third Army, G-5 Sec, Historical Report, Sep 45, pt VI.
24. USFET, Troop Assignment No 139, 5 Sep 45.
25. Staff Memo No 72, Seventh Army, 4 Sep 45; for further details see monograph, "Civil Affairs", Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46.
26. GO 337, USFET, 14 Dec 45.
27. Ibid.
28. GO 43, USFET, 19 Feb 46.
29. GO 117, Third Army, 14 Jun 45.
30. GO 61, USFET, 7 Mar 46.
31. Staff Memo 57, USFET, 13 Jun 46.
32. Ltr, USFET, 7 May 46, file AG 371.2, GRC-AGO, subj: "Security Liaison between Army Units and Military Government."
33. Unless other references are given, the source of any information in this section is the monograph "Redeployment," Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46. For further information see this monograph.
34. Redeployment Progress Report, USFET G-3 Div, 31 Dec. 45.
35. Ibid.
36. USFET G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
37. Ibid.
38. Stars and Stripes, 6 Jan 46.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid; also edition of 9 Jan 46; TWX Conference, Washington-Frankfurt, 8 Jan 46.

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41. Stars and Stripes, 11 Jan 46.
42. Ibid, 13 Jan 46.
43. USFET G-3 Div, Report of Operations 1 Jan-31 Mar 46.
44. Cable WCL-3750, 15 Jan 46, AGWAR to USFET; Press release No 1045, USFET PRD, 15 Jan 46.
45. Ibid.
46. USFET G-3 Div, Report of Operations 1 Jan-31 Mar 46.
47. Ibid.
48. USFET G-3 Div, Trps and Redeployment Br, Redeployment Progress Report, 31 Jan 46.
49. Ibid; also USFET G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
50. USFET G-3 Div, Trps and Redeployment Br, Redeployment Progress Report, 28 Feb 46.
51. USFET G-3 Div, Trps and Redeployment Br, Redeployment Progress Report, 31 Mar 46; USFET G-3 Div, Report of Operations 1 Jan-31 Mar 46.
52. USFET G-3 Div, Redeployment Progress Report, 30 Apr 46; 31 May 46; 30 Jun 46; USFET G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, No 46.
53. TSFET G-3, Report of Operations, 1 Oct. 45-28 Feb 46.
54. Ibid; USFET G-3, Report of Operations, 1 Jan-31 Mar 46.
55. USFET G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46; USFET G-3 Div, Report of Operations, 1 Apr-30 Jun 46.
56. USFET SGS, Report of Operations 1 Oct-31 Dec 45.
57. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 3, 8 Jan 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
58. Memo ACofS, G-3, 29 Jan 46, for CofS.
59. Cable W-89263, 25 May 46, AGWAR sgd WARCOS to USFET.

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60. Ibid.
61. See par 166, above.
62. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 8, 12 Feb 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
63. Cable, W-90337, 5 Jul 46, AGWAR to USFET.
64. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 14, 26 Mar 46, No 15, 2 Apr 46, and No 18, 26 Apr 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
65. Ibid, No 24, 4 Jun 46.
66. Interview with Col Leslie E. Jacoby, formerly Chief, SerSac Br, G-1, TSFET; USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 14, 26 Mar 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
67. Ibid, No 20, 7 May 46; cable S-2935, 29 Apr 46, USFET to AGWAR; cable W-89263, 25 May 46, AGWAR to USFET; IRS USFET, G-1 to AG, 27 May 46.
68. Interview with Col. Jacoby, as cited n. 66.
69. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Reports No 20, 7 May 46 and No 26, 19 Jun 46, Rpts of ACofS, G-1; cable, 20 May 46, USFET to Major Commands.
70. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 26, 19 Jun 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
71. Ltr, USFET, 22 Jun 46, subj: "Negro Manpower" to major commands.
72. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 29, 9 Jul 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1; cable W-93524, 4 Jul 46, AGWAR to USFET; cable WCL-27934, 16 Jul 46, AGWAR to USFET.
73. All information in this paragraph, unless otherwise cited, is from USFET Report of Operations of the Theater Liquidation and Manpower Board, 1 Jan-31 Mar and 1 Apr-30 Jun 46.

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74. GO 10, USFET, 10 Jan 46, subj: "Establishment of the Liquidation and Manpower Board."
75. Cir 4, USFET, 4 Jan 46, subj: "Establishment of the Liquidation and Manpower Board."
76. Ltr, USFET, 11 Mar 46, file AG 230 GAP-AGPC, subj: "Continental Wage Scale; Civ Pers Cir No 16 (revised), USFET, 28 Jun 46, annex "A" "Continental Wage Scale."
77. Cir 60, USFET, 1 May 46.
78. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Reports Nos 3 to 30, Jan-Jul 46.
79. Ibid.
80. Memo, USFET AG 27 May 46, subj: "Employment of Dependents of Military and Civilian Personnel." for Chiefs of Staff and Special Divisions.
81. Civ Pers Cir 15, USFET, 20 May 46, subj: "Civilian Employment Priority."
82. Ltr, USFET, 23 Jun 46, file AG 248 GAP-AGE, subj: "Federal Employee Pay Act of 1946."
83. USFET Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Reports Nos 13 and 35, 19 Mar and 20 Aug 46; USFET G-1 Div, Civ Pers Br, statistical bulletins, April, May and June 46.
84. Cable S-37399, 10 Jun 46, USFET to Seventh US Army.
85. Ltr, Hq USFET, 20 Mar 46, file AG 383.6 GAP-AGO, subj: "Discharge of Prisoners of War for Labor in US Zone."
86. OTPM, Report of Operations, 1 Apr-30 Jun 46, p 13.
87. TSFET, Progress Report, Dec 45, p 111.
88. CTPM, Report of Operations, 1 Jan-31 Mar 46, p 37.
89. USFET Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 26, 19 Jun 46.

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Chapter VIII

1. USFET G-2, Weekly Intelligence Summary No 28, for week ending 24 Jan 46.
2. Stars and Stripes, 29 Jan 46.
3. USFET G-2, Weekly Intelligence Summaries Nos 42, 43, for weeks ending 2 and 9 May 46.
4. Christian Science Monitor, 6 Jun 46.
5. Stars and Stripes, 2 Jul 46.
6. NY Herald Tribune, 15 Apr 46.
7. Ltr, USFET, 30 May 46, file AG 353 GCT-AGO, subj: "Initiation of Training Program and Reduction of Ineffectives."
8. Ltr, USFET, 20 May 46, file AG 461 GCT-AGO, subj: "Leadership and Command Pamphlet for Officers."
9. Stars and Stripes, 19 Jan 46.
10. TM #6, Third Army, 7 Mar 46, subj: "Training of US Constabulary."
11. For further particulars, see monograph "The US Constabulary," Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46, chap II.
12. For further details, see monograph "Manpower," Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46.
13. Stars and Stripes, 21 Feb 46.
14. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 37, 2 Sep 46.
15. Ltr, USFET, 9 Oct 45, file AG 510 GAP-AGP, subj: "Transportation of Dependents from Overseas."
16. CBS, G-1 Sec, Rpt of Opns. 1 Apr-30 Jun 46.
17. For further details, see monograph "The Shipment of Alien Dependents to the US," Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46.

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18. Ltr, USFET, 19 Sep 45, subj: "Special Occupational Planning Board."
19. For further details see monograph, "Shipment of Defendants to the ET and Establishment of Military Communities," Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46.
20. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 7, 5 Feb 46.
21. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 25, 11 Jun 46.
22. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 28, 2 Jul 46.
23. Stars and Stripes, 26 May 45.
24. USFET, Rpt of AES, 8 May-30 Sep 45.
25. USFET, Rpt of AES, 1 Oct-31 Dec 45.
26. USFET, Rpt of AES, 1 Jan-31 Mar 46, 1 Apr-30 Jun 46.
27. USFET, Summary of Special Theater Activities for the Under Secretary of War, 25 May 46.
28. Ltr, USFET, 6 Nov 45, file AG 354.1 GAP-AGO, subj: "Instructions to Govern Operation of Theater Leave Centers."
29. For further details see monograph "The Recreational and Entertainment Program of the US Forces, ET, "Occupational Forces in Europe Series 1945-46, chap IV
30. JCS 1067/6, 26 Apr 45.
31. Cable, CC-20114, 8 Dec 45, OMGUS to AGWAR.

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Chapter IX

1. G-3 Battle Studies, Summary of Operations 12th Army Group: Third Army History, 26 Jan 44-9 May 45, vol II, G-5 sec.
2. Third Army After-Action Report, 26 Jan 44-9 May 45; vol II, G-5 sec.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid. and Ninth Army Tactical History, 1 Sep 44-30 Apr 45.
8. Third Army After Action Report, 26 Jan 44-9 May 45, vol II, G-5 sec.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. G-3 Battle Studios, Summary of Operations 12th Army Group.
13. Fifteenth Army History, 21 Aug 44-8 May 45.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Fifteenth Army, G-3 Bi-Daily Report, 2 Apr 45-14 Jul 45.
17. Ibid. and Fifteenth Army History, 21 Aug 44-8 May 45.
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19. Third Army After-Action Report 26 Jan 44-9 May 45, vol II, G-5 sec; and Fifteenth Army History, 21 Aug 44-8 May 45.
20. Ibid.
21. Fifteenth Army History, 21 Aug 44-8 May 45.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid; and Third Army History, vol II, G-5 sec, 26 Jan 44-9 May 45; and Ninth Army Tactical History, 1 Sep 44-30 Apr 45.
24. Ibid.
25. Ninth Army Tactical History, 1 Sep 44-30 Apr 45.
26. Fifteenth Army History, 21 Aug 44-8 May 45.
27. Ibid; and Third Army History, vol II, G-5 sec, 26 Jan 44-9 May 45; and Ninth Army Tactical History, 1 Sep 22-30 Apr 45.
28. Fifteenth Army History, 21 Aug 44-8 May 45; and Third Army History, vol II, G-5 sec, 26 Jan 44-9 May 45; see also Public Safety, chaps I and II.
29. Fifteenth Army History, 21 Aug 44-8 May 45.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Public Safety, Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46.
33. Fifteenth Army History, 21 Aug 44-8 May 45.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.

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38. Ibid, 16 Apr-10 Jul 45.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid, and New York Times, 20 May 45.
43. Ltrs, SHAEF /231/5 GDP, "Liberation of Norway"; cable M-N-74, 11 Sep 45, USFET Mission to USFET Main.
44. SHAEF Mission to Norway, Report for 13 July 45.
45. USFET Mission to Norway, Report for 13 Aug 45.
46. SHAEF Mission to Norway, Report for 13 July 45.
47. USFET Mission to Norway, Report for 13 Aug 45.
48. Cable S-24328, 20 Sep 45, USFET Main, sgd Eisenhower to major commands.
49. USFET Mission to Norway, Report for 15 Oct 45; cable S-24328, 20 Sep 45, USFET Main to major commands.
50. USFET Mission to Norway, Report for 15 Oct 45.
51. SHAEF Mission to Norway, Report for 13 Jul 45.
52. USFET Mission to Norway, Report for 13 Sep 45.
53. USFET Mission to Norway, Report for 13 Aug 45.
54. SGS file, 091 Norway. Memorandum of Agreement between the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway, 28 June 45.
55. Cable, W-26600, 4 Jul 45, AGWAR from MARCOS to SHAEF Main to COMGENETO; cable S-95426, 5 Jul 45, SHAEF Main to AGWAR for Joint Chiefs of Staff, SCOFOR.
56. USFET Mission to Norway, Report for 15 Oct 45; cable S-25879, 30 Sep 45, USFET Main sgd Eisenhower to major commands; ltr, Hq Allied Land Forces, Norway, 22 Oct 45, file GON 301/1, subj: ETermination of Combined

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Command"; cable S-28794, 21 Oct 45, USFET Main, sgd
Eisenhower to major commands.

57. 12th Army Gp, Final After-Action Report, G-3 sec, pp
50-53.

58. Hq XXII Corps, Report of Operations 8 May-30 Sep 45,
p 3.

59. V Corps, Report of Operations, Jan 42-May 45, p 465.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid., p 464; Hq TUSA, Report of Operations, May-Sep 45,
p 22.

62. Hq XXII Corps Report of Operations, 8 May-30 Sep 45:
and 1 Oct-30 Nov 45.

63. Hq TUSA, Report of Operations, May-Sep 45, p 22.

64. Hq XXII Corps, Report of Operations, 8 May-30 Nov 45.

65. Hq XXII Corps, Report of Operations, 1 Oct-30 Nov 45.

66. V Corps, Report of Operations, Jan 42-May 45, p 458.

67. Hq XXII Corps, Report of Operations, 8 May-30 Nov 45.

68. Hq XXII Corps, Report of Operations, May-Sep 45.

69. Hq. XXII Corps, G-2, Periodic Report of Operations #51,
16 Oct 45,

70. Hq XXII Corps, G-2 Periodic Report of Operations, #52,
23 Oct 45; ltr, Gen Harmon to CG 3d US Army, 2 Oct 45,
subj: "Removal of US Troops from Czechoslovakia."

71. Hq XXII Corps, G-2, Report of Operations, 30 Sep 45, p
4; Hq XXII Corps, G-2, Periodic Report of Operations,
#35, 26 Jun 45.

72. Hq XXII Corps, G-2 Report of Operations, 16 Jun-30 Sep
45.

73. Ibid.

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74. Hq XXII Corps, G-2, Periodic Report of Operations, #39, 24 Jul 45.
75. Hq XXII Corps, G-2, Report of Operations, 16 Jun-30 Sep 45.
76. Ibid.
77. Ltr, Gen Harmon to CG Third US Army, 2 Oct 45, subj: "Removal of US Troops from Czechoslovakia."
78. Cable W-16162, 13 Jun 45, AGWAR fr Marshall to SHAEF Fwd for Eisenhower.
79. Cable W-26489, 4 Jul 45, AGWAR fr Joint Chiefs of Staff to SHAEF Main to Eisenhower.
80. Cable unnumbered, 3 Sep 45, Mil Attache Prague, sgd Holdike to MILID Washington and USFET Main.
81. Memo, 22 Sep 45, for J. D. Beam, Office of U.S. Political Advisor for Germany, Maj Gen H. R. Bull, DCofS.
82. Cable S-27035, 8 Oct 45, USFET Main, sgd Eisenhower, to Hq Eastern Mil Dist.
83. Cable W-77097, 19 Oct 45, AGWAR from MARCOS to USFET Main for Eisenhower; ltr, 23 Oct 45, Gen Harmon to Gen Bull.
84. Cable W-80709, 3 Nov 45, AGWAR sgd MARCOS to USFET Main.
85. Hq 3d US Army, Report of Operations 1 Oct-31 Dec 45.

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Chapter X

1. Cable MX-24200, 7 May 45, Military Mission Moscow from Dean and Archer to SHAEF.
2. Cable WX-79065, 8 May 45, AGWAR CCORs to Military Mission Moscow.
3. Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany, Enactments and Approved Papers, ACA, 5 June 45, vol I, p 10.
4. Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany, Sup No I, p 10.
5. Memo, Off Pol Adv, SHAEF, 4 June 45, file SGS 319.1.
6. Ibid, 12 July 45.
7. Ibid, 30 May 45.
8. Ibid, 2 June 45.
9. Ibid, 24 Oct 45.
10. Ibid, 16 Dec 45.
11. Ibid, 25 May 45.
12. Ibid, 28 Apr 45.
13. Ibid, 25 May 45.
14. Ibid, 26 Apr 45.
15. Ibid, 11 Jul 45.
16. Ibid, 10 Jul 45.
17. Cable W-87519, 26 May 45, AGWAR to ETOUSA.
18. Cable W-67749, 21 Sep 45, AGWAR to USFET.
19. Ltr, Belg Mission, 12 Sep 45, file SGS 322.1 Belg & Lux, from Maj A. D. Berten to Col A. D. Biddle.

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20. Memo, Off Pol Adv, SHAEF, 26 Apr 45, file SGS 319.1.
21. Ltr. SHAEF, 12 May 45, file SGS 0.91 Netherlands, subj: "Battalions for Use in Germany," Prince Bernhard to Lt Gen W. B. Smith.
22. Cable N-1813, 16 Jun 45, SHAEF Mission Netherlands to SHAEF Rear.
23. Cable S-15388, 3 Aug 45, USFET to AGWAR.
24. Cable BL-646, 9 Aug 45, USFET MISSION BELGIUM to USFET.
25. Memo, Off Pol Adv, SHAEF, 27 Apr 45, file SGS 091 Luxembourg.
26. Memo, Off Pol Adv, SHAEF, 15 Jun 45, file SGS 319.1.
27. Cable W-58462, 2 Sep 45, AGWAR to USFET.
28. Cable QX-24015, 15 Jun 45, 12th AG to 3d US Army.
29. Cable S-13691, 24 Jul 45, USFET to AGWAR.
30. Memo, Off Pol Adv, SHAEF, 16 Nov 45, file SGS 319.1.
31. Cable Z-283, 18 Jul 45, ACC Hungary to AGWAR for JCS.
32. Cable Z-288, 18 Jul 45, ACC Hungary to AGWAR for JCS.
33. Memo, Off Pol Adv, SHAEF, 23 May 45, file SGS 319.1.
34. Ibid, 16 Dec 45.
35. Ibid, 17 Dec 45.
36. Cable FX-56777, 19 Dec 45, AFHQ to AGWAR.
37. Memo, Off Pol Adv, SHAEF, 25 Apr 45, file SGS 319.1.
38. Ibid, 28 Apr 45.
39. Ibid, 26 Apr 45.
40. Ibid, 12 Jun 45.

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1. Cable W 75415, 1 May 45, AGWAR from Hull, sgd Marshall, to ETOUSA personal to Eisenhower.
2. Cable E-41727, 8 May 45, ETOUSA (thru SHAEF) to AGWAR.
3. USFET, G-1, Report of Operations, 1 Oct-31 Dec 45, narrative entires of 3 and 5 Oct 45.
4. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 1, 18 Dec 45, Rpt of ACofS, G-1; memo, ACofS, G-3, 6 Dec 45, for CofS (copy in USFET SGS, file 370.5, vol II).
5. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 8, 12 Feb 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
6. Cable WX-87933, 15 May 46, AGWAR to USFET.
7. Cable W-89263, 25 May 46, AGWAR (WARCOS) to USFET.
8. Cable W-90337, 5 Jul 46, AGWAR to USFET.
9. Seventh Army, Report of Operations, 1 Oct-31 Dec 45, narrative, p. 7.
10. Memo, USFET, 24 Nov 45 for Maj Com, (in G-1 Div, file 200.3, vol I).
11. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 1, 18 Dec 45, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
12. Cable W-80642, 2 Nov 45, AGWAR to USFET.
13. Cable WX-79473, 9 May 45, AGWAR to ETOUSA.
14. Memo, USFET, ACofS, G-3, 6 Dec 45, subj: "Training of Replacements," for CofS (copy in SGS, file 370.5, vol II).
15. Cable S-34223, 8 Dec 45, USFET to AGWAR.
16. History of the Ground Forces Reinforcement Command, European Theater, Part III, V-E Day to Inactivation, chap I, introd pp 22, 23, and 30.

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17. Ibid.
18. USFET, AG Div, Report of Operations, 1 Jan-31 Mar 46, narrative.
19. History of the Ground Forces Reinforcement Command, European Theater, Part III, V-E Day to Inactivation, chap I, introd pp 22, 23, and 30.
20. Memo, USFET, AG Div, 5 Feb 46, file AG 352 CAP-AGP, subj: "The Adjutant General's Clerical School", for Chiefs of Gen and Staff Secs.
21. Cable #39196, 30 Jan 46, USFET to AGWAR.
22. Cable W-95636, 2 Feb 46, AGWAR to USFET.
23. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 9, 19 Feb 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
24. Cable W-89721, 30 May 46, AGWAR to USFET.
25. Ltr, USFET, 10 May 46, subj: "Recruiting for a Specific Branch, Unit, or Theater," to AGWAR personal to Maj Gen Willard S. Paul, ACofS, G-1, sgd W. H. Barnes, Col, Acting ACofS, G-1 (in G-1 Div, file 342.18).
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 26, 19 Jun 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
29. Ibid, No 29, 9 Jul 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
30. Cable W-93524, 3 Jul 46, AGWAR to USFET.
31. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 29, 9 Jul 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
32. Interview with Col L. E. Jacoby (formerly Chief of SERAAC Br, G-1, TSFET), Frankfurt a/M, 5 Apr 46.
33. Ltr, USFET, 10 Jul 45, file AG 210.3, subj: "Officer Readjustments," to maj comds.

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34. Cir 15, USFET, 15 Jan 46, subj: "Personnel Rreadjustment Policies and Procedures."
35. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report, No 8, 12 Feb 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
36. Interview with Col L. E. Jacoby, as cited.
37. Cir 15, USFET, 15 Jan 46, as cited.
38. Cable S-22289, 8 Sep 45, USFET to AGWAR.
39. Cable WCL-32780, 29 Dec 45, AGWAR to USFET.
40. Memo, USFET, OACofS, G-1, 25 Mar 46, subj: "Regular Army Integration Program," to Col W. H. Barnes, Actg ACofS, G-1 (in G-1 Div file, 201.1).
41. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 20, 7 May 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
42. History of the Ground Forces Reinforcement Command, European Theater, Part III. V-E Day to Inactivation, chap I, introd p 15.
43. Ibid.
44. TWX, SC-9867, 11 Sep 45, USFET to Maj Comds.
45. USFET, G-1 Div, Report of Operations, 8 May-30 Sep 45, narrative; TWX, SC-9867, 11 Sep 45, USFET to maj comds.
46. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 51, 18 Dec 45, Rpt of ACofS, G-1; ibid, No 7, 5 Feb 46.
47. IRS, USFET, OACofS, G-1, 15 Apr 46, subj: "Application for Appointment in AUS," to AG Mil Pers (including memo for record) (in G-1 Div, file 201.1).
48. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 24, 4 Jun 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
49. Lts, AGWAR, 18 Jun 46, subj: "Authority to Make Appointments in the Army of the US," to Commanding General, USFET, sgd N. F. McCurdy, Adjutant General (in G-1 Div, file 201.1).

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50. SOP 60, ETOUSA, 10 Jun 45, subj: "Readjustment of Personnel after the Defeat of Germany," par 23c.
51. "Interim Directive for Redeployment and Readjustment after the Defeat of Japan," USFET, 22 Aug 45 (copy in USFET, SGS, file 370, vol 3.45).
52. Ltr, USFET, 20 Oct 45, file AG 370 GAP-AGP, subj: "Information on Redeployment and Readjustment," par 6c.
53. SOP 60 ETOUSA, 10 Jun 45, as cited.
54. Cir 134, USFET, 4 Oct 45, subj: "Summary of Personnel Readjustment Policies and Procedures," par 7a, b.
55. TWX, EX-90941, 17 Oct 45, USFET to unit commanders.
56. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 3, 15 Jan 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
57. Ibid, No 11, 5 Mar 46.
58. IRS, USFET, G-1 to SGS, Min 6, 17 Sep 45; ltr, USFET, 17 Sep 45, file AG 342.06 GAP-AGP, subj: "Enlistments and Reenlistments in the Regular Army," to maj comds; cir 124, USFET, 17 Sep 45.
59. TWX, SC-7137, 13 Oct 45, USFET to maj comds.
60. Memo, ACofS, G-1, 6 Nov 45, subj: "Recruiting for the Regular Army." to Theater Comdr, sgd J. M. Bevans, Maj Gen, GSC, ACofS, G-1 (in G-1 Div, file 342.1^g).
61. Ltr, USFET, 31 Dec 45, file AG 342.06, AGMP-H, subj: "Recruiting Progress Report," to AGWAR, Military Personnel Procurement Service.
62. Ibid, 21 Apr 46.
63. Ibid, 31 Jul 46.
64. USFET, Machine Records Unit, Semimonthly Report, 15 May 45 (copy in Statistical Branch, Office of the ACofS, G-1).
65. Ibid, 15 Aug 45.
66. Ibid, 1 Nov 45.

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67. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report, No 7, 5 Feb 46.
68. USFET, OACofS, G-1, Forecast of Personnel in European Theater, 1 Nov 45.
69. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report (Sp Rpt), 22 Jan 46.
70. Ibid, No 1, 18 Dec 45, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
71. USFET, ACofS, G-1, Forecast of Personnel in European Theater, 1 Apr 46.
72. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 20, 7 May 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
73. Cable W-89263, 25 May 46, AGWAR to USFET.
74. USFET, Machine Records Unit, Semimonthly Report, 15 Jul 45 (copy in Statistical Branch, OACofS, G-1).
75. Cable W-90337, 5 Jul 46, AGWAR to USFET.
76. TSFET Planning Directive, 31 May 45, subj: "COM Z Activities from V-E Day to Phase-Out."
77. 3d Army US, G-2 Sec, Historical Report, June 1945.
78. Ltr, ETUSA, 9 Jun 44, file AG 230/1, Op GA, subj: "War Department Civilian Employees with Transportation Corps."
79. Ltr, USFET, 1 Sep 45, file AG GAP-AGE, subj: "Temporary Duty of US Civilian War Department Employees."
80. IRS, TSFET, G-1 to AG, 2 Jun 45.
81. Ltr, USFET, 15 Sep 45, file AG 230 GAP-AGO, subj: "Employment of Civilians."
82. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 1, 18 Dec 45.
83. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report Nos 1 to 30, 18 Dec 45 to 2 Jul 46.

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84. ET-CPC 3, 26 Jul 45, subj: "Utilization of Discharged Military Personnel as Civilian Employees of USFET."
85. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 1, 18 Dec 45.
86. Cable W-74358, 8 Oct 45, AGWAR sgd Hilldring to USFET.
87. Cir 232, TSFET, 8 Dec 45, subj: "Civilian Employment with Military Government"; Public Law 226, 21 Nov 45; cable WCL-23387, 25 Nov 45, AGWAR to USFET; cable SO-1882, 27 Nov 45, USFET to Maj Comds.
88. AG Civ Pers Rpt of Operations, 8 May-30 Sep 45.
89. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report Nos 3 to 30, 1946.
90. Staff Study, USFET, G-1, to Chief of Staff, 15 Sep 45, subj: "Employment of Civilians in Occupied Zone."
91. Ltr, UK Base, 28 Aug 45, file AG 230 PoGA, subj: "Plan to Effect Reduction of Civilian Personnel Under UK Base; ETOUSA, G-1 Div, "G-1 and Its Role in the Fight Against Nazism in the ETO." Jun 45.
92. IRS, ETOUSA, G-1 Civ Pers to AG Civ Pers, 24 May 45, subj: "British Civilian Employees," sgd Howland.
93. ETOUSA, G-1 Div, "G-1 and Its Role in the Fight Against Nazism in the ETO," Jun 45.
94. Ltr, ETOUSA, 2 May 45, file AG 230/1 CPGA, subj: "Employment and Payment of Civilian Personnel Employed in France Accompanying US Forces into Occupied Territory."
95. Statistical Compilations, USFET, G-3 Div, 1 Nov 45.
96. Ltr, USFET, 12 Jul 45, file AG 230 CPGA, subj: "Employment and Payment of Civilian Personnel Employed in Luxembourg accompanying US Forces into Occupied Territory."
97. Ltr, USFET, 14 Jul 45, file AG 230 CPGA, subj: "Employment and Payment of Wages to Civilian Personnel in the Netherlands Accompanying US Forces into Occupied Territory."

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98. USFET Civ Pers Cir No 16, 28 Jun 46, subj: "Civilian Employees of Allied and Neutral Nationality."
99. Statistical Bulletins, USFET, G-1 Div, Civ Pers Br, Apr, May, Jun 46.
100. Statistical Bulletin, USFET, G-1 Div, Civ Pers Br, Jun 46.
101. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Reports Nos 3 to 30, 46.
102. Ltr, ETOUSA, 13 Oct 44, file AG 230 x 248 PubGD, subj: "Procurement, Administration, and Payment of Civilian Labor in Germany"; ltr, ETOUSA, 13 Jun 45, file AG 230 x 248 CPGA, subj: "Administration and Payment of Wages of Civilian Labor in Germany."
103. Ltr, USFET, 15 Sep 45, file AG 230 GAP-AGO, subj: "Employment of Civilians."
104. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 8, 11 Feb 46; Statistical Bulletins, USFET, G-1 Div, Civ Pers Br, Apr, May, Jun 46; USFET, "Special Summary Theater Activities," for USW, 25 May 46; USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Reports Nos 13 and 35, 19 May and 20 Aug 46.
105. Ltr, USFET, 18 Oct 45, file AG 230 GBL-AGE, subj: "Security Restrictions on the Employment of Civilians of Enemy or Ex-Enemy Nationalities."
106. Ltr, USFET, 5 Nov 45, file AG 370.003 GAP-AGO, subj: "Army of German Civilian Guards."
107. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 8, 11 Feb 46; Statistical Bulletins, USFET, G-1 Div, Civ Pers Br, Apr, May, Jun 46; USFET, "Special Summary Theater Activities" for USW, 25 Mar 46; USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Reports, Nos 13 and 35, 19 Mar and 20 Aug 46.
108. Ibid.
109. Adm Memo No 39, SHAEF, 18 Nov 44, subj: "Displaced Persons and Refugees in Germany."
110. Ibid.

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111. Ltr, USFET, 30 Sep 45, file AG 230.2 GAP-AGO, subj: "Civilian Drivers of Military Vehicles."
112. Ltr, TSFET, 8 Oct 45, file AG 322 GDS-AGO, subj: "Utilization of Prisoners of War, Disarmed Germans and Displaced Persons in Performing Quartermaster Functions."
113. USFET, G-4, Labor Supervision Section, 31 Dec 45, "Schedule of Employment of RAMP and Displaced Persons in Guard Companies."
114. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 1, 18 Dec 45, p 29.
115. Statistical Bulletins, USFET, G-1 Div, Civ Pers Br, Apr, May Jun 46.
116. Ltr, ETOUSA, 5 May 45, file AG 230 CPGA, subj: "Functional Responsibilities at Hqs ETOUSA for Civilian Personnel Administration."
117. Memo, 28 Jul 45, Tab 451 of file 310.1Q of annex A, TSFET History, subj: "Functional Responsibilities in Hq TSFET (Rear) for Civilian Personnel Administration," (copy in EUCOM, Historical Div.)
118. SOP 29, ETOUSA, 26 May 44, subj: "Procurement, Utilization and Administration of Civilian Labor in Liberated or Occupied Territories." (Also known as ETO-SOP No 29, "Civilian Labor").
119. Staff Memo No 45, USFET, 18 Sep 45, subj: "Staff Responsibilities for Civilian Personnel," appendix 1.
120. Ltr, USFET, 8 Sep 45, file AG 322.011 GAP-AGO, subj: "Delegation of Civilian Personnel Authority," appendix 2.
121. Ltr, USFET, 3 Oct 45, file AG 322.011 GAP-AGE, subj: "Delegation of Civilian Personnel Authority," appendix 3.
122. Ltr, USFET, 3 Oct 45, file AG 322.011 GAP-AGE, subj: "Responsibility for Civilian Personnel Administration," Tab No 4.

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123. USFET Cir No 7, Civ Pers, 2 Oct 45, subj: "Functions and Responsibilities of G-1 Division, Theater Headquarters and Other Organizations for Civilian Personnel in the ET."
124. USFET AG, Civ Pers Br, Reports of Operation, 1 Jan through 31 Mar 46.
125. ET CPC No 5, 15 Sep 45, incl 1, "Standard Conditions of Employment for United States Citizens Recruited from the United States, its Territories or Possessions, for Duty in the European Theater or Hired in the European Theater in the same Status as if Recruitment Had Been from the United States."
126. Ibid.
127. Ltr, USFET, 24 Jul 45, file AG 230 CPGA, subj: "Application of the Federal Employees Pay Act of 1945."
128. "Standard ETO Contract for Employment of European Residents"; ltr, ETOUSA, 30 May 45, file AG 248 CPGA, subj: "Standard Job Classification and Wage Rates for United Kingdom and Continental Personnel on Duty with the U.S. Forces and Agencies on the Continent and Paid from U.S. Appropriated Funds."
129. Ltr, USFET, 12 Jul 45, file AG 230 CPGA, subj: "Employment and Payment of Civilian Personnel Employed in Luxembourg Accompanying US Forces into Occupied Territory"; ltr, USFET, 14 Jul 45, file AG 230 CPGA, subj: "Employment and Payment of Civilian Employees Employed in Belgium Accompanying US Forces into Occupied Territory."
130. ET CPC No 16 (revised), 28 Jun 46, and annex "A", "Continental Wage Scale."
131. ET CPC No 14, 20 May 46.
132. Cir 60, USFET, 1 May 46.

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133. ET CPC No 2 (revised, 15 Sep 45); 1st Ind, USFET to AGWAR, 23 Oct 45, basic ltr AGWAR to CG'S, Theaters of Operation, 9 Jul 45.
134. Memo, USAFF, Hq EDATC, 20 Jun 45, subj: "Information Relative to Employment of UK Civilians on the Continent."
135. Memo, Hq COMMAND USFET, 2 May 46; par 3.
136. ETC CPC No 12, 13 Mar 46.
137. Ibid.
138. Ibid.
139. ET CPC No 12, 13 Mar 46.
140. Ltr, USFET, 9 Aug 45, file AG 121 GEC-AGO, subj: "Procedure for Financing Payments of US Army Obligations and Civilian Labor in Germany," to TUSA, SUSA.
141. "ETO Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment," May 1945; WD RR 1-3, 15 Sep 44.
142. Sp SvS, Report of Operations, V-E Day to 30 Sep 45.
143. Ibid.
144. Memo, USFET, G-1 Div, QACofS, 19 Jul 45, for all officers in G-1, Appendix "A"; Memo, USFET, G-1 Div, 2 May 46, subj: "Morale Branch Functional Organization."
145. SOP 27, USFET, 1 Feb 46.
146. SOP 69, USFET, 4 Sep 45.
147. Cir 247, WD, 15 Aug 45.
148. Ltr, Managing Director, COFBA, 16 Oct 45, to Gen Loo, sgd Jean Marcadet.

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149. "Formal Agreement with the American Express Company, Inc. Relative to Operation of Tours," sgd A.R. Bolling, Maj Gen, Th Ch of Sp Svcs and John Dowrick, Agent of AM Exp Co Inc, effective 5 Jun 45.
150. Sp Svcs Report of Operations, V-E Day to 30 Jun 46.
151. Cir 3, USFET, 4 Jan 46, par 19.
152. Cf n. 150.
153. Ltr, ETOUSA, 10 Jun 45, file AG 350 OpSS, subj: "Theater Handicraft Program."
154. Cf n. 150.
155. Ibid.
156. Cir 86, USFET, 10 Jun 46.
157. Cf n. 150.
158. SOP 84, USFET, 1 Jul 46.
159. Cf n. 150.
160. CO 145, USFET, 16 May 46.
161. Ltr, USFET, 25 Jul 45, file AG 230 x 353.8 GAP-AGO, subj: "Civilian Entertainers."
162. Cir 120, USFET, 1 Sep 45, Sec I.
163. SOP 83, USFET, 1 Jun 46.
164. Sp Svcs Report of Operations, 1 Apr-30 Jun 46.
165. Cf n. 150.
166. Ibid.
167. Ibid.

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168. Policy Board of the AEF Clubs, Minutes of Monthly Meeting (Twelfth Meeting) held at the Grand Hotel, Paris, 6 Aug 45; IRS, Ch Sp Svs, TSFET, to CG, TSFET, thru G-1, 22 Oct 45, subj: "Meeting of Policy Board, AEF Club, Brussels, 22 Oct 45."
169. Memo, USFET, 30 Aug 45, file AG 080 SGS-AGO, subj: "Assistance to ARC."
170. G-1, USFET, Report of Operations. Oct-Dec 45.
171. SOP 69, USFET, 4 Sep 45.
172. G-1, USFET, Report of Operations. Apr-Jun 46.
173. Cable WX-92772, AGWAR to all Theaters of Operation, 27 Jun 46.
174. Staff Study, G-1, USFET, 4 Jun 46, subj: "Inspection of Clubs in Occupied Zone of Germany."
175. Cf n. 150.
176. Ltr, USFET, 15 Jul 45, file AG 210.711 x 220.711 MPM-GA, subj: "Leaves and Furloughs to Switzerland."
177. Ltr, USFET, 3 Jul 45, file AG 353.02 MPM-GA, subj: "Recreational Tours of France."
178. Ltr, Oise Int Sec, 25 Aug 45, file AG 210.711 x 220.711 G-1, subj: "Leaves and Furloughs to Luxemburg."
179. Ltr, USFET, 1 Aug 45, file AG 210.711 x 220.711 MPM-GA, subj: "Leaves and Furloughs to Rome."
180. Ltr, USFET, 5 Sep 45, file AG 210.711 GAP-AGP, subj: "Leaves, Furloughs, and Tours in Denmark."
181. Minutes of Conference on Theater Leave Program at Hq USFET, 26 Oct 45.
182. Ltr, USFET, 6 Nov 45, file AG 354.1 GAP-AGO, subj: "Instructions to Govern Operation of Theater Leave Centers."

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183. Ltr, USFET, 28 Jan 46, file AG 354.1 GAP-AGP, subj: "Operation of Theater Leave Centers."
184. Treasury License No. NY 769816-T, 1 Apr 46, to Am Exp Co, Inc.
185. "Formal Agreement with the American Express Company, Inc. Relative to Operation of Tours," sgd by A. R. Bolling, Maj Gen, Th Ch of Sp Svs and John Dowrick, Agent of Am Exp Co, Inc, effective 5 Jun 46.
186. Ltr, TSFET, 19 Dec 45, file AG 345.1 AGPM, subj: "Unit Operated Rest and Leave Centers."
187. Cf n. 150.
188. Ltr, WD, 31 Jul 45, CofS, to CG, USFET.
189. Ltr, CG, USFET, 20 Aug 45, to major commanders.
190. Ltr, ETOUSA, 2 Jun 45, file AG 334 OpGA, subj: "Theater Athletic Program."
191. Cf n. 150.
192. Sp Svs Activities Consolidated Report May 45-Dec 46, Office Th Ch of Sp Svs, TIB.
193. Cf n. 150.
194. Ltr, USFET, 29 Dec 45, file 353.8 GAP-AGO, subj: "Proposed Meeting for Formation of an Inter-Allied Athletic Council."
195. Minutes of First Inter-Allied Athletic Meeting, 6-7 Feb 46; Minutes of Allied Forces Sports Council Meeting, 25-26 Apr 46; Minutes of Allied Forces Sports Council Program Committee Meeting, 17-19 Jun 46.
196. Cf n. 192.
197. Ibid.
198. AES, Report of Operations, 8 May to 30 Sep 45, sec II pt I.

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199. Hq TSFET, OC/AES, Plan for Exchange Service to Military Communities in the Occupied Zone, 28 Dec 45.
200. Notes of staff conference, Hq TSFET, 5 Jan 46, subj: "Plans for Army Exchange Service in the Occupied Zone, Including the sale of Surplus Army Military Vehicles," presented by Lt Col Lutz, TC/AES.
201. Cir 85, USFET, 8 Jun 46, subj: "Activation of Community Exchanges in the Occupied Zone."
202. Cable W-80542, 2 Nov 45, AGWAR sgd ACWF to CG USFET; memo, USFET, OACofS, G-1, 30 May 46, for Undersecretary of War, sgd J. M. Bevans, Maj Gen, GSC, OACofS, G-1; Statement of Receipts and Disbursements for the Period 1 Jul 45 through 30 Jun 46, USFET CWF, sgd E. Q. Adams, Asst Custodian.
203. Memo, 3 May 46, subj: "Price Conversion Table Effective 1 May 46, for Continental Price List No 5—Exchange Items," sgd Perry M. Baldwin, Col ICD, for Maj Gen W. A. Burress.
204. AES, Report of Operations, 1 Apr-30 Jun 45, sec II, pt II, par 2.
205. Notes of Staff Conference, TSFET, 12 Feb 46, subj: "Purchase of Merchandise on the Continent for Resale in Army Exchanges," presented by Lt Col Lutz, TC/AES.
206. IRS, USFET, TC/Sp Serv to G-4, 12 Apr 46, subj: "US Army Vehicles Operated by the AES," sgd A. R. Bolling, Maj Gen, USA, TC/Sp Serv.
207. Ltr, USFET, 23 Apr 46, file AG 331.3, GAP-AGO, subj: "Sale of Special Items in PXs to Allied Personnel"; notes of conference with Col Jacoby, 23 Jan 47.
208. Notes of Staff Conference, TSFET, 5 Jan 46, subj: "Plans for AES in the Occupied Zone," presented by Lt Col A. H. Lutz, TC/AES.
209. Cable, undated, USFET to AGWAR, sgd Carter B. Magruder, Maj Gen, GSC.

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210. IRS, USFET, C/Auto Div, AES, to C/AES, 17 Jun 46, file AES 451 Auto Div, subj: "Jeep Sales."
211. Lecture by Louis K. Mather, AES School, Bad Homburg, Mar 47, and figures supplied by him from AES sources; Notes of G-4 Semi-Weekly Staff Conference, 27 Aug 46, subj: "Conditions in ET Affecting AES Operations," presented by Col T. R. Phillips, CAC, TC/AES.
212. AES, Report of Operations, 8 May-30 Sep 45, sec II, par I, par 7, also 1 Oct-31 Dec, sec I, pt II, par 6.
213. GO 67, USFET, 13 Mar 46, sec II.
214. Memo, USFET, 27 Aug 45, subj: "Long-Term Morale Building Program," sgd J. M. Bevans, Maj Gen, AGofS, G-1, for CofS.
215. Ltr, Comd, US Naval Forces in Europe, 25 Jul 45, to Vice Adm. R. L. Ghormley, Comd, Naval Forces, Germany.
216. Cf. n. 214.
217. Memo, 3 Aug 45, subj: "Proposal to Bring Wives of Service Personnel to the UK," sgd W. S. Paul, AGofS, G-1, for CofS, USFET.
218. Ltr, USFET, AG 330.11 GAP-AGO, 19 Sep 45, subj: "Special Occupational Planning Board," to Deputy Chief os Staff.
219. Draft of proposed cable to AGWAR, 8 Oct 45, for Joint Chiefs of Staff, sgd Eisenhower, incl to memo to CofS, 8 Oct 45, subj: "Planning Assumptions for Army of Occupation," sgd H. R. Bull, DCofS.
220. Incl to ltr, USFET, GCT 330.11 JPS, 3 Oct 45, subj: "Special Occupational Planning Board," to CofS.
221. Ltr, Maj Gen Thos Handy, Chief, OPD, WD, to Maj Gen Bull, DCofS, 8 Nov 45.
222. Cable S-27544, 11 Oct 45, Maj Comds from USFET Main sgd Eisenhower.

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223. Ltr, USFET, G-3 Div, 10 Nov 45, GCT 330.12 JFS, subj: "Tentative Location of Military Communities," sgd A. S. Nevins, Brig Gen, AGCofS, G-3, to CofS.
224. Memo, USFET, 28 Nov 45, subj: "Priority for Movement of Dependents to European Theater," sgd J. M. Bevans, AGCofS, G-1, for DCofS.
225. Ltr, USFET, 5 Dec 45, AG 322 SGS-AGO, subj: "Occupational Planning," sgd Emanuel Solomons, Maj Asst, AG, to maj comds.
226. Ltr, USFET, AG 322 GAP-AGO, 15 Dec 45, subj: "Planning for Army of Occupation in Germany," sgd R. B. Levett, Brig Gen, AG, to AG, Washington, D. C.
227. Ltr, USFET, 24 Jan 46, AG 322 GAP-AGO, subj: "Planning for Army of Occupation in Germany," sgd L. S. Ostrander, Brig Gen, AG, to maj comds.
228. Cable W-86886, 4 May 46, USFET, sgd WARCOS to AGWAR.
229. Cir 17, USFET, 12 Feb 46, subj: "Transportation to the European Theater and B billeting Accommodations for Dependents of Military Personnel (Application Procedures)."
230. Cable WCL-49701, 26 Feb 46, AGWAR sgd WARCOS to USFET.
231. Cable WCL-23755, 11 Mar 46, AGWAR sgd WARCOS to CG USFET.
232. Cable T-51117, 26 Apr 46, ACC Rumania, sgd Schuyler to CG USFET, CG USEA for Info.
233. Ltr, USFET, 18 Feb 46, AG 322 GDS-AGO subj: "Military Communities," sgd L. S. Ostrander, Brig Gen, AG.
234. Cable S-28312, 19 Jan 46, USFET sgd McNarney to maj comds, to CBS for Info.
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241. Ltr, 8 May 45, to Maj Gen H. R. Bull, DCofS, USFET, sgd Thomas Handy, Maj Gen. Chief OPD, WD.
242. Ltr, USFET, 11 May 46, AG 461 GEC-AGO, subj: "Furnishing of Information to German Officials Concerning the Establishment of Military Communities."
243. IRS, USFET, Note 2, G-4 to SGS (thru G-1), 28 Jun 46, subj: "Requisitioned "Quarters for Dependents in Liberated Areas," sgd Carter B. Magruder, Maj Gen. ACofS, G-4.
244. Memo, USFET, G-1 Div, 21 Sep 45, subj: "Report on Trip to Paris," sgd K.K. Johnson, Maj WAC, for Chief Morale Branch, G-1.
245. Memo, USFET, 18 Jan 46, subj: "Theater Planning for Reception of Dependents," sgd J.M. Bevans, Maj Gen. ACofS, G-1, for CofS.
246. Memo, USFET, I & E Div, 19 Feb 46, subj: "Educational Program for Dependents in the Army of Occupation," for G-1 Div.
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249. Staff Study, USFET, G-1 Div, 31 May 46, subj: "Allocation of Class VI Supply Funds for Dependents Schools."
250. Memo No 55 (Staff), USFET, 6 Jun 46, subj: "Establishment of Dependents Schools Service Fund."
251. GO 132, USFET, 4 May 46, par 2.
252. Ltr, USFA, 12 Feb 46, AG 352, PAGCT, subj: "Schools for Dependents of US Army and US Civilian Personnel in Austria," sgd T.L. Eastmond, Maj, AG.
253. Press Release No 1665, USFET, PRD, 20 May 46, subj: "Free Medical Service Ready for Dependents on Arrival."
254. Press Release No 1197, USFET, PRD, 11 Feb 46, subj: "Medical Corps Provides Service for Dependents."
255. Incl to ltr, USFET, 28 Feb 46, AG 230 GDS-AGO, subj: "Plan for Movement of Dependents, Household Goods and Automobiles from the US to Military Communities in Germany," to Maj comds.
256. Ltr, USFET, 12 Feb 46, AG 387 CON-AGO, subj: "Occupational Planning."
257. Historical Report, Progress Report for 28 Mar 46, Dependents Section, G-1 Div.
258. Radio Scripts Relative to Dependents; ltr, USFET, 11 Mar 46, AG 230 AGO.
259. Ltr, Hq 78th Div, Off CG Berlin Dist, 21 Mar 46, subj: "Radio Scripts Relative to Dependents," sgd R.W. Barker, Maj Gen, USA, Comd, to CG USFET.
260. IRS, USFET, G-3 Div, to Chief I & E Service, 22 May 46, subj: "Orientation Program for Dependents."

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261. "Outline for Discussion Leader of Orientation Program for Dependents," SGS file 510/1, 28 May 46, vol II.
262. Ltr, USFET, 10 Jul 46, AG 292 GAP-AGO, subj: "Provision of Household Servants," sgd Peter Peters, Lt Col, AAG.
263. Ltr, WD, 24 Nov 43, file AG 29111 (11 Sep 43) OB-S-SPGAL-M, subj: "Overseas Marriages of Military Personnel."
264. Previously only enlisted men of the first three grades were entitled to transportation of their dependents at Government expense.
265. Ltr, WD, 28 Nov 44, file AG 510 (23 Oct 44) OB-S-E-M, subj: "Return of Dependents from Overseas."
266. Cir 245, WD, 11 Aug 45, subj: "Transportation of Dependents from Overseas."
267. Ibid.
268. Ltr, USFET, 9 Oct 45, file AG 510 GAP-AGP, subj: "Transportation of Dependents from Overseas."
269. Ltr, TSFET, to CG's Western Base Section, Chanor Base Section, and Continental Base Section, as cited in IRS, TSFET, G-1 to AG Opns, 23 Jan 46, subj: "Transportation of Servicemen's Dependents to the US."
270. TSFET, G-1, Minutes of Conference on Transportation of Dependents to US, 19 Oct 45.
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272. Cir 83, WD, 22 Mar 46, subj: "Transportation of Dependents from Overseas, Alaska, and Canada."
273. Cable WX-90683, 8 Jun 46, AGWAR to USFET, MTOUSA.
274. Ltr, CBS, 22 Apr 46, file AG 230, G-1, subj: "Guide for Staging of Alien Dependents," par 4c.

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276. Interview with Mr. Alexander T. Scott, former Chief, War Brides Div, Trans Sec, WBS, at Frankfurt a/M, on 3 Jun 47.
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282. Cir 81, USFET, 3 Jun 46, subj: "Non-Appropriated Funds."
283. Memo for CofS, USFET, 29 Aug 45, subj: "Currency Exchange Control," sgd J.M. Bevans, Maj Gen, GSC, ACoFS, G-1 USFET.
284. Cir 139, 10 Oct 45, subj: "Currency Exchange Control."
285. Cir 50, USFET, 15 Apr 46, "Military Payment Certificates."
286. Cir 82, USFET, 3 Jun 46.
287. Cir 130, USFET, 13 Sep 46, subj: "Military Payment Certificates."
288. Ltr, USFET, 4 Feb 47, file AG 010.8 GEC-AGO, subj: "Mil Govt Ordinance No. 10."
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291. Cf n. 1 above, Apr 45, chap V.
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293. Ibid, chap V, par IV.
294. Disarmament Memo No 9, SHAEF, 16 May 45, subj: "Primary Disarmament of German Land Forces and Short Term Disposal of Enemy War Material," pars 5, 7, 8 & 9.
295. Interview with Maj H.W. Brown, Hist Div, EUCOM, 6 Jun 45.
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297. Notice, Military Government of Germany, Supreme Commander's Area of Control, subj: "Surrender of Firearms, Ammunition, Weapons, Carrier Pigeons and Radio-Sending Equipment," MGR 23-217.
298. Proclamation No 1, OMG (US Zone), 14 Jul 45, MRG 23-300.
299. Order No 2, Control Council, 17 Jan 46, subj: "Confiscation and Surrender of Arms and Ammunition," MGR 23-151.2.
300. USFET Weekly Intelligence Summary No 10, 20 Sep 45, pp 45-48; USFET Intelligence Summary No 19, 22 Nov 45, p 61, USFET Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 26, 10 Jan 46, pp 67-68; USFET Weekly Intelligence Summary No 26, 10 Jan 46, p 65.
301. Office of Military Government for Germany, Berlin Declaration of 5 Jun 45, Title 23, Military Government Legislation, Cl, MGR 23-54.

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304. SHAEF, Handbook Governing Policy and Procedure for the Military Occupation of Germany(US), Dec 44, chap IV.

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319. Disbandment Directive No 3, SHAEF, 18 May 45.

320. Disbandment Directive No 4, SHAEF, 5 Jun 45.

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321. Disbandment Directive No 5, SHAEF, 30 Jun 45.
322. Disbandment Directive No 6, SHAEF, 6 Jul 45.
323. Amendment to Directive No 5, SHAEF, 1 Aug 45.
324. Monthly Report of Military Governor, US Zone, No 4, 20 Aug 46, pp 3-6, subj: "Demilitarization."

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3. SHAEF, Public Safety Manual of Procedures, Sep 44.
4. Ibid.
5. SHAEF, TM Public Safety, Feb 45, app. "A", p 51.
6. MG Det FlG2, Daily Journal, Nov 44.
7. First US Army, Report of Operations, JA Sec, Feb 45.
8. MG Det FlG2, Daily Journal, 26 Dec 44; First US Army, After Action Report, G-5 Sec, Feb 45.
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10. 12th Army Group, G-5, After Action Report (MS) Aug 45.
11. USFET, Hdbk, Adm MG in US Zone of Germany, 7 Jul 45.
12. SHAEF, Public Safety Manual of Procedures, Sep 44.
13. SHAEF, TM Public Safety, Apr 45.
14. Hq USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report, No 22, 21 May 46, p 13.
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16. USFET, G-2 WINSUM, No. 47, 3 Jul 45.
17. OMGUS, Monthly Report of the Military Governor, No 7, 20 Feb 46, p 8.
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19. Interview with Maj F.E. Mogan, Chief of PS Br, G-5, USFET, 26 Feb 47.
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22. Third US Army, Report of Operations, 1 Oct-31 Dec 45.
23. USFET, Report of Operations, PM Sec., 1 Oct-31 Dec 45.
24. Third (and Seventh) US Armies, Report of Operations, 1 Sep-31 Dec 45.
25. OMGUS, Regulations, Title 23, MG Legislation, Chg #1, 12 Apr 46.
26. Third US Army, G-5 Report of Operations, 1 Oct-31 Dec 45.
27. Seventh US Army, WMD, G-5 Report of Operation, 8 May-31 Dec 45.
28. Hq USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report, No 2, 2 Jan 46, p 19.
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30. SHAEF, TM Public Safety, Feb 45, p 28.
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33. OMGUS, Title 23, MG Regulations, No. 23-222.
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36. News of Germany, vol I, no. 30, 22 Sep 45, p 4.
37. Cf n. 35.
38. OMG(US), Monthly Reports of the Military Governor, Jun 45-Jun 46.
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41. Hq USFET, WINSUM, No. 47, 6 Jun 46, p 7.
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3. Annual History, Education and Religious Affairs Div, OMG for Grosshessen, p 51.
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5. Ltr, USFET, 25 Oct 45, file AG 014.1 GEC-AGO, subj: "Amendment to Part I (Education), Section VII (Education and Religious Affairs), Administration of Military Government in the U.S. Zone in Germany, 7 July 1945."
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9. Education and Religious Affairs, Monthly Report of Mil Gov, Jul 46.
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3. Consolidated Operational Report on TC Activities in the European Theater of Operations, ETOUSA, May 42 through V-E Day, file 321/1.
4. Ltr, 2d MRS, 26 Jul 45, filed in 2d MRS files with OMGUS (Rear), subj: "Movement Traffic - Destination Berlin," to Lt Col O. H. Osborn, sgd Maj E. W. Hargrave.
5. SOP 67 A, USFET, 27 Aug 45, subj: "Development of Monthly Personnel and Movement Program in United States Occupation Areas."
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7. Ltr, SHAEF, 7 May 45, file AG 814 1-1 GDS-AMG, subj: "Opening the Rhine for Navigation."
8. Ltr, SHAEF, 16 Mar 45, subj: "ECLIPSE Signal Instruction" to 12th Army Cp, Berlin Dist., and Com Z.
9. Ltr, ETOUSA, 12 Jul 45, file Sig 311, subj: "Signal Communications Responsibilities; Post 'ECLIPSE', US Occupation Forces Germany."
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11. SOP 37, USFET, 1 May 44, revised 1 Jan 45.
12. Memo, USFET, 29 Oct 45, subj: "Report of Requisitioned Property."
13. Ltr, USFET, 19 Sep 45, subj: "Special Occupational Planning Board."
14. SOP 57, USFET, 1 Apr 45, C 2, 22 Aug 45; AG Act Rec file 400.703.

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21. TM 38-420, Disposition of Excess and Surplus Property in Oversea Commands, 4 Sep 45, sec III.
22. SOP 5, ETOUSA, pt II, par 4.
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24. Ag Act Rec, file P 400.7, 1945.
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30. Ibid, pp 14 and 15.
31. Ibid, 2 Nov 45, p 12.
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34. Interview with Mr. Altshuler, Surplus Property Br, EUCOM, 20 May 47.

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37. Interview with Mr. Altshuler, Surplus Br, EUCOM, 14 May 47.
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49. Monthly Report of the Military Gov, 20 Oct 45.
50. Ltrs, USFET, 22 Oct 45, file AG 386.3 GDS-AGO, subj: "Control of Enemy War Material in Germany and Austria, Disposal of Enemy War Material in Germany and Austria," to maj cmds.
51. Cable, WX-92228, AGWAR to USFET, 10 Jan 46.
52. Cable W-899-45, 22 Dec 45, War Dept to USFET.

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4. Memo No 2, SHAEF, 23 Feb 45, subj: "Reorganization of the G-5 Division, SHAEF," for all Br and Sec Chiefs.
5. Adm Memo No 43, SHAEF, 30 Apr 45.
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10. GO 177, USFET, 1 Aug 45.
11. SO 195, 12th Army Gp, 31 Jul 45.
12. 12th Army Gp, Summary of Operations in the Defeat of Germany, Publication 819.
13. GO 168, USFET, 21 Jul 45.
14. ETOUSA, 15 Apr 44, T/D & A for the Civil Affairs Staff Sec, Army.
15. Ltr, SHAEF, 9 Nov 44, file AG 014.1-1 (Germany) GE-AGM, subj: "Directive for Military Government of Germany prior to Defeat or Surrender," par 6b.
16. GO 188, USFET, 12 Aug 45,
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22. GO 283, USFET, 8 Oct 45.
23. GO 61, USFET, 7 Mar 46.
24. SO 87, USFET, 28 Mar 46.
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